In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their (...) results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms. (shrink)

Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, reasoning, and memory or, alternatively, is it based in sensory areas in the back of the neocortex? The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic because, even in the absence of report, subjects (...) might engage in post-perceptual cognitive processing. Therefore, to isolate the neural basis of consciousness, a no-cognition paradigm is needed. Here, I describe a no-cognition approach to binocular rivalry and outline how this approach can help resolve debates about the neural basis of consciousness. (shrink)

The minimally conscious sta te (MCS) is usually ascribed when a patientwith brain damage exhibits obser vable volitional behaviors that predict recovery ofcognitive funct ions. Nevertheless, a patient with brain damage who lacks motorcapacit y might nonetheless be in MCS. For this reason, some clinicians use neuralsignals as a communicative means for MCS ascription. For instance, a vegetativestate patient is diagnosed with MCS if activity in the motor area is observed whenthe instruction to imagine wiggling toes is given. The validi (...) ty of using neuralsignals in ascribing MCS requires a special sort of inference. That is, no-reportparadigmatic assessments must have inductively strong ways of inferring a pur-ported informationa l content from the observed neural signal that grounds the factthat the patient has top-down cognitive control (or residual volition). Shannon’smathemat ical theory of communication and Bayes’ theorem reveals the formalstructure of neural communication. On the basis of relevant data from the neuro-science literature, I conclude that the formal structure combined with the data showsthat neural signals can be used as a communicative means for operational diagnosticcriteria for MCS ascription. (shrink)

Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as ‘cognitive access’? The dominantmethodology for supporting this independence hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject’s partial report is evidence that she (...) is conscious of information only where that information is cognitively accessed. So partial report experiments could dissociate consciousness from cognitive access only if there were uncontroversial evidence forconsciousness which did not imply reportability. There is no such evidence. An alternative, broadly Marrian methodology for supporting the independence hypothesis is suggested, and some challenges to it outlined. This methodology does not require experimental evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Instead it focuses on a function of perceptual consciousness when a stimulus is cognitively accessed. If the processes best suited to implement this function exclude cognitive access, the independence hypothesis will be supported. One relevant function of consciousness may be reflected in reason-based psychological explanations of a subject’s behaviour. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Despite Institutional Review Board concerns about psychological harm arising from research participation, evidence from trauma-questionnaire research suggests that participation is typically well-tolerated by participants. Yet, it is unclear how participant experiences of in-lab trauma simulations align with IRB ethical guidelines. Thus, we compared reactions to a trauma film paradigm with reactions to a positive film task or cognitive tasks. Overall, relative to other conditions, the trauma film was well-tolerated by participants: they generally reported low-to-moderate negative emotions, moderate benefits, and (...) that participation was not worse than everyday stressors. Our results have implications for the research community in designing trauma-based research. (shrink)

Advances in science have led to a new vision for toxicity testing based on human cell systems that will be more predictive, have higher throughput, cost less money, and be more comparable to real‐life exposures in humans, while using many fewer animals. This vision, embraced by leading scientific and regulatory groups, is a paradigm shift from animal‐based to human‐based testing that signals a major change in focus and promotes the development of new approaches to understanding the toxicity of chemicals in (...) humans. Information gained from these new approaches will likely affect other areas of research as well, leading to less reliance on animals in the future. (shrink)

The "Nightcap," a relatively nonintrusive and "user-friendly" sleep monitoring system, was used by 11 subjects on 10 consecutive nights in their homes. Eighty-eight sleep mentation reports were obtained after spontaneous awakenings from Nightcap-identified REM sleep and 61 were obtained from NREM awakenings. Sleep mentation was recalled in 83% of REM reports and 54% of NREM reports. The median length of REM reports was 148 words compared to 21 words for NREM reports. Twenty-four percent of the REM reports were over 500 (...) words long; no NREM reports over 500 words were obtained. REM report lengths were lowest during the first 15 min of the REM cycle and longest 15–45 min into the period. In contrast, 7 of the 9 NREM reports more than 100 words long occurred within the first 15 min of NREM periods. The Nightcap thus appears to be an effective and efficient method of collecting large numbers of sleep mentation reports with correlated sleep staging under normal ecological conditions. (shrink)

Whether the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural substrates of consciousness is currently debated. Against prefrontal theories of consciousness, many have argued that neural activity in the prefrontal cortex does not correlate with consciousness but with subjective reports. We defend prefrontal theories of consciousness against this argument. We surmise that the requirement for reports is not a satisfying explanation of the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials, and that prefrontal theories of consciousness come out of this (...) debate unscathed. (shrink)

Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that though physical events may cause mental events, those mental events never cause physical events. In this paper, I will be concerned with the claim that our thoughts, intentions, and awareness play no causal role in producing actions. Though epiphenomenalism has been defended with a priori philosophical arguments, the majority of the support that it has gained in recent years has come from advances in neuroscience. At the center of these experiments is the Libet paradigm that (...) aims to show that our actions are initiated by unconscious brain processes prior to our awareness of the intention or decision to perform the corresponding actions. It has been widely suggested that these studies support the view that consciousness is epiphenomenal, and if Libet-style experiments support this conclusion, the results have direct implications for free will. I argue by way of a dilemma that any study that relies on reports of subjects’ awareness in its methodology cannot be used to support epiphenomenalism because the experimenters would have to rule out the possibility that consciousness plays a causal role in order to do so. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rembrandt’s Art: A Paradigm for Critical Thinking and AestheticsMark S. Conn (bio)IntroductionThe purpose of art is to lay bare the questions, which have been hidden by the answers.—James BaldwinPhilosophers have asked, How do we know the world? Over centuries, many visual artists have responded to this question by provoking us to see the world differently—through their own eyes. Rembrandt, by no small measure, is one of those artists. While (...) many people have attempted to understand and interpret the art of this quintessential master, few have used his art as a tool to teach critical thinking. The challenge, then, is to set forth a paradigm, using Rembrandt’s art as the vehicle, to teach critical thinking skills. These skills can be applied across the curriculum without losing an appreciation for the aesthetic characteristics of his art.Several sections in this article begin with a foundational discussion of the connection between art and the general curriculum, including how the effectiveness of that curriculum may then be measured. Continuing with a working definition of critical thinking, I demonstrate how Rembrandt’s work relates particularly well to the social studies curriculum. Definitions of critical thinking skills are discussed just prior to introducing the paradigm. A discussion of the paradigm’s relationship to aesthetics and necessary concepts is followed by the conclusion, which contains the graphic illustration of the paradigm. [End Page 68]Foundational DiscussionIn order to create a paradigm that encompasses Rembrandt’s art, critical thinking, and aesthetics, it is important to understand the connection that art has to the curriculum. By examining the way in which this relationship has evolved and is measured, we discover its foundation. It also produces a rationale for the paradigm.For decades the educational community has debated the validity of including arts in the curriculum. There are those who believe that in order to justify inclusion in the curriculum, there needs to be evidence that art has a quantifiable impact upon learning. Others believe that there is a need to teach art for art’s sake.1 Elliot Eisner stated, “More often than we would like, arts educators receive requests to justify their professional existence or existence of the arts in our schools on the basis of their contribution to non-art outcomes.”2 According to Eisner’s research, there have been no studies that show a statistically significant relationship between the arts and academic success.3 Additionally, in their final report evaluators from Transforming Education Through the Arts Challenge (TETAC) concluded that “Analysis of site-specific data found no significant relationship between program implementation and performance on reading and math tests.”4 There are many sources that can be cited that report the same findings. In assessing these kinds of findings we find the conclusions to be approximately the same.If we look at the U.S. Department of Education’s National Assessment of Educational Progress, which each year releases “The Nation’s Report Card,” we find a tremendous amount of data.5 However, most of what we find is data that is analyzed scientifically, with a long but incomplete list of incomplete variables. Therefore, it is difficult to come to any consensus about which programs, in which states, are successful and why. All we actually see is who is supposedly doing better in various curriculum areas based upon standardized tests that vary from state to state. Consider an example of current thinking regarding curriculum and testing from an article by Diane Ravitch, former assistant U.S. secretary of education, and Deborah Meir, senior scholar at New York University’s Steinhardt School of Education:Both of us acknowledged that our choices involve risks. A national curriculum might be unwieldy and superficial (“a mile wide and an inch deep—ironically the charge directed at our current incoherent and fragmented curriculum”) as well as politically compromised, while a local one might reflect the low expectations of the local community as local foolishness and local biases (some schools, for example, might teach intelligent design). We agreed that the measurement of “results”—what constitutes intellectual achievement—has been badly distorted by current local and state tests, which undermine high-quality tasks and make... (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate unconscious priming by the use of a spatial mirror-masking paradigm. Words and nonwords with no under-length letters are mirrored at their horizontal axis. The results are figures of geometric-like forms that contain letters in their upper part. In the three experiments reported in this study, a priming procedure used such mirrored words and nonwords as primes. Participants were ignorant of the nature of the construction of the stimuli. Perceptual reports of the participants (...) revealed that they did not realize that words were hidden in the primes. Nevertheless, they showed priming in all three experiments. Priming effects were replicated with prime–target SOAs of between 1 and 3 s. Functional dissociations were found between ignorant and informed participants. Informed groups showed perceptual and semantic priming, while ignorant groups showed only perceptual priming. (shrink)

The question of whether our conscious experience is rich or sparse remains an enduring controversy in philosophy. The “overflow” account argues that perceptual consciousness is far richer than cognitive access: when perceiving a complex scene, subjects see more than they can report. This paper draws on aphantasia to propose a new argument in favor of overflow. First, it shows that opponents of overflow explain subjects’ performance in a change detection paradigm by appealing to a type of “internal imagery.” Second, (...) it provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that aphantasics are incapable of generating this imagery. However, aphantasics perform equally well in this task; and so the no-overflow account fails to explain their performance. This means that proponents of this view are committed to an unsupported view of perception. (shrink)

The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that (...) none of these kinds of evidence can be relevant to a choice among competing computational models unless there are in fact type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states. Thus, I conclude, research into the computational procedures employed in human cognition must be conducted hand-in-hand with research into the brain processes which realize those procedures. (shrink)

Extending a strategy previously used by Clancy, Schacter, McNally, and Pitman , we administered a neutral and a trauma-related version of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm to a sample of women reporting recovered or repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse , women reporting having always remembered their abuse , and women reporting no history of abuse . We found that individuals reporting recovered memories of CSA are more prone than other participants to falsely recalling and recognizing neutral words that were never presented. (...) Moreover, our study is the first to show that this finding even held when trauma-related material was involved. Correlational analyses revealed that fantasy proneness, but not self-reported traumatic experiences and dissociative symptoms were related to false recall and false recognition. (shrink)

In previous studies, we found that bodily symptoms can be learned in a differential conditioning paradigm, using odors as conditioned stimuli and CO2-enriched air as unconditioned stimulus . However, this only occurred when the odor CS had a negative valence , and tended to be more pronounced in persons scoring high for Negative Affectivity . This paper considers the necessity and/or sufficiency of awareness of the CS–US contingency in three studies using this paradigm. The relation between contingency awareness and the (...) selective conditioning effect, and between contingency awareness and NA was also considered. Both self reported symptoms and respiratory physiology served as dependent variables. A learning effect on symptoms was found only for participants aware of the CS–US contingency, but not all participants reporting contingency awareness showed a learning effect. No conditioning effects appeared on the physiological measures. Also contingency awareness did not account for the selective conditioning effect, and did not interact with NA. Overall, the necessity but insufficiency hypotheses can only be withhold for group data and not for individual data. (shrink)

Three experiments introduced a recognition memory paradigm designed to investigate reported subjective awareness during retrieval. At study, in Experiments 1A and 2, words were either generated or read , while modality of presentation was manipulated in Experiment 1B. Word pairs were presented during test trials, and participants indicated if they contained an old word by responding “remember”, “know” or “new” in Experiments 1A and 1B, and by responding “strong no”, “weak no”, “weak yes”, or “strong yes” in Experiment 2. Participants (...) were then required to decide which of the 2 words was old. We demonstrated that the proportion measures used in the Remember Know paradigm substantially underestimated the influence of generation on familiarity resulting in an artificial dissociation between indices of knowing and remembering . We also found a qualitatively different pattern of forced-choice recognition performance as a function of claimed awareness. (shrink)

In this event-related potential study a masking technique that prevents conscious perception of words and non-words through attentional distraction was used to reveal the temporal dynamics of word processing under non-conscious and conscious conditions. In the non-conscious condition, ERP responses differed between masked words and non-words from 112 to 160 ms after stimulus-onset over posterior brain areas. The early onset of the word–non-word differences was compatible with previous studies that reported non-conscious access to orthographic information within this time period. Moreover, (...) source localisations provided evidence for automatic activation of prelexical phonological information, whereas no evidence for non-conscious semantic processing was found. When subjects were informed about the masking technique, lexical differences occurred at later time intervals, suggesting conscious access to additional word related information. These results indicate that early visual word processing does not depend entirely on attentional resources, but that non-conscious processing probably is restricted to rather lower-level linguistic information. (shrink)

Bilingualism has been identified as a potential cognitive factor linked to delayed onset of dementia as well as boosting executive functions in healthy individuals. However, more recently, this claim has been called into question following several failed replications. It remains unclear whether these contradictory findings reflect how bilingualism is defined between studies, or methodological limitations when measuring the bilingual effect. One key issue is that despite the claims that bilingualism yields general protection to cognitive processes, studies reporting putative bilingual differences (...) are often focused on domain specific experimental paradigms. This study chose a broader approach, by considering the consequences of bilingualism on a wide range of cognitive functions within individuals. We utilised 19 measures of different cognitive functions commonly associated with bilingual effects, to form a “cognitive profile” for 215 non-clinical participants. We recruited Welsh speakers, who as a group of bilinguals were highly homogeneous, as means of isolating the bilingualism criterion. We sought to determine if such analyses would independently classify bilingual/monolingual participant groups based on emergent patterns driven by collected cognitive profiles, such that population differences would emerge. Multiple predictive models were trained to independently recognise the cognitive profiles of bilinguals, older adults and higher education attainment. Despite managing to successfully classify cognitive profiles based on age and education, the model failed to differentiate between bilingual and monolingual cognitive ability at a rate greater than that of chance. Repeated modelling using alternative definitions of bilingualism, and just the older adults, yielded similar results. In all cases then, using our “bottom–up” analytical approach, there was no evidence that bilingualism as a variable indicated differential cognitive performance – as a consequence, we conclude that bilinguals are not cognitively different from their monolingual counterparts, even in older demographics. We suggest that studies that have reported a bilingual advantage could well have confounded other key variables that may be driving reported advantages. We recommend that future research refine the machine learning methods used in this study to further investigate the complex relationship between bilingualism and cognition. (shrink)

In a masked priming experimental paradigm, we studied a possible subliminal perception effect on a semantic selection task. To gauge the degree to which subjects solved the SST consciously, they subsequently reported their level of confidence of having made a correct response. This was done on each trial, and the subjects used individually constructed category rating scales to do so, in order to achieve a more sensitive measurement of which trials were influenced by conscious processes. During the construction of these (...) individual rating scales, subjects verbally reported their experiences after each trial. The present study failed to find evidence of performance above chance level when subjects themselves reported to be at chance level. In fact, performance closely covaried with subjects' confidence ratings. About half of the subjects reported they would sometimes experience a 'feeling of knowing' the correct response to the SST, despite being unaware of the specific identity of the prime. From this, we observe the methodological point that in order to demonstrate subliminal perception in a masked priming paradigm with a semantic selection task it is not enough to demonstrate a lack of conscious visual perception of the prime, since a vague, yet conscious, FOK experience can be used by subjects to solve the task. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 49-56, January 2022.

This article examines three texts in the Acts of the Apostles called “summaries”. These texts illuminate one another, keeping each other internal and external connections, as well as relations with the Gospel according to Luke and the corpus paulinum. The analysis of the literary context of the summaries favors a more accurate view of its content, and a more comprehensive understanding of its message which moreover has repercussions on the patristic tradition not only as apologetic value, but as building the (...) monastic community and paradigm to understand the Church. The summaries are established as the fundamental reports, to which the Magisterium often uses in order to a variety of purposes. (shrink)

This is a response to Ian Phillips and Jorge Morales, "The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2020.

A report on the conference “Ecosemiotic Paradigm for Nature and Culture”.

ObjectiveTo assess distracted attention and performance on a computer task following completion of a sustained attention and acute media multitasking task among adolescents with varying self-reported usual media multitasking.MethodsNinety-six 13- to 17-year-olds played the video game Tetris following completion of a Go/No-go paradigm to measure sustained attention in the presence of distractors, an acute media multitasking, or a passive viewing condition. Adolescents completed the conditions on separate visits in randomized order. Sustained attention was measured within the Go/No-go task by measuring (...) errors of omission. Distracted attention while playing the Tetris task was measured by computing eye tracking measures of attention to irrelevant distractor images that bordered the Tetris game. Participants also self-reported their daily media multitasking.ResultsThe Go/No-go task revealed important qualitative differences in sustained attention among low and high usual media multitaskers. There was a uniform improvement in sustained attention among low usual media multitaskers, demonstrated by a consistent linear decrease in omission errors. Among high usual media multitaskers, there was initially a decrease in sustained attention followed by an increase. Completing the Go/No-go task also statistically significantly reduced distractibility and increased performance while playing Tetris compared to the passive viewing condition, but only among those with low usual media multitasking. There was a non-statistically significant trend that completing the acute media multitask increased subsequent distractibility and performance while playing Tetris among high media multitaskers.ConclusionIn this sample of adolescents, practicing a sustained attention task reduces distractibility and improves task performance among those who have low levels of usual media multitasking. (shrink)

If I am looking at myself in a mirror I am directly facing, do I see myself looking at myself? If so, do I also see myself looking at myself looking at myself – and so on?

The Balkan War was a conflict that provoked many parties to intervene. The war was also covered by a number of journalists, who carried out what we may call a “media intervention.” This article ana...

Inspired by theories of prosocial behavior, we tested the effect of relationship status and incentives on intended voluntary blame-taking in two experiments. Participants imagined a close family member, a close friend, or an acquaintance and read a scenario that described this person committing a minor traffic offense. The person offered either a monetary, social, or no incentive for taking the blame. Participants indicated their willingness to take the blame and reasons for and against blame-taking. Overall, a sizable proportion of participants (...) indicated to be willing to take the blame. Blame-taking rates were higher for family members than close friends or acquaintances in both experiments, as expected. Unexpectedly, there was no difference between a close friend and an acquaintance in Experiment 2. Social incentives did not have an effect on voluntary blame-taking in either experiment. Neither did we find an interaction between relationship status and incentives. The results highlight the importance of kin relationships in the context of voluntary blame-taking. (shrink)