Necessitism is the view that necessarily everything is necessarily something; contingentism is the negation of necessitism. The dispute between them is reminiscent of, but clearer than, the more familiar one between possibilism and actualism. A mapping often used to ‘translate’ actualist discourse into possibilist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of a first-order modal language to a sentence the contingentist (but not the necessitist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables (...) the necessitist to extract a ‘cash value’ from what the contingentist says. Similarly, a mapping often used to ‘translate’ possibilist discourse into actualist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of the language to a sentence the necessitist (but not the contingentist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables the contingentist to extract a ‘cash value’ from what the necessitist says. Neither mapping is a translation in the usual sense, since necessitists and contingentists use the same language with the same meanings. The former mapping is extended to a second-order modal language under a plural interpretation of the second-order variables. It is proved that the latter mapping cannot be. Thus although the necessitist can extract a ‘cash value’ from what the contingentist says in the second-order language, the contingentist cannot extract a ‘cash value’ from some of what the necessitist says, even when it raises significant questions. This poses contingentism a serious challenge. (shrink)

A central tenet of truthmaker theory is that necessitation is necessary for truthmaking (NEC). This paper defends NEC in a novel, piecemeal way, namely by responding to a potential counterexample involving a changing past. If Carter won a race at t1 but is later disqualified at t2, then Carter no longer won at t1. A wholly past event seems to have changed in the future. The event makes ‘Carter won the race at t1’ (RACE) true between t1‐2 but fails (...) to make it true at t2. So, we have a potential counterexample to necessitation: a truthmaker of RACE fails in another context to make the same truthbearer RACE true. I argue that the best solution to this challenge is not that there are different truthbearers at t1‐2 and t2 (the semantic response), or that RACE was never true because of the future disqualification or will always be true despite the future disqualification. The best solution is to accept that the past can change: past events can change based on what happens in the future (e.g., via their effects). This paper's novel defence of necessitation will illustrate the importance of utilising explicitly ontological and commonsensical tools in accounting for truth. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to present the distinct ways in which Wolff, Baumgarten, and Kant understand the relationship between necessitation, constraint, and reluctant action in an effort to illustrate the subtle ways in which their conceptions of obligation differ from each another. Whereas Wolff conceives of natural or moral obligation as incompatible with constraint, Baumgarten holds that constraint and reluctant action are, in some instances, compatible with natural obligation. Kant departs from Baumgarten by conceiving of obligation as (...) necessarily involving constraint: as Kant’s reply to Schiller’s famous objection reveals, obligation must take on the character of constraint to reluctant action on account of the fact that human beings possess inclinations that always threaten to impel them in directions that oppose morality. (shrink)

Necessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence is a dissertation on issues in higher-order modal metaphysics. Consider a modal higher-order language with identity in which the universal quantifier is interpreted as expressing universal quantification and the necessity operator is interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity. The main question addressed in the dissertation concerns the correct theory formulated in this language. A different question that also takes centre stage in the dissertation is what it takes for theories to be equivalent.The whole dissertation consists of (...) an extended argument in defence of the truth of two seemingly inconsistent higher-order modal theories, specifically: 1.Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a theory based on Plantinga’s [1] modal metaphysics that is committed to, among other things, the contingent being of some individuals and the necessary being of all possible higher-order entities;2.Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a theory advocated by Williamson [3] which is committed to, among other things, the necessary being of every possible individual as well as of every possible higher-order entity.Part of the case for these theories’ joint truth relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that no things could have been related while being nothing, and Higher-Order Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories. The defence of Higher-Order Necessitism constitutes a powerful challenge to Stalnaker’s [2] Thorough Contingentism, a theory committed to, among other things, the view that there could have been some individuals as well as some entities of any higher-order that could have been nothing.In the dissertation it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are in fact equivalent, even if they appear to be jointly inconsistent. The case for this claim relies on the Synonymy account, a novel account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to this account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same commitments and conception of logical space.By way of defending the Synonymy account’s adequacy, the account is applied to the debate between noneists, proponents of the view that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of the view that to exist just is to be some thing. The Synonymy account is shown to afford a more nuanced and better understanding of that debate by revealing that what noneists and Quineans are really disagreeing about is what expressive resources are available to appropriately describe the world.By coupling a metatheoretical result with tools from the philosophy of language, it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are synonymous theories, and so, by the lights of the Synonymy account, equivalent. Given the defence of their extant commitments made in the dissertation, it is concluded that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are both correct. A corollary of this result is that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is, in an important sense, merely verbal. For if two theories are equivalent, then they “require the same of the world for their truth.”Thus, the results of the dissertation reveal that if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, then one will not go wrong. Notwithstanding, one will still go wrong if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.On the basis of a conception of the individual constants and predicates of second-order modal languages as strongly Millian, i.e., as having actually existing entities as their semantic values, in the appendix are presented second-order modal logics consistent with Stalnaker’s Thorough Contingentism. Furthermore, it is shown there that these logics are strong enough for applications of higher-order modal logic in mathematics, a result that constitutes a reply to an argument to the contrary by Williamson [3]. Finally, these logics are proven to be complete relative to particular “thoroughly contingentist” classes of models. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s Modal Logic as Metaphysics is a book-length defense of necessitism about objects—roughly put, the view that, necessarily, any object that exists, exists necessarily. In more formal terms, Williamson argues for the validity of necessitism for objects (NO: ◻︎∀x◻︎∃y(x=y)). NO entails both the (first-order) Barcan formula (BF: ◇∃xΦ → ∃x◇Φ, for any formula Φ) and the (first-order) converse Barcan formula (CBF: ∃x◇Φ → ◇∃xΦ, for any formula Φ). The purpose of this essay is not to assess Williamson’s arguments either (...) for necessitism (although discussion of these arguments will play a central role in the dialectic) or for necessitism’s two famous corollaries. Instead, the focus shall be a general principle governing abstract objects—the abstract of principle (or AOP) —instances of which seems to be at work in some of Williamson’s central arguments for necessitism. The AOP can be straightforwardly formulated and applied within the neo-logicist framework—in fact, arguably the principle is most naturally formulated in neo-logicist terms. -/- After closely examining, and carefully formalizing, the AOP, the remainder of the paper focuses on arguments for necessitism-like claims (the exact meaning of “necessitism-like” will become clearer as the essay progresses) based on the AOP. In particular, we shall focus on the instance of the AOP that applies to the abstract objects governed by the most well-known and most fully studied abstraction principle: Hume’s Principle (HP). It turns out that, although we cannot reconstruct a valid argument for necessitism based on this numerical instance of the AOP, we can obtain valid arguments for weaker, but equally interesting conclusions. In particular, we shall show that, although HP combined with the AOP (and some additional, related assumptions) allows the contents of the domains of possible worlds to vary, the size of those domains must remain constant. The paper concludes by developing and critiquing some related arguments for necessitism based on applying relevant instances of the AOP to abstraction principles governing sets (or extensions), and to a simple objectual abstraction principle. (shrink)

Here is a puzzling phenomenon. Moral theories are typically thought to be necessary. If act utilitarianism is true, for example, then it is necessarily true. However, scientific theories are typically thought to be contingent. If quantum field theory is true, it’s not necessarily true — the world could have been Newtonian. My aim is to explore this discrepancy between domains. -/- In particular, I explore the role of what I call `internality’ intuitions in motivating necessitism about both moral and scientific (...) domains. In effect, these internality intuitions tell against the explanatory role of certain `external’ entities – like moral or scientific principles. I’ll suggest that perhaps these internality intuitions are more compelling in the moral case than the scientific case. If so, this would rationalize the combination of moral necessitism and scientific contingentism. (shrink)

Let NNG be the claim that necessitation is necessary for grounding, and let NSG be the claim that necessitation is sufficient for grounding. The consensus view is that grounding cannot be reduced to necessitation, and this is due to the (approximately) universally-accepted claim that NSG is false. Among deniers of NSG: grounding contingentists think NNG is also false, but they are in the minority compared to grounding necessitarians who uphold NNG. For one who would defend the claim (...) that grounding is reducible to necessitation, the task is formidable: she must defend NSG and NNG. I consider two prominent objections against NSG, and two more against NNG before developing a reductive account of grounding as minimal necessitation that avoids not only all four of the previously mentioned objections, but also an additional objection that targets minimal necessitation accounts in particular. If my arguments are compelling, then, insofar as we thereby have a strong prima facie case for thinking that grounding can be reduced to (minimal) necessitation, we have a strong prima facie case for thinking the consensus view is mistaken. (shrink)

Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford have recently defended a new kind of modality, which they call ‘dispositional modality’. The key reason to adopt dispositional modality, according to them, is that causes never necessitate their effects. Anjum and Mumford’s chief argument against causal necessitation makes use of what they call the ‘antecedent-strengthening test’ : C causally necessitates E iff C & φ causes E, for any possible φ. This test, they claim, fails in all cases of alleged causal (...) class='Hi'>necessitation. In this paper we argue that the AS-test is not the mark of causal necessitation. First, we show that if the AS-test is taken as the mark of causal necessitation it leads to either an absurdity or to circularity. Second, we argue that, given the Mill/Mackie framework of causes as INUS conditions, apparent counterexamples to causal necessitation fail. (shrink)

Résumé Les théologiens jansénistes s’évertuent à réconcilier la thèse selon laquelle l’homme est assujetti à une nécessité générale de pécher avec le libre arbitre. Jansénius affirme que, malgré la nécessité générale, nous avons la liberté d’indifférence en ce qui concerne les actes particuliers ; mais il prétend aussi (en dépit d’Aristote) que la concupiscence, source des actes particuliers, se ramène à une forme de contrainte. Arnauld se contente d’affirmer la compatibilité de la nécessité générale de pécher avec l’indifférence, tandis que (...) Nicole s’attaque à la conception de la concupiscence comme une forme de contrainte. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the thesis of Necessitism in modal ontology. I demonstrate how instances of the Barcan formula can be witnessed, when the modal operators are interpreted 'naturally' -- i.e., as including geometric possibilities -- and the quantifiers in the formula range over a domain of natural, or concrete, entities and their contingently non-concrete analogues. I argue that, because there are considerations within physics and metaphysical inquiry which corroborate modal relationalist claims (...) concerning the possible geometric structures of spacetime, and dispositional properties are actual possible entities, the condition of being grounded in the concrete is consistent with the Barcan formula; and thus -- in the geometric setting -- merits adoption by the Necessitist. (shrink)

Necessitism is the controversial thesis that necessarily everything is necessarily something, namely that everything, everywhere, necessarily exists. What is controversial about necessitism is that, at its core, it claims that things could not have failed to exist, while we have a pre-theoretical intuition that not everything necessarily exists. Contingentism, in accordance with common sense, denies necessitism: it claims that some things could have failed to exist. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. The (...) paper argues that, granted the assumptions that lead to interpret the Lewisian as a necessitist, she can preserve contingentist intuitions, by genuinely agreeing with the folk that existence is contingent. This is not just the uncontroversial claim that the Lewisian, as a result of the prevalence of restricted quantification in counterpart theoretic regimentations of natural language, can agree with the folk while disagreeing with them in the metaphysical room. Rather, this is the claim that it is in the metaphysical room that the Lewisian can endorse the intuitions lying behind contingentism. (shrink)

We extend stit logic by adding a spatial dimension. This enables us to distinguish between powers and opportunities of agents. Powers are agent-specific and do not depend on an agent’s location. Opportunities do depend on locations, and are the same for every agent. The central idea is to define the real possibility to see to the truth of a condition in space and time as the combination of the power and the opportunity to do so. The focus on agent-relative powers (...) and space-relative opportunities firmly roots effectivity of an autonomous choice making agent in a space–time picture. Our space–time view will be classically Newtonian, since we will assume relativistic phenomena do not play a role in agentive effectivity. We show how our semantics naturally distinguishes between different kinds of histories; histories that reflect real possibilities and histories that reflect counterfactual possibilities. Furthermore, we discuss how the spatial picture sheds light on conceptual problems plaguing the central stit property of ‘independence of agency’. At several points in the article we will emphasise and defend the differences with Belnap’s theory of agency in relativistic branching space–times. (shrink)

L'imaginaire est-il un moyen aléatoire d'un dire sur les Fins dernières ? L'auteur commence par donner quelques caractéristiques de l'imaginaire reconnaissable dans ce domaine et dont la dominante est la nécessité d'un consensus social. Mais la relativité du langage en la matière le contraint à remonter aux sources bibliques des représentations. Le langage apocalypti­que et plus particulièrement l'Apocalypse de S. Jean étant incontestable­ment à l'origine de nombre de représentations, son examen révèle une fonction et une utilisation de l'imaginaire qui contestent (...) les soupçons portés à son encontre. Langage nécessaire pour une réalité présente considérée comme indicible parce qu'inouîe, l'imaginaire traite d'abord l'expérience humaine en ce qu'elle a de plus tragique. Dès lors, le glissement effectué sur les Fins dernières permet de distinguer entre une application légitime de l'imaginaire et les dérives dont celui-ci devient tout autant la victime qu'il peut en être dit responsable.Is the imaginary a haphazard way of expressing the Last Things ? The author begins by giving some characteristics of the imaginary that are recognizable in this domain and of which the most important is the need of a social consensus. But the relativity of language in this matter constrains us to go back to representations in biblical sources. Since apocalyptic language, and especially the Apocalypse of St. John, is without doubt at the origin of a number of representations, its study reveals a function and use of the imaginary that counters the suspicions that are held against it. The imaginary, a language necessary for a present reality considered as inexpressible because unheard-of first treats of human experience in its most tragic aspect. From there the deviations effecting the Last Things allow us to distinguish between a legitimate application of the imaginary and its derivations, the latter of which become just as much the victim, and thus can be called responsible. (shrink)

I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting for (...) the possibility of the type of capacity to have I* thoughts and attitudes is based on the assumption that being conscious necessarily entails being self-aware in at least a minimal sense, and then proceeds to explain how it I*-thoughts and attitudes are possible on the basis of those minimal states of self-awareness. Yet if Sartre's account of self-awareness is so much as plausible, this kind of strategy is bound to be incomplete. By helping itself to a notion of minimal self-awareness that is purportedly constitutive of consciousness, it fails to account for what is, by its own lights, the most fundamental form of self-awareness. (shrink)

In this thesis I investigate the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations. I provide three main discussions that reflect three aspects of my question. The first and second discussions concern different aspects of the 'problem of prevention'. This is the premise that causal interactions can be subject to interference/prevention, generally construed. A number of philosophers have argued that the problem of prevention undercuts the necessitation of lawful regularities in the context of dispositional (...) essentialism. We can term this issue the 'necessitation issue'. In the first discussion I examine whether or not antidotes qua preventative entities are metaphysically possible within the context of Alexander Bird's dispositional monism. I argue that Bird's theory raises a problem of ontological representation re antidotes. The line of thought in this discussion is that it is difficult for Bird to say what antidotes are and how they operate; nevertheless, in this discussion I provide a solution to my problem that stays within the confines of Bird's dispositional monism. In this section of the thesis I remain neutral on the necessitation issue, but I take myself to clarify the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations by criticising Bird's model of antidotes/prevention and setting out a replacement. In the second discussion I examine Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's anti-necessitarian strategies. Mumford and Anjum's 'causal dispositionalism' encompasses a theory of dispositional properties, antidotes, and prevention. Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism is not subject to the problem of ontological representation that Bird's theory raises; nevertheless, I argue that their theory is multiply problematic. The purpose of this discussion, taken as a whole, is to show that a recent strategy for attacking the necessitarian claim of dispositional essentialism is weaker than it has appeared to a number of philosophers. In this section of the thesis I move from a neutral stance on necessitation to a defensive stance. In the first two stages of the thesis, which concern the problem of prevention, I work with the background assumption that dispositional essentialism is a tenable position. In the third section of this thesis, however, I begin by endorsing Stephen Barker's essay The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers, which argues that the main articulations of dispositional essentialism are either internally inconsistent or otherwise disguised versions of brute modalism, where brute modalism focuses upon possible worlds as oppose to properties. In response, I develop a replacement position for dispositional essentialism that I term 'temporal essentialism'. I advance temporal essentialism as a prototype position in the properties and laws debate. It aims to provide a metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities by drawing upon the passage of time. In short, temporal essentialism is the position that it is built into a system of ontology that it dynamically adds new entities to its ontological categories and constructs states of affairs in a rule-following way. (shrink)

José Antonio Valdivia Fuenzalida | Résumé : Pendant le xiiie siècle, plusieurs auteurs scolastiques ont adopté des théories aristotéliciennes pour expliquer la connaissance humaine. Ces théories supposent que l’homme est capable d’acquérir la science en se servant de ses forces naturelles. Notre âme est capable de saisir l’essence des choses en obtenant une connaissance certaine à leur propos. Pourtant, un bon nombre de ces auteurs estimaient que, même en admettant les théories mentionnées, on ne saurait se passer de l’assistance de (...) Dieu afin d’expliquer l’acquisition des connaissances scientifiques. Cet article s’interroge sur les raisons qui ont conduit lesdits auteurs à adopter une telle position. L’analyse de certains textes de saint Bonaventure permet de comprendre ce que la doctrine de l’illumination divine veut expliquer, à savoir : que nous pouvons obtenir de la certitude malgré le fait que les choses créées ne possèdent qu’une « nécessité conditionnelle ». En effet, même l’essence des choses créées n’aurait pas le degré minimum de nécessité qui est requis pour fonder la certitude absolue présupposée dans le concept médiéval de scientia. |: During the 13th century, several scholastic authors adopted Aristotelian theories to explain human knowledge. These theories assume that man is capable of acquiring science by using his natural powers. Our soul is able to grasp the essence of things by obtaining a knowledge that is certain about them. Yet, many of these authors believed that even admitting those theories, God’s assistance could not be dispensed with in order to explain the acquisition of scientific knowledge. This paper examines the reasons that led these authors to such a position. The analysis of several texts by St. Bonaventure allows one to understand what the doctrine of divine illumination aims to explain : namely that we can obtain certainty in spite of the fact that created things only possess a “conditional necessity”. Indeed, even the essence of created things would not have the minimum level of necessity that is required to be the foundation of the absolute certainty presupposed in the medieval concept of Scientia. (shrink)

It is argued that, if Armstrong is correct and truthmakers necessitate the truths they make true, then the truthmakers must include facts about the meanings of the words used to express those truths, and nominalism apparently results. This conclusion, no doubt unpalatable to Armstrong, is, it is claimed, the result of his having failed to distinguish sufficiently the meanings of words and the properties of things.

Les travaux de Saul Aron Kripke et la logique modale contemporaine établissent que la simultanéité de la nécessité et de l’a prioricité constitutives de la métaphysique kantienne résulte d’une confusion entre nécessités aléthique et épistémique. Cela conduit à un renouveau de la métaphysique, fondée sur une nécessité réelle de type non-a priori, c’est-à-dire une nécessité de fait. Celle-ci est perceptible chez Aristote au travers de la conception d’une nécessité hypothétique. Cette conception est ré-élaborée en une métaphysique phénoménologique par Husserl (« (...) faits originaires » [Urtatsachen]), Sartre, Levinas (la phénoménologie « ruine la souveraineté de la représentation ») ou J.-L. Marion (et son concept paradoxal de « contingence nécessaire »), faisant ainsi de l’automanifestation de la phénoménalisation un événement qui émerge spontanément et qui s’établit de soi : une nécessité de fait. (shrink)

Yves Charles Zarka seeks to show that Hobbes conceives of causes as events and that the progressive constitution of his theory of causality, from the Short Tract up to De corpore, introduces all elements required of a theory of event. Such a theory raises special problems as to the nature of rationality, theological foundations of a system of events and the status of politics in a physical universe governed by necessity. Some of those special problems include the well-known objections raised (...) by Cudworth, Bramhall and Leibniz. Zarka stresses in particular the importance of the debate between Hobbes and Bramhall on liberty, necessity and chance in the formulation of those problems. One thesis of this paper is that such a theory of event can explain why Hobbes’s materialism can be changed, in his political thought, into its opposite. (shrink)

I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a "Duplication Principle", according to which a suitable entity T is a truthmaker for a proposition P just in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart of T entails the truth of P, where the counterpart relation is cashed out in terms of qualitative duplication. My account captures an intuitive notion of truthmakers as "things the way they are", validates two appealing principles about (...) entailment and containment proposed by David Armstrong, and invalidates the controversial Disjunction Thesis. (shrink)

This paper presents a new argument for necessitism, the claim that necessarily everything is necessarily something. The argument appeals to principles about the metaphysics of quantification and predication which are best seen as constraints on reality’s fineness of grain. I give this argument in section 4; the impatient reader may skip directly there. Sections 1-3 set the stage by surveying three other arguments for necessitism. I argue that none of them are persuasive, but I think it is illuminating to consider (...) my argument in light of the others and vice versa. These interconnections should be of interest even to those who reject necessitism; of particular interest may be the new conception of validity proposed in section 5. (shrink)