How is it possible that in more than one hundred years, the nature-nurture debate has not come to a satisfactory resolution? The problem, Dale Goldhaber argues, lies not with the proposed answers, but with the question itself. In The Nature-Nurture Debate, Goldhaber reviews the four major perspectives on the issue - behavior genetics, environment, evolutionary psychology and developmental systems theory - and shows that the classic, reductionist strategies are incapable of resolving the issue because (...) they each offer a false perspective on the process of human development. It is only through a synthesis of the two holistic perspectives of evolutionary psychology and developmental systems theory that we will be able to understand the nature of human behavior. (shrink)

Explores the political forces underlying shifts in thinking about the respective influence of heredity and environment in shaping human behavior, and the feasibility and morality of eugenics.

Debate about legal and policy reform has been haunted by a pernicious confusion about human nature, the idea that it is a set of rigid dispositions, today generally conceived as genetic, that is manifested the same way in all circumstances. Opponents of egalitarian alternatives argue that we cannot depart far from the status quo because human nature stands in the way. Advocates of such reforms too often deny the existence of human nature because, sharing this conception, (...) they think it would prevent changes they deem desirable. Both views rest on deep errors about what it is to have a nature and how genetics works. Human nature, like the nature of anything else, is a set of potentials to behave certain ways in given environments, not a nonsocial genetic something that inevitably produces the same result in any environment. To say that existing inequalities, are due to our genes, inalterable because heritable, ignores that genetic propensities may be differently manifested in different environments. Heritability has meaning only relative to an environment and a population and implies nothing about inevitability. A better sort of inegalitarian argument is that a proposed reform, given our nature, would be too costly even if possible. However, this sort of argument is too rarely supported by evidence and generally ignores the costs of existing inequalities. But egalitarians err in supposing that, if behavior is unconstrained by biology, the status quo is easily alterable. The environment may be extremely hard to change. Legal and policy debate should adopt a correct understanding of human nature as a set of propensities and ask of any proposed reform agreed to be otherwise desirable what and how alterable are its causes, genetic, environmental, or more accurately both. (shrink)

This article looks at the way the Brazilian writer and educator Nísia Floresta addresses issues of race and class within her construction of nationhood. This is achieved through a consideration of the specific subject of maternal breast-feeding as discussed by Floresta in two texts, written in Brazil and France, respectively. A comparison of these works reveals a very different engagement with race and class factors in determining women's claim to citizenship. Floresta, in common with early 19th-century European feminism, believed this (...) claim to lie within the domestic sphere, primarily in the role of mother and educator. The article considers how, as a vital aspect of that role, she portrays maternal breast-feeding as both natural and patriotic. It also highlights the extent to which Floresta was influenced by the prevailing concerns of her contemporaries regarding the risks of wet nursing and the threat posed by household slaves, before going on to consider how this discourse leads Floresta to exclude black slave women from her vision of patriotic motherhood, while acknowledging the maternity of women of all classes in a European context. Patriotic concerns, shaped by racial prejudices, overshadow Floresta's feminism, prohibiting the kind of unifying discourse of motherhood, which she claimed to profess. (shrink)

The target article is skeptical of the heritability concept while maintaining an old-fashioned point of view about it. As a descriptive statistic, it is to be expected that heritability goes up and down in different circumstances, but the relationship between heritability coefficients and the biological processes that underlie them is difficult to specify, and may be impossible in humans.

In just a few years, children achieve a stable state of linguistic competence, making them effectively adults with respect to: understanding novel sentences, discerning relations of paraphrase and entailment, acceptability judgments, etc. One familiar account of the language acquisition process treats it as an induction problem of the sort that arises in any domain where the knowledge achieved is logically underdetermined by experience. This view highlights the cues that are available in the input to children, as well as childrens skills (...) in extracting relevant information and forming generalizations on the basis of the data they receive. Nativists, on the other hand, contend that language-learners project beyond their experience in ways that the input does not even suggest. Instead of viewing language acqusition as a special case of theory induction, nativists posit a Universal Grammar, with innately specified linguistic principles of grammar formation. The nature versus nurture debate continues, as various poverty of stimulus arguments are challenged or supported by developments in linguistic theory and by findings from psycholinguistic investigations of child language. In light of some recent challenges to nativism, we rehearse old poverty-of stimulus arguments, and supplement them by drawing on more recent work in linguistic theory and studies of child language. (shrink)

In just a few years, children achieve a stable state of linguistic competence, making them effectively adults with respect to: understanding novel sentences, discerning relations of paraphrase and entailment, acceptability judgments, etc. One familiar account of the language acquisition process treats it as an induction problem of the sort that arises in any domain where the knowledge achieved is logically underdetermined by experience. This view highlights the 'cues' that are available in the input to children, as well as children's skills (...) in extracting relevant information and forming generalizations on the basis of the data they receive. Nativists, on the other hand, content that language-learners project beyond their experience in ways that the input does not even suggest. Instead of viewing language acqusition as a special case of theory induction, nativists posit a Universal Grammar, with innately specified linguistic principles of grammar formation. The 'nature versus nurture' debate continues, as various "poverty of stimulus" arguments are challenged or supported by developments in linguistic theory and by findings from psycholinguistic investigations of child language. In light of some recent challenges to nativism, we rehearse old poverty-of stimulus arguments, and supplement them by drawing on more recent work in linguistic theory and studies of child language. (shrink)

Political imputations in science are notoriously a tricky business. I addressed this issue in the context of the nature–nurture debate in the penultimate chapter of my book Making Sense of Heritability (Cambridge U. P. 2005). Although the book mainly dealt with the logic of how one should think about heritability of psychological differences, it also discussed the role of politics in our efforts to understand the dynamics of that controversy. I first argued that if a scholar publicly (...) defends a certain view (say, hereditarianism) in the debate about IQ, race and genetics this fact alone cannot justify attributing a political motivation to that person. But then later I suggested that the pressure of political correctness could explain some peculiarities of the contemporary controversy about the heritability of group differences in IQ. Several reviewers of my book raised a tu quoque objection. Am I not doing here the same thing that I condemn others for? (shrink)

Some of the most intriguing issues in the study of cognitive, social, emotional, and physical development arise in the debate over nature versus nurture; a debate difficult to resolve because it is difficult to separate the respective contributions of genes and environment to development. The most powerful approach to this separation is through longitudinal adoption studies. The Colorado Adoption Project is the only longitudinal adoption study in existence examining development continuously from birth to adolescence, which makes (...) it a unique, powerful, and tremendously valuable resource. CAP is an ongoing assessment of 245 adopted children and 245 biological control children assessed from birth to early adolescence. This book is the fourth in a series describing CAP results. This latest volume, edited by four eminent researchers in developmental psychology, builds on the large body of research already generated by investigating the role of genes and environments on early adolescent development. Because it is the only volume on the most comprehensive investigation of the effect of genes and environments on early adolescent development, this work will be invaluable to researchers in developmental, cognitive, and social psychology. (shrink)

Trying to separate out nature and nurture as explanations for behaviour, as in classic genetic studies of twins and families, is now said to be both impossible and unproductive. In practice the nature-nurture model persists as a way of framing discussion on the causes of behaviour in genetic research papers, as well as in the media and lay debate. Social and environmental theories of crime have been dominant in criminology and in public policy while biological (...) theories have been seen as outdated and discredited. Recently, research into genetic variations associated with aggressive and antisocial behaviour has received more attention in the media. This paper explores ideas on the role of nature and nurture in violent and antisocial behaviour through interviews and open-ended questionnaires among lay publics. There was general agreement that everybody’s behaviour is influenced to varying degrees by both genetic and environmental factors but deterministic accounts of causation, except in exceptional circumstances, were rejected. Only an emphasis on nature was seen as dangerous in its consequences, for society and for individuals themselves. Whereas academic researchers approach the debate from their disciplinary perspectives which may or may not engage with practical and policy issues, the key issue for the public was what sort of explanations of behaviour will lead to the best outcomes for all concerned. (shrink)

It is worthy to supplement Charney with two historical issues: (1) There were two rival trends in the rebirth of genetic thought in the 1960s: the universal and the variation related. This traditional duality suggested that heredity cannot be equated with genetic determinism. (2) The classical debates and reinterpretation of adoption/twin studies in the 1980s regarding intelligence suggested that the environment had a more active role in unfolding the genetic program.

Keller explains the persistence of the nature/nurture debate by a chronic ambiguity in language derived from classical and behavioral genetics. She suggests that the more precise vocabulary of modern molecular genetics may be used to rephrase the underlying questions and hence provide a way out of this controversy. I show that her proposal fits into a long tradition in which other authors have wrestled with the same problem and come to similar conclusions. - Review of 'The mirage (...) of a space between nature and nurture' by Evelyn Fox Keller, Duke University Press, 2010, ISBN 9780822347316. (shrink)

Exposome research is put forward as a major tool for solving the nature-versus-nurture debate because the exposome is said to represent “the nature of nurture.” Against this influential idea, we argue that the adoption of the nature-versus-nurture debate into the exposome research program is a mistake that needs to be undone to allow for a proper bioethical assessment of exposome research. We first argue that this adoption is originally based on an equivocation (...) between the traditional nature-versus-nurture debate and a debate about disease prediction/etiology. Second, due to this mistake, exposome research is pushed to adopt a limited conception of agential control that is harmful to one's thinking about the good that exposome research can do for human health and wellbeing. To fully excise the nature-versus-nurture debate from exposome research, we argue that exposome researchers and bioethicists need to think about the exposome afresh from the perspective of actionability. We define the concept of actionability and related concepts and show how these can be used to analyze the ethical aspects of the exposome. In particular, we focus on refuting the popular “gun analogy” in exposome research, returning results to study participants and risk-taking in the context of a well-lived life. (shrink)

Phenotypic plasticity integrates the insights of ecological genetics, developmental biology, and evolutionary theory. Plasticity research asks foundational questions about how living organisms are capable of variation in their genetic makeup and in their responses to environmental factors. For instance, how do novel adaptive phenotypes originate? How do organisms detect and respond to stressful environments? What is the balance between genetic or natural constraints (such as gravity) and natural selection? The author begins by defining phenotypic plasticity and detailing its history, including (...) important experiments and methods of statistical and graphical analysis. He then provides extended examples of the molecular basis of plasticity, the plasticity of development, the ecology of plastic responses, and the role of costs and constraints in the evolution of plasticity. A brief epilogue looks at how plasticity studies shed light on the nature/nurture debate in the popular media. (shrink)

In this powerful critique, the esteemed historian and philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller addresses the nature-nurture debates, including the persistent disputes regarding the roles played by genes and the environment in determining individual traits and behavior. Keller is interested in both how an oppositional “versus” came to be inserted between nature and nurture, and how the distinction on which that opposition depends, the idea that nature and nurture are separable, came to be taken (...) for granted. How, she asks, did the illusion of a space between nature and nurture become entrenched in our thinking, and why is it so tenacious? Keller reveals that the assumption that the influences of nature and nurture can be separated is neither timeless nor universal, but rather a notion that emerged in Anglo-American culture in the late nineteenth century. She shows that the seemingly clear-cut nature-nurture debate is riddled with incoherence. It encompasses many disparate questions knitted together into an indissoluble tangle, and it is marked by a chronic ambiguity in language. There is little consensus about the meanings of terms such as nature, nurture, gene, and environment. Keller suggests that contemporary genetics can provide a more appropriate, precise, and useful vocabulary, one that might help put an end to the confusion surrounding the nature-nurture controversy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nature and Nurture in French Ethnography and Anthropology, 1859-1914Martin StaumThe adaptability of non-European peoples to "civilization" was a critical issue deriving from the perennial nature-nurture question that haunted debates in the human sciences in late nineteenth-century France.1 The emerging scholarly disciplines of anthropology and ethnography helped provide a scientific veneer that bolstered existing cultural prejudices concerning the innate limitations or retarded development of non-Europeans. Certainly (...) there were many other pragmatic reasons for imperial expansion, and racists did not automatically become imperialists. But if, as Edward Said contended, imperialism "depends upon the idea of having an empire," there is no doubt that many ethnographers and anthropologists helped legitimate the idea.2 Their debates retain a resonance in our twenty-first century postcolonial world struggling with questions of identity, integration, and cultural diversity.Relying on reports from travelers, missionaries, or colonial officials, human scientists from across the political and religious spectrum justified European superiority. Although a few journalists and philosophers outside the scholarly societies represented a minority anti-imperialist counter-current, the remarkable pervasiveness of hierarchical thinking affected both socially radical anthropologists and more conservative ethnographers.3 While ethnographers proclaimed universal fraternity, they conceded that physical differences affected [End Page 475] intellect and character. The later attack on hereditarianism by Durkheimian sociologists and isolated anthropologists with the catalyst of the Dreyfus Affair is all the more striking.4 As George Stocking has argued concerning a British Victorian thinker, the cultural differences between Europeans and non-Europeans became so entangled with biological issues that there was "difficulty conceptualizing them except in terms of 'race.' "5The two most notable anthropological scholarly societies of the late nineteenth century, both founded in 1859, were the Société d'ethnographie orientale et américaine and the Société d'anthropologie de Paris. Historians have justifiably noted their mutual aversion and have contrasted their differences over scientific method, politics, and religion.6 The ethnographers, inspired by a student of Japanese language and Asian religion, Léon de Rosny (1837-1914), were largely linguists and specialists in Asian texts and pre-Columbian codices that represented partly civilized peoples. Rosny invented the term "ambiantisme" for a philosophy that ostensibly privileged the cultural milieu rather than inborn human nature.7 The society membership varied between 115 in 1864 and 470 in 1878, though it declined to 165 by 1903.8 As a group, compared to the anthropologists, they were more politically conservative, more socially elite, and more inclined toward conventional religion, with its belief in the unity of the species. Their "science of destiny" stressed human freedom and unalterably opposed philosophical materialism.9 [End Page 476]The anthropologists, headed by physician and anatomist Paul Broca (1824-80) consisted of a hard core of like-minded medically trained colleagues. The anthropologists' membership peaked around 500 both in 1885 and 1905, though, they, too declined to 165 by 1914.10 Historians have analyzed the nature-nurture issue more subtly for the anthropologists.11 While the Society almost always expressed interest in both physical and cultural spheres, they privileged the study of crania as an index to the intellectual and moral characteristics of "races." The more extreme hereditarians thought that the nature of allegedly inferior "races" precluded perfectibility. Armand de Quatrefages (1810-92), professor of anthropology at the Muséum national d'histoire naturelle and pioneer of the so-called Muséum school, in his later years cast doubt on whether physical indicators actually demonstrated human superiority. However, the Muséum school did not generally renounce racial hierarchy, though they believed that environmental influences formed and continued to shape human varieties.12 In addition, philosophical materialists, militant atheists, and politically radical thinkers dominated the society in the generation after Broca's death. Almost all were neo-Lamarckians who leavened the idea of a fixed human nature with the possibility of adaptation to a milieu and transmissible acquired characteristics.13 The medical physiologist Charles Richet reported that "heredity and milieu are not antagonistic, but synergistic."14 However, many accounts underplay the differential application of neo-Lamarckianism. In this "racial evolutionist paradigm" already noticed by Laurent Mucchielli, even the Muséum school found only civilized people adaptable... (shrink)

On the nature-nurture debate and the complexities of what make us human.

From a cultural-historical perspective, nature and nurture are contested concepts. The paper focuses on the nature/nurture debate in the work of William Shakespeare and in the Romantic tradition, and argues that while our Romantic inheritance problematises nurture, it tends to mystify nature. Given that conceptions of nature are culturally driven, there is an urgent educational challenge to problematise nature as well as nurture.

From a cultural-historical perspective, nature and nurture (and thus education) are contested concepts. The paper focuses on the nature/nurture debate in the work of William Shakespeare (influenced by Montaigne) and in the Romantic tradition (evidenced by Rousseau and Wordsworth), and argues that while our Romantic inheritance (still highly influential in education) problematises nurture, it tends to mystify nature. Given that conceptions of nature are culturally driven, there is an urgent educational challenge to (...) problematise nature as well as nurture. (shrink)

The nature-nurture debate rages so, one cannot help but wonder why the sides are so vehemently partitioned. What's at stake? It is simply not clear why a great amount of people embrace either one side or the other, but dare not even blow a kiss to the opposite opinion. Prinz does an excellent job of arguing for the nurture position, zeroing in on some of the most preciously held nature arguments including the basis of knowledge, (...) thought, and feelings in experience and cultural values, increasing as a child grows. Most prominent of the nature hypothèses that Prinz takes on may be that of language acquisition and the Chomskyean notion of inborn lingusitic knowledge, via the proposed universal language. He contends that children's language acquisition--even the notion that the supposed inborn language device shuts off somewhere in mid-childhood, meaning most people will not be fully bilingual--need not demand such a natural language faculty in the brain, as general learning strategies can account for language acquisition. His arguments can stimulate both nurturists and naturists. Yet, in the end--realizing how much of the human arise from the genes--one still cannot help wonder why the two debated positions so rally to one flag or the other. (shrink)

A timely and uniquely compelling plea for the importance of nurture in the ongoing nature-nurture debate. In this era of genome projects and brain scans, it is all too easy to overestimate the role of biology in human psychology. But in this passionate corrective to the idea that DNA is destiny, Jesse Prinz focuses on the most extraordinary aspect of human nature: that nurture can supplement and supplant nature, allowing our minds to be (...) profoundly influenced by experience and culture. Drawing on cutting-edge research in neuroscience, psychology, and anthropology, Prinz shatters the myth of human uniformity and reveals how our differing cultures and life experiences make each of us unique. Along the way he shows that we can’t blame mental illness or addiction on our genes, and that societal factors shape gender differences in cognitive ability and sexual behavior. A much-needed contribution to the nature-nurture debate, Beyond Human Nature shows us that it is only through the lens of nurture that the spectrum of human diversity becomes fully and brilliantly visible. (shrink)

Definitions of human nature have preoccupied philosophers, politicians, anthropologists and social scientists for centuries. Our conceptions of ourselves - what we perceive to be 'human nature' - have taken many forms from the abstract to the biologically determined. In The Human Nature Debate, Harry Cowen describes the diversity of ideas about human nature and demonstrates the extent to which all such ideas are socially and politically grounded, reflecting the prevailing concerns and priorities of their times, (...) from the classical Greek conceptions of 'rational man' to the behaviourist explanations that did so much to bolster and justify fascism and Stalinism in the twentieth century. Cowen's admirably clear introduction to the history of ideas about human nature goes beyond the theorising to the ways in which concepts of human nature have both informed and reflected policy and practice. Drawing on a wealth of evidence and example, he demonstrates the political significance of the human nature debate, and looks at the vital interactions between theory and practice in the social sciences, social policy and social practice. (shrink)

This book explores the development of hybrid corn, the history of eugenics, human genetics, the nature-nurture debate, the origins of the Marxian concept of proletarian science, the shift in the meaning of "fitness" in evolutionary theory, the practice of normal science in Nazi Germany, and the making and selling of science textbooks. While the topics are diverse, a common theme unites them - each explores links between biological science, social power, and public policy.

Language, Cognition, and Human Nature collects together for the first time much of Steven Pinker's most influential scholarly work on language and cognition. Pinker's seminal research explores the workings of language and its connections to cognition, perception, social relationships, child development, human evolution, and theories of human nature. This eclectic collection spans Pinker's thirty-year career, exploring his favorite themes in greater depth and scientific detail. It includes thirteen of Pinker's classic articles, ranging over topics such as language development (...) in children, mental imagery, the recognition of shapes, the computational architecture of the mind, the meaning and uses of verbs, the evolution of language and cognition, the nature-nurture debate, and the logic of innuendo and euphemism. Each outlines a major theory or takes up an argument with another prominent scholar, such as Stephen Jay Gould, Noam Chomsky, or Richard Dawkins. Featuring a new introduction by Pinker that discusses his books and scholarly work, this collection reflects essential contributions to cognitive science by one of our leading thinkers and public intellectuals. (shrink)

Scientific disagreements constitute valuable resources for reflecting on epistemic peer disagreements. In this essay I engage in the debate whether epistemic peers who disagree should be conciliatory or steadfast by examining how scientists actually react in the so called nature-nurture debate. The main conclusion of the analysis is that, when taking into consideration concrete epistemic practices with peers responding to different epistemic perspectives, scientists have good reasons to be steadfast. At the same time, the theoretical conceptualizations (...) of the epistemology of peer disagreement illuminates certain aspects of the nature-nurture debate, such as its long persistence. Therefore, this article contributes both to the debate over the epistemology of disagreement and to the understanding of a never-ending controversy in the life sciences. (shrink)

The nature/nurture debate is not dead. Dichotomous views of development still underlie many fundamental debates in the biological and social sciences. Developmental systems theory offers a new conceptual framework with which to resolve such debates. DST views ontogeny as contingent cycles of interaction among a varied set of developmental resources, no one of which controls the process. These factors include DNA, cellular and organismic structure, and social and ecological interactions. DST has excited interest from a wide range (...) of researchers, from molecular biologists to anthropologists, because of its ability to integrate evolutionary theory and other disciplines without falling into traditional oppositions. The book provides historical background to DST, recent theoretical findings on the mechanisms of heredity, applications of the DST framework to behavioral development, implications of DST for the philosophy of biology, and critical reactions to DST. (shrink)

This is a book about the bond between sentient beings. It explores the non-verbal space between two entities, and asks questions like; What is a healthy human being? Is it nature? Nurture? Nature via nurture? How are we born with personality traits, emotion, mood, language abilities, and intelligence? What do we know about attachment, family structure and genetic inheritance? Robert Ingersoll and Dr Anna Scarnà use the life history of the chimpanzee, Nim Chimpsky and his family: (...) parents Carolyn and Pan, companion Lilly, their daughter, Sheba, and an assortment of human carers, to explain the hallmarks of healthy human psychological development. What makes humans 'human', and chimpanzees, 'chimpanzees'? Do chimpanzees have a personality, or should we consider them to have a "chimpanality?" Robert, close friend and carer of Nim, gives the facts about Nim's upbringing and first degree relatives, and Anna reports with reference to theories of brain, personality, self, and language. Together they explain what can be drawn from psychological research and reanalyse the chimpanzee work from the 1960s and 1970s in order to honour and respect the memory of those animals. (shrink)

This article illustrates in which sense genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimensions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic diseases to car accidents, and different kinds of determination due to different norms of reaction. On this basis, this article explicates in which sense the interactionist consensus presupposes the innate?acquired distinction. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the innate?acquired distinction is under attack (...) in contemporary philosophy of biology. Three arguments are then presented to provide a limited and pragmatic defense of the distinction: an epistemic, a conceptual, and a historical argument. If interpreted in a certain manner, and if the pragmatic goals of prevention and treatment are taken into account, then the innate?acquired distinction can be a useful epistemic tool. It can help, first, to understand that genetic determination does not mean fatalism, and, second, to maintain a system of checks and balances in the continuing nature?nurture debates. (shrink)

Nietzsche claims that we are fated to be as we are. He also claims, however, that we can create ourselves. To many commentators these twin commitments have seemed self-contradictory or paradoxical. The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that, despite appearances, there is no paradox here, nor even a tension between Nietzsche's two claims. Instead, when properly interpreted these claims turn out to be intimately related to one another, so that our fatedness emerges as integral to our capacity to (...) become self-creators. The paper also offers, in the course of undermining a false alternative that is deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, a reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati that actually – and perhaps uniquely – makes full sense of section 276 of The Gay Science, the chief source for this aspect of his thought. (shrink)

During the last twenty-five years or so there has been a remarkable growth in the interdisciplinary field bordering on cognitive psychology, linguistics, neurobiology, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind. The book under review makes a belated but significant contribution to the literature of cognitive science, since it provides the first detailed comparison of the views of two of the field's most influential figures, Noam Chomsky and Jean Piaget. The text is based on a conference which was held in October (...) of 1975 at the Abbaye de Royaumont near Paris. Besides Chomsky and Piaget, the participants at the conference included such notables as Jacques Monod and Gregory Bateson, the philosophers Jerry Fodor and Stephen Toulmin, psychologists Norbert Bischof, David Premack and Bärbel Inhelder, as well as distinguished representatives from the fields of biology, anthropology, and artificial intelligence. The major focus of the discussion concerned the differences between Chomsky's and Piaget's views on the nature/nurture question in psychology. (shrink)

The central thesis of this article is that the notion of second nature that John McDowell has reanimated has something of ethical and educational importance, thereby possibly extending the borders of the philosophy of education. The argument to this conclusion is the subject of serious consideration and criticism. The aim of this article is therefore to clarify the educational implications of the conception of second nature by responding to the three likely objections: (1) the charge of idealism, (2) (...) the charge of anthropocentrism, and (3) the charge of triviality. Through critical discussions of these criticisms, it is made explicit that second nature, from the outset, illuminates every sphere of the lives of human beings. A lively appreciation of this leads to the conclusion that the issue of how we develop our world of meaning with the conception of second nature should come under the scope of serious philosophical discourse on education. (shrink)

In both popular and technical discussion we often find the pairs of opposed terms ‘innate/acquired,’ ‘due to genes/due to environment,’ ‘nature/nurture,’ and so forth. They appear to be used as if they all captured a genuine distinction, and the same distinction at that. A related family of opposed pairs is held to describe the difference between those who attribute a certain trait to ‘nature’ and those who attribute it to ‘nurture’: ‘nativists’ versus ‘constructivists’ is one such (...) pair. Chomsky and his followers are often described as ‘nativists’ regarding certain features of language. On a cursory examination, many of the claims of Evolutionary Psychology bear the appearance of ‘nativism.’ That is, it looks as though Evolutionary Psychologists are making claims to the effect that many features of the mind which are often thought to be due to ‘nurture’ are in fact due to ‘nature.’ However, two of the genre's leading practitioners, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, vigorously deny that this is their position. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the Roman Catholic tradition the nature of the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction is best understood in light of its historical development. The moralist tradition that reared and nurtured this distinction implicitly developed a set of general criteria to distinguish the extraordinary from the ordinary. These criteria, conjoined with the context within which they were understood, can play an important role in refereeing the contemporary debate over the agressiveness of medical treatment and the extent of one's moral obligation.

Determining the degree to which persistent human behaviors and traits are the result of genetics or environment is important for a host of theoretical reasons in psychology. This article asks whether the results of such determinations are relevant to the practical tasks of individual change as attempted, for example, through therapy, parenting techniques, or self-transformation. Examples from the psychological literature on happiness or "subjective well-being" illustrate the common idea that a trait being largely genetic implies that it is more difficult (...) to modify than one that is largely environmental. The most widely known theoretical approach to disentangling genetic from environmental effects in humans is behavioral genetics, with its central concept of heritability (h2). This article argues that measures of h2 do not predict the ease or difficulty of modifying behaviors or traits of individuals. A concept different from h2, that of innateness, is explicated, but it, too, is found not to be a useful predictor of individual modifiability. The general conclusion is that knowing only the degree to which a human characteristic results from nature or nurture has no implications for the ease or difficulty of altering that trait. (shrink)