Results for 'motivational internalism'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism.Danielle Bromwich - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  2. Motivational Internalism.Christian Basil Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.
    Cases involving amoralists who no longer care about the institution of morality, together with cases of depression, listlessness, and exhaustion, have posed trouble in recent years for standard formulations of motivational internalism. In response, though, internalists have been willing to adopt narrower versions of the thesis which restrict it just to the motivational lives of those agents who are said to be in some way normal, practically rational, or virtuous. My goal in this paper is to offer (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  3. Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions.Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):715-734.
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4.  97
    Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates.Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–20.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5. Motivational Internalism.Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptoins of moral motivation and moral judgment, it (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6.  51
    Motivational Internalism and The Second-Order Desire Explanation.Xiao Zhang - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (1):(D2)5-18.
    Both motivational internalism and externalism need to explain why sometimes moral judgments tend to motivate us. In this paper, I argue that Dreier’ second-order desire model cannot be a plausible externalist alternative to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation. I explain that the relevant second-order desire is merely a constitutive requirement of rationality because that desire makes a set of desires more unified and coherent. As a rational agent with the relevant second-order desire is disposed towards (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Recent Work on Motivational Internalism.Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):124-137.
    Reviews work on moral judgment motivational internalism from the last two decades.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  8. Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Acount.Mark Van Roojen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):233-241.
    Contemporary internalists typically idealize the conditions for motivation, claiming for example that motivation must be present in rational persons under certain conditions. Robert Johnson, in The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, convincingly argues that these versions of internalism overlook ways in which the conditions in the antecedent of the conditional expressing the analysis are incompatible with the claim under analysis. However, avoiding the fallacy decouples internalism from its use to explain and justify moral action. I use Johnson’s argument as the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  9.  62
    Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (4):417-36.
    My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend a version of motivational internalism. The simplest version is a crude instrumentalism according to which reasoning can generate motivation in us only by identifying means to ends that we already desire. The view advanced here is much less restrictive.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  10.  67
    Motivational Internalism[REVIEW]Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Motivational Internalism is a collection of thirteen new essays on exactly the topic you expect it to be, given the title. It also contains an introductory chapter, in which the editors attach an excellent overview of the current state of play to an intimidating bibliography. The essays in the volume are divided into three sections, each with its own, shorter, introduction by the editors. The first section concerns evidence for and against motivational internalism; the second concerns (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume.Richard Joyce - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    As a metaethicist, I am interested in whether expressivism is true, and thus interested in whether the argument that people think they find in Hume is a sound one. Not being a Hume scholar (but merely a devoted fan), I am less interested in whether Hume really was an expressivist or whether he really did present an argument in its favor. Hume’s metaethical views are very difficult to nail down, and by a careful selection of quotes one can present him (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12.  4
    Some Hazards of Motivational Internalism: The Practical Case for Externalism.Brendan Cline - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Internalists and externalists disagree over how intimately normative judgment and motivation are linked. Proponents on both sides typically try to settle the issue by descriptively interpreting our concept of a normative judgment. Unfortunately, this approach has resulted in deep and apparently intractable disagreement. It is time to consider alternative strategies. In this paper, I argue that the internalist/externalist debate is particularly ripe for revisionary arguments that evaluate conceptions of normative judgment in light of the costs and benefits of their adoption. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Expressivism and Motivation Internalism.R. Joyce - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):336-344.
    The task of this paper is to argue that expressivism [the thesis that moral judgements function to express desires, emotions, or pro/con attitudes] neither implies, nor is implied by, [motivational internalism].
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  14. Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.
    I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  54
    Motivational Internalism, Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Strandberg Caj, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björkland: New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, Pp. Ix + 306, £44.49. [REVIEW]Derek Baker - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):814-816.
  16.  44
    Strong Motivational Internalism.Matej Sušnik - 2015 - International Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):165-177.
    Strong motivational internalists claim that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is necessary. It is widely accepted that strong motivational internalism is false because it cannot accommodate various phenomena from common experience. In order to make room for these phenomena, motivational internalists usually propose the weak formulation of their thesis. In the first part of the paper I differentiate between several versions of both strong and weak motivational internalism. In the second part I (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  5
    Motivational Internalism and Normativity.Karolina Jasser - 2017 - Etyka 54:41-57.
    Motivational internalism is a view about the connection between motivation and moral judgment. The debate over internalism has long focused on establishing the nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation. In this paper I argue that recent studies regarding personality disorders such as psychopathy and VM damage, which have been traditionally seen as providing a counter argument to internalism, indicate that motivational deficiencies in the moral sphere are linked to motivational deficiencies in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  19
    VIII-An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
    In this paper I argue that I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19. Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism.Steven Arkonovich - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219.
    Under what conditions do you have a reason to perform some action? Do you only have reason to do what you want to do? Reasons-motives internalism is the appealingly simple view that unless an agent is, or could be, motivated to act in a certain way, he has no normative reason to act in that way. Thus, according to reasons-motives internalism, facts about an individual’s motivational psychology constrain what is rational for that agent to do. This article (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20. Motivational Internalism and Externalism.G. F. Schueler - 2010 - In Timothy O. Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 293-300.
  21. Motivational Internalism and the Authority of Morality.James Edwin Mahon - 2000 - Dissertation, Duke University
    If it is true that an agent who has a moral reason for acting has a reason for acting independently of whether or not she has a desire to so act , then it cannot also be true both that moral reasons are necessarily motivating and that an agent who is motivated to act is motivated in virtue of a desire to so act . This dissertation argues that the arguments given against Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons are (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  23. An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2):135-156.
    I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. I show that when we clarify (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  24.  96
    The Motivation Argument and Motivational Internalism.Daniel Eggers - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2445-2467.
    Much in contemporary metaethics revolves around the two positions known as ‘motivational internalism’ and the ‘Humean theory of motivation’. The importance of these positions is mostly due to their role in what is considered to be the most powerful argument for metaethical non-cognitivism: the so-called ‘motivation argument’. In my paper, I want to argue that widely accepted renditions of the MA, such as the rendition recently forwarded by Russ Shafer-Landau, are flawed in two senses. First, they fail to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Defusing Counterexamples Against Motivational Internalism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Filosofija. Sociologija 27 (1):23-30.
    Externalists argue that motivation is external to moral judgments on the grounds that people can be unmoved by their moral judgments. I reply that people sometimes act indifferently to their moral considerations not because their moral judgments lack motivation but because their moral judgments are obstructed by rival desires. It appears that the moral motivation wanes while the moral judgments linger. In reality, however, the moral motivation is only made inconspicuous by the motivation of the opposing desires. A moral judgment (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism.Voin Milevski - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):44-57.
    The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Motivational Internalism. Profile of a Kantian Viewpoint.H. F. Klemme - 2004 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 33 (3-4):179-205.
  28. Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism, and Self-Deception in Kant's Ethics.Nelson Potter - 2002 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. Clarendon Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29.  48
    Björnsson and Olinder on Motivational Internalism.Emma Wood - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):379-383.
    I respond to an argument made by Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder against motivational internalism. Björnsson and Olinder present a hypothesis in which all of us are selfishly motivated to act in accordance with our moral judgments. The conceivability of such a possibility, they argue, rules out motivational internalism. I argue that this is not the case, and that, according to one dominant view about moral judgments, the agents in the hypothesis do not make genuine (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  77
    Belief Attribution and the Falsification of Motive Internalism.Michael Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):607 – 616.
    The metatethical position known as motive internalism (MI) holds that moral beliefs are necessarily motivating. Adina Roskies (in Philosophical Psychology, 16) has recently argued against MI by citing patients with injuries to the ventromedial (VM) cortex as counterexamples to MI. Roskies claims that not only do these patients not act in accordance with their professed moral beliefs, they exhibit no physiological or affective evidence of being motivated by these beliefs. I argue that Roskies' attempt to falsify MI is unpersuasive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  31. Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):285-318.
    While differing widely in other respects, both neo-Humean and neo-Kantian approaches to normativity embrace an internalist thesis linking reasons for acting to potential motivation. This thesis pushes in different directions depending on the underlying view of the powers of practical reason, but either way it sets the stage for an attack on realist attempts to ground reasons directly in facts about value. How can reasons that are not somehow grounded in motivational features of the agent nonetheless count as reasons (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32.  37
    Reconsidering the Meta‐Ethical Implications of Motivational Internalism and Externalism.Ragnar Francén - 2020 - Theoria 86 (3):359-388.
    Motivational internalism and externalism – that is, theories about moral motivation – have played central roles in meta‐ethical debate mainly because they have been thought to have implications for the constitutive nature of moral judgements. Thus, internalism and externalism have been adduced in favour of and against various versions of cognitivism and non‐cognitivism. This article aims to question a fundamental presupposition behind such arguments. It has standardly been assumed (i) that if motivational internalism is true (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Review of G. Björnsson Et Al's (Eds.) Motivational Internalism[REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):658-661.
    This is a short review of collection of articles entitled Motivational Internalism, which was edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  52
    The Ideal Observer Theory and Motivational Internalism.Daniel Rönnedal - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):79-98.
    In this paper I show that one version of motivational internalism follows from the so-called ideal observer theory. Let us call the version of the ideal observer theory used in this essay (IOT). According to (IOT), it is necessarily the case that it ought to be that A if and only if every ideal observer wants it to be the case that A. We shall call the version of motivational internalism that follows from (IOT) (moral) conditional (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  14
    Motivating Emotions: Emotionism and the Internalist Connection.Justin J. Bartlett - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):711-731.
    I outline a theory of moral motivation which is compatible with the metaphysical claims of strong emotionism—a sentimentalist account of morality first outlined by Jesse Prinz and supported by myself which construes moral concepts and properties as a subset of emotion-dispositional properties. Given these claims, it follows that sincere moral judgements are necessarily motivating in virtue of their emotional constitution. I defend an indefeasible version of judgement motivational internalism which takes into consideration both positively and negatively valenced affective (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. How Not to Argue for Motivational Internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2011 - In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 64-87.
  37. Semantic Realism and the Argument From Motivational Internalism.Alexander Miller - unknown
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non-factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  38. Motivational Judgement Internalism and The Problem of Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:601-621.
    Motivational judgement internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. There is, though, an important lack of clarity in the literature about the types of moral evaluation the theory is supposed to cover. It is rarely made clear whether the theory is intended to cover all moral judgements or whether the claim covers only a subset of such judgements. In this paper I will investigate which moral judgements internalists should hold their theory to apply (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39.  15
    Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions and Motivational Internalism.Tommaso Bruni - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (3):19-23.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  79
    Alternative Motivation: A New Challenge to Moral Judgment Internalism.Andrew Sneddon - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53.
    Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases . I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  41.  80
    Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation.Houston Smit - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate requiresidentifying (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  42. Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation.Allen Coates - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295-315.
    Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43.  19
    Internalism, Practical Reason, and Motivation.John Robertson - 2001 - In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press. pp. 127--150.
  44. Internalism About Reasons: Sad but True?Kate Manne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.
    Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  45. Why Internalists About Reasons Should Be Humeans About Motivation.Kent Hurtig - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  46. Internalism and the Explanation of Belief/Motivation Changes.Philip Stratton-Lake - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):311–315.
  47. Internalism, Motivational.Mark Roojen - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Metaethical Internalism: Can Moral Beliefs Motivate?Thomas Wren - 1985 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59:58.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  7
    Metaethical Internalism: Can Moral Beliefs Motivate?Thomas E. Wren - 1985 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 59:58-80.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  35
    Internalism and Pessimism.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):189-209.
    Motivational Internalism is the thesis that, necessarily, moral beliefs are accompanied by motivational states. It is plausible to suppose that while another’s testimony might transmit information and justification, it can’t transmit motivational states such as moral emotions. Thus, Internalism provides a compelling explanation of “Pessimism”, the view that there is something illicit about forming moral beliefs by testimony. This paper presents a nonconstitutive reading of the Internalist thesis and then argues that it supports Pessimism in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000