Ever since Berkeley discussed the problem at length in his Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, theorists of vision have attempted to explain why the moon appears larger on the horizon than it does at the zenith. Prevailing opinion has it that the contemporary perceptual psychologists Kaufman and Rock have finally explained the illusion. This paper argues that Kaufman and Rock have not refuted a Berkeleyan account of the illusion, and have over-interpreted their own experimental results. (...) The moon illusion remains unexplained, and a Berkeleyan account is still a contender. (shrink)

''The authors' style is clear, making the book accessible to newcomers, and the illustrations are excellent. There can be no doubt that this book will remain the standard work in the subject, and it will appeal to readers of all types.'' -Sir Patrick Moore in the Times Higher Education Supplement ''It will surely be the standard work on the subject for many years to come and we await with interest the outcome of further research into this fascinating subject.'' -Society for (...) the History of AstronomyFor thousands of years, one scientific puzzle has fascinated and perplexed the greatest philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, and psychologists - why do the moon and sun appear so much larger on the horizon than when high up in the sky? Now, two leading psychologists have provided a compelling account of this fascinating illusion. Taking us through the history, the characters involved, the attempts made to explain the illusion, through to modern day studies of visual perception, the book is the most comprehensive account of this puzzle so far. This is a work which will remain, for some time to come, the definitive book on a mystery that has fascinated and tested the greatest minds throughout the ages. Accessibly written, it will appeal to readers of popular science, along with those within the disciplines of psychology, mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy, from undergraduate upwards. (shrink)

Berkeley and Helmholtz proposed different indirect mechanisms for size perception: Berkeley, that size was conditioned to various cues, independently of perceived distance; Helmholtz, that it was unconsciously calculated from angular size and perceived distance. The geometrical approach cannot explain size-distance paradoxes (e.g., moon illusion). The dorsal/ventral solution is dubious for close displays and untestable for far displays.

The much larger appearance of the moon near horizon than the perceived size of the moon at zenith has motivated many scientists to develop theories that aim at explaining this puzzling phenomenon. Considering that the size of retinal images of the moon in these positions are very similar, the explanation of difference in their apparent sizes has relied on perceptual cues of distance embedded in the retinal image of their respective contexts. Although this account of the (...) class='Hi'>moon illusion is quite popular, it does not explain all aspects of this phenomenon. The theoretical formulation of the moon illusion based on other factors such as size contrast later may have had some advantages but has also created some new problems. Although the moon is perceived in a three-dimensional (3D) environment, the present analysis proposes that an explanation of the moon illusion based on two-dimensional (2D) cues can remove some of the unnecessary problems. The empty space and size contrast that have already been considered in explaining classic geometric-optical illusions play a parallel role in explaining the moon illusion. In other words, the role of open space in interaction with the image of the moon and different objects near horizon, all reflected on the retina, are considered as the main explaining factors. The advantages of this approach will be discussed and some of the facts pertaining to the moon illusion will be explained within this theoretical framework. (shrink)

Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...) Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion.. (shrink)

Democracy - hope or illusion? Blooming, failing or declining? Our doubts and hesitation make part of unbending efforts to endorse and explain democracy. Who is right - the custodians of promise or the prophets of decline? The book concentrates on doubts. The author tries to explore «the other side of the moon», emphasizing the role of critical thinking, opposing a main-current optimism. Defending democracy we want to generate hope, but hoping may be a dangerous craft. Protecting our hope (...) we are prone to believe that democracy - even if it is not a full success story - is justified in its nature and out of question. How much do we have to forget to sanction this view? This is, in fact, the main question the book raises. It gives voice to those who never, in their writing on democracy, used a flattering tone. Starting with Greek giants - Plato and Aristotle - up to modern and most recent times, going through a broad field of revealing criticism, leaving us with an unsettling feeling that democracy is rather something to be explained than something to be celebrated. Living in democracy, lamenting its underperformances, we must not overlook a fundamental question - in what part do our disappointments reflect the «art of forgetting», allowing us to cast into oblivion all serious doubts originating in a critical discourse on modernity and democracy? (shrink)

This overview of the philosophy of certainty will distinguish two types of certainty, specify controversial theses about certainty from recent literature, and explain some of the arguments for and against those theses.

This entry summarizes arguments for and against the thesis that knowledge entails belief.

Dallas Willard was a personal mentor and inspiration to hundreds of pastors, philosophers, and average churchgoers. In Gary W. Moon’s candid and inspiring biography, we read about the development of Willard's personal character, philosophical writing, and spiritual teaching, and how he has inspired some of the most influential books on spirituality of the last generation.

The great majority of commentators have evaluated the splitting of the moon. The vast majority of them think that it occurred in the Prophet’s period basing their view on the clear statement of al-Qamar 54/1 verse and on related rumors. However, some commentators claim that the moon will split on the doomsday, by referring to the context of the same verse. The same names criticize the rumors claiming that they cannot constituteevidence for the splitting of the moon. (...) To those who think so, from the fact that the splitting of the moon was related by few companions and that it was not recorded in various geographies it is evident that the incident did not happen. It cannot be said that the commentators, who took that the view that the split of the moon were in the period of the Prophet, have similar views in this regard. They have different interpretations in matters such as the realization and the shape of the event. On the other hand, those who claim that the split of the moon is only an idiomatic statement and that the event is only a lunar eclipse, declare that the split of the moon never actually happened. In this study which deals with various interpretations of tafsirs of the splitting of the moon, it is aimed to criticize different opinions on this issue. Document analysis and comparison methods were applied in the article.Summary: The issue of the splitting of the moon has attracted many names from various disciplines, notably the commentators. In the verse of al-Qamar 54/1 mentioning the splitting of the moon has been an important factor for the commentators to evaluate this issue. The ḥadīth narratives regarding the cleavage of the moon are found in many ḥadīth sources, in particular, Ṣahīh al-Bukhārīand Ṣahīh al-Muslim. The rumors about the splitting of the moon, albeit with different forms, are attributed to Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/712), Jubayr b. Muṭ‘īm (d. 59/678-679), ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās (d. 68/687-688), ʿAbdallāh b. ‘Omar (d. 73/692), and ʿAbdallāh b. Masʿūd (d. 32/652-653) One of the rumors about the splitting of the moon, although it is based on ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661)is not found in the authentic ḥadīth sources. In some narrations, it is said that the miracle of the moon's splitting took place upon the request of the polytheists while the others are only mentioned how this miracle happened. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the commentators agree on the split of the moon. The main purpose of this study is to identify these opinions with its basis. Apart from those who do not accept the occurrence of the incident, there are differences of opinion among the commentators who see this event as a miracle of the Prophet Muḥammad. It is possible to classify the disagreements of the commentators in this subject in two headings as the time and manner of occurrence of this incident.Most of the classical commentators, on the basis of narrations, think that the splitting of the moon occurred during the period of Mecca. Among these commentators, al-Wāḥidī (d. 468/1076) and al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273), as well as the rumors of this evidence, offer as a proof the verse, "if they see a miracle, they turn away and say that this is a great magic." (al-Qamar 54/2). Some commentators, such as al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), accept that this phenomenon has taken place in the past by referring to the opinion of the commentators about the split of the moon. The views of many of the modern-day commentators such as Siddiq Ḥasan Khan (d. 1307/1890), Mawdūdī (d. 1399/1979) and Sābūnī, on this issue, apart from the narrations related to the subject have shaped the general opinion of the commentators. There are differences of opinions among some of the commentators, who accept that the splitting of the moon takes place during the time of the Prophet Muḥammad, as to the reasons and arbitrariness of the incident. According to classical period commentators such as al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), al-Samarqandī (d. 373/983), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273), and Shīʿī commentators al-Qummī (d. 329/941), this incident took place upon the Prophet Muḥammad asked for a miracle as evidence for his prophethood by Meccan polytheists. Therefore, these commentators establish a relationship between the splitting of the moon and the prophethood of the prophet Muḥammad. On the other hand, commentators like Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1385/1966) argue that the splitting of the moon cannot be regarded as evidence of the prophethood, citing the fact that the miracles of the Prophet Muḥammad except the Qurʾān were not reported. There is a disagreement about the validity of the narrations related to the events among the commentators, who see the splitting of the moon as a miracle of the Prophet Muḥammad. Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) and Shawkanī (d. 1250/1834) commentators, such as the rumors about this issue as a precise; ibn ʿĀshūr (d. 1879/1973) does not accept the news on this issue as a precise. There are also some commentators who suggest that the splitting the moon will take place in the future. The commentators, who shared this view, especially Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1353/1935) argued that the splitting of the moon did not take place in the past, pointing out that the validity criteria of narrations related to the splitting of the moon, and contradictory issues in the content of the rumors, also most of the people narrated by him/her cannot witness the incident and that it is not possible for people in a certain geography to witness this incident.There are few classical period commentators who suggest that the moon will be split in the future during the apocalypse. The prominent names are al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, (d. 110/728), ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ (d. 114/732) and Abū Bakr al- Aṣamm (d. 200/816). On the other hand, many names such as Rashīd al-Riḍā (d. 1353/1935), al-Marāghī (d. 1364/1945) and al-Shinqīṭī (d. 1394/1974) from the modern period declare that the moon will split during the apocalypse.According to these, in the verses of the al-Qamar 54/1 that apocalyptic scene is mentioned.In the verse, they try to justify the use of the verb meaning of a split in the past tense by introducing some evidence from other verses.According to them, in many verses that speak of apocalyptic scenes, events are expressed in the past tense. There are also commentators who have different evaluations on the way of the occurring event instead of the time concept. Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Muḥyiddīn Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) and Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī (d. 1052/1642) do not see the splitting of the moon as a real split mentioned in the verse of the al-Kamer 54/1. According to them, the event is an optical illusion. Muḥammad Asad (d. 1412/1992) connected this illusion to the lunar eclipse. Trying to explain the splitting of the moon by some commentators is one of the commentary differences in this issue. According to Mawdūdī, who did not see this event scientifically impossible, it is possible to reunite a fragmented star with gravity. Without a doubt, Ṭanṭawī al-Jawharī (d. 1940) is one of the names who make the most striking evaluations in this issue. According to him, the miracle of the moon's splitting has many aspects to shed light on scientific studies. Ṭanṭawī al-Jawharī sees the verse as the sign of the moon instead of any other celestial body, as a sign that the moon had long ago broken off from the world. Therefore, Ṭanṭawī al-Jawharī establishes a relationship between the splitting of the month mentioned in the verse and the theories about the separation of the moon in the modern period.One of the arguments about the splitting of the moon is related to the fineness of the language. Some commentators, who draw attention to the expression of the splitting of the moon, which is the expression in the Qurʾān, argue that the purpose of the separation of the moon is the occurrence of truth. According to the advocates of this view, the Arabs use such a statement to express that a work has come to light. According to this, the term "splitting the moon" as means that the Qurʾān expands the darkness in its period. In summary, the commentators make various comments on different grounds such as the narrative expression of the verse al-Qamar 54/1 regarding the splitting of the moon, the narrations about the event, and the language subtleties. (shrink)

I argue that the following theses are both popular among evidentialists but also jointly inconsistent with evidentialism: 1) Time-Slice Mentalism: one’s justificational properties at t are grounded only by one’s mental properties at t; 2) Experience Ultimacy: all ultimate evidence is experiential; and 3) Sleep Justification: we have justified beliefs while we have dreamless, nonexperiential sleep. Although I intend for this paper to be a polemic against evidentialists, it can also be viewed as an opportunity for them to clarify their (...) views. Furthermore, the paper is not only relevant to evidentialists. For example, the arguments of this paper could give Time-Slice Mentalists a reason to deny evidentialism. (shrink)

Say to the Sun, “Don’t Rise,” and to the Moon, “Don’t Set”: Two Oral Narratives from the Country- side of Maharashtra. Edited and translated by Anne Feldhaus, with Ramdas Atkar and Rajaram Zagade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xii + 632, 3 illus. $99.

Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees. Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude (...) that beliefs do not come in degrees. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In Part 1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In Part 2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in Part 3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only if (...) one believes one might be wrong; I argue that this is superior to the account that says that one has doubt if and only if one has less than the highest degree of confidence. (shrink)

In this article I explore a tantalising definition of cinematic belief as a belief without belief by briefly considering the way in which film theory and film-philosophy have engaged with the question of belief in cinema. I also take into account Simon Critchley’s discussion of religious belief in The Faith of the Faithless (2012) within the context of anthropological studies of religion such as that by Émile Durkheim. In addition, I discuss Sigmund Freud’s 1927 reflection on religion in “The Future (...) of an Illusion”. I then show that this line of thought can be linked to the philosophical discussion around the so-called paradox of fiction and introduce the idea that belief can be understood itself as an emotion or mood. I argue in favour of the solution to the paradox that claims that emotions experienced in response to fictional entities are quasi-emotions but radicalise this claim by showing that this must imply that all emotions are in fact structured like quasi-emotions and that we do not require an essentialist understanding of emotion in the first place. Throughout I use the example of the various cinematic representations of the life of St Francis to flesh out the argument, including Roberto Rossellini’s Francesco, giullare di Dio / Francesco, God’s Jester / The Flowers of St Francis (1950) but particularly Franco Zeffirelli’s much maligned Brother Sun, Sister Moon (1972). (shrink)

Introduction: a day at the shelter -- How can I volunteer at an animal shelter? -- How can I volunteer at a wildlife center? -- How can I volunteer as a citizen scientist? -- How can I Volunteer at a zoo?

In this chapter, we defend an explanationist version of proper functionalism. After explaining proper functionalism’s initial appeal, we note two major objections to proper functionalism: creatures with no design plan who appear to have knowledge (Swampman) and creatures with malfunctions that increase reliability. We then note how proper functionalism needs to be clarified because there are cases of what we call warrant-compatible malfunction. We then formulate our own view: explanationist proper functionalism, which explains the warrant-compatible malfunction cases and helps to (...) block the above objections. We also advance a positive argument for explanationist proper functionalism. (shrink)

G.A. Cohen criticizes Rawls’s account of justice because his difference principle permits inequalities that reflect the relative scarcity of different skills and natural abilities. Instead of viewing the ‘basic structure’ as the primary subject of justice, Cohen argues that individual citizens should cultivate an egalitarian ethos, which would enable a just society to dispense with the use of incentive payments to induce individuals to use their talents in socially ideal ways. This study examines Cohen’s critique, including his rejection of ‘incentives,’ (...) and vindicates Rawls’s approach. Ultimately, Cohen’s argument fails to grapple with the moral pluralism that characterizes modern, democratic societies, whereas Rawls’s theory is constructed to accommodate such pluralism. (shrink)

RésuméEn expliquant la relation entre hypothèses et images dans l'analogie de la ligne du livre Vl de laRépubliquede Platon, je m'attarde d'abordsur l'élucidation platonicienne de la nature des mathématiques telle que la conçoit le mathématicien lui-même. Je poursuis avec une critique des interprétations traditionnelles de cette relation, qui partent de l'assomption douteuse que les mathématiques s'occupent des Formes platoniciennes. Pour formuler mon point de vue sur cette relation, j'exploite la notion de «structure». Je montre comment les «hypothèses» comme principes de (...) preuve peuvent déterminer les structures des «images» par lesquelles les structures intelligibles correspondantes des objets mathématiques en viennent à être connues. (shrink)

RésuméEn expliquant la relation entre hypothèses et images dans l'analogie de la ligne du livre Vl de laRépubliquede Platon, je m'attarde d'abordsur l'élucidation platonicienne de la nature des mathématiques telle que la conçoit le mathématicien lui-même. Je poursuis avec une critique des interprétations traditionnelles de cette relation, qui partent de l'assomption douteuse que les mathématiques s'occupent des Formes platoniciennes. Pour formuler mon point de vue sur cette relation, j'exploite la notion de «structure». Je montre comment les «hypothèses» comme principes de (...) preuve peuvent déterminer les structures des «images» par lesquelles les structures intelligibles correspondantes des objets mathématiques en viennent à être connues. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough the Life-Sustaining Treatment (LST) Decision Act was enforced in 2018 in Korea, data on whether it is well established in actual clinical settings are limited. Hospital-acquired pneumonia (HAP) is a common nosocomial infection with high mortality. However, there are limited data on the end-of-life (EOL) decision of patients with HAP. Therefore, we aimed to examine clinical characteristics and outcomes according to the EOL decision for patients with HAP.MethodsThis multicenter study enrolled patients with HAP at 16 referral hospitals retrospectively from (...) January to December 2019. EOL decisions included do-not-resuscitate (DNR), withholding of LST, and withdrawal of LST. Descriptive and Kaplan–Meier curve analyses for survival were performed.ResultsOf 1,131 patients with HAP, 283 deceased patients with EOL decisions (105 cases of DNR, 108 cases of withholding of LST, and 70 cases of withdrawal of LST) were analyzed. The median age was 74 (IQR 63–81) years. The prevalence of solid malignant tumors was high (32.4% vs. 46.3% vs. 54.3%, P = 0.011), and the ICU admission rate was lower (42.9% vs. 35.2% vs. 24.3%, P = 0.042) in the withdrawal group. The prevalence of multidrug-resistant pathogens, impaired consciousness, and cough was significantly lower in the withdrawal group. Kaplan–Meier curve analysis revealed that 30-day and 60-day survival rates were higher in the withdrawal group than in the DNR and withholding groups (log-rank P = 0.021 and 0.018). The survival of the withdrawal group was markedly decreased after 40 days; thus, the withdrawal decision was made around this time. Among patients aged below 80 years, the rates of EOL decisions were not different (P = 0.430); however, mong patients aged over 80 years, the rate of withdrawal was significantly lower than that of DNR and withholding (P = 0.001).ConclusionsAfter the LST Decision Act was enforced in Korea, a DNR order was still common in EOL decisions. Baseline characteristics and outcomes were similar between the DNR and withholding groups; however, differences were observed in the withdrawal group. Withdrawal decisions seemed to be made at the late stage of dying. Therefore, advance care planning for patients with HAP is needed. (shrink)

Abstract This essay explores what it means to be human in an age of infomedia. Appropriating Niklas Luhmann's systems theory/media theory in dialogue with other resources, I propose a post-Luhmannian paradigm of (1) extended media/meaning that conceives the world as world multimedia systems processing variegated meanings, and (2) an embodied, contextualized soft posthumanist anthropology that conceives the human as emergent collective phenomena of distinct meaning making by body-mind-society-technology media couplings. I argue: (1) Homo sapiens is Homo medialis distinct with mediatic (...) communication that emerged to cope with contingencies. (2) Evolution is the mediatization/codification of the world that culminated with the outcome of Homo medialis uniquely equipped to process transcendent meanings and to mediatize the world via diverse media—Mediatized Co-Mediatizer or Codified Co-Codifier. (3) This anthropic universe is possibly the most “meaningful” (full of meaning possibilities) of all possible worlds. (4) Social fragmentation could be an optimization; science-and-religion is an infomedium optimizing religion's manifest and science’ latent observation of divine manifestations. (shrink)