Metaknowledge may not always facilitate acquisition of knowledge or performance of complex tasks. A pigeon, for example, depending on the task, can report what it is doing even if it cannot perform the task well, and it can fail to report what it is doing when it performs the task well (Shimp 1982; 1983).

In the following dialogue between TT - a foundationalist - and WdeV - a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of (...) the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.' In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge - that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars's principle. WdeV defends Sellars's metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars's principle are debated. (shrink)

Do I know that my chair won’t sprout wings and fly away? I know that it would be needlessly anomaly-generative to believe that it will. Setting aside limiting-cases, such as my knowledge that I am conscious, what we refer to as knowing that such-and-such is really knowledge that it would be needlessly anomaly-generative to believe otherwise. Consequently, what we typically refer to knowing that such-and-such is the case is really meta-knowledge to the effect that granting such-and-such eliminates mysteries and denying (...) it creates them. (shrink)

This paper presents a four layer model for working with legal knowledge in expert systems. It distinguishes five sources of knowledge. Four contain basic legal knowledge found in published and unpublished sources. The fifth consists of legal metaknowledge. In the model the four basic legal knowledge sources are placed at the lowest level. The metaknowledge is placed at levels above the other four knowledge sources. The assumption is that the knowledge is represented only once. The use of (...) class='Hi'>metaknowledge at various levels should make it possible to use the appropriate knowledge for the problem presented to the system. The knowledge has to be represented as closely to the original format as possible for this purpose. Suitable representation formalisms for the various types of knowledge in the five knowledge sources are discussed. It is not possible to indicate a best representation formalism for each knowledge source. (shrink)

Realists typically suppose that nonepistemic truth is an independent condition on propositional knowledge. Few philosophers, however, have seriously questioned the meta-epistemic consequences of combining alethic and epistemic variants of realism. In this paper I aim to show that the truth condition in the customary definition of knowledge presents an important problem for the realist at higher epistemic levels. According to my argument, traditional epistemic-logical analyses of metaknowledge fail because of their extensionalism and certain presuppositions they have about the satisfaction (...) of the truth condition. I further suggest that we need a different approach to metaknowledge if (1) we want to retain alethic realism, and (2) we want our epistemological accounts to adequately explicate the meta-epistemic states of actual, evidence-bound cognitive agents. (shrink)

Leibniz said with a mixture of admiration and inspiration that the Duchess Sophie of Hannover always wanted to know the reason why behind the reason why. And that is just how rationality works: it wants to leave no loose ends to understanding, seeking to enable us to understand things through to the bitter end. In the twelve chapters that make up Satisfying Reason, Rescher develops and defends the following perspective: That rationality is a cardinal virtue in cognitive matters. That this (...) is not something simple and cut-and-dried: in the pursuit of truth through the development of knowledge we face obstacles -- sometimes even insuperable ones. All that we can do is the best we can, realizing that even our very best may still be imperfect. Nevertheless, the venture is far from hopeless. While absolutes are unattainable in the cognitive venture, some solutions are situationally optimal, being comparatively the best that can be managed under the circumstances. That reason itself enables us to come to terms with this state of affairs, urging us to accept the best we can do as good enough. Satisfying Reason is an explanation of the presuppositions and methods of rational enquiry, an original exercise in metaknowledge, developing a systematic body of knowledge about the scope and limits of knowledge itself. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to sketch an idea—seen from the point of view of a cognitive scientist—of cognitive semiotics as a discipline. Consequently, the article presents aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines: semiotics and cognitive science. The main assumption of the argumentation is that at least some semiotic processes are also cognitive processes. At the methodological level, this claim allows for application of cognitive models as explanations of selected semiotic processes. In particular, the processes of embedded (...) interpretation are considered: belief revision, dynamic organization of meaning and metaknowledge. The explanations are formulated in terms of artificial cognitive agents of the GLAIR/SNePS cognitive architecture. Finally, it is suggested that even if someone rejects the idea of artificial cognitive systems as simulations of semiotic processes, they may acknowledge the usefulness of cognitive modeling in analysis of semiotic processes in virtual, simulated worlds and in the area of “new media”. (shrink)

A representation methodology for knowledge allowing multiple interpretations is described. It is based on the following conception of legal knowledge and its open texture. Since indeterminate, legal knowledge must be adapted to fit the circumstances of the cases to which it is applied. Whether a certain adaptation is lawful or not is measured by metaknowledge. But as this too is indeterminate, its adaptation to the case must be measured by metametaknowledge, etc. This hierarchical model of law is quite well-established (...) and may serve well as a basis for a legal knowledge system. To account for the indeterminacy of law such a system should support the construction of different arguments for and against various interpretations of legal sources. However, automatizing this reasoning fully is unsound since it would imply a restriction to arguments defending interpretations anticipated at programming time. Therefore, the system must be interactive and the user''s knowledge be furnished in a principled way. Contrary to the widespread opinion that classical logic is inadequate for representing open-textured knowledge, the framework outlined herein is given a formalization in first order logic. (shrink)

Canonical theists insist that the Church initially canonized a Trinitarian ontology, leaving epistemic convictions to speak for themselves. Pursuing epistemology is a vital exercise in its own right. Within this, particularism is compatible with metaknowledge, with a doctrine of analogy, and with the propositional content of Christian theism. We can also build on past insights and accommodate ordinary believers who have no idea what epistemology is. This program overlaps with the work of Plantinga but differs in its analysis of (...) the Holy Spirit and argues that a diachronic account of warrant can better handle the problems to be faced. (shrink)

The book is a collection of papers and aims to unify the questions of syntax and semantics of language, which are included in logic, philosophy and ontology of language. The leading motif of the presented selection of works is the differentiation between linguistic tokens (material, concrete objects) and linguistic types (ideal, abstract objects) following two philosophical trends: nominalism (concretism) and Platonizing version of realism. The opening article under the title “The Dual Ontological Nature of Language Signs and the Problem of (...) Their Mutual Relations” provides a broad introduction into the problem area connected with this differentiation, while the logic-formal characteristics of the distinction are framed in the work entitled “On the Type-Token Relationships” (Chapter 1). The basic part of the book deals with issues relating to syntax (Chapters 2-4) and semantics of language (Chapters 5-6), as well as pertaining to syntactic-semantic pragmatic questions (Chapters 7-13). Throughout the book, language, categorial language, is characterized syntactically as generated by classical categorial grammar (Chapter 2) and formalized on two opposing levels: as language of expression-tokens (level of tokens) and language of expression-types (level of types). The author’s considerations contained in Chapters 2 and 4 lead to the important philosophical conclusion that in formal-logical syntactic studies on language the assumption that expression-types constitute the primary language layer while expression-tokens make the secondary one, can be neglected; thus, this speaks in favour of the opposing standpoint—the concretistic one—in the ontology of language syntax. In the works “Meaning and Interpretations”, Parts I and II (Chapters 5 and 6), it is underlined, however, that such semantic concepts as: meaning, denotation and interpretation are defined on the types level, yet their formal definitions require making use of notions of the tokens level. The semantic notions introduced in the above-mentioned articles are also used in the following works of the present selection, under the titles: “Three Principles of Compositionality” and “On Metaknowledge and Truth” (Chapters 7 and 8). They formalize two principles of compositionality that are well known in the literature on the subject, deriving from Frege, i.e. those of meaning and of denotation; they are related to the syntactic principle of compositionality which was introduced by the author. All the three principles are, at the same time, three conditions of homomorphism of categorial language algebra into three kinds of non-standard models of language (one syntactic and two semantic ones: intensional and extensional), which allows introducing three definitions of truthfulness into these models. The next two works in the collection, entitled: “On Language Adequacy” and “What is the Sense in Logic and Philosophy of Language” (Chapters 9 and 10) concern adequacy of categorial language syntax along with its dual semantics: intensional and extensional, and categorial compatibility of any of its syntactic categories with two corresponding semantic categories: intensional and extensional, based on the compatibility the syntactic category of each language expression with the ontological category assigned to its denotatum. The well-known problem of categorial compatibility for first-order quantifiers finds its solution in the paper “Categories of First-Order Quantifiers” (Chapter 11). In the work “Logic and Ontology of Language” (Chapter 12), being in a sense a summary of the considerations presented in the preceding chapters of the book, language is treated as an ontological being, characterized in compliance with the logical conception of language proposed by Ajdukiewicz. Application—like throughout the book—of tools of classical logic and set theory has resulted in emergence of a general formal logical theory of syntax, semantics and pragmatics of language, which takes into account duality in the understanding of linguistic expressions as tokens (concretes) and types (abstract objects). In terms that take into account a functional approach to language itself, there comes out an ontological neutrality of logic with respect to existential assumptions relating to the ontological nature of linguistic expressions and their extra-linguistic ontological counterparts. The issues connected with applying logic while explaining the manner of using linguistic tokens and linguistic types to determine notions of language communication are raised and illustrated in the last chapter of the work, bearing the title “A Logical Conceptualization of Knowledge on the Notion of Language Communication”. (shrink)

O problema do critério é um dos mais importantes da epistemologia. A resposta que se dá a ele definirá um aspecto fundamental das teorias do conhecimento. Neste ensaio, o problema do critério é apresentado e algumas das conseqüências geradas pela aceitação de exigências metaepistemicas são analisadas. Em especial, essas conseqüências são avaliadas em relação ao infinitismo – a teoria epistemológica segundo a qual as razões que sustentam nossas crenças devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas. Ao final, sustenta-se que cláusulas (...) que exigem que a metajustificação seja necessária para o conhecimento não apenas tornam as teorias epistemológicas mais plausíveis, mas também que a ausência de tais exigências acaba criando problemas muito difíceis, como o assim chamado “problema do conhecimento fácil”. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Infinitismo. Problema do critério. Metajustificação. Conhecimento. Metaconhecimento. Ceticismo. ABSTRACT This essay discusses the Problem of the Criterion, one of the most important problems in Epistemology. The answer given to this problem will shape a fundamental aspect of theories of knowledge. It also analyzes some of the consequences epistemological theories may face in accepting metaepistemological requirements. These consequences are given special consideration with regard to Infinitism, the epistemological theory according to which the reasons that support our beliefs must be infinite and non-repeating. Finally, this essay claims not only that those propositions that require metajustification make any theory, even Infinitism, more plausible, but also that the absence of such requirements creates difficult problems, such as the so-called “Problem of Easy Knowledge.” KEY WORDS – Infinitism. Problem of the Criterion. Metajustification. Knowledge. Metaknowledge. Skepticism. (shrink)

Smith et al. demonstrate the viability of animal metacognition research. We commend their effort and suggest three avenues of research. The first concerns whether animals are explicitly aware of their metacognitive processes. The second asks whether animals have metaknowledge of their own uncertain responses. The third issue concerns the monitoring/control distinction. We suggest some ways in which these issues elucidate metacognitive processes in nonhuman animals.

A rule-based expert system is demonstrated to have both a symbolic computational network representation and a sub-symbolic connectionist representation. These alternate views enhance the usefulness of the original system by facilitating introduction of connectionist learning methods into the symbolic domain. The connectionist representation learns and stores metaknowledge in highly connected subnetworks and domain knowledge in a sparsely connected expert network superstructure. The total connectivity of the neural network representation approximates that of real neural systems and hence avoids scaling and (...) memory stability problems associated with other connectionist models. (shrink)