Results for 'mental contents'

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  1.  9
    Mental content.Colin McGinn - 1989 - New York, NY, USA:
    Aimed at philsophy graduates this book investigates mental content in a systematic way and advances a number of claims about how mental content states are related to the body and the world. Internalism is the thesis that they are; externalism is the theory that they are not.
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  2. Is mental content prior to linguistic meaning?: Stalnaker on intentionality.Jeff Speaks - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):428-467.
    Since the 1960's, work in the analytic tradition on the nature of mental and linguistic content has converged on the views that social facts about public language meaning are derived from facts about the thoughts of individuals, and that these thoughts are constituted by properties of the internal states of agents. I give a two-part argument against this picture of intentionality: first, that if mental content is prior to public language meaning, then a view of mental content (...)
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  3. Narrow mental content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it (...)
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  4.  35
    Mental contents, tracking counterfactuals, and implementing mechanisms.Josep E. Corbí & Josep L. Prades - 2000 - In Josep E. Corbí & Josep L. Prades (eds.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 1-11.
    In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine-grained (...)
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  5. Mental content and external representations: Internalism, anti-internalism.David Houghton - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):159-77.
    According to ‘internalism’, what mental states people are in depends wholly on what obtains inside their heads. This paper challenges that view without relying on arguments about the identity‐conditions of concepts that make up the content of mental states. Instead, it questions the internalist’s underlying assumption that, in Searle’s words, “the brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves”, which neglects the fact that human beings have used their brains to devise methods (...)
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  6. Mental content.Colin Allen - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (4):537-553.
    Daniel Dennett and Stephen Stich have independently, but similarly, argued that the contents of mental states cannot be specified precisely enough for the purposes of scientific prediction and explanation. Dennett takes this to support his view that the proper role for mentalistic terms in science is heuristic. Stich takes it to support his view that cognitive science should be done without reference to mental content at all. I defend a realist understanding of mental content against these (...)
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  7. Why mental content is not like water: reconsidering the reductive claims of teleosemantics.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2271-2290.
    According to standard teleosemantics, intentional states are selectional states. This claim is put forward not as a conceptual analysis, but as a ‘theoretical reduction’—an a posteriori hypothesis analogous to ‘water = H2O’. Critics have tried to show that this meta-theoretical conception of teleosemantics leads to unacceptable consequences. In this paper, I argue that there is indeed a fundamental problem with the water/H2O analogy, as it is usually construed, and that teleosemanticists should therefore reject it. Fortunately, there exists a viable alternative (...)
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  8.  53
    Mental content and hot self-knowledge.Bernard W. Kobes - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):71-99.
  9.  67
    Mental content and hot self-knowledge.Bernard W. Kobes - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 71-99.
  10. Mental Content.Colin McGinn - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
  11. Mental content and evolutionary explanation.Colin Allen - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.
    Cognitive ethology is the comparative study of animal cognition from an evolutionary perspective. As a sub-discipline of biology it shares interest in questions concerning the immediate causes and development of behavior. As a part of ethology it is also concerned with questions about the function and evolution of behavior. I examine some recent work in cognitive ethology, and I argue that the notions of mental content and representation are important to enable researchers to answer questions and state generalizations about (...)
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  12.  34
    Mental content.Peter Schulte - 2023 - Cambridge University Press.
    This Element provides a comprehensive introduction to contemporary theories of mental content. After clarifying central concepts and identifying the questions that dominate the current debate, it presents and discusses the principal accounts of the nature of mental content (or mental representation), which include causal, informational, teleological and structuralist approaches, alongside the phenomenal intentionality approach and the intentional stance theory. Additionally, it examines anti-representationalist accounts which question either the existence or the explanatory relevance of mental content. Finally, (...)
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  13. The Transparency of Mental Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.
    I believe that the notion of epistemic transparency does play an important role in our ordinary conception of mental content and I want to say what that role is. Unfortunately, the task is a large one; here I am able only to begin on its outline. I shall proceed somewhat indirectly, beginning with a discussion of externalist conceptions of mental content. I shall show that such conceptions violate epistemic transparency to an extent that has not been fully appreciated. (...)
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  14.  22
    Mental Content.Jay L. Garfield - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):691.
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  15. Does Kantian mental content externalism help metaphysical realists?Axel Mueller - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):449-473.
    Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by conditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of representation and cognitive significance have been able to show that Kant is committed to a certain form of Mental Content Externalism, and therefore to the realist view that the objects involved (...)
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  16. Nonconceptual mental content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  17.  60
    Mental content: Many semantics, one single project.Liza Skidelsky - 2003 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 38 (82):31-55.
  18.  98
    Connectionism, analogicity and mental content.Gerard O'Brien - 1998 - Acta Analytica 13:111-31.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism (...)
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  19. Function, modality, mental content.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (2):84-87.
    I clarify some of the details of the modal theory of function I outlined in Nanay (2010): (a) I explicate what it means that the function of a token biological trait is fixed by modal facts; (b) I address an objection to my trait type individuation argument against etiological function and (c) I examine the consequences of replacing the etiological theory of function with a modal theory for the prospects of using the concept of biological function to explain mental (...)
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  20.  83
    Mental Contents, Transparency, Realism: News from the Phenomenological Camp.Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl - 2013 - Husserl Studies 29 (1):33-50.
  21.  44
    Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms.Josep E. Corbí & Josep L. Prades - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:1-11.
    In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine-grained (...)
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  22. Mental content and the division of epistemic labour.Christopher Gauker - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):302-18.
    Tyler Burge's critique of individualistic conceptions of mental content is well known.This paper employs a novel strategy to defend a strong form of Burge's conclusion. The division of epistemic labor rests on the possibility of language-mediated transactions, such as asking for something in a store and getting it. The paper shows that any individualistic conception of content will render such transactions unintelligible.
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  23. Can mental content explain behavior?Pierre Jacob - 2002 - In Languages of the Brain.
    I scrutinize the argument for why externally individuated mental content might not be causally efficacious in the explanation of an individual's physical movements. I argue that even though externalististically construed mental content might not explain an individual's physical movements, it might nonetheless explain his or her behavior on a componential view of behavior according to which an individual's physical movement is a component of his or her behavior.
     
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  24.  23
    Mental Content Externalism and Social Understanding.Halvor Nordby - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-9.
    Tyler Burge has in many writings distinguished between mental content externalism based on incorrect understanding and mental content externalism based on partial but not incorrect understanding. Both and have far-reaching implications for analyses of communication and concept possession in various expert-layperson relations, but Burge and his critics have mainly focused on . This article first argues that escapes the most influential objection to . I then raise an objection against Burge’s argument for . The objection focuses on Burge’s (...)
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  25.  75
    Causal Theories of Mental Content: Where is the "Causal Element" and How Does it Make Intentionality Relational?Mindaugas Gilaitis - 2015 - Problemos 87:19-30.
    This paper has two interrelated aims. The primary aim is to specify the character of philosophical theories of mental content that are usually classified as ‘Causal Theories of Intentionality’, ‘Causal Theories of Representation’, or ‘Causal Theories of Mental Content’ (CTs). More specifically, the aim is to characterize the role and place of causation in philosophical reflections on the nature of mental content, as suggested by theories of this kind. Elucidation of the role of the concept of causation (...)
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  26.  64
    The supervenience of mental content.Manuel García-Carpintero - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:117-135.
    Defends the supervenience of mental content under an externalist view of both contents and the supervenience base.
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  27. Causation and Mental Content: Against the Externalist Interpretation of Ockham.Susan Brower-Toland - 2017 - In Magali E. Roques & Jennifer Pelletier (eds.), The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy. Cham: Springer.
    On the dominant interpretation, Ockham is an externalist about mental content. This reading is founded principally on his theory of intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition plays a foundational role in Ockham’s account of concept formation and judgment, and Ockham insists that the content of intuitive states is determined by the causal relations such states bear to their objects. The aim of this paper is to challenge the externalist interpretation by situating Ockham’s account of intuitive cognition vis-à-vis his broader account of (...)
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  28.  14
    Mental Content and Hot Self-Knowledge.Bernard W. Kobes - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):71-99.
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  29. Personal identity and mental content.James Baillie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts (...)
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  30. Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.
    I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases", "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence plays the central role in fixing mental content and ruling out deviant (...)
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  31. Externalism about mental content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.
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  32. Can mental content explain behavior?Pierre Jacob - 2002 - In Languages of the Brain.
    I scrutinize the argument for why externally individuated mental content might not be causally efficacious in the explanation of an individual's physical movements. I argue that even though externalististically construed mental content might not explain an individual's physical movements, it might nonetheless explain his or her behavior on a componential view of behavior according to which an individual's physical movement is a component of his or her behavior.
     
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  33. Causal theories of mental content.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about (...)
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  34. Causal theories of mental content.Robert D. Rupert - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.
    Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. Section 1 explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. Section 2 specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. Sections 3, 4, and 5 critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, Dan Ryder, and (...)
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  35. Mental Content and Skepticism in Descartes and Spinoza.Michael Della Rocca - 1995 - Studia Spinozana: An International and Interdisciplinary Series 10:19-42.
  36. Normativity and mental content.Jussi Haukioja - 2005 - In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.
     
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  37.  27
    Mental Content by Colin McGinn. [REVIEW]Pierre Jacob - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):723-728.
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  38.  69
    Joint attention to mental content and the social origin of reasoning.Cathal O’Madagain & Michael Tomasello - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4057-4078.
    Growing evidence indicates that our higher rational capacities depend on social interaction—that only through engaging with others do we acquire the ability to evaluate beliefs as true or false, or to reflect on and evaluate the reasons that support our beliefs. Up to now, however, we have had little understanding of how this works. Here we argue that a uniquely human socio-linguistic phenomenon which we call ‘joint attention to mental content’ plays a key role. JAM is the ability to (...)
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  39. Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions. # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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  40.  48
    VII*—The Supervenience of Mental Content.Manuel García-Carpintero - 19934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:117-136.
    The paper discusses the criticism of externalist theories of content which, on the basis of "Twin Earth" considerations, claims that such theories cannot make intentional properties supervenient on basic, intrinsic properties of the organism -- while supervenience is a necessary condition for the causal efficacy of any macro-property. The paper accepts the supervenience requirement, understood as arising from a requirement that macro- properties should be explained by micro- properties. It points out, however, that as a consequence of this, the modality (...)
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  41.  23
    Mental Content.Michael Levin - 1993 - Noûs 27 (1):137-139.
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  42. Can mental content externalism prove realism?Axel Mueller - manuscript
    Recently, Kenneth Westphal has presented a highly interesting and innovative reading of Kant's critical philosophy.2 This reading continues a tradition of Kantscholarship of which, e.g., Paul Guyer's work is representative, and in which the antiidealistic potential of Kant's critical philosophy is pitted against its idealistic selfunderstanding. Much of the work in this tradition leaves matters at observing the tensions this introduces in Kant's work. But Westphal's proposed interpretation goes farther. Its attractiveness derives for the most part from the promise that (...)
     
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  43. Mental Content, Teleological Theories of.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
     
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  44. An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content.Todd Buras - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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  45. How to think about mental content.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.
    Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...)
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  46. Placement, grounding, and mental content.Kelly Trogdon - 2015 - In Chris Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 481-496.
    Grounding-theoretic reformulation of Fodor's theory of content that addresses recalcitrant Quinean concerns.
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  47. A Trilemma about Mental Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - In Schear Joseph (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-world. Routledge. pp. 272-282.
    Schellenberg sheds light on the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role and nature of concepts in perceptual experience, by considering the following trilemma: (C1) Non-rational animals and humans can be in mental states with the same kind of content when they are perceptually related to the very same environment. (C2) Non-rational animals do not possess concepts. (C3) Content is constituted by modes of presentations and is, thus, conceptually structured. She discusses reasons for accepting and rejecting each (...)
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  48. Mental Content.Jaegwon Kim - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
  49. Mental content and skepticism in Descartes and Spinoza.Michael Della Roca - 1994 - Studia Spinozana: An International and Interdisciplinary Series 10:19-42.
  50.  8
    Reflexive Transparency, Mental Content, and Externalism.Paul Bernier - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 35:46-53.
    It has been disputed whether an externalist conception of the individuation of intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, is compatible with self-knowledge, that is, the claim that one's judgments about one's intentional states are non-evidential, non-inferential, and authoritative. I want to argue that these theses are indeed incompatible, notwithstanding an important objection to this incompatibility claim. The worry has been raised that if externalism is true, then for a subject to know, say, that he or she believes that p, (...)
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