"This is a most timely, intelligent, well-written, and absorbing essay on a central and painful social and political problem of out time."--Sir Isaiah Berlin"The major achievement of this remarkable book is a critical theory of nationalism, worked through historical and contemporary examples, explaining the value of national commitments and defining their moral limits. Tamir explores a set of problems that philosophers have been notably reluctant to take on, and leaves us all in her debt."--Michael WalzerIn this provocative work, Yael (...) Tamir urges liberals not to surrender the concept of nationalism to conservative, chauvinist, or racist ideologies. In her view, liberalism, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice, and nationalism, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity are not irreconcilable. Here she offers a new theory, "liberal nationalism," which allows each set of values to accommodate the other. Tamir sees nationalism as an affirmation of communal and cultural memberships and as a quest for recognition and self-respect. Persuasively she argues that national groups can enjoy these benefits through political arrangements other than the nation-state. While acknowledging that nationalism places members of national minorities at a disadvantage, the author offers guidelines for alleviating the problems involved using examples from currents conflicts in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe.Liberal Nationalismis an impressive attempt to tie together a wide range of issues often kept apart: personal autonomy, cultural membership, political obligations, particularity versus impartiality in moral duties, and global justice. Drawing on material from disparate fields--including political philosophy, ethics, law, and sociology--Tamir brings out important and previously unnoticed interconnections between them, offering a new perspective on the influence of nationalism on modern political philosophy. (shrink)

This essay sets out from the strain of liberal political thought which, in recent years, has come to the defence of nationalism, and raises some preliminary thoughts concerning its appropriate application to the very concrete issue of national territorial rights. It asks what type of justifications could be morally acceptable to “liberal nationalism” for the acquisition and holding of territory. To this end, the paper takes a brief look at five central arguments for territorial entitlement which (...) have become predominant in political debates. These are: so called “historical rights” to territory; demands for territorial restitution; efficiency arguments; claims of entitlement to territories settled by co‐nationals; and lastly, territorial demands based on claims of equal entitlement to the earth's natural resources. These popular arguments point towards several potential criteria for the arbitration of territorial conflicts. The paper attempts to outline the morally relevant guidelines for thinking about territorial issues that flow from, or are at least consistent with, applying liberal values to the national phenomenon. It places the territorial aspect of nationalism at the head of the liberal nationalist agenda and offers an initial common ground for discussion (including disagreement) among liberals, and for the mediation of claims between nations. (shrink)

Liberal nationalists advance two claims: (1) an empirical claim that nationalism is functionally indispensable to the viability of liberal democracy (because it is necessary to social integration) and (2) a normative claim that some forms of nationalism are compatible with liberal democratic norms. The empirical claim is often supported, against postnationalists’ view that social integration can bypass ethnicity and nationality, by pointing to the inevitable ethnic and cultural particularities of all political institutions. I argue that (...) (1) the argument that ethno-cultural particularity demonstrates the need for nationalist integration depends on an implausible reification of national identity at the level of social theory, and that (2) this reification ironically serves to undermine liberal nationalists’ normative claim. (shrink)

Over the past ten years or so, the position of Liberal Nationalism has progressed from being an apparent oxymoron to a widely accepted view. In this paper I sketch the most prominent liberal defenses of nationalism, focusing first on the difficulties of specifying criteria of nationhood, then criticizing what I take to be the most promising, culture-based defense, forwarded by Will Kymlicka. I argue that such an approach embroils one in a pernicious conservatism completely at odds (...) with the global justice concerns that I take to be central to liberalism with its core values of equality and liberty. (shrink)

Many liberals have argued that a cosmopolitan perspective on global justice follows from the basic liberal principles of justice. Yet, increasingly, it is also said that intrinsic to liberalism is a doctrine of nationalism. This raises a potential problem for the liberal defense of cosmopolitan justice as it is commonly believed that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are conflicting ideals. If this is correct, there appears to be a serious tension within liberal philosophy itself, between its cosmopolitan (...) aspiration on the one hand, and its nationalist agenda on the other. I argue, however, that this alleged conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan liberalism disappears once we get clear on the scope and goals of cosmopolitan justice and the parameters of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan global justice, properly understood, are mutually compatible ideals. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Defining the Terms The Global Democratic Potentials of Liberal Nationalism's Main Tenets David Miller's Account The Exclusion Problem Acknowledgments References.

To respond to globalization‐related challenges, many contemporary political theorists have argued for forms of democracy beyond the level of the nation‐state. Since the early 1990s, however, political theory has also witnessed a renewed normative defense of nationhood. Liberal nationalists have been influential in claiming that the state should protect and promote national identities, and that it is desirable that the boundaries of national and political units coincide. At first glance, both positions—global democracy and nationalism—seem to contradict each other. (...) We do not share this oppositional picture. Developing a more harmonic picture of nationalist ideals and cosmopolitan visions is the aim of this essay. (shrink)

Abstract: To respond to globalization-related challenges, many contemporary political theorists have argued for forms of democracy beyond the level of the nation-state. Since the early 1990s, however, political theory has also witnessed a renewed normative defense of nationhood. Liberal nationalists have been influential in claiming that the state should protect and promote national identities, and that it is desirable that the boundaries of national and political units coincide. At first glance, both positions—global democracy and nationalism—seem to contradict each (...) other. We do not share this oppositional picture. Developing a more harmonic picture of nationalist ideals and cosmopolitan visions is the aim of this essay. (shrink)

To respond to globalization-related challenges, many contemporary political theorists have argued for forms of democracy beyond the level of the nation-state. Since the early 1990s, however, political theory has also witnessed a renewed normative defense of nationhood. Liberal nationalists have been influential in claiming that the state should protect and promote national identities, and that it is desirable that the boundaries of national and political units coincide. At first glance, both positions - global democracy and nationalism -seem to (...) contradict each other. We do not share this oppositional picture. Developing a more harmonic picture of nationalist ideals and cosmopolitan visions is the aim of this essay. © 2009 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (shrink)

This essay sets out from the strain of liberal political thought which, in recent years, has come to the defence of nationalism, and raises some preliminary thoughts concerning its appropriate application to the very concrete issue of national territorial rights. It asks what type of justifications could be morally acceptable to “liberal nationalism” for the acquisition and holding of territory. To this end, the paper takes a brief look at five central arguments for territorial entitlement which (...) have become predominant in political debates. These are: so called “historical rights” to territory; demands for territorial restitution; efficiency arguments; claims of entitlement to territories settled by co‐nationals; and lastly, territorial demands based on claims of equal entitlement to the earth's natural resources. These popular arguments point towards several potential criteria for the arbitration of territorial conflicts. The paper attempts to outline the morally relevant guidelines for thinking about territorial issues that flow from, or are at least consistent with, applying liberal values to the national phenomenon. It places the territorial aspect of nationalism at the head of the liberal nationalist agenda and offers an initial common ground for discussion among liberals, and for the mediation of claims between nations. (shrink)

Must liberalism, in dealing with issues of basic rights and primary goods, take into account national belonging as a particularly important form of cultural belonging? The paper first discusses liberalism which is frequently defined as difference-blind and which considers citizens solely on the basis of some of their abstract and common features. The alternative position is liberal nationalism, according to which individuals and their primary goods stand at the center of considerations of justice, but which also finds it (...) impossible to ignore cultural belonging when discussing primary goods and basic rights of individuals. In discussing the strategy which affirms national cultural belonging as a precondition for autonomy, an attempt is made to show that this is not a sufficient basis for the role of a special national cultural belonging in the definition of primary goods, because even if a national cultural belonging is needed for practicing autonomy, specific national cultural belonging isn’t. (shrink)

This paper sketches some developments in the discussion of liberal nationalism since the early 1990s and proposes a generic understanding of nationalism according to which its main feature is the act of sorting people into members and non-members of the nation with a view to regulating access to political goods linked to the state. One discussion of liberal nationalism that has recently received renewed attention is the relation between nationalism and multiculturalism. Liberal (...) class='Hi'>nationalism sees nationalism as a response to increased diversity and involves normative demands on nationalism for accommodating this diversity. In light of the proposed generic understanding of nationalism, the question arises whether such a liberal nationalism is coherent. This question requires us to distinguish between a substantive and a performative perspective on nationalism, raising the possibility that liberal nationalism can be substantively coherent but performatively incoherent. (shrink)

In recent times, the world has seen an explosion of episodes of forced migration. Whether another state has led the attack, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or by its own state such as Myanmar, ousting the Rohingyas, this international political reality of forced exit can neither be denied nor ignored. Consequent to the international political reality, some states have tightened their borders as they hold nationalist concerns against immigration of such kind. Their concern stems from the philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>nationalism which claims the protection of borders and sovereignty in light of the influx of refugees and the burden on the state. This paper aims to elaborate on the interaction of political and legal philosophy related to Liberalism and Nationalism. I put forward the hypothesis that the current reality of international politics - the influx of victims of forced migration such as refugees should be rethought with the application of the philosophy of liberal nationalism. Liberalism and nationalism are two very different moral and political philosophies. Liberal claims protect individual freedom, advocate open borders, and promote equality of all before the law and consent of the governed. Nationalist philosophy promotes the interests of the state, and advocates devotion to the state, its ideology, culture and ethos. In the context of forced migration, the ideas of these disunited philosophies can be utilised to balance and accommodate the concerns of refugees, states and citizens. For this, I will examine the philosophies of liberalism, nationalism and liberal nationalism, which present an inclusive form of nationalism. (shrink)

There are nationalisms and nationalisms, and as nationalisms vary from barbarous and murderous to benign and, all things considered, perhaps desirable, so theories of nationalism vary from irrational or turgid metaphysical accounts to reasonable and carefully articulated and argued theories of nationalism. André Van de Putte has well described some of the former while David Miller, Yael Tamir, Geneviève Nootens, Ross Poole, and Robert X. Ware have carefully argued for some modest forms of nationalism, sometimes explicitly and (...) sometimes only by implication. But there are also, as the reader will have seen, forcefully argued and systematic theories setting themselves against even the most sophisticated and plausible defences of nationalism. The articles of Harry Brighouse, Omar Dahbour, and Andrew Levine fall explicitly into that category and, we would argue, so does Allen Buchanan's carefully wrought article, though implicitly and by implication but not by programmatic intent. (shrink)

Critics claim that liberalism provides an inadequate foundation for nationalism because of its supposed abstractness, universalism, rationalism, and excessive individualism. This essay refutes this claim by arguing that Locke facilitated the emergence of an historically important variety of modern nationalism grounded in liberal individualism which supports a coherent theory of collective rights and national identity. Unlike other forms of nationalism, liberal nationalism insists that the struggle for self-determination has as its purpose the protection of (...) individual freedom. By advocating popular sovereignty and reconceptualizing the meaning of political rights, Locke provided theoretical assumptions that undermined traditional pre-nationalist political theory. (shrink)

The view that social justice takes priority over both global justice and the demands of sub-groups faces two critics. Particularist critics ask why societies should have fundamental significance compared with other groups as far as justice is concerned. Cosmopolitan critics ask why any social unit short of humanity as a whole should have fundamental significance as far as justice is concerned. One way of trying to answer these critics is to show that members of societies have special obligations to one (...) another. This paper considers voluntarist and liberal nationalist accounts of such special obligations. It is especially concerned with developing a strong, sympathetic case for the less familiar nationalist position. Nonetheless, in each case the best arguments against the cosmopolitan critic require important concessions to the particularist critic. This suggests that there is a general problem with defending social justice against both critics at the same time. (shrink)

A nationalist theory of the modern state holds that territorial states should be constituted as nations composed of people who in some sense belong with each other as members of their country. Liberal philosophers have defended this view on the grounds that nationality creates the solidarity necessary for social justice. Their argument is troubled by the case of the United States, where nationality is strong but solidarity weak. According to the best empirical studies, the fundamental reason for the American (...) exception is not libertarian political culture, but white anti-black racism. This essay makes the case that an open border policy with Mexico and other Latina/o states is likely to weaken the national identity now widely held in the United States, but increase the political prospects for racial justice. It follows that a liberal nationalist justification for excluding undocumented Latina/o immigrants from membership in U.S. society should be rejected. (shrink)

It is often alleged that liberalism and nationalism are mutually antagonistic in theory and practice. Max Weber is a good example, the dominant interpretation maintains, as his political thought betrays its liberal foundation by embracing an ardent nationalism that was popular in Wilhelmine Germany. Weber was, in short, a nationalist, and thus illiberal, political thinker. Against this conventional wisdom I argue that Weber's liberal nationalism cannot be placed squarely in the authoritarian, ethnic tradition of German (...) nationalism, and its idiosyncrasy becomes evident once Weber's twofold political project of revivifying a robust civil society while imbuing it with the spirit of public citizenship is foregrounded more clearly. Thus recast, Weber's political thought reveals a strong affinity with that of Tocqueville and Mill, especially in their similar concern with moral personality and political maturity in a mass democracy. (shrink)

Pitanje ovoga članka jest treba li nacionalnu pripadnost uvrstiti na popis primarnih dobara, odnosno, postoji li snažna veza između nacionalne pripadnosti i primarnih dobara o kojima se govori u klasičnoj liberalnoj formulaciji do mjere da njezina zaštita zaslužuje uvrštenje među njih. O ovom pitanju, na izravan ili manje izravan način, raspravljaju vodeći autori liberalne nacionalističke paradigme. U ovom tekstu posebno se raspravlja pretpostavljena veza između zaštite nacionalne pripadnosti i primarnog dobra društvenih osnova samopoštovanja. Unatoč određenoj potrebi javnog priznanja nacionalne pripadnosti, (...) utemeljenje njezine zaštite na razini primarnih dobara, barem kada je riječ o argumentu koji se poziva na društvene osnove samopoštovanja, nije uvjerljivo.The issue regarded in this article is whether we have to include national belonging in the list of primary goods, i.e., whether there is a strong connection between national belonging and primary goods about which the classical liberal theory speaks, such that the protection of national belonging must be included in the list of primary goods. Leading authors in the liberal nationalist paradigm, more or less directly, discuss about this issue. In this paper, the supposed connection between the protection of national belonging and the social bases of selfrespect is specifically discussed. Despite the reasons for some public protection of national belonging, its foundation at the level of primary goods, at least as far as it concerns the argument that relies on the social bases of selfrespect, is not plausible. (shrink)

Democracy is the very rationale for many nationalist movements aspiring to form a state of their own. In their view, political sovereignty is a necessary condition for a people to secure in its own culture, language and traditions, first, to control its internal affairs and second, to gain a voice in the concert of nations. The latter is increasingly important, so goes the argument, in a context in which the shaping of a new global world order is at issue. The (...) same argument is currently made by citizens of existing liberal countries who urge their state to keep, within new economic or political larger unions, the control of the national economy, culture and institutions. (shrink)

Democracy is the very rationale for many nationalist movements aspiring to form a state of their own. In their view, political sovereignty is a necessary condition for a people to secure in its own culture, language and traditions, first, to control its internal affairs and second, to gain a voice in the concert of nations. The latter is increasingly important, so goes the argument, in a context in which the shaping of a new global world order is at issue. The (...) same argument is currently made by citizens of existing liberal countries who urge their state to keep, within new economic or political larger unions, the control of the national economy, culture and institutions. (shrink)

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism - namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values - is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that (...) is the issue of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled. (shrink)

The claim that liberal democratic normative commitments are compatible with nationalism is challenged by the widely acknowledged fact that national identities invariably depend on historical myths: the nationalist defence of such publicly shared myths is in tension with liberal democratic theory’s commitment to norms of publicity, public justification, and freedom of expression. Recent liberal nationalist efforts to meet this challenge by justifying national myths on liberal democratic grounds fail to distinguish adequately between different senses of (...) myth. Once this is done (drawing on Arthur Danto’s analytical philosophy of history), it becomes apparent that historical narratives cannot be justifiably shielded from criteria of truth and significance, and that genuinely historical myths are incompatible with liberal democratic political philosophy. (shrink)

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism—namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values—is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of (...) what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled. (shrink)

Arguments from stability for liberal nationalism rely on considerations about conditions for the feasibility or stability of liberal political ideals and factual claims about the circumstances under which these conditions are fulfilled in order to argue for nationalist conclusions. Such reliance on factual claims has been criticised by among others G. A. Cohen in other contexts as ideological reifications of social reality. In order to assess whether arguments from stability within liberal nationalism, especially as formulated (...) by David Miller, are vulnerable to a comparable critique, the rationale for their reliance on factual claims is discussed on the basis of a number of concerns in John Rawls’s political liberalism. The concern with stability in liberal nationalism differs from stability in Rawls’s work, mainly because of the stronger non-ideal or ‘realist’ focus of the former. In so far as the ‘realism’ of arguments from stability for liberal nationalism is recognized, they are not vulnerable to the reification charge. But if the arguments are construed as realist, this at the same time makes for other tensions within liberal nationalism. (shrink)

Distinguishing between reasonable partiality and reasonable impartiality makes a difference in resolving the serious clashes between priority for compatriots versus cosmopolitan global duties. Defenders of a priority for compatriots have to acknowledge two strong moral constraints: states have to fulfil all their special, domestic and trans-domestic duties, and associative duties are limited by distributive constraints resulting from the moral duty to fight poverty and gross global inequalities. In the recent global context, I see four main problems for liberal-nationalist defenders (...) of priority for compatriots: (i) Reasonable particularists often forget that associative duties for compatriots compete with many sub-national and trans-domestic associative duties. (ii) They tend to forget that associative national duties compete with other, strong special (contractual, reparative) obligations regarding not only citizens and residents inside nation-states but also trans-domestic obligations across state borders. (iii) They do not properly discuss the problem of unallocated duties in addressing global poverty and insecurity. (iv) The design of supra-national and global mediating institutions, and the crafting of policies to remedy the misallocation of duties and to coordinate the required state activities is an urgent task neglected by liberal nationalists. In the recent context, reasonable partialitys bias towards partiality is most unwelcome and morally dubious. Reasonable impartialitys bias towards cosmopolitanism helps to stimulate a drastic shift in obligations and stimulates productive trans-national institutional design. (shrink)

Distinguishing between reasonable partiality and reasonable impartiality makes a difference in resolving the serious clashes between 'priority for compatriots' versus cosmopolitan global duties. Defenders of a priority for compatriots have to acknowledge two strong moral constraints: states have to fulfil all their special, domestic and trans-domestic duties, and associative duties are limited by distributive constraints resulting from the moral duty to fight poverty and gross global inequalities. In the recent global context, I see four main problems for liberal-nationalist defenders (...) of priority for compatriots: Reasonable particularists often forget that associative duties for compatriots compete with many sub-national and trans-domestic associative duties. They tend to forget that associative national duties compete with other, strong special obligations regarding not only citizens and residents inside nation-states but also trans-domestic obligations across state borders. They do not properly discuss the problem of unallocated duties in addressing global poverty and insecurity. The design of supra-national and global 'mediating' institutions, and the crafting of policies to remedy the misallocation of duties and to coordinate the required state activities is an urgent task neglected by liberal nationalists. In the recent context, reasonable partiality's bias towards partiality is most unwelcome and morally dubious. Reasonable impartiality's bias towards cosmopolitanism helps to stimulate a drastic shift in obligations and stimulates productive trans-national institutional design. (shrink)

Much of the discussion on cosmopolitanism and nationalism has focused on their different normative views. The purpose of this article is to shift the attention away from the normative debate to the metatheoretical argument about how we determine moral and political principles independently of each other. I argue that the discussion among proponents of cosmopolitanism and contextualist models boils down to latent methodological and metatheoretical assumptions about what selection of facts are considered politically relevant. In the article, I explore (...) what I call ‘the indeterminacy failure’ of moral cosmopolitanism, that is, the view according to which moral principles fail to determine what political-institutional level might be preferable; and the ‘indeterminacy failure’ of liberal nationalism, that is, the view according to which national identity fails to determine moral principles. In opposition to dichotomist cosmopolitan models and alternative contextualist approaches, I promote a ‘split-level’ model that is set to avoid the difficulties in the other approaches. The split-level corrects the indeterminacy failures of cosmopolitanism and contextualism by distinguishing clearly between the level of moral theorising and the level of political theorising. (shrink)

As part of a vigorous debate about the politics of multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka has sought to find grounds within liberal political theory to defend rights for cultural groups. Kymlicka argues that the individual's ability to choose the good life necessarily takes place in a cultural context such that access to one's ethnic or national culture constitutes a condition of autonomy. Thus, in liberal societies where the culture of minority ethnic groups or nations is under threat, these groups should (...) enjoy certain special rights so as to up hold the autonomy of their individual members. However, Kymlicka's ‘liberal nationalist' argument relies on a problematic isomorphism between culture and identity. Very simply, I shall argue that an individual's culture is not necessarily given by their membership of an ethnic group or nation, thus breaking the link between individual autonomy and rights for ethnic groups or nations. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(3) 2002: 180-189. (shrink)

The nation is usually taken to be an expression, and ?nationalism? a defence, of culture. But we may have sanguinary national conflict (as in Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia) where cultural difference is small; and we may have minimal conflict (as in Switzerland or Belgium) where cultural difference is great. This essay proposes a shift, away from seeing nations as grounded in culture, to seeing them as grounded in ?identity? ? often forged by historical forces having nothing to (...) do with culture per se. This essay rejects a cultural argument for liberal nationalism (associated with the work of Raz, Miller and Kymlicka among others) precisely because it confounds national identity with common culture. Since nations diverge despite a common culture, ?common culture? cannot explain them. Identity is more fundamental. It persists where culture changes. (shrink)

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls The paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract—contractualism. (...) This problem inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate. (shrink)

The paper presents stylized facts about the two hundred years of Brazilian economic history according to classical liberals, nationalists, and Marxists. For this, some classic authors of each theoretical orientation are chosen according to the influence of their interpretations. While classical liberals praise economic dependence and criticize the political struggle to overcome the colonial and neo-colonial heritage, nationalists and Marxists, in different ways, criticize dependence and propose to overcome it politically. Marxists have never been in power in Brazil, but a (...) pendulum between liberals and nationalists is clear. The relevance of the proposed classification is illustrated by recalling that, today, Brazil is governed by a leader in the Latin American authoritarian neoliberalism tradition inaugurated by Augusto Pinochet in 1973. However, shortly after commemorating 200 years of political independence on September 07th, 2022, the presidential elections in October 2022 may set a new swing in the pendulum toward a nationalist vision of the Brazilian past and future. (shrink)