Partial proceedings of the 17th World Congress, International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Bologna, 1995.

Aus dem Inhalt: Views from the North: Hans Petter Graver: Law, Justice and the State: Nordic Perspectives u Jacob Dahl Rendtorff: The Danish Welfare State: Philosophical Ideals and Systemic Reality u Sigri!Dur *orgeirsdottir: Feminist Ethics and Feminist Politics u Kuellike Lengi: The Situation of Human Rights in Estonia u Einar Palsson: Pythagoras and Early Icelandic Law u Law, Discourse and Rationality: Mats Flodin: Internal and External Rationality of Legal Systems u Logi Gunnarsson: A Discourse About Discourse u Hjordi!s Hakonardottir: (...) Legal Language: A Tool of Justice u Ghita Holmstrom-Hintikka: On the Use of Expert Witness in Legal Reasoning and Inquiry u Law, State and Nation: Agust H. Ing*orsson: Democracy, Bureaucracy and Marginalization of the State u Aleksander Peczenik: Law-State, Legal Certainty and Legitimacy of Law u Ove K. Pedersen/Sverre Raffnsoe: Reorganizing Society u Juha Raikka: Mill on National Sentiment u Pall Skulason: Concepts of the State and Classes of Value u Problems of Law and Rights: Britt-Mari Blegvad: How to Cope With Uncertainty: Trust and Law u Jon Wetlesen: Animal Rights or Human Duties?. (shrink)

Papers presented at the IVR 11th World Congress, Helsinki, 1983.

This chapter contains sections titled: Theoretical‐Explanatory Enquiries Moral Enquiries Brief Concluding Remarks Acknowledgments References.

Legal Philosophies has been written to provide a clear guide to the main topics in a jurisprudence or legal theory course with the novice in mind. It provides summaries of the pertinent arguments within these topics, and of the views of leading theorists. This new edition takes a look at the emergence of "Critical Legal Studies" and "Feminist Jurisprudence", whilst there are new sections on "Moral Truth" and "Communitarianism" (a revived theoretical approach).

This article gives a concise overview on developments in German legal philosophy since 1990. After briefly sketching the previous streams, dating back to 1945, it focuses on current tendencies and topics. Three main debates are reported in detail, namely the debates on the structure of legal argumentation, on the structure of the legal system, and on Radbruch’s Formula. This includes, inter alia, Robert Alexy’s new theory of balancing as well as the debate on the role of (...) logic in legal reasoning. Overall, the article introduces the main protagonists and schools as well as their respective advantages, drawbacks, and challenges. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of experimental legal philosophy with a special focus on questions in general jurisprudence, that part of legal philosophy that asks about the concept and nature of law. Much of the experimental general jurisprudence work has tended to follow the questions that have interested general jurisprudence scholars for decades, that is, questions about the relation between legal norms and moral norms. Wholesale criticism of experimental general jurisprudence is scant, but, given existing (...) debates about experimental philosophy generally, one can anticipate where disagreement is likely to occur. Outside of experimental general jurisprudence, there is plenty of vibrant discussion about how experimental results can enrich our understanding of various concepts that figure in everyday legal thought such as causation, intention, consent, or meaning. In the future, experimental legal philosophers should continue to consider the degree to which their project is purely descriptive or whether it is revisionary or pragmatic in its ambitions. Also, future work might consider whether to focus more attention on legal experts. (shrink)

What principles explain or justify legal institutions or decisions, thereby transforming coercion to authority? Are there or could there be any such universal principles? Can any philosophical theory account for such principles? How, if at all, do philosophical theories of law and politics apply to particular issues? And finally, what, if any, do such practical applications tell us about general theories and principles? The essays in this volume represent the efforts of an international group of scholars to understand these (...) general aspects of legal philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay I argue a particular legal philosophy is committed to a partial and closed view of how philosophical work is conceived. This view produces a legal philosophy that lacks the ability to guide substantive discussions. I argue that methodological legal positivism is not a good way to articulate the development of legal philosophy. Then, I argue that we need to consider the place that legal philosophy should occupy in the (...) global intellectual landscape. In addition, I develop my argument by distinguishing the work of legal-philosophy jurists from that of legal-philosophy philosophers and philosophy philosophers. As a coda, I sketch the criteria in order to conceive analytical legal philosophy from a new perspective.Resumen:En este ensayo defiendo que cierta forma de hacer filosofía jurídica está comprometida con una visión cerrada y parcial de concebir el quehacer filosófico. Esta visión genera una filosofía jurídica intelectualmente pobre y carente de capacidad para guiar debates sustantivos. Defiendo que el positivismo jurídico metodológico no es una buena manera de articular el desarrollo de la filosofía jurídica. Sostengo, además, que es preciso re- flexionar sobre el lugar que debería ocupar la filosofía jurídica en un panorama intelectual global. Para desarrollar mis argumentos, distingo el trabajo de los filósofos del derecho juristas respecto del de los filósofos del derecho-filósofos y los filósofos-filósofos. A modo de coda, bosquejo cuáles serían los criterios que hay que revisar para concebir la filosofía jurídica analítica desde una nueva perspectiva. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

In this paper, I argue that dialogue between legal philosophers and social scientists can be mutually beneficial. Nicola Lacey offers a vision of jurisprudence that supposes as much. I start by setting out my interpretation of her view. I then defend its potential, which she takes for granted, from the challenges posed by, first, an apparent friend—Brian Leiter—and, second, obvious adversaries—Joseph Raz and others. My response proposes an alternative to their conceptions of legal philosophy, one that is (...) consistent with my understanding of the approach to jurisprudence that Lacey recommends. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction On Law and Morality Legal Rights and Legal Principles Law and Legal Systems Deontic Logic and Legal Philosophy Philosophical Doctrines in Latin America Conclusion References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Nineteenth‐Century Idealism From Idealism to Nineteenth‐Century Constructivism: The Case of the Historical School From the Turn of the Century to World War II: Disintegration and Reconstruction The Period from 1933 to 1945: “Völkische” Jurisprudence The Period from 1945 to the Present: From Natural Law to Postmodernism References.

In pre-revolutionary Russia, law was criticized from many points of view: in the name of Christ or the name of Marx, in defense of anarchism or of an idealized autocracy, on behalf of the "Russian soul" or of universal progress towards socialism. Examining the rich tradition of hostility to law, Walicki presents those Russian thinkers who boldly challenged this legacy of anti-legal prejudice by developing liberal philosophies of law, vindicating the value of human rights and rule of law. He (...) discusses six leading theorists--Boris Chicherin, Vladimir Soloviev, Leon Petrazycki, Pavel Novgorodtsev, Bogdan Kistiakovsky, and Sergius Hessen--all of whom viewed law in the context of wider philosophical and social problems. (shrink)

This article, written for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, offers an overview of the most important American contributions to legal philosophy - American legal realism, law and economics, various critical schools of jurisprudence, Lon Fuller, and Ronald Dworkin - while speculating on what might be distinctive of American legal philosophy. One obvious recurring theme is a focus on practical application in general, and adjudication (especially constitutional adjudication) in particular.

Given statements like these about current developments in intellectualizing about law in America it is an exciting time to look at American legal philosophy. Given the ferment in the law schools and the volume of literature in the law journals it is also a difficult task confidently to extract the main lines of current thought and adequately to assess the significance of current intellectual movements. American lawyers are inclined to point out that there is no such thing as (...) ‘American law’. Rather, in addition to Federal law and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction there are some fifty jurisdictions each with its own Constitution, Legislature and Supreme Court and consequently diversity rather than uniformity is the rule. Equally, the very idea that there is some single, coherent and widely accepted theory of law deserving description as ‘American legal philosophy’ obviously begs all manner of significant questions. (shrink)

Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does (...) the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content. (shrink)

The international community has long been affected by the political, philosophical and ethical issues surrounding the practice of tyrannicide, defined as the targeted killing of a tyrant. However, there exists no specific international legal instrument that concerns the practice of tyrannicide, rendering the legitimacy of the practice ambiguous. This paper aims to investigate the issue of tyrannicide and offers a number of speculative arguments concerning its legal-philosophical status. It finds that there are essentially two arms of international (...) class='Hi'>legal jurisprudence that may regulate the practice of tyrannicide. The first is largely prohibitive and is based on the derived legal arguments against assassination involving the element ofperfidy, relevant extradition law, provisions in the Hague, Geneva and New York Conventions, and the prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter. The second position, though far more radical and speculative, is more permissive regarding the moral legitimacy of tyrannicide. This position is based on arguments from the classical international theorists Gentili, Grotius and Vattel, contemporary human rights standards, the principle of humanitarian intervention, the duty to protect, and legal category of hostis hutnani generis. It is argued that though the vast majority of international legal principles are indicative ofthe illegality oftyrannicide, that the practice may nevertheless be philosophically legitimated under humanitarian principles. (shrink)

The state, by V.I. Lenin.--The revolutionary part played by law and the state; a general doctrine of law, by P.I. Stuchka.--The theory of Petrazhitskii: Marxism and social ideology. Law, our law, foreign law, general law, by M.A. Reisner.--The general theory of law and Marxism, by E.B. Pashukanis.--The right deviation in the Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Political report of the Central (Party) Committee to the XVI Congress, 1930, by J.V. Stalin.-- The Soviet state and the revolution in law, by E.B. Pashukanis.--Socialism (...) and law, by P. Yudin.--The fundamental tasks of the science of Soviet socialist law, by A.Y. Vyshinsky.--Report to the XVIII Party Congress, by J.V. Stalin.--The theory of the state and law, by S.A. Golunskii and M.S. Strogovich.--The Soviet state in the war for the fatherland, by A.Y. Vyshinsky.--The relationship between state and law, by I.P. Trainin. (shrink)

A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence is the first-ever multivolume treatment of the issues in legal philosophy and general jurisprudence, from both a theoretical and a historical perspective. The work is aimed at jurists as well as legal and practical philosophers. Edited by the renowned theorist Enrico Pattaro and his team, this book is a classical reference work that would be of great interest to legal and practical philosophers as well as to (...) jurists and legal scholar at all levels. The work is divided in two parts. The theoretical part (published in 2005), consisting of five volumes, covers the main topics of the contemporary debate; the historical part, consisting of six volumes (Volumes 6-8 published in 2007; Volumes 9 and 10, published in 2009; Volume 11 published in 2011 and Volume 12 forthcoming in 2016), accounts for the development of legal thought from ancient Greek times through the twentieth century. Volume 12 Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World Volume 12 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, titled Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil-Law World, functions as a complement to Gerald Postema's volume 11 (titled Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World), and it offers the first comprehensive account of the complex development that legal philosophy has undergone in continental Europe and Latin America since 1900. In this volume, leading international scholars from the different language areas making up the civil-law world give an account of the way legal philosophy has evolved in these areas in the 20th century, the outcome being an overall mosaic of civil-law legal philosophy in this arc of time. Further, specialists in the field describe the development that legal philosophy has undergone in the 20th century by focusing on three of its main subjects-namely, legal positivism, natural-law theory, and the theory of legal reasoning-and discussing the different conceptions that have been put forward under these labels. The layout of the volume is meant to frame historical analysis with a view to the contemporary theoretical debate, thus completing the Treatise in keeping with its overall methodological aim, namely, that of combining history and theory as a necessary means by which to provide a comprehensive account of jurisprudential thinking. (shrink)

Preparation for the Study of Theories of Law: Non-Universality of Law, Irreconcilable Epistemologies, Ideological Incipience; Theories in Metaphysical-Rational Epistemology: Divine and Prophetic Theories; Natural Law: Early Hindu, Chinese, Greek, Roman, and Modern; Theories in Idealist Epistemology; Theories in Empiricist Epistemology; Positivist: Early Hindu, Chinese, Later Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, Hart; Historical Von Savigny, Maine, Marx and Engels; Sociological Jhering, Ehrlich, Duguit, Jurisprudence of Interests, Free Law; Psychological Petrazycki; American Realist; Philosophical Framework; Expressions; Scandinavian Realist; Phenomenological; The Critical Legal Studies and (...) its Offshoots: Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Jurisprudence, Critical Race Theory; Legal Polycentricity. (shrink)

In this short paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more than they have done so far on problems of legal reasoning. Not only is this a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but it is also, in my estimation, the field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to both the study and the practice of law. For even though reasoning and interpretation are at the center of what legal practitioners (...) and legal scholars do, neither legal practitioners nor legal scholars reason with the same care and precision as philosophers do. Against this background, I suggest that the following three types of questions regarding legal reasoning are especially worthy of serious consideration. The first is that of the possible relevance of the theory of reasons holism to legal reasoning in general. The second is the question of how to analyze legal statements in a way that does not undermine the rationality of legal reasoning. And the third is the question of whether legal arguments are to be understood as deductive arguments, or as inductive arguments, or both, and if so how. (shrink)

This chapter examines three approaches to applied political and legal philosophy: Standard activism is primarily addressed to other philosophers, adopts an indirect and coincidental role in creating change, and counts articulating sound arguments as success. Extreme activism, in contrast, is a form of applied philosophy directly addressed to policy-makers, with the goal of bringing about a particular outcome, and measures success in terms of whether it makes a direct causal contribution to that goal. Finally, conceptual activism (like (...) standard activism), primarily targets an audience of fellow philosophers, bears a distant, non-direct, relation to a desired outcome, and counts success in terms of whether it encourages a particular understanding and adoption of the concepts under examination. (shrink)