Results for 'joint goals'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  2
    Joint Goals in Older Couples: Associations With Goal Progress, Allostatic Load, and Relationship Satisfaction.Nadine Ungar, Victoria I. Michalowski, Stella Baehring, Theresa Pauly, Denis Gerstorf, Maureen C. Ashe, Kenneth M. Madden & Christiane A. Hoppmann - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    Older adults often have long-term relationships, and many of their goals are intertwined with their respective partners. Joint goals can help or hinder goal progress. Little is known about how accurately older adults assess if a goal is joint, the role of over-reporting in these perceptions, and how joint goals and over-reporting may relate to older partners' relationship satisfaction and physical health. Two-hundred-thirty-six older adults from 118 couples listed their three most important goals (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  58
    What Are Goals and Joint Goals?Raimo Tuomela - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (1):1-20.
  3. Joint Action Goals Reduce Visuomotor Interference Effects From a Partner’s Incongruent Actions.Sam Clarke, Luke McEllin, Anna Francová, Marcell Székely, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & John Michael - 2019 - Scientific Reports 9 (1).
    Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4.  19
    The Joint Effect of Paternal and Maternal Parenting Behaviors on School Engagement Among Chinese Adolescents: The Mediating Role of Mastery Goal.Juan Wang, Xinxin Shi, Ying Yang, Hong Zou, Wenjuan Zhang & Qunxia Xu - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5.  43
    Joint Action : Shared Intentions and Collective Goals.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  36
    Social Cues to Joint Actions: The Role of Shared Goals.Lucia M. Sacheli, Salvatore M. Aglioti & Matteo Candidi - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7.  6
    Joint Action Enhances Cohesion and Positive Affect, but Suppresses Aspects of Creativity When Combined With Shared Goals.Reneeta Mogan, Joseph Bulbulia & Ronald Fischer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  9. Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of (...) action, an account compatible with the premise about development. The new account is no replacement for the leading account; rather the accounts characterise two kinds of joint action. Where the kind of joint characterised by the leading account involves shared intentions, the new account characterises a kind of joint action involving shared goals. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  10. Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  11. New Prospects for Organizational Democracy? How the Joint Pursuit of Social and Financial Goals Challenges Traditional Organizational Designs.Julie Battilana, Michael Fuerstein & Michael Y. Lee - 2018 - In Subramanian Rangan (ed.), Capitalism Beyond Mutuality?: Perspectives Integrating Philosophy and Social Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 256-288.
    Some interesting exceptions notwithstanding, the traditional logic of economic efficiency has long favored hierarchical forms of organization and disfavored democracy in business. What does the balance of arguments look like, however, when values besides efficient revenue production are brought into the picture? The question is not hypothetical: In recent years, an ever increasing number of corporations have developed and adopted socially responsible behaviors, thereby hybridizing aspects of corporate businesses and social organizations. We argue that the joint pursuit of financial (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Joint Attention in Joint Action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  13.  70
    Assertions, Joint Epistemic Actions and Social Practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.
    In this paper I provide a theory of the speech act of assertion according to which assertion is a species of joint action. In doing so I rely on a theory of joint action developed in more detail elsewhere. Here we need to distinguish between the genus, joint action, and an important species of joint action, namely, what I call joint epistemic action. In the case of the latter, but not necessarily the former, participating agents (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Joint Action: Neurocognitive Mechanisms Supporting Human Interaction.Harold Bekkering, Ellen R. A. de Bruijn, Raymond H. Cuijpers, Roger Newman-Norlund, Hein T. van Schie & Ruud Meulenbroek - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):340-352.
  15.  66
    Joint Epistemic Action and Collective Moral Responsibility.Seumas Miller - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (3):280-302.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between joint epistemic action and collective moral responsibility. Here, we need to distinguish between the genus, joint action, and an important species of joint action which I introduced in some earlier work, namely, joint epistemic action. In the case of the latter, but not necessarily the former, participating agents have epistemic goals, e.g. the acquisition of knowledge. The notion of joint action per se is a familiar one (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  16.  56
    Joint Cooperative Hunting Among Wild Chimpanzees: Taking Natural Observations Seriously.Christophe Boesch - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):692-693.
    Ignoring most published evidence on wild chimpanzees, Tomasello et al.'s claim that shared goals and intentions are uniquely human amounts to a faith statement. A brief survey of chimpanzee hunting tactics shows that group hunts are compatible with a shared goals and intentions hypothesis. The disdain of observational data in experimental psychology leads some to ignore the reality of animal cognitive achievements.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  17.  59
    Early Developments in Joint Action.Celia A. Brownell - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
    Joint action, critical to human social interaction and communication, has garnered increasing scholarly attention in many areas of inquiry, yet its development remains little explored. This paper reviews research on the growth of joint action over the first 2 years of life to show how children become progressively more able to engage deliberately, autonomously, and flexibly in joint action with adults and peers. It is suggested that a key mechanism underlying the dramatic changes in joint action (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  18.  9
    Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism About Joint Action.Pierre Saint Germier, Cedric Paternotte & Clement Canonne - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):97-118.
    This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by highly unspecific goals and the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  14
    Drawn Together: When Motor Representations Ground Joint Actions.Francesco Della Gatta, Francesca Garbarini, Marco Rabuffetti, Luca Viganò, Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2017 - Cognition 165:53-60.
    What enables individuals to act together? Recent discoveries suggest that a variety of mechanisms are involved. But something fundamental is yet to be investigated. In joint action, agents represent a collective goal, or so it is often assumed. But how, if at all, are collective goals represented in joint action and how do such representations impact performance? To investigate this question we adapted a bimanual paradigm, the circle-line drawing paradigm, to contrast two agents acting in parallel with (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  20. Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy?Malinda Carpenter - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):380-392.
  21.  1
    When Are Leaders Receptive to Voiced Creative Ideas? Joint Effects of Leaders’ Achievement Goals and Personal Sense of Power.Roy B. L. Sijbom & Sharon K. Parker - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  78
    Why We Do Things Together: The Social Motivation for Joint Action.Marion Godman - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):588-603.
    Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  23.  53
    Joint Action Without and Beyond Planning.Olle Blomberg - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account of ‘shared intentional activity’, take joint activity to be the outcome of two or more agents having a ‘shared intention’, where this is a certain pattern of mutually known prior intentions that are directed toward a common goal. With Bratman’s account as a foil, I address two lacunas that are relatively unexplored in the philosophical literature. The first lacuna concerns how to make sense of the apparently (...) cooperative activities of agents that lack the capacities for planning and “mindreading” that one must have in order to be a party to a shared intention. The second lacuna concerns how participants are able to coordinate their actions “online”—that is, during action execution as a joint activity unfolds—without recourse to plans that specify in advance what they should do. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the first lacuna, while chapters 4 and 5 focus on the second. In chapter 2, I focus on why participants must have mutual or common knowledge of each other’s intentions and beliefs in order to have a shared intention: Why must these attitudes be “out in the open”? I argue that, if participants lack the concept of belief, then one of the two main motivations for the common knowledge requirement—to filter out certain cases that intuitively aren’t cases of genuine joint activity—actually dissipates. Furthermore, a kind of “openness” that only requires of participants that they have the concept of goal but not that of belief can satisfy the other main motivation, to make sense of the idea that joint activities are non-accidentally coordinated. In chapter 3, I offer an account of a kind of joint activity in which agents such as young children and some non-human primates could participate, given what we know about their socio-cognitive capacities. In chapter 4, I argue that ‘shared intention’-accounts are unable to say much about spontaneous or skilful joint action because of the following widely accepted constraint on what one can intend: while an agent might intend—in the sense of commit to a plan—that “we” do something together, an agent cannot intend to perform “our” joint action. I reject this constraint and argue that some joint actions are joint in virtue of each participant having what I call ‘socially extended intention-in-action’ that overlap. In chapter 5, I review empirical work on subpersonal enabling mechanisms for the coordination of joint action. The review provides clues to what it is that enables participants to successfully coordinate their actions in the absence of plan-like intentions or beyond what such intentions specify. While what I address are lacunas rather than problems, an upshot of this thesis is that leading philosophical accounts of joint activity may have less explanatory scope than one might otherwise be led to believe. The accounts of joint activity and joint action that are presented in this thesis are arguably applicable to many of the joint activities and joint actions of adult human beings. The account also helps us avoid the false dichotomy between a very robust form of joint activity and a mere concatenation of purely individualistic actions—a dichotomy that accounts such as Bratman’s arguably invite us to adopt. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Joint Optimization of a Dry Port with Multilevel Location and Container Transportation: The Case of Northeast China.Feng Pian, Qiuju Shi, Xue Yao, Huiling Zhu & Weixin Luan - 2021 - Complexity 2021:1-16.
    Dry port construction can reduce the cost of container transportation, and its location is the focus of existing research. Considering dry port capacity limitations and scale advantages, this study calculates the costs associated with dry port construction and operations, transportation, time, and the environment and constructs a joint optimization model of the dry port location and transportation scheme to minimize the total cost. Taking 35 prefecture-level cities in Northeast China as the source of container goods and Dalian port as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  8
    Joint Improvisation in the Arts Practices : Entrainment, Engagement and Expert Skill.Ingar Brinck - 2018 - In Simon Penny & Kelly Donahey (eds.), Proceedings from A Body of Knowledge : Embodied Cognition and the Arts conference 8-10 Dec 2016 - Embodied Cognition and the Arts conference 8-10 Dec 2016. pp. 1-19.
    To improvise together for the pure curiosity, joy, and beauty of it constitutes a central but often neglected ability of human beings. Integrating pragmatic, practical, and technical skills with conceptual understanding, improvisation is adaptive and collaborative. It seems made to counter the challenges of living in a fleeting present, unconstrained by physical and historical boundaries, and very likely has deep evolutionary roots. I present an account of joint improvisation in the performative arts based in reviews of empirical research in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  26
    Cooperation as Joint Action.Raimo Tuomela - 2011 - Analyse & Kritik 33 (1):65-86.
    The paper studies cooperation as joint action, where joint action can, first, be conceptualized either individualistically in terms of the participants' individual goals and beliefs that the joint action is taken to serve. This is individualistic or 'I-mode' cooperation. Special version of it is 'pro-group I-mode' cooperation, where the goals are shared. Second, cooperation can be of the kind where a group of persons act together as a group in terms of the non-aggregative 'we' that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27.  2
    Creating Situated Knowledge Through Joint Learning Processes Among Dairy Farmers and Scientists in a Mineral Project in the Netherlands.Jasper Eshuis & Marian Stuiver - 2005 - Agriculture and Human Values 22 (2):137-148.
    This article analyzes learning in context through the prism of a sustainable dairy-farming project. The research was performed within a nutrient management project that involved the participation of farmers and scientists. Differences between heterogeneous forms of farmers’ knowledge and scientific knowledge were discursively constructed during conflict and subsequent alignment over the validity and relevance of knowledge. Both conflict and alignment appeared to be essential for learning in context. Conflict spurred learning when disagreeing groups of actors developed their knowledge in order (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  28. Games, Goals, and Bounded Rationality.Leigh Tesfatsion - 1984 - Theory and Decision 17 (2):149-175.
    A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by "policies," i. e., end-mean pairs of candidate goals and "controls" (partial contingency plans). The existence of individual objective functions over the joint policy choice set is axiomatized in terms of primitive preference and probability orders. Conditions are given for the existence of pure policy Nash equilibrium points in n-person games, and pure (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  27
    Implicit Coordination: Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions.Luke Roelofs & Judith Martens - 2018 - Journal of Social Ontology 4 (2):93-120.
    We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon – implicit coordination – is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by “explicit” intentions differ from individual actions driven by “implicit” intentions. More precisely, implicit coordination is both analogous to wholly (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  20
    Carving Nature at its Joints Using a Knife Called Concepts.Justin J. Couchman, Joseph Boomer, Mariana Vc Coutinho & J. David Smith - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):207 - 208.
    That humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitary goal of forming concepts is important enough that it receives redundant expression in cognition. Categorization science focuses on commonalities involved in concept learning. Eliminating makes this more difficult.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31.  1
    Solving a Joint Pricing and Inventory Control Problem for Perishables Via Deep Reinforcement Learning.Rui Wang, Xianghua Gan, Qing Li & Xiao Yan - 2021 - Complexity 2021:1-17.
    We study a joint pricing and inventory control problem for perishables with positive lead time in a finite horizon periodic-review system. Unlike most studies considering a continuous density function of demand, in our paper the customer demand depends on the price of current period and arrives according to a homogeneous Poisson process. We consider both backlogging and lost-sales cases, and our goal is to find a simultaneously ordering and pricing policy to maximize the expected discounted profit over the planning (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  22
    A Habermasian Perspective on Joint Meaning Making Online : What Does It Offer and What Are the Difficulties?Michael Hammond - unknown
    This paper is an exploration of the relevance of Habermas’s social theory for understanding meaning making in the context of shared online interaction. It describes some of the key ideas within Habermas’s work, noting the central importance it gives to the idea of communicative action - a special kind of discourse in which there is ‘no other force than that of the better argument’ and no other motive other than ‘the cooperative search for truth’. The paper then turns to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  26
    A View on Human Goal-Directed Activity and the Construction of Artificial Intelligence.Pavel N. Prudkov - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):363-383.
    Although activity aimed at the construction of artificial intelligence started about 60 years ago however, contemporary intelligent systems are effective in very narrow domains only. One of the reasons for this situation appears to be serious problems in the theory of intelligence. Intelligence is a characteristic of goal-directed systems and two classes of goal-directed systems can be derived from observations on animals and humans, one class is systems with innately and jointly determined goals and means. The other class contains (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  81
    Making Our Ends Meet: Shared Intention, Goal Adoption and the Third-Person Perspective.Luca Tummolini - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):75-98.
    Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing others’ and ones’ own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that another agent’s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. The Emergence of Self: Sensing Agency Through Joint Action.Natalie Sebanz - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):234-251.
    This article explores the role of social factors in the emergence of self and other. It is suggested that the experience of causing actions contributes to a basic sense of self in which awareness of mental states and the experience of a mental self are grounded. According to the proposed evolutionary scenario, the experience of agency emerged as individuals acting in social context learned to differentiate between effects caused by their own actions and effects resulting from joint action. Through (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36.  59
    Philosophy and Distributed Artificial Intelligence: The Case of Joint Intention.Raimo Tuomela - 1996 - In N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Wiley.
    In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37.  10
    Abductive Understanding of Dialogues About Joint Activities.Pat Langley, Ben Meadows, Alfredo Gabaldon & Richard Heald - 2014 - Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 15 (3):426-454.
    This paper examines the task of understanding dialogues in terms of the mental states of the participating agents. We present a motivating example that clarifies the challenges this problem involves and then outline a theory of dialogue interpretation based on abductive inference of these unobserved beliefs and goals, incremental construction of explanations, and reliance on domain-independent knowledge. After this, we describe UMBRA, an implementation of the theory that embodies these assumptions. We report experiments with the system that demonstrate its (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38.  11
    Abductive Understanding of Dialogues About Joint Activities.Pat Langley, Ben Meadows, Alfredo Gabaldon & Richard Heald - 2014 - Interaction Studies 15 (3):426-454.
    This paper examines the task of understanding dialogues in terms of the mental states of the participating agents. We present a motivating example that clarifies the challenges this problem involves and then outline a theory of dialogue interpretation based on abductive inference of these unobserved beliefs and goals, incremental construction of explanations, and reliance on domain-independent knowledge. After this, we describe UMBRA, an implementation of the theory that embodies these assumptions. We report experiments with the system that demonstrate its (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  6
    Fiat Boundaries: How to Fictionally Carve Nature at its Joints.Nicola Piras - 2020 - Philosophical Inquiries 8 (2):85-106.
    Boundaries are the outermost parts of objects, with a twofold function: dividing objects from their environment and allowing objects to touch each other. The task of this paper is to classify and describe the human dependent boundaries, i.e., the so-called fiat boundaries, on the basis of the seminal work by Smith and Varzi. Roughly, a fiat boundary is a marker of discontinuity between two or more objects which relies on a human function assignment, usually called ‘fiat act’. In what follow (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  27
    When Actions Are Carved at the Joints.Merideth Gattis, Harold Bekkering & Andreas Wohlschläger - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):691-692.
    We focus on Byrne & Russon's argument that program-level imitation is driven by hierarchically organized goals, and the related claim that to establish whether observed behavior is evidence of program-level imitation, empirical studies of imitation must use multi-stage actions as imitative tasks. We agree that goals play an indispensable role in the generation of action and imitative behavior but argue that multi-goal tasks, not only multi-stage tasks, reveal program-level imitation.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41.  45
    Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.Nicolai Knudsen - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  95
    Structured Propositions and Trivial Composition.Bryan Pickel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2991-3006.
    Structured propositions are often invoked to explain why intensionally equivalent sentences do not substitute salva veritate into attitude ascriptions. As the semantics is standardly developed—for example, in Salmon, Soames :47–87, 1987) and King :516–535, 1995), the semantic value of a complex expression is an ordered complex consisting of the semantic values of its components. Such views, however, trivialize semantic composition since they do not allow for independent constraints on the meaning of complexes. Trivializing semantic composition risks “trivializing semantics” Semantics versus (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43.  23
    The Origins of Mindreading: How Interpretive Socio-Cognitive Practices Get Off the Ground.Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2020 - Synthese (9):1-23.
    Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through cultural rather than biological evolution. Although these accounts describe the role of culture in the ontogenetic development of mindreading, they neglect the question of the cultural origins of mindreading in human prehistory. We discuss four possible models of this, distinguished by the role they posit for culture: the standard evolutionary psychology model, the individualist empiricist model, the cultural (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  45. Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   431 citations  
  46. An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47.  17
    Multiple Sensory‐Motor Pathways Lead to Coordinated Visual Attention.Chen Yu & Linda B. Smith - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S1):5-31.
    Joint attention has been extensively studied in the developmental literature because of overwhelming evidence that the ability to socially coordinate visual attention to an object is essential to healthy developmental outcomes, including language learning. The goal of this study was to understand the complex system of sensory-motor behaviors that may underlie the establishment of joint attention between parents and toddlers. In an experimental task, parents and toddlers played together with multiple toys. We objectively measured joint attention—and the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive Processing.Wanja Wiese & Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. -/- The features described here (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  49.  35
    A Second-Person Approach Cannot Explain Intentionality in Social Understanding.Chris Moore & Markus Paulus - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):430-431.
    A second-person approach that prioritizes dyadic emotional interaction is not well equipped to explain the origins of the understanding of mind conceived as intentionality. Instead, the critical elements that will deliver the understanding of self and other as persons with intentionality are shared object-centered interactions that include not only emotional engagement, but also joint attention and joint goal-directed action.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50.  72
    Towards a Resolution of Terrorism Using Game Theory.C. Maria Keet - 2003 - In Luke Ashworth & Maura Adshead (eds.), Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration.
    Both terrorism and game theory are contested concepts within the social sciences, but in this paper, I will show that a rational approach (game theory) towards the emotion-laden idea and practice of terrorism does aid understanding of the “terrorist theatre”. First, an outline will be provided on the type of actors (game players) that are, or may be, involved to a more or lesser extend in (supporting) terrorism. Then several game models will be assessed on their applicability. This includes averting (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000