Results for 'joint commitments'

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  1. Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World.Margaret Gilbert - 2013 - Oup Usa.
    This new essay collection by distinguished philosopher Margaret Gilbert provides a richly textured argument for the importance of joint commitment in our personal and public lives. Topics covered by this diverse range of essays range from marital love to patriotism, from promissory obligation to the unity of the European Union.
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  2.  33
    Joint Commitments.Burleigh Wilkins - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (2):145-155.
    I question the adequacy of Margaret Gilbert''s account of collectivefeelings of guilt as collective judgments which do not necessarilyhave any phenomenological components. I question whether joint commitment theory in its present form helps us to understand orresolve social conflicts.
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  3. Joint Commitment and Collective Belief.Leo Townsend - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 9 (9):46-53.
    According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of (...)
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    The Impersistence of Joint Commitments.Line Edslev Andersen & Hanne Andersen - manuscript
    The phenomenon of shared intention has received much attention in the philosophy of mind and action. Margaret Gilbert (1989, 2000c, 2014b) argues that a shared intention to do A consists in a joint commitment to intend to do A. But we need to know more about the nature of joint commitments to know what exactly this implies. While the persistence of joint commitments has received much attention in the literature, their impersistence has received very little (...)
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  5. Obligation and Joint Commitment.Margaret Gilbert - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (2):143.
    I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there (...)
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  6. Shared Intention is Not Joint Commitment.Matthew Kopec & Seumas Miller - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (2):179-189.
    Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to the view as a whole have yet to appear in the literature. Here we (...)
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    Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, Written by M. Gilbert.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):475-478.
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    Joint Commitment.Thomas H. Smith - 2018 - ProtoSociology 35:38-52.
    I defend some of Gilbert’s central claims about our capacity jointly to commit ourselves, and what follows from an exercise of it. I argue that, to explain these claims, we do not need to suppose, as Gilbert does, that we ever are jointly committed, that is, jointly in a state of being committed. I offer a diagnosis of why the gratuitousness of this supposition has been overlooked.
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  9. Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science : Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies.Alban Bouvier - 2009 - In Jeroen Van Bouwel (ed.), The Social Sciences and Democracy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 143--61.
  10. Joint Commitments and Group Identification in Human-Robot Interaction.John Michael & Alessandro Salice - 2017 - In Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality. Springer.
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  11. Joint Commitment and Circularity.Michael H. Robins - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 1--299.
     
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  12.  40
    The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership.Titus Stahl - 2014 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. pp. 229-244.
    Collective intentionality is one of the most fundamental notions in social ontology. However, it is often thought to refer to a capacity which does not presuppose the existence of any other social facts. This chapter critically examines this view from the perspective of one specific theory of collective intentionality, the theory of Margaret Gilbert. On the basis of Gilbert’s arguments, the chapter claims that collective intentionality is a highly contingent achievement of complex social practices and, thus, not a basic social (...)
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  13. Considerations on Joint Commitment: Responses to Various Comments.Margaret Gilbert - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 1--73.
  14. Acting Together, Joint Commitment, and Obligation.Margaret P. Gilbert - manuscript
    What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how (...)
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  15.  12
    Shared Intentionality, Joint Commitment, and Directed Obligation.Margaret Gilbert - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.
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    Remarks on Joint Commitment and its Relation to Moral Thinking.Margaret Gilbert - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):755-766.
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  17. How Do Non-Joint Commitments Come Into Being? An Attempt at Cultural Naturalism.Ingvar Johansson - 2007 - In Nikolaos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos. pp. 135--150.
     
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  18.  64
    Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):258-262.
  19. Dialogue and Joint Commitment.Maura Priest & Margaret Gilbert - forthcoming - In Les Defis de Collectif.
  20.  27
    Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment How We Make the Social World. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (3):140-142.
  21.  16
    Obligation and Joint Commitment.Ii Hart On Obligations - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (2).
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  22. Individual and Joint Commitments.Kaarlo Miller - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 255--272.
     
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  23.  12
    Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW]Review by: Caroline T. Arruda - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):258-262,.
  24.  34
    On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):89–120.
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are (...)
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    Joint Actions, Commitments and the Need to Belong.Víctor Fernandez Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - Synthese (8):1-30.
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this question, we need to provide (...)
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    Sellars’ Theory of We-Intentions and Gilbert’s Theory of Joint Commitment: A Critical Notice of Jeremy R. Koons, The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars: New York, USA, Routledge, 2019, X + 360 Pp., (Hardback), ISBN 987-1-138-70874-7.Ronald Loeffler - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):114-127.
    Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 114-127.
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    Sellars’ Theory of We-Intentions and Gilbert’s Theory of Joint Commitment By Ronald Loeffler.Ronald Loeffler - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-14.
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    Sellars’ Theory of We-Intentions and Gilbert’s Theory of Joint Commitment: A Critical Notice of Jeremy R. Koons, The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars: New York, USA, Routledge, 2019, X + 360 Pp., , ISBN 987-1-138-70874-7. [REVIEW]Ronald Loeffler - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):114-127.
    Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 114-127.
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    Observing Joint Action: Coordination Creates Commitment.John Michael, Natalie Sebanz & Günther Knoblich - 2016 - Cognition 157:106-113.
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    Joint Actions, Commitments and the Need to Belong.Víctor Fernández Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7597-7626.
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this question, we need to provide (...)
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    Alignment and Commitment in Joint Action.Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):831-849.
    Important work on alignment systems has been applied to philosophical work on joint action by Tollefsen and Dale. This paper builds from and expands on their work. The first aim of the paper is to spell out how the empirical research on alignment may be integrated into philosophical theories of joint action. The second aim is then to develop a successful characterization of joint action, which spells out the difference between genuine joint action and simpler forms (...)
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    Investing in Commitment : Persistence in a Joint Action is Enhanced by the Perception of a Partner's Effort.Marcell Székely & John Michael - 2018 - Cognition 174:37-42.
    Can the perception that one’s partner is investing effort generate a sense of commitment to a joint action? To test this, we developed a 2-player version of the classic snake game which became increasingly boring over the course of each round. This enabled us to operationalize commitment in terms of how long participants persisted before pressing a ‘finish’ button to conclude each round. Our results from three experiments reveal that participants persisted longer when they perceived what they believed to (...)
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    Investing in Commitment: Persistence in a Joint Action is Enhanced by the Perception of a Partner’s Effort.Marcell Székely & John Michael - 2018 - Cognition 174:37-42.
    Can the perception that one’s partner is investing effort generate a sense of commitment to a joint action? To test this, we developed a 2-player version of the classic snake game which became increasingly boring over the course of each round. This enabled us to operationalize commitment in terms of how long participants persisted before pressing a ‘finish’ button to conclude each round. Our results from three experiments reveal that participants persisted longer when they perceived what they believed to (...)
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    The Doctrine of “Joint Criminal Enterprise”: Criminal Liability of the Military-Political Leadership of the Armed Conflict Opposing Party for Committing War Crimes.Hayk Grigoryan - 2020 - Wisdom 15 (2):140-146.
    The article analyzes the mechanisms of bringing the military and political leadership of the opposing party of the armed conflict to criminal liability through the doctrine of "joint criminal enterprise", which is used in International criminal law, considering that the acts committed by this category of individuals, as a rule, are subject to investigation by international criminal tribunals on the basis of definitions developed by international practice. The analysis carried out by the Author also enables to propose scientifically substantiated (...)
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  35. Normativity in Joint Action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):97-120.
    The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come to a stalemate due to a dependence on intuitional methods. Normativists, such as Margaret Gilbert, argue that action-relative normative relations are inherent in joint action, while non-normativists, such as Michael Bratman, claim that there are minimal cases of joint action without normative relations. In this work, we describe the first experimental examinations of these intuitions, and report the results of six studies that weigh in favor of the (...)
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  36. Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds.Johannes Roessler - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It (...)
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    The Influence of Volunteers’ Psychological Capital: Mediating Role of Organizational Commitment, and Joint Moderating Effect of Role Identification and Perceived Social Support.Li Ping Xu, Yu Shen Wu, Jing Jing Yu & Jie Zhou - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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    Joint Meaning.Prof Antonella Carassa & Prof Marco Colombetti - 2009 - Cogprints.
    In this paper we want to reconcile two apparently conflicting intuitions: the first is that what a speaker means is just a function of his or her communicative intentions, independently of what the hearer understands, and even of the actual existence of a hearer; the second is that when communication is carried out successfully, the resulting meaning is, in some important sense, jointly construed by the speaker and the hearer. Our strategy is to distinguish between speaker’s meaning, understood as a (...)
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  39. Trust and Commitment in Collective Testimony.Leo Townsend - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: pp. 39-58.
    In this paper I critically discuss Miranda Fricker’s ‘trust-based’ view of collective testimony—that is, testimony that comes from a group speaker. At the heart of Fricker’s account is the idea that testimony involves an ‘interpersonal deal of trust’, to which the speaker contributes a commitment to ‘second-personal epistemic trustworthiness’. Appropriating Margaret Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment, Fricker suggests that groups too can make such commitments, and hence that they, like individuals, can ‘enter into the second-personal relations of trust (...)
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  40. Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy?Malinda Carpenter - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):380-392.
  41.  76
    Distinguishing Joint Actions From Collective Actions.Paul Hammond - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).
    This paper argues that the intentional actions of collective entities, such as corporations and agencies, are not necessarily joint intentional actions by several members of those collectives. I briefly summarize the social action theories of John Searle, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and Seumas Miller, which I argue are all theories of joint action. I then describe a case based loosely on events from the 2008 financial crisis in which an intentional collective action is performed by a (...)
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    Joint Action Without and Beyond Planning.Olle Blomberg - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account of ‘shared intentional activity’, take joint activity to be the outcome of two or more agents having a ‘shared intention’, where this is a certain pattern of mutually known prior intentions that are directed toward a common goal. With Bratman’s account as a foil, I address two lacunas that are relatively unexplored in the philosophical literature. The first lacuna concerns how to make sense of the apparently (...) cooperative activities of agents that lack the capacities for planning and “mindreading” that one must have in order to be a party to a shared intention. The second lacuna concerns how participants are able to coordinate their actions “online”—that is, during action execution as a joint activity unfolds—without recourse to plans that specify in advance what they should do. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the first lacuna, while chapters 4 and 5 focus on the second. In chapter 2, I focus on why participants must have mutual or common knowledge of each other’s intentions and beliefs in order to have a shared intention: Why must these attitudes be “out in the open”? I argue that, if participants lack the concept of belief, then one of the two main motivations for the common knowledge requirement—to filter out certain cases that intuitively aren’t cases of genuine joint activity—actually dissipates. Furthermore, a kind of “openness” that only requires of participants that they have the concept of goal but not that of belief can satisfy the other main motivation, to make sense of the idea that joint activities are non-accidentally coordinated. In chapter 3, I offer an account of a kind of joint activity in which agents such as young children and some non-human primates could participate, given what we know about their socio-cognitive capacities. In chapter 4, I argue that ‘shared intention’-accounts are unable to say much about spontaneous or skilful joint action because of the following widely accepted constraint on what one can intend: while an agent might intend—in the sense of commit to a plan—that “we” do something together, an agent cannot intend to perform “our” joint action. I reject this constraint and argue that some joint actions are joint in virtue of each participant having what I call ‘socially extended intention-in-action’ that overlap. In chapter 5, I review empirical work on subpersonal enabling mechanisms for the coordination of joint action. The review provides clues to what it is that enables participants to successfully coordinate their actions in the absence of plan-like intentions or beyond what such intentions specify. While what I address are lacunas rather than problems, an upshot of this thesis is that leading philosophical accounts of joint activity may have less explanatory scope than one might otherwise be led to believe. The accounts of joint activity and joint action that are presented in this thesis are arguably applicable to many of the joint activities and joint actions of adult human beings. The account also helps us avoid the false dichotomy between a very robust form of joint activity and a mere concatenation of purely individualistic actions—a dichotomy that accounts such as Bratman’s arguably invite us to adopt. (shrink)
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    The Joint Establishment of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and of UNESCO After World War II.Patrick Petitjean - 2008 - Minerva 46 (2):247-270.
    The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFScW) and UNESCO share roots in the Social Relations of Science (SRS) movements and in the Franco-British scientific relations which developed in the 1930s. In this historical context (the Great Depression, the rise of Fascism and the Nazi use of science, the social and intellectual fascination for the USSR), a new model of scientific internationalism emerged, where science and politics mixed. Many progressive scientists were involved in the war efforts against Nazism, and tried to (...)
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  44.  71
    Solidarity as Joint Action.Andrea Sangiovanni - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (4):340-359.
    The demand for social justice, especially in the context of the welfare state, is often framed as a demand of solidarity. But it is not clear why: in what sense, if any, is social justice best understood as a demand of solidarity? This article explores that question. There are two reasons to do so. First, very little has been written on the concept of solidarity, and almost nothing on why and how solidarity can both give rise to and be the (...)
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  45.  52
    Commitment, Types of Dialogue, and Fallacies.Douglas Walton - 1992 - Informal Logic 14 (2):93-103.
    This paper, based on research in a forthcoming monograph, Commitment in Dialogue, undertaken jointly with Erik Krabbe, explains several informal fallacies as shifts from one type of dialogue to another. The normative framework is that of a dialogue where two parties reason together, incurring and retracting commitments to various propositions as the dialogue continues. The fallacies studied include the ad hominem, the slippery slope, and many questions.
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  46. On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - unknown
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are (...)
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  47. Monuments as Commitments: How Art Speaks to Groups and How Groups Think in Art.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):971-994.
    Art can be addressed, not just to individuals, but to groups. Art can even be part of how groups think to themselves – how they keep a grip on their values over time. I focus on monuments as a case study. Monuments, I claim, can function as a commitment to a group value, for the sake of long-term action guidance. Art can function here where charters and mission statements cannot, precisely because of art’s powers to capture subtlety and emotion. In (...)
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  48. Publicity and Commitment to Believe.Robert Williams - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and (...)
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  49.  53
    Passive Consensus and Active Commitment in the Sciences.Alban Bouvier - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):185-197.
    Gilbert (2000) examined the issue of collective intentionality in science. Her paper consisted of a conceptual analysis of the negative role of collective belief, consensus, and joint commitment in science, with a brief discussion of a case study investigated by Thagard (1998a, 1998b). I argue that Gilbert's concepts have to be refined to be empirically more relevant. Specifically, I distinguish between different kinds of joint commitments. I base my analysis on a close examination of Thagard's example, the (...)
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    How Apes Get Into and Out of Joint Actions.Emilie Genty, Raphaela Heesen, Jean-Pascal Guéry, Federico Rossano, Klaus Zuberbühler & Adrian Bangerter - 2020 - Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 21 (3):353-386.
    Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others, which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality. Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination and to be unique to humans. The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as (...)
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