This paper clarifies the notion of "contact with reality" by investigating one way in which lack of such contact can be expressed: the interrogative attitude. The case of a socially withdrawn, seventeen-year-old schoolboy is examined. Paul C. had long been overly logical and precise in his style of thinking. An acute disturbance began with mental fatigue along with apparent obsessive symptoms (e.g., extreme monitoring of his own actions) to the point that simple, everyday actions became very time-consuming; he also (...) developed a tendency to ask endless questions even about trivial phenomena. However, unlike those of the true obsessive, Paul's monitoring, doubting, and querying seemed to lack any emotional or personal element; he was not anxious but, rather, apathetic. Also, Paul lacked real curiosity: To him, everything had the same level of importance, and his attention was not directed by any precise or personal goal. This paper argues that Paul's interrogative attitude was actually a form of autistic-schizophrenic thinking characterized by "pragmatic weakening" and a loss of vital contact with reality, which are consequences of a weakening of the "élan vital" with its "vital propulsion toward the future." Such patients retain their intellectual powers but do not use these powers in accord with the requirements of reality. The interrogative attitude can be seen as a compensation mechanism—a way to maintain some minimal contact with the world. The paper ends with psychotherapeutic recommendations. (Abstract written by special issue editor: L.A.S.). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.

Our paper addresses the following question: Is there a general characterization, for all predicates P that take both declarative and interrogative complements , of the meaning of the P-interrogative clause construction in terms of the meaning of the P-declarative clause construction? On our account, if P is a responsive predicate and Q a question embedded under P, then the meaning of ‘P + Q’ is, informally, “to be in the relation expressed by P to some potential complete answer (...) to Q”. We show that this rule allows us to derive veridical and non-veridical readings of embedded questions, depending on whether the embedding verb is veridical or not, and provide novel empirical evidence supporting the generalization. We then enrich our basic proposal to account for the presuppositions induced by the embedding verbs, as well as for the generation of intermediate exhaustive readings of embedded questions. (shrink)

Nous partageons le problème de savoir comment faire face à autant d'humains si semblables et si différents. A autant d'êtres qui ne peuvent interpréter le fait d'exister sans se comparer les uns aux autres, sans se distinguer les uns des autres, et qui doivent néanmoins cohabiter. Et de savoir comment ces humains peuvent d'autant plus se distinguer qu'ils prennent la place successivement les uns les autres, qu'ils reprennent les mêmes traces et doivent les réinterpréter. La première formulation du problème est (...) plutôt celle de la problématologie, dans la mesure où elle place au centre de la condition humaine le langage ordinaire, l'incessante différence de la question et de la réponse. C'est par elle que les humains mesurent ce qui les éloigne ou les rapproche et qu'ils règlent leurs désaccords. La seconde formulation du problème est plutôt celle de l'herméneutique, dans la mesure où elle place au centre de la condition humaine la condition interprétative, où chaque génération doit réinterpréter le monde où elle se découvre, pour reprendre la conversation rompue par la mort. En exposant ces deux " gestes " élémentaires du questionnement, en construisant l'écart entre deux traditions philosophiques de styles aussi hétérogènes, sans chercher à les subordonner l'un à l'autre, il s'est agi de penser une éthique de l'interrogativité. Ce sens de l'interrogation peut seul orienter nos " éthiques de responsabilité " et nous remettre ensemble dans un monde où nous comparaissons d'autant plus heureux de nous distinguer que nous nous effaçons devant l'autre. Ces deux attitudes font notre civilité. (shrink)

The thesis concerns itself with the selection constraints governing the basic distributional patterns of five complement constructions in English--the bare clause, the that-clause, the interrogative, the concealed question construction and the exclamative complement--across a wide array of knowledge, belief and communication predicates. The relevant distributional phenomena--which predicates are capable of embedding which complement types--have traditionally been captured by stipulative grammatical markings such as subcategorization frames, semantic selection frames and case-theoretic lexical markings. These theoretical tools, even to the extent that (...) they successfully reduplicate the observed phenomena, are of no explanatory value, as they do not derive the different behavioral patterns from some independently established properties of the embedding predicates or their complements. In the thesis, I present an epistemically-based theory, which attempts to derive the relevant distributional phenomena, including those traditionally assumed to reflect hard-core syntactic idiosyncrasies, from a linguistic-epistemic theory of knowledge, belief and communication. ;The theory is based on a lexical-semantic analysis of the embedding predicates, according to which they denote ternary relations between agents, objects of attitude and objects of representation. Thus, to give an example, the predicate think denotes a ternary relation between a thinker, a thought mentally represented by the thinker, and a proposition expressed by the thought and believed by the thinker to be true. This analysis, developed on linguistic grounds for linguistic purposes, echoes some of the recent insights in the philosophy of mind, especially Crimmins . Coupled with a theory of the meanings of the different complement types--partially based on the formal semantic insights of Karttunen , Groenedijk and Stokhof and Ginzburg --this account derives the distributional patterns from simple considerations of semantic compatibility: those predicates which are capable of embedding a certain complement type are exactly those whose lexical semantics is compatible with the semantics of the complement. ;Some of the distributional patterns discussed in the thesis, especially the one involving concealed questions, have traditionally been taken to provide empirical support for the hypothesis of the autonomy of syntactic representations . The analysis presented in this thesis reveals the dramatic extent to which the semantics and the syntax of lexical selection are transparent to each other, and thus implies, at least with respect to the core domain of lexical selection, that the autonomy hypothesis is empirically unjustified. (shrink)

I defend a proposition-directed, sui generis account of agnosticism, according to which being agnostic about some proposition, P, involves a sceptical or questioning mental stance towards both the truth and falsity of P. Call this the questioning-attitude account. The questioning-attitude account contrasts with the question-directed attitude account of Jane Friedman, which holds that the object of agnosticism is a question rather than a proposition. I argue that the questioning-attitude account not only avoids a major weakness of Friedman’s question-directed attitude account, (...) but it also displays the following three attractive features: (1) it offers an explanation of why ascriptions of agnosticism often take an interrogative compliment, (2) it offers a univocal account of the content of all three doxastic attitudes, and (3) it fleshes out the claim that agnosticism is sui generis by describing what makes agnosticism distinct from both belief and disbelief. (shrink)

This guest column suggests that we should follow Hannah Arendt in resisting the urge to expound doctrines or systems and, instead, should disclose the processes of our thought as they are “in motion.” While we should not hesitate to express judgments, our aim in intellectual work should be to occasion (and experience) surprise. Like Arendt, we should candidly express “the bliss of thought” as we think and write. On this basis, the political arena can become “a space for self-analysis and (...) (by analogy with psychoanalysis) continuous rebirth.” And it is only on this basis, Kristeva argues, that reconstruction, after a century of unprecedented destruction, be accomplished without our succumbing to nostalgia. Efforts at reconstruction must be undertaken, as Arendt undertook them, “in light of the history of nihilism” and “in the name of sheer survival.” Kristeva joins Arendt in advising against a return to foundationalism while at the same time urging the development of a kind of “re-foundationalism.” Kristeva concludes by showing how, in these attitudes, Arendt's thinking was—despite her notorious dismissal of psychoanalysis—in tune with those of Freud. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Jane Friedman has argued that attitudes like wondering, enquiring, and suspending judgement are question-directed and have the function of moving someone from a position of ignorance to one of knowledge. Call such attitudes interrogative attitudes. Friedman insists that all IAs are governed by the following Ignorance Norm: Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought not have an IA towards Q at t. However, I argue that key premisses (...) in Friedman’s argument actually point towards an opposing conclusion; namely, that IAs are not governed by the Ignorance Norm, and IAs have functions other than moving someone from a position of ignorance to one of knowledge. I conclude that the Ignorance Norm should be rejected. (shrink)

Since Gayle Salamon’s 2018 article “What is Critical about Critical Phenomenology?”, phenomenologists and critical theorists have offered various responses to the question this title poses. In doing this, they articulated the following considerations: is renewed criticality targeting the phenomenological method itself, does it expand its subject matter to marginalized experiences, does it retool key phenomenological concepts? One aspect of this debate that has been left under-interrogated, however, is the word “phenomenology” itself. There is after all another question to ask in (...) this context: what is phenomenological about critical phenomenology? Many avenues of response are of course possible. Phenomenology could most broadly be meant as an approach that concerns itself with what is given in experience in order to describe the structures of that givenness. From a Husserlian perspective, pure phenomenology is the science which concerns itself with phenomena in the full and diverse sense of the word—not as understood by specific natural or human sciences. What is distinctive of phenomenology is thus not what subset or type of phenomena it is interested in but how it relates to them, which, as Husserl introduces Ideas I, happens “in a completely different attitude.”. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue for the ethical and political virtue of a form of critique associated with the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault’s tryptich of essays on critique---namely ”What is Critique?’ ”What is Revolution?’ and ”What is Enlightenment?’---develop a formulation of critique understood as an attitude or disposition, a kind of relation that one bears to oneself and to the actuality of the present. I suggest that this critical attitude goes hand in hand with a mode of intellectual (...) practice realized rhetorically in the form of the interrogative and methodologically in ”problematology’. But, in addition to highlighting the habitus of critique suggested by Foucault, I also want to consider the entanglement of this critical enterprise in the conditions of the present that it attempts to diagnose. Specifically, I ask, in what way is a critical enterprise in the interrogative mood itself imbricated in the trope of interrogation that fills so much of our current political and public landscape? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedThe Ahmadis: Community, Gender, and Politics in a Muslim Society. By Antonio Gualtieri. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004. Pp. xvi + 192. Hardcover $65.00. Paper Cdn $24.95 / U.S. $19.95.American Knees. By Shawn Wong. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2005. Pp. xxi + 229. Paper $14.95.The Art of Worldly Wisdom. By Baltasar Gracian and translated by Joseph Jacobs. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. (...) xiii + 114. Paper $5.95.Bashō's Journey: The Literary Prose of Matsuo Bashō. Translated by David Landis Barnhill. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Pp. xvii + 191. Hardcover $59.50. Paper $17.95.Bringing the Gods to Mind: Mantra and Ritual in Early Indian Sacrifice. By Laurie L. Patton. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Pp. xv + 289. Hardcover $49.95/£32.50.Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. By Kristin Beise Kiblinger. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. viii + 145. Hardcover $89.95.A Chinese Ethics for the New Century: The Ch'ien Mu Lectures in History and Culture, and Other Essays on Science and Confucian Ethics. By Donald J. Munro. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005. Pp. xlv + 158. Hardcover $33.00.Chinese Theories of Reading and Writing: A Route to Hermeneutics and Open Poetics. By Ming Dong Gu. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 334. Hardcover $85.00.A Dictionary of Cantonese Slang: The Language of Hong Kong Movies, Street Gangs, and City Life. By Christopher Hutton and Kingsley Bolton. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp. xxiv + 492. Paper $28.00.Ghazālī and the Poetics of Imagination. By Ebrahim Moosa. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. Pp. xiii + 349. Hardcover $59.95. Paper $22.50.Going Forth: Visions of Buddhist Vinaya. Edited by William M. Bodiford. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp. x + 317. Hardcover $48.00.The Harem: Inside the Grand Seraglio of the Turkish Sultans. By N. M. Penzer. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. 277. Paper $14.95.Ideals of the East: The Spirit of Japanese Art. By Kakuzo Okakura. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. xiv + 106. Paper $5.95. [End Page 365]An Illustrated Chinese Materia Medica. By Jing-Nuan Wu. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 706. Price not given.Jews and Arabs: A Concise History of Their Social and Cultural Relations. By S. D. Goitein. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. xv + 263. Paper $12.95.The Logic of Nothingness: A Study of Nishida Kitarō. By Robert J. J. Wargo. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp xi + 241. Paper $25.00.The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi. By Raghavan N. Iyer. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 449. Paper Rs 520.00.Nietzsche's Epic of the Soul: Thus Spoke Zarathustra. By T. K. Seung. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. Pp. xxviii + 370. Hardcover $83.00. Paper $27.95.Of Guilds, Companies, Corporations, and Governance: A Conceptual Sketch. By Leonardo R. Silos. Makati City, Philippines: Asian Institute of Management, 2005. Pp. xvi + 238. Price not given.The Path to Rome. By Hilaire Belloc. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. ix + 251. Paper $12.95.The Philosophy of the Bhagavadgātā : A Study based on the Evaluation of the Commentaries of Śamkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. By S. M. Srinivasa Chari. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2005. Pp. xxvi + 294. Hardcover Rs 575.00.The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore. By Kalyan Sen Gupta. Burlington, VT: Ash-gate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. ix + 103. Hardcover $79.95.The Pristine Dao: Metaphysics in Early Daoist Discourse. By Thomas Michael. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 170. Hardcover $60.00. Paper $21.95.Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume. Edited by Shoun Hino and Toshihiro Wada. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 2004. Pp. xx + 903. Hardcover Rs. 1800.The Unity of Mystical Traditions: The Transformation of Consciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism. By Randall Studstill. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005. Pp. xii + 304. Hardcover @89/$127.00.Writing the World: On Globalization. Edited by David... (shrink)

Après " le Temps et sa Flèche ", la deuxième rencontre " Physique et Interrogations Fondamentales ", dont le présent ouvrage rassemble les actes, était consacrée à une question, certes ancienne, mais que les développements des techniques de l'information posent avec une brûlante actualité, celle des rapports du virtuel et du réel. Les textes ici rassemblés témoignent du remarquable effort de clarté et d'accessibilité consenti par les auteurs. Par son existence même, ce livre met en évidence le fil conducteur qui (...) a traversé tous les débats de la rencontre, à savoir le puissant rôle heuristique du virtuel : Ce qu'il faut, c'est voir. Et voir c'est chercher à voir, derrière toutes les images, toutes les représentations, derrière toutes les visions, ce qui ne se laisse pas voir, mais qui se laisse chercher. ". (shrink)

What sort of epistemic positions are compatible with inquiries driven by interrogative attitudes like wonder and puzzlement? The ignorance norm provides a partial answer: interrogative attitudes directed at a particular question are never compatible with knowledge of the question’s answer. But some are tempted to think that interrogative attitudes are incompatible with weaker positions like belief as well. This paper defends that the ignorance norm is exhaustive. All epistemic positions weaker than knowledge directed at (...) the answer to a question are compatible with having an interrogative attitude towards that question. We offer two arguments for this conclusion. The first is based on considerations about the role of hedging in inquiry. The second is conditional on considerations related to the aim of inquiry as a goal-directed activity. (shrink)

Can agents rationally inquire into things that they know? On my view, the answer is yes. Call this view the Compatibility Thesis. One challenge to this thesis is to explain why assertions like “I know that p, but I’m wondering whether p” sound odd, if not Moore-Paradoxical. In response to this challenge, I argue that we can reject one or both premises that give rise to it. First, we can deny that inquiry requires interrogative attitudes. Second, we can (...) deny the ignorance norm, on which agents are not permitted to both know and have interrogative attitudes, such as wondering. I argue that there are compelling reasons to deny the former and reasons to question the latter. Both options pave the way for further work on further inquiry. (shrink)

Much of the recent work on epistemology of inquiry defends two related theses. First, inquiry into a question rationally prohibits believing an answer to that question. Second, knowledge is the aim of inquiry. I develop a series of cases which indicate that inquiry is not as narrow as these views suggest. These cases can be accommodated if we take a broader approach and understand inquiry as aiming at epistemic improvement, described more generally. This approach captures a wider range of inquiring (...) phenomena because it accounts for forms of epistemic improvement that fall short of, or go beyond, coming to know the answer to a question. (shrink)

The study of defeasible reasoning unites epistemologists with those working in AI, in part, because both are interested in epistemic rationality. While it is traditionally thought to govern the formation and (with)holding of beliefs, epistemic rationality may also apply to the interrogative attitudes associated with our core epistemic practice of inquiry, such as wondering, investigating, and curiosity. Since generally intelligent systems should be capable of rational inquiry, AI researchers have a natural interest in the norms that govern (...) class='Hi'>interrogative attitudes. Following its recent coinage, we use the term ``zetetic'' to refer to the properties and norms associated with the capacity to inquire. In this paper, we argue that zetetic norms can be modeled via defeasible inferences to and from questions---a.k.a erotetic inferences---in a manner similar to the way norms of epistemic rationality are represented by defeasible inference rules. We offer a sequent calculus that accommodates the unique features of ``erotetic defeat" and that exhibits the computational properties needed to inform the design of zetetic agents. The calculus presented here is an improved version of the one presented in Millson (2019), extended to cover a new class of defeasible erotetic inferences. (shrink)

Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...) of future contingents according to which many of them are true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true, either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither true nor false, face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. Reflecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. After presenting an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has been recently proposed by Jane Friedman and outlining some norms governing wondering, I argue that all accounts of future contingents except Ockhamism face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. (shrink)

Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at knowledge. I go on to develop an alternative view, according to which inquiry aims at (...) maximizing the epistemic value of our credences. This alternative view makes room for knowledge that falls shy of certainty, and it coheres nicely with a rich body of work in epistemic decision theory. I proceed to highlight the implications of this replacement for some important topics in epistemology, including the dogmatism paradox, the nature of interrogative attitudes, and the norm of practical reasoning. (shrink)

Recent philosophical work on inquiry yields important results about when it is appropriate to inquire and to what extent norms on inquiry are compatible with other epistemic norms. However, philosophers have been remarkably silent on the matter of what questions we ought to take up in the first place. In this paper, I take up this question, and argue that moral considerations constitute fit-related, right-kind reasons to adopt interrogative attitudes towards, and so inquire about, particular questions. This is (...) a conclusion of more general interest, because – as I explain – we might think that moral considerations are at best wrong-kind reasons for attitudes. If my contentions are right, then there is at least one kind of attitude – namely interrogative attitudes – of which this is not true. (shrink)

Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge—for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. -/- This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I argue (...) that we should think of progress relative to the epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry (rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 291-293 [Access article in PDF] Schizophrenia and the Void Jean Naudin and Jean-Michel Azorin It was Eugene Minkowski who, from the 1920s on, introduced the French to the work of Eugen Bleuler, whose student he had been. In the introduction to his first book, Schizophrenia: Psychopathology of Schizoids and Schizophrenics (Minkowski 1927), Minkowski nevertheless notes with regard to Bleuler that he could not (...) allow himself "to be restricted to this student's task." For Minkowski, Bleuler certainly enjoys the great merit of having substituted the notion of schizophrenia for that of dementia praecox and of having described autism with precision. But—Minkowski says—autism is badly defined when, relying upon the concept of Spaltung, Bleuler fails to break free of associationist psychology. Minkowski justifies his critical attitude by appealing, as does Binswanger, to Husserl and above all to Bergson. For Bergson, dissociation is a normal feature of thought. If, for Minkowski, it is important to pay attention to autism, it is because it attests not to a certain fragmentation of consciousness, but rather to an attitude whereby the subject seeks to preserve the precarious equilibrium of a personality that is threatened by a void.The article translated into English for this special issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology prefigures Schizophrenia and, like an earlier article on the theme of "morbid rationalism," already announces certain key concepts. Here these concepts are, so to speak, caught in their embryonic state, and one is forced to recognize with Tatossian (1993) how radically Minkowski differs from his master, Bleuler, in the choice of specific cases. By according exemplary significance to cases of "poor autism," Minkowski focuses on the reflexivity of the subjective experience of the patient rather than on the proliferation of the delusional state, which lends itself more readily to clinical observation. We must remember that Minkowski is above all a healer. If, like Bleuler, he is interested in the problem that generates the illness, it is only in order to be able to heal the patient. It is therefore not so much the isolated problem that interests him as the way the person tries to deal with it. So it should not come as a surprise that one of the essential themes of this article is what Minkowski calls "compensation." Like the psychoanalytical concepts to which Bleuler refers, compensation is a dynamic concept. But Minkowski takes care to distinguish the compensation that characterizes the interrogative attitude from motives of a more psychological kind aimed at meeting a lack by symbolically satisfying a desire. In the purely phenomenological sense in which Minkowski takes it, compensation does not refer to a hidden motive. It represents a way of getting around the void or sense of emptiness that results from the schizophrenic person's inability to project himself into the future by pursuing the practical goals of normal, daily life. In this case, the dynamic does not feed off the vicissitudes of drive but off the élan vital—or rather, off the decline of élan vital that such persons suffer. [End Page 291]Minkowski particularly insists upon the fact that Paul's interrogative attitude is not simple curiosity, even if Paul's questioning began with sexual curiosity. Confronted with incessant questioning reminiscent of a child, a psychoanalyst would be likely to invoke infantile curiosity concerning procreation and sexual difference. Minkowski, however, seeks to show that the prevailing motive in Paul's case is not so much desire for knowledge as the vital necessity of finding a way of—can one put it this way?—playing for time. In other words, the interrogatory attitude is a way of avoiding confrontation with the realm of practical concerns that, at bottom, makes the patient suffer. If this realm makes him suffer, it is because the absence of any vital attachment leaves him floating in a kind of void. The fundamental problem of schizophrenia is therefore identified as the loss of meaning going along with a deficiency in the individual's attachment to practical reality. Practical reality, or to put it otherwise, an orientation toward practical activity... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 299-301 [Access article in PDF] Reading Minkowski with Husserl Bernard Pachoud Eugene Minkowski is generally regarded as one of the main figures of the phenomenological strand of psychiatry in France. However, it is striking that, as a phenomenologist, he very rarely mentions Husserl or Heidegger in his texts. Nor, for that matter, does he use their concepts or rely on their descriptions (except (...) in a few texts entirely devoted to the presentation of the philosophical roots of phenomenology). Actually, the philosopher he most often refers to, and whose concepts he borrows, is Bergson, who is not a phenomenologist. But although Minkowski's framework is not phenomenological in the philosophical sense of the term, his clinical descriptions are certainly based on a genuinely phenomenological approach—in the sense that they deal with the subjective experience of patients and the way in which their experience determines their behavior. It is all the more striking to notice just how much his descriptions of abnormal experiences echo certain Husserlian studies that he seems to ignore. I will focus on some common points between Minkowski's clinical descriptions and Husserlian studies that Minkowski could not, in fact, have known at the time of writing this article (at least in their complete form, since they were developed after 1923).The present text, "A Contribution to the Study of Autism: The Interrogative Attitude," is a typical example of Minkowski's clinical descriptions and theoretical interests. The interrogative attitude of the patient Paul C. is considered by Minkowski to be one of the "schizophrenic attitudes," expressing what he calls "loss of contact with reality," a phenomenon held to be characteristic of schizophrenia. These attitudes are quite simply the modalities of schizophrenic "autism" in Bleuler's sense of the latter term. Minkowski (1925) distinguishes the attitudes of withdrawal that have an affective coloring (morbid daydreaming, sulking, and regrets) from those that are purely intellectual (morbid rationalism, the interrogative attitude, the morbid hypertrophy of geometric and static factors). What gives a pathological cast to Paul C.'s systematically interrogative attitude is that it expresses (following Minkowski's clinical description) the patient's inability to engage in action or to establish any practical relationship with reality. This interrogative attitude can be considered a way to take some initiative and thereby avoid complete passivity, but it is a deficient mode of "position taking" since there is no engagement in real action.This emphasis on disorder of action has a modern sound, for it echoes theoretical hypotheses regarding schizophrenia developed by contemporary neuroscientists (Frith 1992). It also echoes the Husserlian studies of perception, in which the feeling of reality largely depends on the strong connection between perception and voluntary movement (action), kinesthetic sensations playing here a key role (Husserl 1989). There are also some remarkable convergences [End Page 299] with Husserl's studies of the active and passive dimensions of consciousness, to be considered next. Husserl's Studies of the Activity and Passivity of Consciousness The main claim of transcendental phenomenology is that our experience completely depends on what Husserl calls the synthetic activity of consciousness. Everything that we become aware of is constituted by the activity of the mind. In texts written between 1918 and 1926 and gathered together under the title, "Analysis of Passive Synthesis," Husserl (1966) distinguishes different degrees of the activity of consciousness, depending on whether or not the ego has the initiative. Mainly, two kinds of activity are described, one depending on the subject (the ego) and requiring his initiative, the other occurring, so to say, in an anonymous, automatic way, elicited by the object, and labeled for this reason "passive synthesis." In other words, when experience relies on synthetic activity, Husserl distinguishes synthetic acts initiated by the ego (the genuine acts) from those that occur in consciousness in an automatic, passive way. Accordingly, the activity of consciousness turns out never to be a pure activity; it always occurs against a background of passivity. Most often, the act is a response to prior stimulation given passively, and it is through this act that the "I" discovers itself as a... (shrink)

Attitude verbs fall in different categories depending on the kind of sentential complements which they can embed. In English, a verb like know takes both declarative and interrogative complements. By contrast, believe takes only declarative complements and wonder takes only interrogative complements. The present paper examines the hypothesis, originally put forward by Hintikka (1975), that the only verbs that can take both that -complements and whether -complements are the factive verbs. I argue that at least one half of (...) the hypothesis is empirically correct, namely that all veridical attitude verbs taking that -complements take whether -complements. I distinguish veridical verbs from factive verbs, and present one way of deriving the generalization. Counterexamples to both directions of the factivity hypothesis are discussed, in particular the case of emotive factive verbs like regret , and the case of non-veridical verbs that licence whether complements, in particular tell, guess, decide and agree . Alternative accounts are discussed along the way, in particular Zuber (1982), Ginzburg (1995) and Saebø (2007). (shrink)

I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to (...) the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B. We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?". (shrink)

What is it for a car, a piece of art or a person to be good, bad or better than another? In this first book-length introduction to value theory, Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative concepts used in everyday thinking and speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse. The various dimensions, structures and connections that value concepts express are interrogated with clarity and incision. -/- Orsi provides a systematic survey of both classic texts including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Moore and Ross (...) and an array of contemporary theorists. The reader is guided through the moral maze of value theory with everyday examples and thought experiments. Rare stamps, Napoleon's hat, evil demons, and Kant's good will are all considered in order to probe our intuitions, question our own and philosophers' assumptions about value, and, ultimately, understand better what we want to say when we talk about value. -/- 1. Value and Normativity 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Which Evaluations? 1.3 The Idea of Value Theory 1.4 Value and Normativity 1.5 Overview 1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality 1.7 Value Theory: The Questions -/- 2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co. 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples 2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value 2.4 The Reduction to Facts 2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value 2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value? 2.7 Summary -/- 3. The Challenge against Absolute Value 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness 3.3 Foot and the Virtues 3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way 3.5 Zimmerman's Ethical Goodness 3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes 3.7 Summary -/- 4. Personal Value 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Moore on Good and Good For 4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes 4.4 Moore Strikes Back? 4.5 Agent-relative Value 4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative 4.7 Summary -/- 5. The Chemistry of Value 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations 5.3 Organic Unities 5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value 5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value 5.6 Holism and Particularism 5.7 Summary -/- 6. Value Relations 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability 6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability 6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations 6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity 6.6 Parity and Choice 6.7 Parity and Incomparability 6.8 Summary -/- 7. How Do I Favour Thee? 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring 7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing 7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value? 7.5 Summary -/- 8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals 8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem 8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response 8.5 Reasons for What? 8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons 8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority 8.8 Summary . (shrink)

L’attitude réaliste constitue de prime abord la posture du sens commun vis-à-vis de la science. Elle consiste à attribuer à la science l’objectif de décrire littéralement la réalité tout en lui reconnaissant la capacité, en vertu de ses méthodes, d’atteindre ce but. Si le réalisme scientifique apparait comme représentant le sens commun, il a dû, au courant du siècle dernier, s’ériger en véritable posture philosophique argumentée devant l’influence grandissante des différentes formes d’antiréalismes. Dans la mesure où la posture qu’un philosophe (...) adopte concernant la prétention des théories scientifiques à décrire le réel a un impact sur son traitement d’à peu près toutes les questions pertinentes de son champ de recherche, on peut dire que l’examen de la question du réalisme scientifique est recommandable à quiconque souhaite mener une réflexion philosophique à propos de l’entreprise scientifique. Cet article débute sur la présentation des thèses fondamentales du réalisme scientifique pour ensuite le distinguer des autres postures réalistes et antiréalistes qui s’y sont opposées. Une fois les contours de la notion de réalisme scientifique précisés, il sera question des principales considérations qui ont été mises de l’avant en sa faveur et en sa défaveur. Le principal argument positif pour le réalisme scientifique est l’argument dit de l’absence de miracle. Au-delà de cet argument, tous les arguments du réalisme scientifique sont issus de répliques aux différents défis antiréalistes qui lui ont été lancés depuis la seconde moitié du 20e siècle. Il s’agira donc, par la suite, de présenter ces différents défis en identifiant les postures qui s’en réclament ainsi que les principales stratégies employées par les réalistes pour tenter de les relever. À la lumière de ce qui aura été présenté, l’article se conclut en interrogeant la distance qui sépare véritablement le réalisme scientifique de l’antiréalisme dans leurs formes contemporaines. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a novel account of knowledge ascriptions with concealed questions as complements. I begin by discussing various theories of knowledge-the proposed in the literature and raising some problems for each. I then present and explain my positive proposal, arguing that knowledge ascriptions with concealed questions as complements say that the subject stands in the knowledge relation to a question. I claim that this view avoids the problems facing other accounts and offers a unified account of knowledge-the, (...) knowledge-wh, and, importantly, other attitudes with interrogative complements. On this account, when we utter any attitude ascription that contains an explicit question, an indirect question, or a concealed question, we say that some subject stands in the relevant relation to a question. (shrink)

Perguntaremos aqui "como seria ver como um ser humano". Tal questão é difícil, pois recuando um passo em relação à percepção e considerando que ela pode não ser o que é, essa questão vai de encontro àquilo que é comumente considerado como a "atitude natural". Merleau-Ponty articulou esta relativização da visão humana e seu realismo espontâneo de duas maneiras diferentes. Em primeiro lugar, há o que poderia ser chamado a "via da finitude". Ela consiste em assumir o ponto de vista (...) de parte alguma para a percepção, o ponto de vista de um espírito sem ligações mundanas. Poder-se-ia dizer então, como Merleau-Ponty não pára de dizer, que perceber não é ver de parte alguma, eque sempre percebemos a partir de algum lugar, em um corpo finito, e não do ponto de vista de deus. Nossa origem animal, contudo, oferece uma segunda maneira completamente diferente de frustar o dogmatismo da fé perceptiva. Essa é a via adotada por Merleau-Ponty em A estrutura do comportamento, onde muito naturalmente ele é levado a interrogar o que distingue a percepção animal da percepção humana. Sua resposta é valiosa: ver como um ser humano significa ser capaz de "multiplicidade perspectiva". Apreender tal conceito e encarar a visão humana como plural e como excesso, apenas é possível para quem abandonou o ponto de vista de parte alguma e decidiu filosofar começando pelo animal.Percepção. Origem animal. Ser humano. Atitude natural. Multiplicidade.We will ask here “what is it like to see as a human”. Such a question is difficult, for in taking a step back from perception and in considering that it might not be what it is, this question goes against what is commonly called the “natural attitude”. Merleau-Ponty will have orchestrated this relativization of human seeing and its spontaneous realism in two different ways. First, there is what might be called the “way of finitude.” This consists in taking the point of view from nowhere on perception, the point of view of a mind without worldly attachments. We would then say, as Merleau-Ponty never stopped saying, that perceiving is not seeing from nowhere, and that we always perceive from somewhere, in a finite body, and not from the point of view of god. Our animal origin, however, offers a second, quite different way of frustrating the dogmatism of the perceptual faith. This is the way that Merleau-Ponty adopts in The Structure of Behavior, where he is, in a very natural manner, brought to interrogate that which distinguishes animal perception from human perception. His answer here is valuable: to see as a human is to be capable of “perspectival multiplicity.” To catch sight of such a concept, to see human seeing as plural and excessive, is only possible for someone who has abandoned the point of view of nowhere and who has decided to philosophize starting from the animal.Perception. Animal Origin. Human being. Natural attitude. Perspectival multiplicity. (shrink)

Is there any reason to discriminate among the rival claims self-proclaimed conservatives make for being truly conservative? This article argues that at least some of these claims can legitimately be dismissed by an independent third. Drawing on and critically interrogating the theories of conservatism provided by Huntington, Oakeshott, as well as Brennan and Hamlin, this article argues that many characterizations of conservatism mistake contingent circumstances explaining why people historically were or conceivably might be reluctant to promote social change for a (...) fully-formed conservative ideology. Not least, risk- and uncertainty-centred accounts, which have gained in popularity as of recently, constitute no viable basis for plausible claims to being truly conservative. Rather than specifying what it takes to be a true conservative, these accounts provide a formalized description of one kind of contingent circumstances that may lead a principled non-conservative to adopt conservative political attitudes. (shrink)

Is there any reason to discriminate among the rival claims self-proclaimed conservatives make for being truly conservative? This article argues that at least some of these claims can legitimately be dismissed by an independent third. Drawing on and critically interrogating the theories of conservatism provided by Huntington, Oakeshott, as well as Brennan and Hamlin, this article argues that many characterizations of conservatism mistake contingent circumstances explaining why people historically were or conceivably might be reluctant to promote social change for a (...) fully-formed conservative ideology. Not least, risk- and uncertainty-centred accounts, which have gained in popularity as of recently, constitute no viable basis for plausible claims to being truly conservative. Rather than specifying what it takes to be a true conservative, these accounts provide a formalized description of one kind of contingent circumstances that may lead a principled non-conservative to adopt conservative political attitudes. (shrink)

Cet article s’interroge sur ce qu’est l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη visée par Sextus dans le Contre les arithméticiens. Après avoir rappelé brièvement le contenu de M IV, on examine la nature de cette discipline. Une fois clarifiée la question de savoir en quoi consistait l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη dans l’Antiquité – et donc ce que visait Sextus dans M IV –, on examine son rapport avec les autres disciplines critiquées par Sextus dans le Contre les Professeurs. Cette enquête mène à mettre en lumière une (...) importante présupposition implicite dans l’attitude de Sextus à l’égard des sciences. (shrink)

While the varied theoretical frameworks of second wave feminism made possible critical interrogation of societal patterns of domination and oppression in view of the transformative goal of liberation, Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of power shifts contemporary feminist thought away from this binary field of relations towards more fundamental questions about gender constitution. Indeed, from the perspective of popular culture it would seem that challenges to rigid gender roles were a thing of the past, to which freedom and certain kinds of gender (...) malleability were intrinsically tied. In fact gender roles continue to be defined in strict opposition to each other and sexist attitudes and practices continue, although increasingly disguised and unacknowledged. If liberation from the strictures of patriarchy is nothing but a lost illusion from the second wave, is there nonetheless a need for a resurgent feminist consciousness today? In this paper, I argue that this is the case, and attempt to show that “the work of the intellect” described by Foucault, must first be catalyzed by an experiential disruption, leading to recognition of what pragmatist philosopher John Dewey described as the “problematic situation.” While both Foucault and Dewey emphasize the necessity of problematization, Dewey’s methodology includes focus on envisioning desired outcomes. Here, my aim is not to resurrect an old idea of unconditioned liberation, but merely to reconsider whether and how experiential disruption and subsequent consideration of the problem might lead to a shift in social and self-consciousness, and create the possibility for change. (shrink)

"L'un des aspects les plus intrigants de l'œuvre de Michel Foucault réside dans son intérêt tardif pour la pensée antique, plus spécialement pour la culture grecque et son héritage romain qu'on peut faire remonter à ses recherches ayant mené, à partir de 1976, à son Histoire de la sexualité. Du fait même de l'infléchissement que connut alors sa pensée, Foucault fut à même d'établir des liens à tous égards originaux et même surprenants entre la pensée antique et la réflexion moderne. (...) En le lisant, c'est une tradition de près de 2500 ans qui s'offre désormais à notre regard. Que nous apprend, sur notre histoire, le fait de mettre en parallèle les propos de Socrate et ceux de Kant? À quoi peut servir l'interrogation menée sur la sexualité antique, si ce n'est peut-être à la « dépsychologiser », la « dépathologiser », la « détaxonomiser », et ainsi la « désenclaver » de ses classifications ultérieures? Que nous enseigne le fait d'entendre par « modernité » non plus une « époque » particulière de l'histoire, mais une manière d'être des individus, une certaine attitude adoptée, « ce que les Grecs, souligne Foucault, appelaient un ' éthos ' »? De quelle manière, finalement, l'esprit critique moderne s'éclaire-t-il de l'esprit critique antique? Les études ici rassemblées posent ces questions à Foucault, avec Foucault et parfois aussi contre Foucault, en écho toujours à ce « courage de la vérité » dont il incarna si splendidement l'exemple."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Violence, domination, inégalité, tyrannie et insurrections : la réflexion de Spinoza sur le droit et la politique ne se limite pas au pacte social, ni à la liberté de philosopher. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de dresser la liste des droits respectifs du souverain et des sujets, dans le sillage des théories du droit naturel. Déjà Althusser avait rapproché Spinoza de Marx et Alexandre Matheron avait montré le rôle essentiel des passions dans la Cité et ses transformations. Toute une génération (...) de chercheurs s'est interrogée ensuite sur les notions par lesquelles se pense ce devenir : foule, peuple, nation, mais aussi multitude. C'est ce dernier terme surtout qui concentre le mieux une pensée de l'initiative historique des citoyens et de leur puissance collective. Il restait à en tirer les conséquences sur les rapports entre individu et multitude, sur les relations de la pensée spinoziste avec Machiavel, Grotius et Hobbes, sur l'attitude de Spinoza envers révolution et conservation, résistance, assimilation et intégration, citoyenneté, désobéissance et révolte. Autant de thèmes qui sont développés ici, à travers la lecture renouvelée de L'Ethique, du Traité théologico-politique, et du Traité politique. Le volume s'achève par un entretien avec Toni Negri, qui fut le premier, dans son livre L'Anomalie sauvage, à mettre en lumière l'importance et le rôle de ce concept. Il y fait le bilan de son propre itinéraire et des discussions qu'il a suscitées."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cet article interroge un fait de langage : l’emploi de l’expression de « bons sentiments » impliquant un sens critique et une attitude de rejet. La généralisation de cet usage est ici mise en évidence. De Louis Althusser se méfiant de la pensée « camusienne » à la mise en garde de Pierre Nora contre l’empire des bons sentiments au détriment de la vertu, les rangs de la critique publique des émotions se sont étoffés. Quelles sont les motivations d’une telle (...) attitude critique? Quels en sont les effets? Dans la mesure où l’emploi critique de l’expression de « bons sentiments » paraît manifester une méconnaissance de la nature des phénomènes affectifs, la question soulevée ici en dernière instance consiste à se demander si nous ne sommes pas confrontés à un cas de déférence langagière sans expertise, situation qui interpelle les compétences d’analyse logique et de définition conceptuelle de la philosophie. (shrink)

Cet article interroge un fait de langage : l’emploi de l’expression de « bons sentiments » impliquant un sens critique et une attitude de rejet. La généralisation de cet usage est ici mise en évidence. De Louis Althusser se méfiant de la pensée « camusienne » à la mise en garde de Pierre Nora contre l’empire des bons sentiments au détriment de la vertu, les rangs de la critique publique des émotions se sont étoffés. Quelles sont les motivations d’une telle (...) attitude critique? Quels en sont les effets? Dans la mesure où l’emploi critique de l’expression de « bons sentiments » paraît manifester une méconnaissance de la nature des phénomènes affectifs, la question soulevée ici en dernière instance consiste à se demander si nous ne sommes pas confrontés à un cas de déférence langagière sans expertise, situation qui interpelle les compétences d’analyse logique et de définition conceptuelle de la philosophie. (shrink)

Cet article interroge le statut du magique chez le premier Sartre à la fois comme héritage d'un dialogue avec la psychologie et l'anthropologie françaises et comme le lieu de la coupure phénoménologique par laquelle se développe une philosophie de l'existence originale. L'A. retrace l'apparition de la conscience magique, pour laquelle la spontanéité persiste d'une manière spécifique là où elle semblait mise en défaut, notamment dans les pathologies de l'imagination et dans l'émotion. Aussi la catégorie du magique permet-elle de penser l'autonomie (...) de la conscience irréfléchie en dotant ses différentes attitudes d'une signification selon une approche synthétique de la réalité-humaine. En un autre point névralgique chez Sartre, la conscience absolue s'emprisonne dans le monde selon un phénomène de dégradation grâce auquel apparaît le psychique : cette existence mixte entre pour-soi et en-soi est irréductiblement magique. Or, le fait psychique est le lieu des relations concrètes avec autrui et l'A. montre, qu'en dernière instance, le magique reparaît dans l'ontologie phénoménologique à travers le schème de la possession – possession d'autrui et possession des choses – mettant la transcendance au compte d'une sorcellerie originelle. (shrink)

Cet article interroge le statut du magique chez le premier Sartre à la fois comme héritage d'un dialogue avec la psychologie et l'anthropologie françaises et comme le lieu de la coupure phénoménologique par laquelle se développe une philosophie de l'existence originale. L'A. retrace l'apparition de la conscience magique, pour laquelle la spontanéité persiste d'une manière spécifique là où elle semblait mise en défaut, notamment dans les pathologies de l'imagination et dans l'émotion. Aussi la catégorie du magique permet-elle de penser l'autonomie (...) de la conscience irréfléchie en dotant ses différentes attitudes d'une signification selon une approche synthétique de la réalité-humaine. En un autre point névralgique chez Sartre, la conscience absolue s'emprisonne dans le monde selon un phénomène de dégradation grâce auquel apparaît le psychique : cette existence mixte entre pour-soi et en-soi est irréductiblement magique. Or, le fait psychique est le lieu des relations concrètes avec autrui et l'A. montre, qu'en dernière instance, le magique reparaît dans l'ontologie phénoménologique à travers le schème de la possession – possession d'autrui et possession des choses – mettant la transcendance au compte d'une sorcellerie originelle. (shrink)

This paper interrogates the fundamental logic of data-driven decision-making as it has taken hold in education and argues for a critical analysis of data-driven education via an attitude of historical ontology. Though influenced by Foucault’s understanding of this concept, I center Colin Koopman’s recent analysis of the ‘informational person’ to point attention to the ways in which the very formatting of data may be understood as historically contingent and, thus, more contestable. After examining the background of DDDM and relevant critiques (...) of it, I suggest that investigating the socio-historical formations of data itself are important for indicating its potential dangers within education. Such a critical analysis identifies the doubled politics of data formatting, with its ability to tether subjectivity to data, while potentially baking modes of power into a variety of technological data apparatuses. To conclude, I consider Koopman’s work in terms of how it may extend critical studies of educational datafication. (shrink)

This chapter interrogates Hollywood film as a powerful public pedagogical machine and as an influential component of the broader media culture, that serves as a primary terrain where the authority of violence and the violence of authority expresses, justifies, and legitimates itself in the U.S. Allegiances to, identifications with, beliefs in, desires for, and attitudes about violence, authority, militarism, and power are largely constructed, imbued, directed and shaped through dominant media formations as they create images and spectacles of violence, (...) either real or fabricated. During a time of continuing imperial aggression, expanding Pentagon budgets, increased international violence, growing authoritarian tendencies, and when an “imperially ambitious” United States has embarked on what Anatole Lieven calls a policy of “unilateral global domination through absolute military superiority,” the inculcation into the mass consciousness of the justification for, identification with, acceptance and pursuit of mass violence through military aggression becomes all the more crucial. (shrink)

Andreas Stokke presents a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. He investigates how lying relates to other forms of insincerity and explores the kinds of attitudes that go with insincere uses of language. -/- Part I develops an account of insincerity as a linguistic phenomenon. Stokke provides a detailed theory of the distinction between lying and speaking insincerely, and accounts for the relationship between lying and deceiving. A novel framework of assertion underpins the analysis of various kinds (...) of insincere speech, including false implicature and forms of misleading with presuppositions, prosodic focus, and semantic incompleteness. -/- Part II sets out the relationship between what is communicated and the speaker's attitudes. Stokke develops the view of insincerity as a shallow phenomenon that is dependent on conscious attitudes rather than deeper motivations. The various of ways of speaking while being indifferent toward what one communicates are covered, and the phenomenon of 'bullshitting' is distinguished from lying and other forms of insincerity. Finally, an account of insincere uses of interrogative, imperative, and exclamative utterances is also given. (shrink)

La 4ème de couverture indique : "Si le futur a de tout temps inquiété les hommes, le futur du droit, traditionnellement, préoccupe peu les juristes. Ceux-ci se concentrent sur son passé (l'histoire du droit) et son actualité (le "droit positif"). Aujourd'hui, cependant, interroger l'avenir du droit devient de plus en plus nécessaire à mesure que celui-ci ne parvient plus à s'adapter à son environnement - formellement autant que matériellement -, à mesure que le fossé se creuse par rapport aux nouvelles (...) sociétés, économies, cultures, technologies, etc. La situation pourrait d'ailleurs sembler exaltante aux yeux des juristes tant il reste beaucoup de concepts, catégories, méthodes, modèles, principes, techniques légistiques et régimes juridiques à inventer. La faculté d'anticipation est une condition de survie. En droit comme ailleurs, et plus que jamais, il convient de ne pas entrer dans l'avenir à reculons. Plutôt que d'adopter l'attitude du pompier qui réagit à l'événement et tente d'en limiter les conséquences négatives, mieux vaut peut-être épouser la conduite du stratège qui cherche à provoquer les meilleurs changements. C'est pourquoi ce livre interroge la possibilité et l'opportunité d'importer les fins et les moyens de la prospective au sein de la recherche juridique. La prospective juridique est une anticipation scientifique et critique visant à éclairer l'action présente à la lumière des futurs du droit possibles et du futur du droit souhaitable. Par nature, les juristes s'intéressent aux lois en vigueur, aux jurisprudences classiques et aux doctrines bien établies, non au droit prospectif. Mais certains, notamment dans les universités, pourraient étudier le droit à venir et, ce faisant, jouer un rôle d'éclaireurs et de guides, favorisant la capacité d'anticipation et la proactivité de tous les acteurs du droit. La prospective juridique s'affirmerait alors telle une nouvelle branche de la recherche juridique.". (shrink)

" Les critiques de la métaphysique ne s'attachent plus aujourd'hui à la réfuter, car cela supposerait ce qui est justement en question, à savoir que ses propositions soient falsifiables. De Nietzsche à Derrida en passant par Heidegger, on s'attache plutôt à la "dépasser" ou à la "déconstruire", c'est-à-dire à la déborder ou à mettre à nu sa structure, tout en laissant subsister dans sa massivité incontournable l'événement qu'elle représente... On voudrait, dans ces quelques leçons prononcées dans le cadre de la (...) Chaire Étienne Gilson, s'interroger sur les raisons d'une telle attitude, qui n'est qu'apparemment iconoclaste, et montrer que ces raisons sont aussi anciennes que la métaphysique elle-même, donc co-essentielles à son projet. Cela ne signifie pas que la métaphysique résiste, pour les avoir anticipées, à toutes les tentatives de déconstruction, mais que le moment herméneutico-critique de la déconstruction est inhérent à sa fonction proprement métaphysique de dépassement. ". (shrink)

Drug use and drug addiction are severely stigmatised around the world. Marc Lewis does not frame his learning model of addiction as a choice model out of concern that to do so further encourages stigma and blame. Yet the evidence in support of a choice model is increasingly strong as well as consonant with core elements of his learning model. I offer a responsibility without blame framework that derives from reflection on forms of clinical practice that support change and recovery (...) in patients who cause harm to themselves and others. This framework can be used to interrogate our own attitudes and responses, so that we can better see how to acknowledge the truth about choice and agency in addiction, while avoiding stigma and blame, and instead maintaining care and compassion alongside a commitment to working for social justice and good. (shrink)

Le concept de " care ", qui désigne tout à la fois une attitude morale - l'attention à l'autre, la sollicitude à son égard - et un ensemble de pratiques destinées à prendre soin des autres, a fait une entrée remarquée dans le débat public au printemps 2010. Tandis que certains y ont vu le pivot d'un projet de société alternatif, d'autres ont immédiatement répliqué que le care ne présentait aucun intérêt politique, voire constituait un concept écran masquant sous une (...) rhétorique en vogue un ensemble de problèmes politiques sérieux, tels que l'accroissement des inégalités ou la permanence des rapports de domination. Face à la polarisation du débat, comme aux malentendus concernant le care auxquels il a donné lieu, cet ouvrage collectif voudrait poser une double question : les théories du care sont-elles dotées d'une portée politique? Et si tel est le cas, en quoi consiste cette dernière? En réunissant les contributions de sociologues et de philosophes qui pensent les pratiques sociales par le biais du concept de care et des théories du care, cet ouvrage souhaite ainsi interroger ce que le care fait au politique et à nos manières de le concevoir, ou autrement dit, comment la prise en compte des activités de care et de l'éthique sociale qui leur est immanente peut faire surgir de nouvelles questions comme de nouvelles perspectives dans notre manière de définir ce que serait une société juste ou décente. (shrink)

"L'abstention, le désintérêt, le désespoir et la haine que suscite "la politique" appellent à changer désormais la stratégie. Le terme de stratégie, interrogé sous le prisme des implications que peuvent avoir ses connotations militaires en termes d'affects et de désaffection, le type d'action politique qu'il paraît induire, ouvre un commentaire précis de Jacques Rancière, de ses positions et intentions. En passant par la littérature, car "l'homme est un animal politique parce que c'est un animal littéraire", Vincent Jarry dessine alors autre (...) chose en résonance : une démocratie des murmures loin des donneurs de leçon, piste pratique cherchant à conjurer le manque de sensibilité dont souffre trop souvent le militantisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)