A midbrain neural basis for the perceptualoscillations of binocular rivalry is suggestedon the basis of fMRI studies of rivalry andinferences from the properties of rivalry thatcannot be explained from the known propertiesof primary visual cortical (V1) neurons. Therivalry switch is proposed to activatehomologous areas of each cerebral hemispherealternately, by means of a bistable oscillatorcircuit that straddles the midline of theventral tegmentum. This bistable oscillatoroperates at the same slow rate that ischaracteristic of perceptual rivalryalternations. Whilst attempting to divert thepresent preoccupation with (...) cortical mechanismsfor rivalry, the new proposal integrates manycortical areas, in keeping with recent evidencethat binocular rivalry involves widespreadareas of the hemispheres. By linking rivalry tointerhemispheric switching mechanisms in thisway, the new proposal for the switch makes theprediction that binocular rivalry will besubject to high level influences such as moodand motivation. These predictions are beingfulfilled, with rivalry playing an increasingrole in the diagnosis and understanding if mooddisorders, schizophrenia and other psychiatricconditions. (shrink)

In addressing thescientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them? (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis (...) of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bi hemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. (shrink)

Objective: Caloric vestibular stimulation has traditionally been used as a tool for neurological diagnosis. More recently, however, it has been applied to a range of phenomena within the cognitive neurosciences. Here, we provide an overview of such studies and review our work using CVS to investigate the neural mechanisms of a visual phenomenon - binocular rivalry. We outline the interhemispheric switch model of rivalry supported by this work and its extension to a metarivalry model of interocular-grouping phenomena. In addition, (...) studies showing a slow rate of binocular rivalry in bipolar disorder are discussed, and the relationship between this finding and the interhemispheric switch model is described. We also review the effects of CVS in various clinical contexts, explain how the technique is performed and discuss methodological issues in its application. (shrink)

In addressing the scientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, “It is prob- able that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them?” (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electro- physiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the (...) class='Hi'>interhemispheric switch hypothesis of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alterna- tions, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bihemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. (shrink)

This essay is about a special kind of transformative choice that plays a key role in debates about permissivism, the view that some bodies of evidence permit more than one rational response. A prominent objection to this view contends that its defender cannot vindicate our aversion to arbitrarily switching between belief states in the absence of any new evidence. A prominent response to that objection tries to provide the desired vindication by appealing to the idea that arbitrary switching (...) would involve a special kind of transformative choice: the choice to change one’s epistemic standards, i.e., one’s commitments regarding the relative importance of achieving true belief and avoiding false belief. My first aims here are to argue that this response is unsuccessful and propose an alternative. My secondary aim is to consider how this discussion might bear on more general debates about transformative choice. (shrink)

John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect‐switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect‐switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect‐switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural‐kind properties, such (...) as being a tomato. (shrink)

John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect‐switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect‐switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect‐switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural‐kind properties, such (...) as being a tomato. (shrink)

This article deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that attempted to undermine the immaterialist position about human nature. After some introductory remarks and explanation of the conceptual background, the article analyses the structure of the argument, with special attention to the idea of soul-switching.’ Some comparisons are made between the argument reported by Razi and a number of arguments from modern and contemporary eras of philosophy. One section is devoted to the critique of the argument and (...) its conceptual basis. This article shows that the argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of a family of contemporary epistemological arguments against substance dualism. It is also shown that discussion of the argument could be useful to highlight a weakness in some, but not all, versions of immaterialism about human nature. (shrink)

Because network scaling costs tend to limit absolute brain size, Striedter suggests that large cetacean brains must have evolved some novel ways to cope with these costs. A new analysis of available data shows that the scaling pattern of interhemispheric connectivity in cetaceans is isometric and differs from that observed in terrestrial mammals.

PurposeThyroid-associated ophthalmopathy is a vision threatening autoimmune and inflammatory orbital disease, and has been reported to be associated with a wide range of structural and functional abnormalities of bilateral hemispheres. However, whether the interhemisphere functional connectivity of TAO patients is altered still remain unclear. A new technique called voxel-mirrored homotopic connectivity combined with support vector machine method was used in the present study to explore interhemispheric homotopic functional connectivity alterations in patients with TAO.MethodsA total of 21 TAO patients and (...) 21 wellmatched healthy controls, respectively, underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning in the resting state. We evaluated alterations in the resting state functional connectivity between hemispheres by applying VMHC method and then selected these abnormal brain regions as seed areas for subsequent study using FC method. Furthermore, the observed changes of regions in the VMHC analysis were chosen as classification features to differentiate patients with TAO from HCs through support vector machine method.ResultsThe results showed that compared with HCs, TAO patients showed significantly lower VMHC values in the bilateral postcentral gyrus, lingual gyrus, calcarine, middle temporal gyrus, middle occipital gyrus and angular. Moreover, significantly decreased FC values were found between the right postcentral gyrus/lingual gyrus/calcarine and left lingual gyrus/cuneus/superior occipital gyrus, left postcentral gyrus/lingual gyrus/calcarine and right lingual gyrus/ middle temporal gyrus, right middle temporal gyrus and left cerebellum-8/lingual gyrus/middle occipital gyrus/supplementary motor area, left middle temporal gyrus and right middle occipital gyrus, right middle occipital gyrus/angular and left middle temporal pole. The SVM classification model achieved good performance in differentiating TAO patients from HCs.ConclusionThe present study revealed that the altered interhemisphere interaction and integration of information involved in cognitive and visual information processing pathways including the postcentral gyrus, cuneus, cerebellum, angular, widespread visual cortex and temporal cortex in patients with TAO relative to HC group. VMHC variability had potential value for accurately and specifically distinguishing patients with TAO from HCs. The new findings may provide novel insights into the neurological mechanisms underlying visual and cognitive disorders in patients with TAO. (shrink)

Formal methods developed for modeling levels of selection problems have recently been applied to the investigation of major evolutionary transitions. We discuss two new tools of this kind. First, the ‘near-variant test’ can be used to compare the causal adequacy of predictively equivalent representations. Second, ‘state-variable gestalt-switching’ can be used to gain a useful dual perspective on evolutionary processes that involve both higher and lower level populations.

Theories of embodied cognition hold that the conceptual system uses perceptual simulations for the purposes of representation. A strong prediction is that perceptual phenomena should emerge in conceptual processing, and, in support, previous research has shown that switching modalities from one trial to the next incurs a processing cost during conceptual tasks. However, to date, such research has been limited by its reliance on the retrieval of familiar concepts. We therefore examined concept creation by asking participants to interpret modality-specific (...) compound phrases (i.e., conceptual combinations). Results show that modality switching costs emerge during the creation of new conceptual entities: People are slower to simulate a novel concept (e.g., auditory jingling onion) when their attention has already been engaged by a different modality in simulating a familiar concept (e.g., visual shiny penny). Furthermore, these costs cannot be accounted for by linguistic factors alone. Rather, our findings support the embodied view that concept creation, as well as retrieval, requires situated perceptual simulation. (shrink)

This article deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that attempted to undermine the immaterialist position about human nature. After some introductory remarks and explanation of the conceptual background, the article analyses the structure of the argument, with special attention to the idea of soul-switching.’ Some comparisons are made between the argument reported by Razi and a number of arguments from modern and contemporary eras of philosophy. One section is devoted to the critique of the argument and (...) its conceptual basis. This article shows that the argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of a family of contemporary epistemological arguments against substance dualism. It is also shown that discussion of the argument could be useful to highlight a weakness in some, but not all, versions of immaterialism about human nature. (shrink)

Realists about group agency, according to whom corporate agents may have mental states and perform actions over and above those of their individual members, think that individual agents may switch between participating in individual and corporate agency. My aim is, however, to argue that the inescapability of individual agency spells out a difficulty for this kind of switching – and, therefore, for realism about corporate agency. To do so, I develop Korsgaard's notion of plight inescapability. On my take, it (...) suggests that individual agents are continuously faced with fully exercising their own individual agency (absent external limits at the time of its exercise). But then individual agents may not switch to acting as members of corporate agents, in the sense of taking on irreducible mental states that differ from their own. As it nevertheless is possible to participate fully in the action of a corporate entity, this incompatibility between individual and corporate mental states suggests a challenge for group agent realism. (shrink)

The contentious question of bilingual processing cost may be recast as a fresh question of code-switching (CS) strategies—quantitative preferences and structural adjustments for switching at particular junctures of two languages. CS strategies are established by considering prosodic and syntactic variables, capitalizing here on bidirectional multi-word CS, spontaneously produced by members of a bilingual community in northern New Mexico who regularly use both languages (Torres Cacoullos and Travis, 2018). CS strategies become apparent by extending the equivalence constraint, which states (...) that bilinguals avoid CS at points of word placement conflict (Poplack, 1980), to examine points of inconsistent equivalence between the languages. Such sites of variable equivalence are junctures where the word strings of the two languages are equivalent only sometimes due to language-internal variable structures. A case in point for the English-Spanish language pair is the boundary between main and complement clauses, where a conjunction occurs always in Spanish but variably in English. The prosodic distancing strategy is to separate the juncture of the two languages. Here the complement clause appears in a different prosodic unit from the main clause, disproportionately as compared both with monolingual benchmarks and with bilinguals' own unilingual English and Spanish. Prosodic distancing serves to mitigate variable equivalence. The syntactic selection strategy is to opt for the variant that is more quantitatively available and more discourse neutral. Here the preference is for the Spanish complementizer que—regardless of main or complement clause language— which is the more frequent option in bilinguals' combined experience in both their languages, whereas English complementizer that is subject to a number of conditioning factors. Syntactic selection serves to restore equivalence at sites of variable equivalence. Discovery of community CS strategies may spur reconsideration of processing cost as a matter of relative difficulty, which will depend on bilinguals' prosodic and syntactic choices at particular CS sites. (shrink)

Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: (...) truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint. (shrink)

Based on content externalism, the question of whether self-knowledge is authoritative or not has launched a real controversy in the philosophy of mind. Boghossian proposed slow switching argument in defense of incompatibility of the two views. This argument has been criticized by some philosophers through different approaches. Vahid is one of them. He claimed that Boghossian's argument appeals to some controversial assumptions without which it cannot achieve its conclusion. In this article, I criticize Vahid's response to slow switching (...) argument and show that self-knowledge in Vahid's response differs in having authority and therefore in function from that of Boghossian. (shrink)

The attempt to model the structure of consciousness in split-brain subjects is ongoing. This paper concerns the recently proposed ?switch model? of split-brain consciousness, according to which a split-brain subject possesses only a single stream of consciousness, unified at and across time, that shifts from one hemisphere to the other from moment to moment. The paper argues that while the central explanatory element of the switch model may account for some aspects of split-brain consciousness, the best general picture of split-brain (...) consciousness is still offered by some version of the ?conscious duality model.? (shrink)

Code switching is defined as the use of two or more languages or varieties of language in conversation. It is a general phenomenon in Pakistani society. This research was conducted through a qualitative descriptive method; it produces descriptive data in the form of code switched sentences from editorial of Urdu newspaper. In this research paper I discussed code switching in editorial of an Urdu newspaper. Daily Khabrain Newspaper was selected for this purpose. One week newspapers were collected for (...) research from 1st January, 2020 to 7th January, 2020 to analyze code switching in editorial. In this research paper I discussed code switching in editorial of an Urdu newspaper. Aims and Objectives are; in this research paper I discussed code switching in editorial of an Urdu newspaper. Research Question was what type of code switching is in editorial in Daily Khabrain Newspaper? Daily Khabrain Newspaper from first January 2020 to 7th January 2020 was collected for the analysis of language or code switching and its type in editorial. Through the analysis of data of newspaper it can be concluded that the type of code switching was intra sentential, word code switching and total integrated Urdu. (shrink)

Inducing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) requires that participants look at an imitation hand while it is stroked in synchrony with their occluded biological hand. Previous explanations of the RHI have emphasized multisensory integration, and excluded higher cognitive functions. We investigated the relationship between the RHI and higher cognitive functions by experimentally testing task switch (as measured by switch cost) and mind wandering (as measured by SART score); we also included a questionnaire for attentional control that comprises two subscales, attention-shift (...) and attention-focus. To assess experience of RHI, the Botvinick and Cohen (1998) questionnaire was used and illusion onset time was recorded. Our results indicate that rapidity of onset reliably indicates illusion strength. Regression analysis revealed that participants evincing less switch cost and higher attention-shift scores had faster RHI onset times, and that those with higher attention-shift scores experienced the RHI more vividly. These results suggest that the multi-sensory hypothesis is not sufficient to explain the illusion: higher cognitive functions should be taken into account when explaining variation in the experience of ownership for the rubber hand. (shrink)

Recent models of the conceptual system hold that concepts are grounded in simulations of actual experiences with instances of those concepts in sensory-motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001). Studies supportive of such a viewhave shown that verifying a property of a concept in one modality, and then switching to verify a property of a different concept in a different modality generates temporal processing costs similar to the cost of switching modalities in perception. In addition (...) to non-emotional concepts, the present experiment investigated switching costs in verifying properties of positive and negative (emotional) concepts. Properties of emotional concepts were taken from vision, audition, and the affective system. Parallel to switching costs in neutral concepts, the study showed that for positive and negative concepts, verifying properties from different modalities produced processing costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher. Importantly, this effect was observed when switching from the affective system to sensory modalities, and vice-versa. These results support the embodied cognition view of emotion in humans. (shrink)

Deciphering how DCAFs (DDB1‐CUL4 Associated Factors) modulate a broad spectrum of cellular processes, including cell cycle progression and maintenance of genomic integrity is critical to better understand cellular homeostasis and diseases. Cells contain more than 100 DCAFs that associate with the Cullin‐Ring Ubiquitin Ligase 4 (CRL4) complex that target specific protein substrates for degradation. DCAFs are thought to act as substrate receptors that dictate the specificity of the ubiquitination machinery (“catalytic DCAFs”). However, recent studies have suggested that some DCAFs might (...) play a different role by targeting CRL4 complexes to distinct cellular compartments (“structural DCAFs”). Once localized to their correct cellular domains, these CRLs dissociate from the structural DCAFs prior to their association with other, substrate‐specific catalytic DCAFs. Thus, we propose that DCAF switches can provide a mechanistic basis for the degradation of proteins that regulate cell growth and proliferation at precise points in space and time. (shrink)

Recent models of the conceptual system hold that concepts are grounded in simulations of actual experiences with instances of those concepts in sensory-motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001). Studies supportive of such a viewhave shown that verifying a property of a concept in one modality, and then switching to verify a property of a different concept in a different modality generates temporal processing costs similar to the cost of switching modalities in perception. In addition (...) to non-emotional concepts, the present experiment investigated switching costs in verifying properties of positive and negative (emotional) concepts. Properties of emotional concepts were taken from vision, audition, and the affective system. Parallel to switching costs in neutral concepts, the study showed that for positive and negative concepts, verifying properties from different modalities produced processing costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher. Importantly, this effect was observed when switching from the affective system to sensory modalities, and vice-versa. These results support the embodied cognition view of emotion in humans. (shrink)

This study investigates switching costs in landmark-based wayfinding using olfactory and visual landmark information. It has already been demonstrated that there seem to be no switching costs, in terms of correct route decisions, when switching between acoustically and visually presented landmarks. Olfaction, on the other hand, is not extensively focused on in landmark-based wayfinding thus far, especially with respect to modality switching. The goal of this work is to empirically test and compare visual and olfactory landmark (...) information with regard to their suitability for wayfinding including a modality switch. To investigate this, an experiment within a virtual environment was conducted in which participants were walked along a virtual route of 12 intersections. At each intersection, landmark information together with directional information was presented, which was to be memorized and recalled in the following phase, either in the same or in the other modality. The results of the study show that, in contrast to the no-switching costs between auditory and visual landmarks in previous studies, switching costs occur when switching modality from visual to olfactory and vice versa. This is indicated by both longer decision times and fewer correct decisions. This means that a modality switch involving olfactory landmark information is possible but could lead to poorer performance. Therefore, olfaction may still be valuable for landmark-based-wayfinding. We argue that the poorer performance in the switching-condition is possibly due to higher cognitive load and the separate initial processing of odors and images in different cognitive systems. (shrink)

An explicitly frame related interpretation of a very general more for less result is used to establish a correspondingly general class of frame related switching results. These are used in turn to show how preference reversals of kinds found by Allais and others may not only be essentially non-paradoxical in character, but can be expected to be frequently observed, even under conditions of certainty and of complete information.

This article discusses xenotransplantation and examines the way its scientific promoters have defended their technology against potentially damaging public representations. The authors explore the criteria used to legitimate the selection of the pig as the best species from which to “harvest” transplant tissues in the future. The authors’ analysis shows that scientists and medical practitioners routinely switch between scientific and cultural repertoires. These repertoires enable such actors to exchange expert identities in scientific discourse for public identities in cultural discourse. These (...) discourses map onto similarities and differences between animal donors and human hosts. Finally, the case is used to comment on a number of related approaches where the dynamics of medical and scientific authority are discussed. (shrink)

Organisations that design and deploy artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly commit themselves to high-level, ethical principles. However, there still exists a gap between principles and practices in AI ethics. One major obstacle organisations face when attempting to operationalise AI Ethics is the lack of a well-defined material scope. Put differently, the question to which systems and processes AI ethics principles ought to apply remains unanswered. Of course, there exists no universally accepted definition of AI, and different systems pose different ethical (...) challenges. Nevertheless, pragmatic problem-solving demands that things should be sorted so that their grouping will promote successful actions for some specific end. In this article, we review and compare previous attempts to classify AI systems for the purpose of implementing AI governance in practice. We find that attempts to classify AI systems proposed in previous literature use one of three mental models: _the Switch_, i.e., a binary approach according to which systems either are or are not considered AI systems depending on their characteristics; _the Ladder_, i.e., a risk-based approach that classifies systems according to the ethical risks they pose; and _the Matrix_, i.e., a multi-dimensional classification of systems that take various aspects into account, such as context, input data, and decision-model. Each of these models for classifying AI systems comes with its own set of strengths and weaknesses. By conceptualising different ways of classifying AI systems into simple mental models, we hope to provide organisations that design, deploy, or regulate AI systems with the vocabulary needed to demarcate the material scope of their AI governance frameworks. (shrink)

This discussion takes up an attack by Jerrold Aronson (seconded by Rom Harre) on the use made by Norwood R. Hanson of the Gestalt-Switch Analogy in the philosophy of science. Aronson's understanding of what is implied in a gestalt switch is shown to be flawed. In his endeavor to detach conceptual understanding from perceptual identification he cites several examples, without realizing the degree to which such gestalt switches can affect conceptualizing or how conceptualizing can affect gestalts. In particular, he has (...) not confronted the possibility of such gestalt selection being involved in the basic identification of what we term "entities". (shrink)

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement—and perhaps ultimately replace—the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS—when further improved—also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human (...) embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have ‘active’ potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through ‘potentiality switches’ about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification. (shrink)

This paper questions two prima facie plausible claims concerning switching in the presence of ambiguous figures. The first is the claim that reversing is an instantaneous process. The second is the claim that the ability to reverse demonstrates the interpretive, inferential and constructive nature of visual processing. Empirical studies show that optical and cerebral events related to switching protract in time in a way that clashes with its perceived instantaneity. The studies further suggest an alternative theory of reversing: (...) according to such alternative, seeing the same thing in multiple ways is a matter of uncovering what is already present to the senses through visual search. (shrink)

Genomic imprinting is an epigenetic mechanism resulting in the preferential expression of the maternal or paternal alleles of a specific subset of genes in the mammalian genome. A key but relatively unexplored question is how imprints are established in the germline. New observations(1) on two classical imprinting disorders, the Prader‐Willi (PWS) and Angleman (AS) syndromes, offer the first genetic insight into this process. Molecular analysis of imprinting mutations that interfere with the appropriate establishment of the maternal and paternal epigenotypes has (...) led to the identification of imprinted transcripts that could be involved in switching imprints in the germlines. (shrink)