Ender's tortured conscience is an illustration of the moral importance of following principles of just war theory—the “unspoken rules of manly warfare”—and their apparent tension with the demands of war and survival. This chapter talks about the ethics of conflict in Ender's various games—his battles and wars. It asks, was justice served in the Third Invasion and destruction of the bugger worlds, the event that came to be called the xenocide. Ender's life is actually a testimony to the just war (...) axiom that all people desire peace. In the tradition of just war theory, there are five principles that lay out the requirements of jus ad bellum, or how to go to war in an ethical way. They include just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, probability of success, and last resort. Ender's strategy is always to use devastating force to incapacitate the enemy. (shrink)

Background: Increasing interest in empirical ethics has enhanced understanding of healthcare professionals’ ethical problems and attendant decision-making. A four-stage decision-making model involving ethical attention, reasoning, intention and action offers further insights into how more than reasoning alone may contribute to decision-making.Aims: To explore how the four-stage model can increase understanding of decision-making in healthcare and describe the decision-making of an under-researched professional group.Methods: 23 purposively sampled UK community pharmacists were asked, in semi-structured interviews, to describe ethical problems in their work (...) and how they were resolved. Framework analysis of transcribed interviews utilised the four decision-making stages, together with constant comparative methods and deviant-case analysis.Results: Pharmacists were often inattentive and constructed problems in legal terms. Ethical reasoning was limited, but examples of appeals to consequences, the golden rule, religious faith and common-sense experience emerged. Ethical intention was compromised by frequent concern about legal prosecution. Ethical inaction was common, typified by pharmacists’ failure to report healthcare professionals’ bad practices, and ethical passivity emerged to describe these negative examples of the four decision-making stages. Pharmacists occasionally described more ethically active decision-making, but this often involved ethical uncertainty.Discussion: The four decision-making stages are a useful tool in considering how healthcare professionals try to resolve ethical problems in practice. They reveal processes often ignored in normative theories, and their recognition and the emergence of ethical passivity indicates the complexity of decision-making in practice. Ethical passivity may be deleterious to patients’ welfare, and concerns emerge about improving pharmacists’ ethical training and promoting ethical awareness and responsibility. (shrink)

Environmental health remains a niche topic in bioethics, despite being a prominent social determinant of health. In this paper we argue that if bioethicists are to take the project of health justice as a serious one, then we have to address environmental injustices and the threats they pose to our bioethics principles, health equity, and clinical care. To do this, we lay out three arguments supporting prioritizing environmental health in bioethics based on bioethics principles including a commitment to vulnerable populations (...) and justice. We also highlight and advocate for environmental law efforts that align with these priorities, focusing specifically on the need for a right to a healthy environment. Our intention is to draw attention to the legal and ethical concepts that underlie the importance of a healthy environment, and urge bioethicists to prioritize both legal and ethical advocacy against environmental injustices in their practice. (shrink)

Núñez et al. (2019) argue that cognitive science has failed either “to transition to a mature inter‐disciplinary coherent field” (p. 782) or “to generate a successful [Lakatosian] research program” (p. 789). We argue that the former was never the intention of many early researchers within the field, while the latter is an inappropriate criterion by which to judge an entire discipline. However, we concur with Núñez et al. (2019) that the individual disciplinary balance within cognitive science has changed over time. (...) Of particular concern is the fact that the use of computational methods appears to be on the wane. (shrink)

In this paper I return to Hegel's dispute with Kant over the conceptual ordering of external and internal purposiveness to distinguish between two conceptions of teleology at play in the contemporary function debate. I begin by outlining the three main views in the debate (the etiological, causal role and organizational views). I argue that only the organizational view can maintain the capacity of function ascriptions both to explain the presence of a trait and to identify its contribution to a current (...) system, for it is the only view that considers teleology as a natural cause. To establish how teleology can be considered as a natural cause, advocates of the organizational view return to Kant's analysis of internal purposiveness. However, while Kant identifies the requirements that an object must meet to satisfy the demands of teleological judgment, I suggest that he denies that we can know whether they are truly met. I argue that Hegel's philosophy of nature is better equipped to determine how internal purposiveness can be considered as a natural cause, for it grounds organization in a form of purposiveness that is more fundamental than a designer's intention. (shrink)

Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task-dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top-down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom-up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top-down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal-directed (...) action that goes beyond existing models by operationalizing an interface between two putative systems—a routine and a non-routine system—thereby demonstrating how explicitly represented goals can interact with the emergent task representations that develop through learning in the routine system. The gradual emergence of task representations offers an explanation for the transfer of control with experience from the non-routine goal-based system to the routine system. At the same time it allows action selection to be sensitive both to environmental triggers and to biasing from multiple levels within the goal system. (shrink)

This paper is part of a broader project whose aim is to present a coherent unified approach to natural language dialogue semantics using tools from type theory. Here we explore aspects of our approach which relate to situation theory and situation semantics. We first point out a relationship between type theory and the Austinian notion of truth. We then consider how records in type theory might be used to represent situations and how dependent record types can be used to model (...) constraints on situations. We then sketch treatments of attitude phenomena for which Barwise and Perry proposed situation semantic analyses (perception complements, belief, the Pierre puzzle) as well as two other intensional phenomena (intensional verbs and intentional identity). Finally we give a characterisation of the type theory used and a small illustrative fragment of English. (shrink)

We shall consider a formulation of generalised quantifiers using type theory with records (TTR). TTR follows closely the development of record types in Martin-L¨of or constructive type theory but differs in that the type theory is defined on a classical set theoretic basis. This means that the classical set-theoretic approach to generalised quantifiers can be imported into the type theoretic framework. The result is, I believe, equivalent to the proposal for dynamic generalised quantifiers in Chierchia (1995). The use of dependent (...) types provides us with an elegant approach to the formulation of dynamic quantifiers. We use a notion of hypothetical context which we have used elsewhere to give accounts of intentional identity, answers to questions and information state updates in dialogue management. We suggest that this points towards a general theory of hypothetical context in natural language. We suspect also that our analysis using records will support analyses of common noun phrase and verb-phrase anaphora and also facilitate representations which are underspecified with respect to quantifier scope, though we leave the investigation of this to future research. (shrink)

Although psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism derive from theoretical and philosophical assumptions worlds apart, both experientially-based traditions share at their heart a desire for the understanding, development, and growth of the human experience. Paul Cooper utilizes detailed clinical vignettes to contextualize the implications of Zen Buddhism in the therapeutic setting to demonstrate how its practices and beliefs inform, relate to, and enhance transformative psychoanalytic practice. The basic concepts of Zen, such as the identity of the relative and the absolute and the (...) foundational principles of emptiness and dependent-arising, are given special attention as they relate to the psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious and its processes, transference and countertransference, formulations of self, and more. In addition, through an analysis of apophasis, a unique style of discourse that serves as a basic structure for mystical languages, he provides insight into the structure of the seemingly irrational Zen koan in order to demonstrate its function as a pedagogical and psychological tool. Though mindful of their differences, Cooper’s intent throughout is to illustrate how the practices of both Zen and psychoanalysis become internalized by the individual who engages in them and can, in turn, inform one another in mutually beneficial ways in an effort to comprehend the ramifications of an individual or collective expanding vision. (shrink)

This article considers the extent to which insights from the philosophy of art can assist copyright law in identifying the author or authors of works to which many have contributed. In doing so, it looks to institutional theories of art, which go beyond a simple bifurcation of ‘author’ and ‘work’, and focus instead on broader determinants of an art work’s production, such as the ‘artworld’. It puts forward a framework focusing on three components of authorship supported by these theories: role, (...) authority and intention. The paper then draws attention to some important challenges that this framework raises for copyright law’s joint authorship doctrine in the UK and USA, and suggests some ways in which copyright law might be reformed, so as to allow copyright to retain its own benchmarks while also bringing conceptions of authorship in law and art closer together. (shrink)

The first part of the chapter translates and discusses, section by section, Metaphysics Α 10. The second part rveiews in retrospect Aristotle's intentions in Metaphysics Α as a whole, and the progress of his argument through the 10 chapters of the book. It is Aristotle's intention to search for the first principles and causes of being, by reviewing and examining the opinions of his predecessors on this subject. A distinction must be made between Aristotle's report of his predecessors' opinions and (...) his critical discussion of the difficulties he thinks their views involve; at the end of the book Aristotle reminds us that we need to mull over these difficulties for ourselves: this is the programme set for Book B. (shrink)

In everyday causal explanations of human behaviour, known generally as folk psychology,' the causal powers of the mental seem to be taken for granted. Mental properties such as perceptions, beliefs, and desires, are all called upon in causal explanations of events that are deemed intentional. Jaegwon Kim's exclusion principle has led him to deny mental properties causal efficacy unless they are metaphysically reduced to physical properties, but what of their causal relevance? By giving up the assumption of causally efficacious (...) mental properties, has Kim put into question the explanatory value of explanations with mental descriptions? In other words, if a lower order neurological causal explanation involving a causally efficacious property is at hand, does it make the higher order mental explanation irrelevant and therefore redundant? If we are to save the explanatory importance of higher order predicates, and thus the causal explanations of the special sciences and folk psychology, we need an account of how such properties can be relevant as opposed to irrelevant in causal explanations, even though they may not be causally efficacious. Frank Jackson's and Philip Pettit's notion of program explanation tries to do just this. (shrink)

Excerpt from Spiritual Experiences: Including Seven Months With the Brothers Davenport About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our (...) edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in (...) action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action. It does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher-order interlocking intentions. (shrink)

This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a form of team reasoning in which team members aim to achieve common interests, rather than maximising a common utility function, and in which team reasoners can coordinate their behaviour by following pre-existing practices. I argue that a market transaction can express intentions for mutually beneficial cooperation even if, extensionally, participation in the transaction promotes each party’s self-interest.

This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to J are neither necessary nor sufficient for J to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, in turn, lead to my (...) positive proposal. People cooperate, I argue, just in case their activities are coordinated in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. (shrink)

Jules Salomone-Sehr argues that an activity is cooperative if and only if, roughly, it consists of several participants’ actions that are (i) coordinated for a common purpose (ii) in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. He argues that guidance by shared intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation. Thereby, he claims to “topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory." In response, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s account captures another notion of cooperation than the sociopsychological notion shared (...) agency theory has focused on. Furthermore, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s interpretation of (ii) is too demanding; it implausibly makes cooperation incompatible with exploitation. (shrink)

In their attempt to provide a reason to be moral, contractarians such as David Gauthier are concerned with situations allowing a group of agents the chance of mutual benefit, so long as at least some of them are prepared to constrain their maximising behaviour. But what justifies this constraint? Gauthier argues that it could be rational (because maximising) to intend to constrain one's behaviour, and in certain circumstances to act on this intention. The purpose of this paper is to examine (...) the conditions under which it is rational to form, and to act on, intentions. I introduce and examine in detail what Gauthier has to say on these issues, argue that it suffers from various problems, and propose an alternative account which I claim avoids them. (shrink)

In a recent essay, Charles F. Capps takes issue with a permissive interpretation of St. Alphonsus Liguori’s influential understanding of cooperation with evil, and develops a more stringent interpretation. In response, I argue that Capps relies on a particular conception of what it is for a cooperator to share a wrongdoer’s bad intention, that this conception of intention sharing is not plausible because it is overly inclusive, and, that on account of this over-inclusiveness, it yields mistaken moral judgments. I (...) then develop and defend an alternative conception of intention sharing. (shrink)

In a recent essay, Charles F. Capps takes issue with a permissive interpretation of St. Alphonsus Liguori’s influential understanding of cooperation with evil, and develops a more stringent interpretation. In response, I argue that Capps relies on a particular conception of what it is for a cooperator to share a wrongdoer’s bad intention, that this conception of intention sharing is not plausible because it is overly inclusive, and, that on account of this over-inclusiveness, it yields mistaken moral judgments. I (...) then develop and defend an alternative conception of intention sharing. (shrink)

This study, theoretically based on integrated threat and image theory, explored (1) the mental constructs produced by the Slovak majority in relation to cooperation with the Roma minority and (2) differences in thinking about different Roma demographic groups. In Slovakia, prejudice towards Roma people is a long-standing phenomenon. In this study there were 228 participants, mostly young adults, who produced 22 categories of associations, explored using content and network analyses. The frequency of category associations in the first and second (...) research group was mostly the same, but the distribution differed for the demographic groups considered by the third research group, which was asked to produce associations separately for each Roma demographic group. The largest difference measured was between integrated and segregated Roma people – the associations were mostly positive for the first and negative for the second. These results provide the first empirical exploration of cooperation intentions with Roma people in the Slovak context and suggestions are made for future discourse on Roma. (shrink)

Groups need contributions that are personally costly to their members. Such cooperation is only adaptive when others cooperate as well, as unconditional cooperation may incur high costs to the individual. We argue that individuals can useWe-if-then plans (collective implementation intentions, cIIs) to regulate their group-directed behavior strategically, helping them to cooperate selectively with group members in the situation planned for. In line with this prediction, a cII to consider group earnings increased cooperative decisions in a prisoners’ dilemma game (...) when playing against another group member but not when playing against a stranger (i.e., non-group member). Moreover, cIIs to cooperate in the prisoners’ dilemma game did not increase cooperation in a structurally similar investment game that participants had not planned for. We discuss the role of collective planning in solving social dilemmas. (shrink)

Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of (...) framing, group identification and team reasoning. I argue that the account of shared intentions this approach yields is less cognitively and conceptually demanding than other accounts and is thus applicable to the intentional joint actions performed by young children. I also argue that it has limitations of its own and that considering what these limitations are may help us understand why we sometimes need to take other routes to shared intentions. (shrink)

Contemporary society very often asks of individuals and/or corporate entities that they perform actions connected in some way with the immoral actions of other individuals or entities. Typically, in the attempt to determine what would be unacceptable cooperation with such immoral actions, Christian scholars and authorities refer to the distinction, which appears in the writings of Alphonsus Liguori, between material and formal cooperation, the latter being connected in some way with the cooperator's intention in so acting. While expressing (...) agreement with most of Alphonsus's determinations in these regards, Cooperation with Evil also argues that the philosophical background to these determinations often lacks coherence, especially when compared to related passages in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Having compared the philosophical approaches of these two great moralists, Cooperation with Evil then describes a number of ideas in Thomas's writings that might serve as more effective tools for the analysis of cases of possible immoral cooperation. The book also includes, as appendixes, translations of relevant passages in both Alphonsus and Thomas. (shrink)

Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members (...) of organized groups can be minimally cooperative in virtue of playing roles in an organizational structure and having a common goal. The minimal form of cooperation I argue for is not grounded in collective intentions involving symmetric mental states, special collective intentional modes, or joint commitments. More generally, I show how considering minimal cooperation in the context of organized groups provides an opportunity to reevaluate the extent to which the social world and social phenomena depend on internalist mental factors (e.g., intentions, beliefs) and externalist non-mental factors (e.g., documents, laws, job descriptions). The view of minimal cooperation among members of organized groups I offer provides support for an externalist rather than internalist theory of at least one social phenomenon. (shrink)

Most definitions of cooperation provide sufficient but not necessary conditions. This paper describes a form of minimal cooperation, corresponding to mass actions implying many agents, such as demonstrations. It characterizes its intentional, epistemic, strategic, and teleological aspects, mostly obtained from weakening classical concepts. The rationality of minimal cooperation turns out to be part of its definition, whereas it is usually considered as an optional though desirable feature. Game-theoretic concepts thus play an important role in its definition. (...) The paper concludes by answering concrete questions about what should and should not be called cooperation. (shrink)

Cooperation admits of degrees. When factory workers stage a slowdown, they do not cease to cooperate with management in the production of goods altogether, but they are not fully cooperative either. Full cooperation implies that participants in a joint action are committed to rendering appropriate contributions as needed toward their joint end so as to bring it about, consistently with the type of action and the generally agreed upon constraints within which they work, as efficiently as they can, (...) where their contributions are sensitive to information (where available) about how others are contributing in the sense that they adjust as needed their contributions in light of information about how others are contributing to ensure effective pursuit of their joint end, where this includes rendering aid to other participants if needed, insofar as they are able. Full cooperation entails those cooperating are engaged in a joint intentional action. Some prominent studies of joint intentional action focus exclusively on cases of full cooperation (notably that of Michael Bratman (2014)). But not all joint intentional action is fully cooperative. One example is the work slowdown. Another example is provided by competitive games like chess and football, or sports like boxing and wrestling, where participants are clearly not intending to contribute to the pursuit of all of the goals of the others engaged in the activity, even when those goals are internal to the type of activity in question, but instead intend actively to frustrate some of them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of forms of non-cooperative behavior within the context of behavior that is still to some degree cooperative, and I argue that the minimal conditions of joint intentional action define minimal cooperative behavior, that is, that minimally joint intentional action is per se minimally cooperative behavior. I define in precise terms what that comes to, and how it is possible in cases in which it seems that one or more participants are in one or more ways acting so as to frustrate the contributions of other participants to their joint action. (shrink)

In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of (...) the intentions themselves, but of the mode of reasoning by which they are formed. We analyse collective intentions as the outcome of team reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning used by individuals as members of groups. We describe this mode of reasoning in terms of formal schemata, discuss a range of possible accounts of group agency, and show how existing theories of collective intentions fit into this framework. (shrink)

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and (...) evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention. Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition. Key Words: collaboration; cooperation; cultural learning; culture; evolutionary psychology; intentions; shared intentionality; social cognition; social learning; theory of mind; joint attention. (shrink)

David Gauthier argues that it can be rational to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, since there are certain situations in which it is rational to adopt an intention to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, and since if it is rational to adopt an intention to do something, then it is rational to do that thing. An important objection to this argument focuses on the move from the rationality of adopting intentions to the rationality of acting on them. Gregory Kavka argues (...) that there are other situations – involving deterrence rather than cooperation – in which it is rational to adopt an intention to perform an irrational retaliatory action, that these situations and the cooperative ones are relevantly similar, so that, in the original cooperative situations, it is rational to adopt an intention to cooperate but irrational actually to cooperate. In this paper, I examine one way in which the argument for cooperation may be reformulated to circumvent this particular objection. (shrink)

This entry surveys main accounts of collective intentions.

This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...) our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. The essays offer extensive discussions of related views by, among others, Donald Davidson, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Christine Korsgaard, Harry Frankfurt, and P. F. Strawson. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students. (shrink)

Steven Pinker proposes a game-theoretic framework to help explain the use of veiled speech in contexts where the ultimate aims of the speaker and hearer may diverge—such as cases of bribing a police officer to get out of a ticket and paying a maître d’ to get a table. This is presented as a response to what Pinker sees as the failure in H. P. Grice’s influential theory of meaning to recognize that speakers and hearers are not always cooperating. In (...) this paper I argue that Pinker mischaracterizes Grice’s views on cooperation, and use this to refine a positive picture of what sort of cooperation is demanded by Grice’s Cooperative Principle. This positive picture serves to insulate the Gricean framework from objectors—including Pinker—who overstate the obligations entailed by the adoption of the Cooperative Principle. I then argue that the cases Pinker presents are best treated by recognizing that in each instance the utterance is formulated with two intentions towards two different audiences and detail a resulting revision to Pinker’s game-theoretic framework that reflects this proposal. I conclude by demonstrating how this proposed game-theoretic framework of cooperation with multiple audiences can be used to model the costs and benefits of other types of discourse, including political speech. (shrink)

David Gauthier has argued that, under certain conditions, cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma is rational. A crucial principle he employs in this argument, however, also implies the pointless retaliation after a failed threat could also be rational. In this paper, I introduce one possible reformulation of the Cooperation Argument, by replacing its second premise with a principle connecting rationally adopted intentions, rational action, and rational reconsideration, and a specific theory of rational reconsideration. I then argue that this reformulated (...) Cooperation Argument is not susceptible to any form of the Deterrence Objection, and conclude that the Deterrence Objection may be circumvented if proper attention is paid to the role of rational reconsideration. (shrink)

In order to understand how infants come to understand others' intentions we need first to study how intentional engagements occur in early development. Engaging with intentions requires that they are, first of all, potentially available to perception and, second, that they are meaningful to the perceiver. I argue that in typical development it is in the infant's responses to others' infant-directed intentional actions that others' intentions first become meaningful. And that it is through the meaningful joining of intentions (...) that understanding continues to develop. I use three common arenas in the first year to illustrate this claim: infants' anticipatory adjustments to being picked up, infants' emerging compliance to others' directives, and infant teasing. Even by the age of two months infants adjust their postures appropriately, gazing at the adult's face as they approach with arms outstretched to pick them up. From the middle of the first year infants come to recognize the meanings of verbal directives and start to comply with them, being drawn further into the cultural worlds of their families. In the last quarter of the first year infants start to playfully tease and foil others' intentions in a variety of ways, actively redirecting the course of intentional engagements. Others' intentions are thus increasingly available to infants, allowing cooperation, challenge, and further elaboration. Joint intentional actions are best understood as the processes through which intention awareness develops rather than just as the products of such awareness. (shrink)

Ignoring most published evidence on wild chimpanzees, Tomasello et al.'s claim that shared goals and intentions are uniquely human amounts to a faith statement. A brief survey of chimpanzee hunting tactics shows that group hunts are compatible with a shared goals and intentions hypothesis. The disdain of observational data in experimental psychology leads some to ignore the reality of animal cognitive achievements.

Cooperation in wrongdoing is an everyday matter for all of us, though we need to discern when such cooperation is morally excluded as constituting formal cooperation, as opposed to material (unintended) cooperation whether justified or otherwise. In this paper, I offer examples of formal cooperation such as referral of patients for certain procedures where the cooperating doctor intends an intrinsically wrongful plan of action on the part of the patient and a medical colleague. I also (...) consider a case of formal cooperation where the cooperator intends a choice on the part of another person that is not intrinsically wrong, but wrong in the circumstances because the person believes it will cause serious uncompensated harm. (shrink)

An adequate moral theory must provide for cooperation and trust between moral agents, but a tension exists between cooperating and maximizing. This tension is prominent in utilitarianism and contractarianism . Various puzzles illustrate this tension, and both utilitarians and contractarians must solve these to present a coherent moral theory. These puzzles include new and resilient versions of classic objections to utilitarianism, such as the claims that utilitarian agents cannot be trusted to keep promises and cannot take rights seriously. They (...) also include the contractarian puzzle of why rational agents would cooperate by making and keeping impartial contracts. In solving these problems, utilitarians and contractarians alike must choose between traditional and revisionary maximizing theories. ;In light of these problems: David Gauthier urges contractarians to appeal to a revisionary theory of rationality, Donald Regan has developed a new variety of utilitarianism, and many other theorists still argue for the revisionary theory of rule utilitarianism. These people underestimate the potential of traditional theories. Although traditional theories like act utilitarianism look only to the future--while revisionary theories sometimes take prior acts such as promises, deliberations, and intentions to justify action--traditional theories are still able to solve these puzzles and furnish a satisfactory account of cooperation and trust. Surprisingly, even though these puzzles were developed as objections to the traditional theories and the revisionist theories were designed to deal with these puzzles, the traditional theories provide superior solutions. ;This defense of traditional theories has broad implications in philosophy and elsewhere, but I specifically discuss two significant implications for modern moral theory and two implications for applied ethics. I reject the criticism that act utilitarianism fails on its own terms and argue that it has previously unnoticed advantages over rule utilitarianism. I also reformulate Gauthier's moral theory using the traditional theory of rationality, thereby answering a major criticism of his theory. In addition, I apply my understanding of traditional maximizing theories to the utilitarian theory of rights and then to the strategic problems of nuclear deterrence and of threats in general. (shrink)

Machiavellians are often seen as manipulative people who contribute negatively to teams and ventures. However, recent work has shown that Machiavellians can also cooperate and act in pro-social ways in a team context. Thus, some aspects of Machiavellianism might be conducive for teams and team members’ intentions to start a business venture. Most studies in this area have failed to (a) assess the effect of Machiavellianism at the team level, (b) take into account the dimensional nature of Machiavellianism, and (c) (...) assess moderators of these effects. We propose that the combination of Machiavellianism and resilience in teams predict team entrepreneurial intentions (EI). Moreover, we propose that different team level dimensions of Machiavellianism (amoral manipulation, desire for status, desire for control, distrust of others) are differentially related to EI. More specifically, we expect at the team level that amoral manipulation and desire for status are positively related to changes in EI (as teams high on these dimensions feel that they can use unethical practices that give them an advantage in being successful), whereas desire for control and distrust of others should be negatively related to changes in EI (as entrepreneurial teams usually work in less structured situations and need to closely work together). Furthermore, all sub-dimensions of Machiavellianism should interact positively with team resilience as resilience acts as a buffer that protects teams from potential negative effects of Machiavellianism. In a multi-wave study among newly formed teams engaged in entrepreneurship projects, controlling for psychopathy and narcissism, we found partial support for our hypotheses. Results supported our expectations for the “amoral manipulation” and “desire for control” sub-dimensions, but not for the “desire for status” and the “distrust of others” sub-dimensions of Machiavellianism, with distrust of others showing unexpectedly opposite effects. This study contributes to the literature by looking at the dimensions of Machiavellianism at the level of entrepreneurial teams in conjunction with the more positive team characteristic, resilience. Our results indicate that the relationship between Machiavellianism and EI is more complex than previously hypothesized, as the sub-dimensions are sometimes positively and sometimes negatively related to entrepreneurial intentions and interact with team-level resilience. (shrink)

The idea that society is a cooperative venture has been used by contractualists, contractarians, and deliberative democrats to justify the burdens of society to each member. In such a cooperative venture, those who benefit from society owe a contribution and those who contribute are owed benefits. Even though this idea is quite intuitive, there are deep disagreements about what makes society cooperative. Some focus on acts of production, others on fair interaction, and still others on the intention to contribute to (...) shared projects. In this article, I show where this kind of disagreement causes problems in current debates, and I defend one conception of social cooperation as uniquely best. Specifically, I argue that the relevant acts that make society a cooperative venture are acts of institutional rule-following. Society is a cooperative venture because people cooperate with one another by following the rules of our basic institutions. (shrink)

The idea that society is a cooperative venture has been used by contractualists, contractarians, and deliberative democrats to justify the burdens of society to each member. In such a coop- erative venture, those who benefit from society owe a contribution and those that contribute are owed benefits. Even though this idea is quite intuitive, there are deep disagreements about what makes society cooperative. Some focus on acts of production, others on fair interaction, and still others on the intention to contribute (...) to shared projects. In this article, I show where this kind of disagreement causes problem in current debates, and I defend one conception of social cooperation as uniquely best. Specifically, I argue that the relevant acts that make soci- ety a cooperative venture are acts of institutional rule-following. Society is a cooperative ven- ture because people cooperate with one another by following the rules of our basic institu- tions. (shrink)