Results for 'immunity to error through misidentification'

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  1. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Simon Prosser & François Recanati (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this collection of newly commissioned essays, the contributors present a variety of approaches to it, engaging with historical and empirical aspects of the subject as well as contemporary philosophical work.
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  2. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: What It is and Where It Comes From.François Recanati - unknown - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--201.
    I argue that immunity to error through misidentification primarily characterizes thoughts that are 'implicitly' de se, as opposed to thoughts that involve an explicit self-identification. Thoughts that are implicitly de se involve no reference to the self at the level of content: what makes them de se is simply the fact that the content of the thought is evaluated with respect to the thinking subject. Or, to put it in familiar terms : the content of the (...)
     
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  3. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.James Pryor - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):271-304.
  4. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Bodily Illusion Experiment.Masaharu Mizumoto & Masato Ishikawa - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):3-19.
    In this paper we introduce a paradigm of experiment which, we believe, is of interest both in psychology and philosophy. There the subject wears an HMD (head-mount display), and a camera is set up at the upper corner of the room, in which the subject is. As a result, the subject observes his own body through the HMD. We will mainly focus on the philosophical relevance of this experiment, especially to the thesis of so-called 'immunity to error (...)
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  5. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Past-Tense Memory Judgements.J. L. Bermudez - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):211-220.
    Autobiographical memories typically give rise either to memory reports (“I remember going swimming”) or to first person past-tense judgements (“I went swimming”). This article focuses on first person past-tense judgements that are (epistemically) based on autobiographical memories. Some of these judgements have the IEM property of being immune to error through misidentification. This article offers an account of when and why first person past-tense judgements have the IEM property.
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  6. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term.John Campbell - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):89-104.
  7. Sources of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Simon Prosser - 2012 - In Simon Prosser Francois Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158-179.
    Saying ┌ that ψ is F ┐ when one should have said ┌ that φ is F ┐ involves making one of two different kinds of error. Either the wrong nominal term (┌ ψ ┐ instead of ┌ φ ┐) is ascribed to the right object or the right nominal term is ascribed to the wrong object. Judgments susceptible to one kind of error are immune to the other. Indexical terms such as ‘here’ and ‘now’ exhibit a corresponding (...)
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  8. De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.
    I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal (...)
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  9.  99
    Observer Memory and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Jordi Fernández - forthcoming - Synthese (1):641-660.
    Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining (...)
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  10. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought.Aidan McGlynn - 2016 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 25-55.
  11. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification * Edited by Simon Prosser and Francois Recanati. [REVIEW]J. Schwenkler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):180-182.
  12. Three Questions About Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Giovanni Merlo - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):603-623.
    It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what (...)
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  13. Memory and Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Andy Hamilton - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):409-417.
    In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a (...)
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  14.  26
    Episodic Memory is Not Immune to Error Through Misidentification: Against Fernández.Kourken Michaelian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9525-9543.
    The claim that episodic memory is immune to error through misidentification enjoys continuing popularity in philosophy. Psychological research on observer memory—usually defined as occurring when one remembers an event from a point of view other than that that from which he originally experienced it—would seem, on the face of it, to undermine the IEM claim. Relying on a certain view of memory content, Fernández, however, has provided an ingenious argument for the view that it does not. This (...)
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  15. Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). (...)
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  16.  8
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification in Observer Memories: A Moderate Separatist Account.Denis Perrin & Christopher Jude McCarroll - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  17. Memory and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Jordi Fernández - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):373-390.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The (...)
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  18.  10
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Functionalist, Self-Reflexive Account of Episodic Memory.Steven James - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía 64:189-200.
    Fernández offers an account of the nature of episodic memory that marries two core ideas: role-functionalism about episodic memory, and self-reflexive mnemonic content. One payoff of this view is that episodic memory judgments are immune to error through misidentification. Fernández takes this to reveal something important about the nature of one’s self-awareness in memory and our first-person conception of ourselves. However, once one sees why such judgments are immune in this way, according to the proposed account, the (...)
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    The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):191-206.
    Recanati’s (2007, 2009) argues for a Lewisian subjectless view of the content of “implicit” de se thought, on the basis that we can thus better explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. The paper argues that this is not the case, and suggests that such a view is in tension with Recanati’s mental files approach to de re thought in general and the SELF concept in particular.
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  20. Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Cheryl K. Chen - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):21-38.
    Abstract: Some first person statements, such as ‘I am in pain’, are thought to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM): I cannot be wrong that I am in pain because—while I know that someone is in pain—I have mistaken that person for myself. While IEM is typically associated with the self-ascription of psychological properties, some philosophers attempt to draw anti-Cartesian conclusions from the claim that certain physical self-ascriptions are also IEM. In this paper, I will examine (...)
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  21.  23
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term.Campbell John - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):89-104.
  22.  4
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Experience Reports.Denis Delfitto, Anne Reboul & Gaetano Fiorin - 2019 - In Alessandro Capone, Una Stojnic, Ernie Lepore, Denis Delfitto, Anne Reboul, Gaetano Fiorin, Kenneth A. Taylor, Jonathan Berg, Herbert L. Colston, Sanford C. Goldberg, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri, Cliff Goddard, Anna Wierzbicka, Magdalena Sztencel, Sarah E. Duffy, Alessandra Falzone, Paola Pennisi, Péter Furkó, András Kertész, Ágnes Abuczki, Alessandra Giorgi, Sona Haroutyunian, Marina Folescu, Hiroko Itakura, John C. Wakefield, Hung Yuk Lee, Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Brian E. Butler, Douglas Robinson, Kobie van Krieken, José Sanders, Grazia Basile, Antonino Bucca, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri & Kobie van Krieken (eds.), Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages. Springer Verlag. pp. 39-59.
    In this contribution, we address the issues concerning the semantic value of Wittgenstein’s subject “I”, as in “I have a toothache”, resulting from the use of predicates that involve first-person knowledge of the mental states to which they refer. As is well-known, these contexts give rise to the phenomenon of ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ : the utterer of cannot be mistaken as to whether he is the person having a toothache. We provide a series of (...)
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  23.  29
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Trilemma About the Self.Annalisa Coliva - unknown
    The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification (...)
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  24.  49
    The Epistemology of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Ivan Hu - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (3):113-133.
    This paper offers several new insights into the epistemology of immunity to error through misidentification, by refining James Pryor’s distinction between de re misidentification and wh-misidentification. This is crucial for identifying exactly what is at issue in debates over the Immunity thesis that, roughly, all introspection-based beliefs about one’s own occurrent psychological states are immune to error through misidentification. I contend that the debate between John Campbell and Annalisa Coliva over (...)
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  25.  52
    The Misidentification of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Rachael Wiseman - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (12):663-677.
    Sidney Shoemaker credits Wittgenstein’s Blue Book with identifying a special kind of immunity to error that is characteristic of ‘I’ in its “use as subject”. This immunity to error is thought by Shoemaker, and by many following him, to be central to the meaning of ‘I’ and thus to the topics of self-knowledge, self-consciousness and personal memory. This paper argues that Wittgenstein’s work does not contain the thesis, nor any version of the thesis, that there is (...)
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  26.  80
    Arithmetic Judgements, First-Person Judgements and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):155-172.
    The paper explores the idea that some singular judgements about the natural numbers are immune to error through misidentification by pursuing a comparison between arithmetic judgements and first-person judgements. By doing so, the first part of the paper offers a conciliatory resolution of the Coliva-Pryor dispute about so-called “de re” and “which-object” misidentification. The second part of the paper draws some lessons about what it takes to explain immunity to error through misidentification. (...)
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  27.  39
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, by Simon Prosser and François Recanati : Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, Pp. X + 294, $47.95. [REVIEW]S. G. Williams - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):209-210.
  28.  2
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification in Observer Memories: A Moderate Separatist Account.Denis Perrin & Christopher Jude McCarroll - forthcoming - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  29.  47
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, Edited by Simon Prosser and François Recanati. [REVIEW]Kristina Musholt - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1228-1234.
  30.  84
    Perception, Nonconceptual Content, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Kristina Musholt & Arnon Cahen - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):703-723.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun. In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then (...)
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  31.  33
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification, 'de Se', and Pragmatics.Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. pp. 413-437..
  32.  45
    Memory Judgments and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.José Luis Bermúdez - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):123-142.
    First person judgments that are immune to error through misidentifi cation (IEM) are fundamental to self-conscious thought. The IEM status of many such judgments can be understood in terms of the possession conditions of the concepts they involve. However, this approach cannot be extended to first person judgments based on autobiographical memory. Th e paper develops an account of why such judgments have the IEM property and how thinkers are able to exploit this fact in inference.
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  33.  1
    I and I: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification of the Subject.Galen Strawson - unknown
    I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, (...)
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  34. First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--245.
  35.  21
    Review of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification[REVIEW]Donovan Wishon - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    This reviews Simon Prosser's and Francois Recenati's (eds.) 2012 Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays.
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  36.  65
    Identification-Free at Last. Semantic Relativism, Evans’s Legacy and a Unified Approach to Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Marie Guillot - 2014 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):07-30.
    One broadly recognised characteristic feature of (a core subset of) the self-attributions constitutive of self-knowledge is that they are ‘immune to error through misidentification’ (hereafter IEM). In the last thirty years, Evans’s notion of “identification-freedom” (Evans 1982) has been central to most classical approaches to IEM. In the Evansian picture, it is not clear, however, whether there is room for a description of what may be the strongest and most interesting variant of IEM; namely what Pryor (1999) (...)
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  37. 'Action and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification'.Lucy O'Brien - 2012 - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to error through misidentification. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 124-143.
    In this paper I want to examine a claim made about the kind of immunity through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM) that attaches to action self-ascriptions. In particular, I want to consider whether we have reason to think a stronger kind of immunity attaches to action self-ascriptions, than attaches to self-ascriptions of bodily movement. I assume we have an awareness of our actions – agent’s awareness – and that agent’s awareness is not a form (...)
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  38.  15
    I and I: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification of the Subject.Galen Strawson - 2012 - In S. Prosser and F. Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 202-223.
    I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, (...)
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  39. Relinquishing Control: What Romanian De Se Attitude Reports Teach Us About Immunity To Error Through Misidentification.Marina Folescu - 2019 - In Alessandro Capone, Una Stojnic, Ernie Lepore, Denis Delfitto, Anne Reboul, Gaetano Fiorin, Kenneth A. Taylor, Jonathan Berg, Herbert L. Colston, Sanford C. Goldberg, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri, Cliff Goddard, Anna Wierzbicka, Magdalena Sztencel, Sarah E. Duffy, Alessandra Falzone, Paola Pennisi, Péter Furkó, András Kertész, Ágnes Abuczki, Alessandra Giorgi, Sona Haroutyunian, Marina Folescu, Hiroko Itakura, John C. Wakefield, Hung Yuk Lee, Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Brian E. Butler, Douglas Robinson, Kobie van Krieken, José Sanders, Grazia Basile, Antonino Bucca, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri & Kobie van Krieken (eds.), Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages. Springer. pp. 299-313.
    Higginbotham argued that certain linguistic items of English, when used in indirect discourse, necessarily trigger first-personal interpretations. They are: the emphatic reflexive pronoun and the controlled understood subject, represented as PRO. PRO is special, in this respect, due to its imposing obligatory control effects between the main clause and its subordinates ). Folescu & Higginbotham, in addition, argued that in Romanian, a language whose grammar doesn’t assign a prominent role to PRO, de se triggers are correlated with the subjunctive mood (...)
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  40. The Elusiveness Thesis, Immunity to Error Through Misidentification, and Privileged Access.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
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    Crossed Wires About Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Léa Salje - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.
    Suppose that the following describes an intelligible scenario. A subject is wired up to another's body in such a way that she has bodily experiences ‘as from the inside’ caused by states and events in the other body, that are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary somatosensory perception of her own body. The supposed intelligibility of such so-called crossed wire cases constitutes a significant challenge to the claim that our somatosensory judgements are immune to error through misidentification relative to (...)
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  42.  98
    Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 203--239.
  43. Reflections on François Recanati's,'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: What It is and Where It Comes From'.Crispin Wright - 2012 - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 247--280.
  44.  79
    Somatoparaphrenia, the Body Swap Illusion, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shao-Pu Kang - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (9):463-471.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case and an experiment and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that (...)
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  45.  37
    First-Person Awareness of Intentions and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):493-514.
    Each of us enjoys a special awareness of (some) of her mental states. The adverbial model of first-person awareness claims that to be aware of a mental state is for it to be conscious, where ‘conscious’ describes the kind of state it is, rather than denoting a form of awareness directed at it. Here, I present an argument for construing first-person awareness of intentions adverbially, by showing that this model can meet a serious challenge posed by the simulation hypothesis, which (...)
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  46. Why Nonconceptual Content Cannot Be Immune to Error Through Misidentification.R. Meeks - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:81-100.
  47.  44
    Seeing Without an I: Another Look at Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 549-568.
  48. Review of S. Prosser & F. Recanati (Eds) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. CUP. [REVIEW]Kristina Musholt - forthcoming - Mind.
     
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  49.  24
    Simon Prosser and François Recanati, Eds. , Immunity to Error Through Misidentification[REVIEW]Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):318-321.
  50.  3
    We-Intentions and Immunity to Error Through Self-Misidentifications.Björn Petersson - unknown
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