ARISTOTLE often claims that words are "homonymous" or "multivocal". He claims this about some of the crucial words and concepts of his own philosophy—"cause," "being," "one," "good," "justice," "friendship." Often he claims it with a polemical aim; other philosophers have wrongly overlooked homonymy and supposed that the same word is always said in the same way. Plato made this mistake; his accounts of being, good, and friendship are rejected because they neglect homonymy and multivocity. In Aristotle’s view Plato (...) shared the Socratic assumption about words and definitions. Socrates thought that when he asked "What is F?" some single definition of F could always be found to match the name "F." Aristotle thinks the Socratic question is important, but argues that it must be controlled by awareness of homonymy and multivocity. (shrink)

‘There are important differences between Aristotle's account of homonymy and synonymy on the one hand, and Speusippus' on the other; in particular, Aristotle treated homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, whereas Speusippus treated them as properties of words. Despite this difference, in certain significant passages Aristotle fell under the influence of Speusippus and used die words “homonymous” and “synonymous” in their Speusippan senses.’.

아리스토텔레스에 따르면 기하학의 대상도 연속적(suneches)이고, 자연적 대상도 연속적이다. 그리고 그는 ‘연속’ 개념을 마치 하나의 의미를 공유하는 ‘동음동의어’(synonymy)처럼 사용한다. 하지만 연속은 동음동의어가 아니라 ‘동음이의어’(homonymy)이고, 이때 연속의 다양한 의미들 간의 관계를 해명하는 것이 논문의 목표이다. 연속 개념은 ‘핵심-의존적’(pros hen) 동음동의어에 속한다. 그는 연속 개념을 세 개의 맥락에서 다른 방식으로 규정한다. 형이상학적 규정, 자연적 규정, 기하학적 규정이 그것이다. 필자는 연속 개념의 다양한 규정들이 의존하는 ‘핵심’ 규정이 형이상학적 규정이라는 것과 자연적 규정과 기하학적 규정이 이 핵심 규정에 어떤 방식으로 의존하는지를 해명하고자 한다. 다의성은 ⑴ (...) 단절된 다의성과 ⑵ 포괄적 다의성 이렇게 둘로 분류될 수 있다. 여기서 포괄적 다의성은 단절된 다의성의 여집합이다. 모든 다의성은 의미들 간에 아무런 관련이 없는 다의성이거나, 일정 부분 관련을 갖는 다의성이거나 둘 중 하나이다. 이 둘 중에서 ‘포괄적 다의성'에는 향일적(pros hen) 의미를 갖는 다의성, 즉 ‘핵심-의존적Core-Dependent 다의성이 포함된다. 핵심-의존적 다의성은 하나의 핵심적인 의미가 있고, 나머지 의미들은 여기에 의존적이다. 여러 다의적 개념들 중에서 ‘연속’(the continuous)은 ‘핵심-의존적’ 다의성에 속한다. 연속 개념의 다양한 의미들은 ‘향일적으로’(pros hen) 묶일 수 있고, 하나의 핵심적인 의미에 다른 의미들이 의존한다. 연속의 다양한 의미들이 가지는 상호 관계는 다음과 같이 정리될 수 있다. ⑴ 두 개의 대상들이 (이질적이거나 동질적일 때) 하나의 경계를 공통으로 가지는 것도 연속이고, ⑵ 대상들이 (이질적일 때) 두 개의 접촉하는 대상들이 쉼퓌시스(sumphusis)에 의해 결합되어 있는 것도 연속이며, ⑶ 대상들이 (동질적일 때) 하나의 경계를 갖는 연속체의 부분들이 무한하게 분할될 수 있는 것도 연속이다. 이때 ⑴ 형이상학적 연속은 나머지 연속의 의미들의 핵심적 원리가 된다는 의미에서 ‘핵심적’ 연속으로 기능한다는 것을 알 수 있고, ⑵ 자연적인 연속과 ⑶ 기하학적 연속이 이 핵심적 연속에 의존한다는 것을 알 수 있다. (shrink)

Starting with Ackrill's problem of homonymous parts and the responses of Williams, Cohen and Whiting, I examine Aristotle's account of the matter of living bodies, focusing on the homogeneous parts. I conclude that the dual nature of these parts (material and formal) underlies the homonymy principle in its biological application, and contributes to a coherent theory of body and soul as matter and form.

The notion of homonymy has been of perennial philosophical interest to scholars of Aristotle from ancient Greek commentators to modern thinkers. Across historical periods, certain issues have remained central, such as the nature of Aristotelian homonymy, its relation to synonymy and analogy, and whether the concept undergoes change throughout the corpus. In addition, fundamental questions concerning the use of homonymy in regard to dialectical practice and scientific inquiry are raised and discussed. It is argued that there are (...) two aspects to Aristotelian homonymy, negative and positive in function, which provide complementary roles in regard to dialectic and science. (shrink)

Aristotle attaches particular significance to the homonymy of many central concepts in philosophy and science: that is, to the diversity of ways of being common to a single general concept. His preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to almost every subject that he considers, and it clearly structures the philosophical methodology that he employs both when criticizing others and when advancing his own positive theories. Where there is homonymy there is multiplicity: Aristotle aims to find the order (...) within this multiplicity, and believes that doing so is crucial to scientific inquiry and philosophical progress.Christopher Shields investigates and evaluates Aristotle's approach to questions about homonymy, characterizing the metaphysical and semantic commitments necessary to establish the homonymy of a given concept. Then, in a series of case-studies, Shields examines in detail some of Aristotle's principal applications of homonymy--to the body, sameness and oneness, life, goodness, and being. Shields's aim is not only to give a fuller understanding of Aristotle's methodology and to illuminate his specific doctrines in a variety of areas, but to show that this methodology remains fruitful today. (shrink)

The paper completes a “serial” of my contributions to the hot problems of current semantics, i.e. propositional / notional attitudes, de dicto / de re, synonymy, homonymy, equivalence, meaning, sense, denotation, reference. Two kinds of believing, knowing, etc. are distinguished, namely implicit believing of an ideal believer and explicit believing of a logical / mathematical ignorant . A special case of a week, hidden homonymy is considered and we show that when claiming two expressions being synonymous we have (...) to be careful, for a more fine-grained analysis may reveal that there is a semantic difference between them. The distinction between de dicto / de re supposition is defined and a special case of ‘existence’ being de dicto / de re is solved. (shrink)

By Aristotle’s own admission, homonymy and amphiboly, or syntactic homonymy, are unlikely to be accidental features of the Greek language (nor of any language, nor of language as such), but rather a radical evil that can at best be subdued, through recourse to categories, for example. Or we could choose to follow the sophists and exploit it by aiming at an essentially sonorous consensus. But then such texts would constitute a radical evil for translation.

Aristotle attaches particular significance to the homomyny of many of the central concepts in philosophy and science: that is, to the diversity of ways of being that are denoted by a single concept. Shields here investigates and evaluates Aristotle's approach to questions about homonymy, characterizing the metaphysical and semantic commitments necessary to establish the homonymy of a given concept. Then, in a series of case studies, he examines in detail some of Aristotle's principal applications of homonymy--to the (...) body, sameness and and oneness, life, goodness, and being. This first full-length study of a central aspect of Aristotle's thought will interest philosophers working in a number of areas. (shrink)

One of the most striking innovations in Aristotle’s philosophical writing is also one of its most characteristic features. That feature is Aristotle’s idea that terms central to philosophy, including ‘cause’ [aition], ‘good’, and even the verb ‘to be’, are, as he likes to put it, “said in many ways.” To be sure, philosophers before Aristotle give some evidence of having recognized the phenomenon of being said in many ways. Plato, in particular, suggests that things in this world that we call (...) “just” are only namesakes of the Just Itself. But, beyond that, homonymy seems to have been, even for Plato, no more than a source of ambiguity for wordplay. Aristotle is apparently the first philosopher to propose a taxonomy of homonymy and to view the identification and analysis of homonymies as a genuinely philosophical project. (shrink)

The topic of homonymy, especially the variety of homonymy that has gone under the title, “focal meaning,” is of fundamental importance to large portions of Aristotle’s work-not to mention its central place in the ongoing controversies between Aristotle and Plato. It is quite astonishing, therefore, that the topic should have gone so long without a book-length treatment. And it is all the more gratifying that the new book on homonymy by Christopher Shields should be so comprehensive, and (...) of such uniformly high quality.’ Everyone who cares about Aristotle will be in his debt. Shields’s book falls into two parts. In the first, he is concerned to lay out the basic structure of Aristotle’s views about homonymy; in the second part, we are led through the various applications of the idea, to the analysis of friendship, for example, the homonymy of the body, the account of goodness and, not least, the homonymy of being. Shields’s book brings out well how the topic of homonymy weaves in and out of the fabric of Aristotle’s thinking in a variety of areas. I will resist the temptation to follow Shields through these various subject-matters, and instead take up essentially two topics. First, (I), the basic outline of Aristotle’s notion of homonymy, more or less independently of its different applications (here, I follow Shields’s example in the first half of his book). Thereafter, I discuss a single application: the homonymy of being (this is the subject of Shields’s last and longest chapter). Here, I will be interested (II) in how homonymy relates to the theory of the categories; and (III) in the application of homonymy to the analysis of substance in the Metaphysics. (shrink)

My topic is the fundamental Aristotelian division between the animate and the inanimate. In particular, I discuss the transformation that occurs when an inanimate body comes to be ensouled. When nutriment is transformed into flesh it is first changed into blood. I argue that blood is unique in being, at one and the same time, both animate and inanimate; it is inanimate nutriment in actuality (or in activity) and animate flesh in potentiality (or in capacity). I provide a detailed exposition (...) of these manners of being (covering individual substances, artifacts, and mixtures), apply these insights to the case of blood, and then argue that blood's curious status is central to understanding hylomorphism in living organisms. (shrink)

The topic of homonymy, especially the variety of homonymy that has gone under the title, “focal meaning,” is of fundamental importance to large portions of Aristotle’s work—not to mention its central place in the ongoing controversies between Aristotle and Plato. It is quite astonishing, therefore, that the topic should have gone so long without a book-length treatment. And it is all the more gratifying that the new book on homonymy by Christopher Shields should be so comprehensive, and (...) of such uniformly high quality. Everyone who cares about Aristotle will be in his debt. (shrink)

Julie K. Ward examines Aristotle's thought regarding how language informs our views of what is real. First she places Aristotle's theory in its historical and philosophical contexts in relation to Plato and Speusippus. Ward then explores Aristotle's theory of language as it is deployed in several works, including Ethics, Topics, Physics, and Metaphysics, so as to consider its relation to dialectical practice and scientific explanation as Aristotle conceived it.

According to Aristotle’s homonymy principle, when we use a common name to refer to wholes and parts that lack the capacity to carry out the function signified by the name, we are using the name in a homonymous way. For example, pictures and statues of a man, or a dead eye, are called “man” and “eye” only homonymously because they cannot carry out their proper function, i.e., to live and to see. This principle serves well Aristotle’s purposes in natural (...) philosophy, for it avoids a reduction of the essence of living bodies and their parts to their material composition and shape. This principle, however, leaves unexplained why we still use those names in common language, despite their homonymy. Using Aristotle’s own comments on homonymy, I will examine the role played by external figure, for it explains why such homonyms are not accidental. In fact, they are correct forms of linguistic usage in non-philosophical contexts. (shrink)

The problem of the meaning of a reasonable natural language expression is solved. First, traditional ”denotational” approach is criticized. The meaning of a sentence is not its truth value, similarly the meaning of, eg, ”The president of U.S.A.” is not Bill Clinton, etc. Frege met this problem when analyzing the so called propositional attitudes in which ”denotational” approach has lead to the paradox of analysis. His well-known solution consists in splitting the meaning into sense and reference. But this is rejected (...) in the paper as well, for its radical contextualism. In the first attempt, meaning is defined as an intension — mapping from possible worlds and time points — or extension , respectively. The problem of the propositional attitudes is seemingly solved. The proposition that Morning Star = Evening Star is diffe_rent than that of Morning Star = Morning Star. But, alas, in the case of analytical expressions we get the paradox of omniscience. A fine-grained solution is, therefore, proposed: the meaning is a closed construction denoted by the respective expression. Yet this solution is still not precise enough. Eventually the meaning is a concept which is the equivalence class of quasi-identical constructions indiscernible from the conceptual point of view. Finally, homonymous, synonymous and equi_valent expressions are precisely defined. Concluding we state that only synonymous expressions, having exactly the same meaning, ie. representing one and the same concept, can be mutually substituted in propositional attitudes without lea_ding to paradoxes. (shrink)

Professor Shields of the University of Colorado presents a detailed and quite complete study of analogy in the works of Aristotle by analyzing the texts in which Aristotle uses homonyms to denote different things.

ABSTRACT: In this paper I show that, contrary to the prevalent view, in his De Interpretatione chapter 8, Aristotle is concerned with a kind of ambiguity, i.e. with homonymy; more precisely, with homonymy of linguistic expressions as it may occur in dialectical argument. The paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue that in the Sophistici Elenchi 175b39-176a5 Aristotle indubitably deals with homonymy in dialectical argument; that De Interpretatione 8 is a parallel to Sophistici Elenchi (...) 175b39-176a5; that De Interpretatione 8 is concerned with dialectical argument; that, hence, De Interpretatione 8, too, deals with homonymy in dialectical argument. In the second part I discuss objections that have been put forward against the view that De Interpretatione 8 is about homonymy and demonstrate that they do not succeed. (shrink)

Proponents of ground, which is used to indicate relations of ontological fundamentality, insist that ground is a unified phenomenon, but this thesis has recently been criticized. I will first review the proponents' claims for ground's unicity, as well as the criticisms that ground is too heterogeneous to do the philosophical work it is supposed to do. By drawing on Aristotle's notion of homonymy, I explore whether ground's metaphysical heterogeneity can be theoretically accommodated while at the same time preserving its (...) proponents' desideratum that it be a unified phenomenon. (shrink)

The thus far little noticed element in Aristotle's definition of the soul – namely, its nexus to the particularities of a complex physical body (σῶμα φυσικόν / sôma physikon) – is the key to resolve three apparent inconsistencies of Aristotelian hylomorphism: First, the incompatible modalities of the assumed binding relation between physical body as a simultaneously functional matter and the soul as its form; second, the homonymy problem, i.e., that, according to Aristotle's own statement, a body’s remnant that was (...) abandoned by its soul can only homonymously be called that which it was when it was alive; third, the problem that form in hylomorphism seems to be nothing but a configuration of material parts, which, though conceptualised in abstraction and independent from matter, would nevertheless add nothing new to the material composition in which it is instantiated. If that were so, how, then, can a hylomorphic theory conceive of form as ontologically separate from matter? Without a comprehensive and comprehensible resolution of those three major aporias – that is in line with today’s scientific conception of the world – Aristotle’s definition of the soul as form-without-matter would, in Ackrill's words, ‘resist interpretation’. This paper shows that such a resolution can in fact be achieved and that Aristotle’s hylomorphism allows for a plausible and consistent interpretation. (shrink)