The London and Bauer monograph occupies a central place in the debate concerning the quantum measurement problem. Gavroglu has previously noted the influence of Husserlian phenomenology on London's scientific work. However, he has not explored the full extent of this influence in the monograph itself. I begin this paper by outlining the important role played by the monograph in the debate. In effect, it acted as a kind of 'lens' through which the standard, or Copenhagen, 'solution' to the measurement (...) problem came to be perceived and, as such, it was robustly criticized, most notably by Putnam and Shimony. I then spell out the Husserlian understanding of consciousness in order to illuminate the traces of this understanding within the London and Bauer text. This, in turn, yields a new perspective on this 'solution' to the measurement problem, one that I believe has not been articulated before and, furthermore, which is immune to the criticisms of Putnam and Shimony. (shrink)

Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views cannot (...) account for the generality of visual experiences, and that the naïve realist explanation of particularity has unacceptable implications for self- knowledge: the knowledge we have of the character of our own experiences. We argue in this paper that neither claim is correct: naïve realism can explain the generality of experiences, and the naïve realist explanation of particularity raises no problems for our self-knowledge. (shrink)

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed (...) than standard formulations are in the metaphysics of perception. (shrink)

Cartwright and her collaborators have elaborated a provocative view of science which emphasises the independence from theory &unknown;in methods and aims&unknown; of phenomenological model building. This thesis has been supported in a recent paper by an analysis of the London and London model of superconductivity. In the present work we begin with a critique of Cartwright's account of the relationship between theoretical and phenomenological models before elaborating an alternative picture within the framework of the partial structures version of the semantic (...) approach to theories. Drawing on the recent histories of superconductivity by Dahl and Gavroglu, together with the original works by London and London and by F. London separately, and taking due consideration of the heuristic aspects, we argue that the historical details fail to support Cartwright et al.'s claims but that they fit comfortably within the partial structures framework. (shrink)

This paper provides a phenomenology of the suicidal process. It begins with an examination of the self and the breaks that occur within the world that the suicidal individual endures. This includes an examination of suicidal hopelessness, termed in this paper as ontological petrification. It follows with the role in which hope plays in the suicidal. The paper then turns to carrying out the action of suicide, including a discussion of the suicide note and the developing form of the (...) suicide note as found in live-streams on social media. The paper concludes by describing the completion of the suicidal process, and the persistence of the suicidal drive in the suicidal individual. The paper makes use of suicide notes, video suicide notes, and stories of suicides. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Suárez and Cartwright return to the example of London and London's construction of a model for superconductivity and raise a number of concerns against the account of this construction presented in French and Ladyman and elsewhere. In this discussion note, we examine the challenge they raised and offer our responses.

In this thesis, I both analyze the phenomenology of vision from a geometrical point of view, and also develop certain connections between that geometrical analysis and the mind body problem. In order to motivate the need for such an analysis, I first show, by means of a refutation of direct realism, that visual space is never identical with any of the physical objects being indirectly "seen" by constituting color arrangements in it. It thus follows that the geometry of visual (...) space may be quite different from the Euclidean geometry of physical space, and I proceed to analyze that geometry. ;I argue that topologically, visual space is two dimensional, inasmuch as regions of it are capable of being bounded by a line, such as the borders around the various objects constituted in it. An apparent paradox arises here though, inasmuch as we posess phenomenal depth perception, which is particularly striking during binocular vision, and thus the question arises as to how the binocular depth cue of retinal disparity is registered phenomenally in a two dimensional space. I resolve this apparent paradox by arguing that the internal metric struture of this space can be apprehended phenomenally, and can serve as such a phenomenal depth cue. It is shown that holistically, this metric structure is elliptical, since for example marginal distortions in wide-angle photography are not present in visual space, and it is also noted that there is a tendency towards size constancy in visual perception. It is shown from these geometrical considerations that visual space posseses a variable curvature, with that curvature being determined by the physical depths of objects constituted in the space. ;Finally, I investigate what bearing the preceding geometrical conclusions have on the question of how events in visual space may be causally determined by neural events in the brain. The classical isomorphic theory of Gestalt psychology is then reinterpreted in light of my analysis of the geometry of visual space. (shrink)

We examine, from the partial structures perspective, two forms of applicability of mathematics: at the “bottom” level, the applicability of theoretical structures to the “appearances”, and at the “top” level, the applicability of mathematical to physical theories. We argue that, to accommodate these two forms of applicability, the partial structures approach needs to be extended to include a notion of “partial homomorphism”. As a case study, we present London's analysis of the superfluid behavior of liquid helium in terms of Bose‐Einstein (...) statistics. This involved both the introduction of group theory at the top level, and some modeling at the “phenomenological” level, and thus provides a nice example of the relationships we are interested in. We conclude with a discussion of the “autonomy” of London's model. (shrink)

This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology?

This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?

This book is an introduction to French phenomenology in the post-1945 period. While many of phenomenology's greatest thinkers--Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty--wrote before this period, Steven DeLay introduces and assesses the creative and important turn phenomenology took after these figures. He presents a clear and rigorous introduction to the work of relatively unfamiliar and underexplored philosophers, including Jean-Louis Chrétien, Michel Henry, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Jean-Luc Marion and others. After an introduction setting out the crucial Husserlian and Heideggerian (...) background to French phenomenology, DeLay explores Emmanuel Levinas's ethics as first philosophy, Henry's material phenomenology, Marion's phenomenology of givenness, Lacoste's phenomenology of liturgical man, Chrétien's phenomenology of the call, Claude Romano's evential hermeneutics, and Emmanuel Falque's phenomenology of the borderlands. Starting with the reception of Husserl and Heidegger in France, DeLay explains how this phenomenological thought challenges boundaries between philosophy and theology. Taking stock of its promise in light of the legacy it has transformed, DeLay concludes with a summary of the field's relevance to theology and analytic philosophy, and indicates what the future holds for phenomenology. Phenomenology in France: A Philosophical and Theological Introduction is an excellent resource for all students and scholars of phenomenology and continental philosophy, and will also be useful to those in related disciplines such as theology, literature, and French studies. (shrink)

Inconspicuous turns: Heidegger and the "inapparent" theological turn -- Inconspicuous revelation: Marion, Heidegger, and an antinomic phenomenality -- Inconspicuous phenomenology: on Heidegger's unscheinbarkeit or inapparent -- Inconspicuous lifeworld of religion: Henry's "life," Heidegger's "world" -- Inconspicuous liturgy: Lacoste, Heidegger, and the space of godhood -- Inconspicuous adoration: Nancy, Heidegger, and a praise of the ordinary -- Inconspicuous evidence: Janicaud, religious experience, and a methodological atheism -- Inconspicuous faith: Chretien, Heidegger, and forgetting -- Inconspicuous God: Levinas, Heidegger, and the idolatry (...) of incomprehensibility -- The spectacle of God: inverting the sacred/profane paradigm. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Emmanuel Levinas Michel Henry Jacques Derrida Jean‐Luc Marion Jacques Derrida The Saturated Phenomenon According to Jean‐Luc Marion The Face According to Levinas The Auto‐Revelation of the Figure of Christ in Michel Henry.

The paper is an interdisciplinary study, which describes the results of applying phenomenological analysis in Sartre’s analysis of being, as well as the main emphases in Merleau-Ponty’s explorations of body/consciousness problem. It also shows the possibilities of applying the phenomenological approach in psychotherapy, in particular in the logotherapy of Victor Frankl. The author’s intention is to show the relationship between the intentional consciousness with its possibilities and limits and the conception of phenomena, which differs strongly with the respective thinkers. While (...) for Sartre the phenomenon is a means of selfalienation and for Ponty a means of embedding the embodied consciousness, with Frankl the phenomenon is a medium of meaning for the intentional consciousness itself. (shrink)

Is the phenomenological concept of “body” not, in general, an ideal? The purpose of this article is to defend this thesis within the scope of the French phenomenological tradition. The French phenomenological concept of “lived body” points to an ideal, rather than to our actual experience of the body; and this ideal is none other than that of the soul. The Cartesian ideal of the soul becomes, in the French phenomenological tradition, the ideal of the body—of a (...) body that is determined, in return, by the soul’s properties. The French concept of “lived body” results indeed from two forms of idealization that will be exposed successively: the epistemological idealization that consists in attributing, to the body, the soul’s mode of knowledge as a cogito; the practical idealization that consists in attributing, to the body, the soul’s mode of power and action as an unlimited will. This twofold gesture finds its paradigmatic expression in Michel Henry’s phenomenology of the body, but can also be seen at work in Sartre, Ricœur and Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

Words of Life is the sequel and companion to Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn," edited by Dominique Janicaud, Jean-Francois Courtine, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, and Paul Ricoeur. In that volume, Janicaud accuses Levinas, Henry, Marion, and Chrétien of "veering" from phenomenological neutrality to a theologically inflected phenomenology. By contrast, the contributors to this collection interrogate whether phenomenology's proper starting point is agnostic or atheistic. Many hold the view that phenomenology after the theological turn may (...) very well be true both to itself and to the phenomenological "things themselves." In one way or another, all of these essays contend with the limits and expectations of phenomenology. As such, they are all concerned with what counts as "proper" phenomenology and even the very structure of phenomenology. None of them, however, is limited to such questions. Indeed, the rich tapestry that they weave tells us much about human experience. Themes such as faith, hope, love, grace, the gift, the sacraments, the words of Christ, suffering, joy, life, the call, touch, listening, wounding, and humility are woven throughout the various meditations in this volume. The contributors use striking examples to illuminate the structure and limits of phenomenology and, in turn, phenomenology serves to clarify those very examples. Thus practice clarifies theory and theory clarifies practice, resulting in new theological turns and new life for phenomenology. The volume showcases the work of both senior and junior scholars, including Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Kevin Hart, Anthony J. Steinbock, Jeffrey Bloechl, Jeffrey L. Kosky, Clayton Crockett, Brian Treanor, and Christina Gschwandtner-as well as the editors themselves. (shrink)

In this essay, I provide an introduction to the so-called 'theological turn' in recent French, 'new' phenomenology. I begin by articulating the stakes of excluding God from phenomenology (as advocated by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger) and then move on to a brief consideration of why Dominique Janicaud contends that, by inquiring into the 'inapparent', new phenomenology is no longer phenomenological. I then consider the general trajectories of this recent movement and argue that there are five (...) main themes that unite the work of such varied thinkers as Levinas, Derrida, Marion, Henry, Chrétien, Lacoste, and Ricœur. I conclude by outlining points of overlap between new phenomenology and contemporary analytic philosophy of religion and suggest that the two stand as important resources for each other. (shrink)

In his phenomenological works Jan Patočka increasingly referred to movement and lived/physical corporeality. He conceived the concept of the world in terms of the correlation of life with its milieu. In conjunction with Edmund Husserl’s late phenomenology of the lifeworld, he took lived corporeality as his starting point and guiding motif in a way that is parallel to Merleau-Ponty’s work. The article expresses an opinion, that it was also one of the reasons why he kept his distance from Eugen (...) Fink’s philosophical cosmology. And still, it is Patočka’s reference to this cosmological project that has had, and keeps on having, an important impact on the recent reception of his work in France. (shrink)

In this article I focus on a specific knot in the articulated and, as Paul Ricœur famously said, “heretical” constellation of French phenomenology. The aim is to account for a transition that appears to be particularly interesting from both a theoretical and a historical point of view: that from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s recasting and overcoming the lifeworld in terms of all-encompassing and more originary conceptions of Being and Nature during the 1950s and the 1960s, to the (...) radical transgression of the phenomenological horizon itself accomplished by their disciple Jean-François Lyotard between the 1950s and the 1970s. As I will argue, far from being simply sidelined, in Lyotard the theme of the lifeworld is instead deconstructed in favor of a dramatic and “scattered” picture of the shattering impact of capitalism and modern technologies on our daily experience. Within this context, art and aesthetic experience become a privileged site of exploration and experimentation. (shrink)

This paper suggests that one single thread characterizes the developments of French phenomenology that occurred after 1990 in the wake of Merleau-Ponty's and Levinas's major contributions. Janicaud in 1991 had already identified one global trend in French phenomenology and believed it was possible to unite the thoughts of Levinas, Henry, Marion and Chrétien under the common banner of “theological phenomenology.” However, his analysis seems to fail to account for deeper-seated affinities that exist between French (...) phenomenologists such as Marion, Lacoste, Chrétien, Richir, Depraz, Romano – and Benoist for part of his work. This is the reason why, although the present paper does agree with Janicaud's idea that the French authors who define themselves as phenomenologists share some common ground, it defines this common trend quite differently, i.e., as a form of epistemological realism that ultimately manifests itself as a radical empiricism. Consequently, the present study will state and defend three hypotheses: contemporary French phenomenology professes a form of realism of experience, which is the true rallying point of otherwise differing elaborations; this type of epistemological empiricism, by virtue of its radicality, implies a problem that threatens to drive phenomenology towards its own dissolution, because as it precipitates in fine the dilution of philosophical discourse into a multitude of other discourses; this variant of empiricism shows that, within its strictly defined viewpoint, there is scarcely any difference between French phenomenology and a certain part of French analytical philosophy. All three hypotheses lead to the same conclusion: the determination of the defining aspect of contemporary French phenomenology entails, beyond the apparent, misleading, and futile quarrel of paradigms, to bring to light a common space for contemporary French philosophy, which, from both perspectives, can be conveyed by the single term “to show.” It is, in fact, the elevation of “to show” to the detriment of “to demonstrate” that seems to ensnare thinkers within an impasse. (shrink)

A network of dates, persons, activities and publications relating to the beginning of phenomenology in France is listed below, thus enabling to substantiate the direct objective of this essay: estimate how much Aron Gurwitsch contributed to the reception of phenomenology in France during the 1930s, to what extent he contributed, how and when. The indirect objective is to establish the legacy of Gurwitsch in France after he was exiled to the United States. Another objective is related tacitly with (...) this: to show that in his Parisian stage Gurwitsch was not merely in a kind of transit, unimportant, “between” the life of the novice researcher in Germany and life of the relevant phenomenolgist in the US. He played an important role in France. This to the point that without Gurwitsch, probably French phenomenology would not have followed the path it followed in the years after his departure. Yet, paradoxically, this crucial role was exercised implicitly and has had to be explicated. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the complex relationship between the philosophies of Sir William Hamilton and Henri Bergson. We then place these philosophies in a critical relation to French phenomenological philosophy, particularly, Merleau-Ponty's. By so doing we examine a historical and theoretical 'ark' that rises in 19th Century Scotland and falls in 20th Century France, an ark that has received little attention hitherto by historians of philosophy. Our aim is to open up a new dimension of these philosophies and (...) provoke a fresh debate over their relationships and the philosophical tensions that exist between them. (shrink)

I would like to show how with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, we have to do with three different ways of understanding the experience of the other. For Sartre it is a visual experience, the experience of being looked at by the other, so that the experience of the other is understood as a confrontation; for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the other necessarily implies coexistence and what he calls intercorporeality, so that for him the other is never to be found in (...) front, but instead beside me, in reciprocity with me; for Levinas, the experience of the other is the experience of a non-reciprocity, of an assymetrical relation, because the experience of the other is for him an ethical and not an ontological experience, and because this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other : the look for Sartre, intercorporeality for Merleau-Ponty and the face for Levinas. (shrink)

In this paper I consider Ricœur’s negotiation of the boundary or relationship between philosophy and religion in light of the larger debate in contemporary French philosophy. I suggest that contrasting his way of dealing with the intersection of the two discourses to that of two other French thinkers (Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry) illuminates his stance more fully. I begin with a brief outline of Ricœur’s claims about the distinction or relation between the discourses, then reflect on those (...) of Marion and Henry, who although they do not relate them in the same way still together form a significant contrast to Ricœur’s perspective, and conclude with a fuller consideration of Ricœur’s methodology in light of this comparison. I suggest that it is in particular his hermeneutic commitments that lead him both to more rigorous distinctions between discourses and ironically to greater mediation. (shrink)

Dominique Janicaud considered Paul Ricœur an ally in the dispute with those who, like Emmanuel Lévinas and Jean-Luc Marion, allegedly failed to keep phenomenology within its proper methodological limits. Janicaud also claimed to have been guided by Ricœur when it came to developing positive proposals for the future direction of phenomenology. This paper argues, however, that Janicaud misinterpreted key passages in works by Ricœur that address phenomenological issues. It also offers alternative readings which take account of the wider (...) context. Thus, for example, Ricœur’s comments on Lévinasian phenomenology are shown to be appreciative rather than polemical. The paper also discusses Ricœur’s rarely commented upon oblique and indirect response to Janicaud, which establishes that Ricœur chose to align himself with phenomenologists who had taken “the theological turn.”. (shrink)

This work investigates the early encounters of French philosophers and religious thinkers with the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Following an introductory chapter addressing context and methodology, Chapter 2 argues that Henri Bergson's insights into lived duration and intuition and Maurice Blondel's genetic description of action functioned as essential precursors to the French reception of phenomenology. Chapter 3 details the presentations of Husserl and his followers by three successive pairs of French academic philosophers: Léon Noël and (...) Victor Delbos, Lev Shestov and Jean Hering, and Bernard Groethuysen and Georges Gurvitch. Chapter 4 then explores the appropriation of Bergsonian and Blondelian phenomenological insights by Catholic theologians Édouard Le Roy and Pierre Rousselot. Chapter 5 examines applications and critiques of phenomenology by French religious philosophers, including Jean Hering, Joseph Maréchal, and neo-Thomists like Jacques Maritain. A concluding chapter expounds the principal finding that philosophical and theological receptions of phenomenology in France prior to 1939 proceeded independently due to differences in how Bergson and Blondel were perceived by French philosophers and religious thinkers and their respective orientations to the Cartesian and Aristotelian/Thomist intellectual traditions. (shrink)