The problem of freedom of the will and determinism is one of the most intriguing and difficult in the whole area of philosophy. It constüutes a paradox. If we look at ourselves, at our ability to deliberate and make moral choices, it seems obvious that we are free. On the other hand, if we look at what we believe about causality (i.e., that every event and thing must have a cause), then it appears that we do not have (...) free wills but are determined. Thus we seem to have inconsistent beliefs. In this paper I set forth and analyze the major contemporary arguments for free will and determinism as well as for compatibilism, the position that tries to combine insights from both theories. I end with a brief conclusion regarding my assessment of the status of the arguments. (shrink)

This collection of contemporary essays by prominent contemporary thinkers on the topics of determinism and free agency concentrates primarily on two areas: the compatibility problem and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. There are also essays on the related fields of determinism and action theory. The book is unique in that it contains up-to-date summaries of the life-work of five influential philosophers: John Earman, Ted Honderich, Keith Lehrer, Robert Kane, and Peter van Inwagen. There are also contributions by other (...) familiar and distinguished authors, including Richard Feldman, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, and John Perry, as well as important rising philosophers. While most of the articles are written from a Western, analytic perspective, the volume includes a paper that addresses Buddhist perspectives on freedom of the will. With an opening essay written by the editors -- "Freedom and Determinism: A Framework" -- that sets the terms of the discussion, the book provides a remarkably comprehensive set of articles that are of value to a wide audience, from students of philosophy to scholars. (shrink)

Any person truly considering belief in a scientific world view has to confront the question of whether and in what sense, if she views herself as a natural system in a world governed by natural laws, she can continue to regard herself as free. The prima facie clash is usually expressed in terms of a conflict between freedom and determinism, captured in an argument known as the Consequence Argument. If the natural laws are deterministic, our behavior must be (...) deducible by them from the initial conditions of the universe, and we are wrong to think that we exercise regulative control over action. The most common tactic for those who defend the compatibility of freedom and determinism is to deny that regulative control is a requirement of freedom. I will argue that, whether or not regulative control is a requirement of freedom, it is – surprisingly! - compatible with determinism. The discussion here replays themes of the first essay. Personal freedom is a complex concept, embedded in a tangle of criss-crossing personal, social, theological, psychological, and metaphysical debates, each placing its own requirement on the concept, and I make no attempt to address the general question of whether we are free. It is only the specific challenge presented by the Consequence Argument that I address, and that challenge is a clearly defined dynamical issue about the possibility of regulative control over action in a world governed by deterministic laws. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1936, divides into roughly two parts: a re-examination of historical material; and a positive theory of causation suggested by the results of this re-examination. The historical study discloses an ambiguity in the meanings of causation and determinism; it discloses also that this ambiguity is transferred to the meaning of freedom.

The question of the relation between freedom and determinism elicits contrasting intuitions. It is clear to incompatibilists that freedom requires the falsity of determinism. And it is clear to compatibilists that freedom is compatible with forms of determinism. Compatibilists and incompatibilists differ not only with respect to the content of their accounts, but also with respect to their “method”. Whereas, compatibilists could be represented as elucidating our ordinary notion of freedom, incompatibilists could be (...) represented as offering a revision of that notion. I argue that if we get the methodological point right, we can be free and determined. (shrink)

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It is above all in virtue of the will, or freedom of choice, that I understand myself to bear in some way the image or likeness of God. For ... God's will ... does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will in the essential and strict sense. This is because the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something; ... or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when something is put (...) forward for our consideration by the intellect, we are moved to affirm or deny it, or pursue or avoid it, in such a way that we feel we are not determined by any external force. For in order for me to be free, there is no need for me to be capable of moving both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction - either because I understand that reasons of truth and goodness point that way ... the freer is my choice. (Descartes, Fourth Meditation.). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Adorno's metacritique of freedom in Negative Dialectics and related texts remains fruitful today. I begin with some background on Adorno's conception of ‘metacritique’ and on Kant's conception of freedom, as I understand it. Next, I discuss Adorno's analysis of the experiential content of Kantian freedom, according to which Kant has reified the particular social experience of the early modern bourgeoisie in his conception of unconditioned freedom. Adorno argues against this conception (...) of freedom and suggests that freedom is always conditioned by our embodiment and by our social and historical situation. Finally, I turn to Adorno's criticism of Kant's discussion of freedom and determinism in the Critique of Pure Reason and argue that while his philosophical argument against Kant fails, his metacritical argument remains suggestive. Scepticism about freedom arises when the standpoint of theoretical reason encroaches upon the standpoint of practical reason and assimilates persons to things. (shrink)

In this paper, have two parts: the first is the critical part, in this section I will critically pointed out that the reductionism of the research project in the face of ideas and language to explain the dualism of the plight of the game, only to avoid paying with phenomenology price. Followed by the construction of the part, I will be back "perspective of dualism," the anthropological roots, and this "perspective dualism" itself does not exclude a unified view of natural (...) evolution. On the "spirit of the decision situation of the brain" and "the spirit of stylized brain," the complex interactions between the images is a philosophical reflection of the results, rather than the results of natural science knowledge itself. I represent a non-scientific or a "soft" the naturalistic point of view and attempt to obtain a between Kant and Darwin compatible views. This article mainly has two parts: First is the critique part, I will criticize in this part and it will be pointed out that when the reductional research plan will face the dualism's difficult situation of the explanation viewpoint and the language game, it tries only to avoid to pay the price of epiphenomenon. Next constructs the construction part, I will recall the anthropological root of "the perspective dualism", because this "the perspective dualism" itself has not certainly repelled the unified viewpoint of the natural theory of evolution. About the complex interactive image between "cerebrum" and "spirit" is one philosophical reflexive achievement, but is not the natural sciences knowledge itself achievement. I represent one kind of non-science or "soft" naturalism viewpoint and try obtaining the compatible opinion between Kant and Darwin. (shrink)

There may in general be said to be two ways in which progress may be made in the understanding and towards the solution of a problem. The one is that of the continual development of it in the form originally given to it, by confirming this and rejecting that point in the light of fresh evidence, by clarification of concepts, and by detecting and resolving ambiguities and inconsistencies. Here it is assumed that the standpoint from which the problem has been (...) approached is relevant and adequate. The other is entered upon when an “impasse” has been reached which can only be avoided by the realization that the original question was asked in a way which was either partially or wholly false or misleading. This is the more radical way of partial or total reformulation of the problem to be solved. (shrink)

THE question which I am to raise for discussion is one which has long been debated by philosophers, and consequently I consider it doubtful whether anything very new can be said on the matter. But it may be profitable to review once more the present position of the controversy and to have in mind the reasons which at present make the question of interest and of importance.

A fairly long (~15,000 word) overview of ancient theories of freedom and determinism. It covers the supposed threat of causal determinism to "free will," i.e., the sort of control we need to have in order to be rightly held responsible for our actions. But it also discusses fatalistic arguments that proceed from the Principle of Bivalence, what responsibility we have for our own characters, and god and fate. Philosophers discussed include Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Carneades, Alexander of (...) Aphrodisias, and Plotinus. Plato is mentioned in passing a few times in connection with other philosophers. (shrink)

Carlos Vaz Ferreira argues that the problem of freedom is conceptually distinct from the problem of causal determinism. The problem of freedom is ultimately a problem regarding the ontologically independent agency of a being, and the problem of determinism is a problem regarding explanations of events or acts in terms of the totality of their antecedent causal conditions. As Vaz Ferreira sees it, failing to keep these problems apart gives rise to merely apparent but unreal puzzles (...) pertaining to the nature of freedom and its relation to determinism. In this article, I present my interpretation of Vaz Ferreira’s distinctive ideas regarding the nature of freedom and its relation to casual determinism. (shrink)

This collection of seven papers by six authors centers about the relation of free action to determinism as both a metaphysical as well as a methodological hypothesis. Chisholm is concerned with the problem of whether a human whose behavior is completely controlled by outside forces can still be considered free; Danto studies the old problem of whether it can be said that actions of men are caused in the same way as the activities of other objects. Richard Taylor examines (...) the problem of free will in light of the apparent asymmetry of the prevention and the postvention—the doing of an act not ruled out by antecedent conditions—of events; Ginet develops a notion of "contingent necessitation" and proceeds to show that humans do not have a choice as to whether their actions satisfy certain conditions, these conditions following by contingent necessity from events not themselves in an individual's control. Wilfrid Sellars contributes two papers; the first is a study of the locution of "intending that," desiring and willing, intending, believing, the condition of being disposed to, and the practical syllogism; the second paper continues the tenor of the first—Sellars formalizes the notions of various kinds of "necessary" states of affairs, and uses this to make a distinction between being able to will and being able to do an act. The editor has the last paper which concerns the matter of whether there can be an empirical disproof of determinism.—P. J. M. (shrink)

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility brings together nine substantial essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in antiquity by Susanne Bobzien. The essays present the main ancient theories on these subjects, ranging historically from Aristotle followed by the Epicureans, the early Stoics, several later Stoics, and up to Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE. -/- The author discusses questions about rational and autonomous human agency and their compatibility with a large range of important philosophical (...) issues, including their compatibility with divine predetermination and other theological questions; with atomism and continuum theory and with the physical sciences more generally; with the determination of character and its development from childhood through nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with theories of necessity, possibility and contingency; with external or internal preceding causes and impediments; and with folk theories of fatalism. Room is also given to the questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, and to blame and praise. -/- Historically unified, philosophically profound, and methodologically rigorous, Bobzien’s essays show that in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy these topics were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or to a free will, and that the latter two notions were fully developed only later. The volume will be of interest both to philosophers and to historians of philosophy, with more than half of the essays accessible to advanced undergraduates. (shrink)

The debate between hard and soft determinists is dealt with in this brief but interesting study. The author argues that there is no empirical dispute between hard and soft determinists. They draw different conclusions from the observed facts and these differences are the result of using different senses of the terms 'freedom' and 'moral responsibility'. Moritz Schlick's Problems of Ethics is the author's favored source for the soft determinist position and well-known articles by Paul Edwards and John Hospers the (...) sources for hard determinism. Other writers are quoted and briefly discussed. The treatment of many criticisms and countercriticisms is all too brief to do full justice to all the issues involved, but those topics which the author discusses are often illuminated. Interesting things are said about such topics as kleptomania, post-hypnotic suggestion, punishment, and excusable behavior. The book makes a convincing case, at least for the claim that a sophisticated version of the hard determinist position, such as appears in Hospers article, is only verbally different than many versions of soft determinism. Other versions of hard and soft determinism can and do come in substantive conflict with one another.--R. H. K. (shrink)