Theorem 1. If T is a sound formalized theory whose language contains the language of basic arithmetic, then there will be a true sentence GT of basic arithmetic such that T ￿ GT and ￿ ¬GT, so T must be negation incomplete.

In the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, the Paris-Harrington variant of Ramsey's theorem is celebrated as the first result of a long ‘search’ for a purely mathematical incompleteness result in first-order Peano arithmetic. This paper questions the existence of any such search and the status of the Paris-Harrington result as the first mathematical incompleteness result. In fact, I argue that Gentzen gave the first such result, and that it was restated by Goodstein in a (...) number-theoretic form. (shrink)

For every sequence |p n } n of formulas of Peano ArithmeticPA with, every formulaA of the first-order theory diagonalizable algebras, we associate a formula 0 A, called the value ofA inPA with respect to the interpretation. We show that, ifA is true in every diagonalizable algebra, then, for every, 0 A is a theorem ofPA.

We employ the lens provided by formal truth theory to study axiomatizations of Peano Arithmetic ${\textsf {(PA)}}$. More specifically, let Elementary Arithmetic ${\textsf {(EA)}}$ be the fragment $\mathsf {I}\Delta _0 + \mathsf {Exp}$ of ${\textsf {PA}}$, and let ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}]$ be the extension of ${\textsf {EA}}$ by the commonly studied axioms of compositional truth ${\textsf {CT}}^-$. We investigate both local and global properties of the family of first order theories of the form ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf (...) {EA}}] +\alpha $, where $\alpha $ is a particular way of expressing “ ${\textsf {PA}}$ is true” (using the truth predicate). Our focus is dominantly on two types of axiomatizations, namely: (1) schematic axiomatizations that are deductively equivalent to ${\textsf {PA}}$ and (2) axiomatizations that are proof-theoretically equivalent to the canonical axiomatization of ${\textsf {PA}}$. (shrink)

One of the philosophical uses of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano Arithmetic is to provide support for semantic realism. To this end, the logical framework in which the proof of the theorem is conducted becomes highly significant. I examine different proposals regarding these logical frameworks and focus on the philosophical benefits of adopting open-ended schemas in contrast to second order logic as the logical medium of the proof. I investigate Pederson and Rossberg’s critique of the ontological advantages (...) of open-ended arithmetic when it comes to establishing the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic and show that the critique is highly problematic. I argue that Pederson and Rossberg’s ontological criterion deliver the bizarre result that certain first order subsystems of Peano Arithmetic have a second order ontology. As a consequence, the application of the ontological criterion proposed by Pederson and Rossberg assigns a certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its subtheories. (shrink)

It is often remarked that first-order Peano Arithmetic is non-categorical but deductively well-behaved, while second-order Peano Arithmetic is categorical but deductively ill-behaved. This suggests that, when it comes to axiomatizations of mathematical theories, expressive power and deductive power may be orthogonal, mutually exclusive desiderata. In this paper, I turn to Hintikka’s :69–90, 1989) distinction between descriptive and deductive approaches in the foundations of mathematics to discuss the implications of this observation for the (...) class='Hi'>first-order logic versus second-order logic divide. The descriptive approach is illustrated by Dedekind’s ‘discovery’ of the need for second-order concepts to ensure categoricity in his axiomatization of arithmetic; the deductive approach is illustrated by Frege’s Begriffsschrift project. I argue that, rather than suggesting that any use of logic in the foundations of mathematics is doomed to failure given the impossibility of combining the descriptive approach with the deductive approach, what this apparent predicament in fact indicates is that the first-order versus second-order divide may be too crude to investigate what an adequate axiomatization of arithmetic should look like. I also conclude that, insofar as there are different, equally legitimate projects one may engage in when working on the foundations of mathematics, there is no such thing as the One True Logic for this purpose; different logical systems may be adequate for different projects. (shrink)

The relative strengths of first-order theories axiomatized by transfinite induction, for ordinals less-than 0, and formulas restricted in quantifier complexity, is determined. This is done, in part, by describing the provably recursive functions of such theories. Upper bounds for the provably recursive functions are obtained using model-theoretic techniques. A variety of additional results that come as an application of such techniques are mentioned.

Let M be a model of first order Peano arithmetic and I an initial segment of M that is closed under multiplication. LetM0 be the {0, 1,+}-reduct ofM. We show that there is another model N of PA that is also an expansion of M0 such that a · Ma = a · Na if and only if a ∈ I for all a ∈ M.

Let $\mathscr{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot, <\}$ be the usual first-order language of arithmetic. We show that Peano arithmetic is the least first-order L-theory containing IΔ0 + exp such that every complete extension T of it has a countable model K satisfying. (i) K has no proper elementary substructures, and (ii) whenever $L \prec K$ is a countable elementary extension there is $\bar{L} \prec L$ and $\bar{K} \subseteq_\mathrm{e} \bar{L}$ such that $K \prec_{\mathrm{cf}}\bar{K}$ (...) . Other model-theoretic conditions similar to (i) and (ii) are also discussed and shown to characterize Peano arithmetic. (shrink)

Let= {0,1, +,·,<} be the usual first-order language of arithmetic. We show that Peano arithmetic is the least first-order-theory containingIΔ0+ exp such that every complete extensionTof it has a countable modelKsatisfying(i)Khas no proper elementary substructures, and(ii) wheneverL≻Kis a countable elementary extension there isandsuch that.Other model-theoretic conditions similar to (i) and (ii) are also discussed and shown to characterize Peano arithmetic.

The shortest definition of a number by a first order formula with one free variable, where the notion of a formula defining a number extends a notion used by Boolos in a proof of the Incompleteness Theorem, is shown to be non computable. This is followed by an examination of the complexity of sets associated with this function.

The paper is concerned with the old conjecture that there are infinitely many twin primes. In the paper we show that this conjecture is true, that is, it is true in the standard model of arithmetic. The proof is based on Rasiowa–Sikorski Lemma. The key role are played by the derived notion of a Rasiowa–Sikorski set and the method of forcing adjusted to arbitrary first–order languages. This approach was developed in the papers Czelakowski [ 4, 5 ]. (...) The central idea consists in constructing an appropriate countable model \(\textbf{A}\) of Peano arithmetic by means of a Rasiowa–Sikorski set. This model validates the twin prime conjecture. Since \(\textbf{A}\) is elementarily equivalent to the standard model, the conjecture follows. Thus the standard model validates the twin primes conjecture. More generally, it is shown that de Polignac’s conjecture has a positive solution. The paper employs methods borrowed from the contemporary mathematical logic. Such a ’logical’ approach may be viewed as a useful addition to the dominant methodology in number theory based on mathematical analysis. (shrink)

In this paper the modal operator "x is provable in Peano Arithmetic" is incorporated into first-order theories. A provability extension of a theory is defined. Presburger Arithmetic of addition, Skolem Arithmetic of multiplication, and some first order theories of partial consistency statements are shown to remain decidable after natural provability extensions. It is also shown that natural provability extensions of a decidable theory may be undecidable.

Let T 0?T 1 denote that each computable function, which is provable total in the first order theory T 0, is also provable total in the first order theory T 1. Te relation ? induces a degree structure on the sound finite Π2 extensions of EA (Elementary Arithmetic). This paper is devoted to the study of this structure. However we do not study the structure directly. Rather we define an isomorphic subrecursive degree structure <≤,?>, and (...) then we study <≤,?> by ubrecursive and computability-theoretic means. Furthermore, we introduce and investigate some operators on the degrees of <≤,?>. These operators corresponds to inferencerules in formal arithmetic. One operator corresponds to the Σ1 collection rule. Another operator corresponds to the Σ1 induction rule. (shrink)

The incompleteness of formal systems for arithmetic has been a recognized fact of mathematics. The term “incompleteness” suggests that the formal system in question fails to offer a deduction which it ought to. This chapter focuses on the status of a formal system, Peano Arithmetic, and explores a viewpoint on which Peano Arithmetic occupies an intrinsic, conceptually well-defined region of arithmetical truth. The idea is that it consists of those truths which can be perceived directly (...) from the purely arithmetical content of a categorical conceptual analysis of the notion of natural number. The chapter explores its conceptual stability in light of the apparently destabilizing effect, through extensibility, of the phenomenon of incompleteness. It also offers heuristic and conceptual support for the viewpoint that Peano Arithmetic is the strongest natural first-order system for arithmetic, and that there is a sense in which it is complete with respect to purely arithmetical truth. (shrink)

We propose a rudimentary formal framework for reasoning about recursion equations over inductively generated data. Our formalism admits all equational programs , and yet singles out none. While being simple, this framework has numerous extensions and applications. Here we lay out the basic concepts and definitions; show that the deductive power of our formalism is similar to that of Peano's Arithmetic; prove a strong normalization theorem; and exhibit a mapping from natural deduction derivations to an applied λ -calculus, (...) à la Curry–Howard, which provides a transparent proof of Gödel's result that the provably recursive functions of PA are definable by primitive recursion in finite types. Also of interest is the extent, uncommon among similar constructions, to which our mapping is oblivious to first order terms, including first order quantification and equality. Additional applications and extensions of the method will be presented in sequel papers. In particular, the methodology introduced here lends itself to systematic links between natural sub-formalisms and computational complexity classes. Since these sub-formalisms are largely transparent, allowing one to reason formally in the full system while leaving to automatic software tools the task of verifying that restrictions are complied with, the framework is particularly attractive for the development of Feasible Mathematics. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to formulate first-order Peano arithmetic within the resources of relevant logic, and to demonstrate certain properties of the system thus formulated. Striking among these properties are the facts that it is trivial that relevant arithmetic is absolutely consistent, but classical first-order Peano arithmetic is straightforwardly contained in relevant arithmetic. Under, I shall show in particular that 0 = 1 is a non-theorem of relevant (...) class='Hi'>arithmetic; this, of course, is exactly the formula whose unprovability was sought in the Hilbert program for proving arithmetic consistent. Under, I shall exhibit the requisite translation, drawing some Goedelian conclusions therefrom. Left open, however, is the critical problem whether Ackermann’s rule γ is admissible for theories of relevant arithmetic. The particular system of relevant Peano arithmetic featured in this paper shall be called R♯. Its logical base shall be the system R of relevant implication, taken in its first-order form RQ. Among other Peano arithmetics we shall consider here in particular the systems C♯, J♯, and RM3♯; these are based respectively on the classical logic C, the intuitionistic logic J, and the Sobocinski-Dunn semi-relevant logic RM3. And another feature of the paper will be the presentation of a system of natural deduction for R♯, along lines valid for first-order relevant theories in general. This formulation of R♯ makes it possible to construct relevantly valid arithmetical deductions in an easy and natural way; it is based on, but is in some respects more convenient than, the natural deduction formulations for relevant logics developed by Anderson and Belnap in Entailment. (shrink)

It is well known that number theory can be interpreted in the usual set theories, e.g. ZF, NF and their extensions. The problem I posed for myself was to see if, conversely, a reasonably strong set theory could be interpreted in number theory. The reason I am interested in this problem is, simply, that number theory is more basic or more concrete than set theory, and hence a more concrete foundation for mathematics. A partial solution to the problem was accomplished (...) by WTN in [2], where it was shown that a predicative set theory could be interpreted in a natural extension of pure number theory, PN, (i.e. classical first-order Peano Arithmetic). In this paper, we go a step further by showing that a reasonably strong fragment of predicative set theory can be interpreted in PN itself. We then make an attempt to show how to develop predicative fragments of mathematics in PN.If one wishes to know what is meant by reasonably strong and fragment please read on. (shrink)

Gurevich and Shelah have shown that Peano Arithmetic cannot be interpreted in the monadic second-order theory of short chains (hence, in the monadic second-order theory of the real line). We will show here that it is consistent that the monadic second-order theory of no chain interprets Peano Arithmetic.

By a theorem of R. Kaye, J. Paris and C. Dimitracopoulos, the class of the Πn+1-sentences true in the standard model is the only consistent Πn+1-theory which extends the scheme of induction for parameter free Πn+1-formulas. Motivated by this result, we present a systematic study of extensions of bounded quantifier complexity of fragments of first-order Peano Arithmetic. Here, we improve that result and show that this property describes a general phenomenon valid for parameter free schemes. As (...) a consequence, we obtain results on the quantifier complexity, finite axiomatizability and relative strength of schemes for Δn+1-formulas. (shrink)

This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume's Principle and Basic Law V with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The (...) main results of this paper are: (i) there is a consistent extension of the hyperarithmetic fragment of Basic Law V which interprets the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, and (ii) the hyperarithmetic fragment of Hume's Principle does not interpret the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, so that in this specific sense there is no predicative version of Frege's Theorem. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is, to tentatively sketch and try defend some observations regarding the ontological dignity of object references, as they may be used from within in a formalized language. -/- Hence I try to explore, what properties objects are presupposed to have, in order to enter the universe of discourse of an interpreted formalized language. -/- First I review Frege′s analysis of the logical structure of truth value definite sentences of scientific colloquial language, to draw (...) suggestions from his saturated vs. unsaturated sentence components paradigm. -/- Next try investigate, in how far reference to non pure math objects might allow for a role as argument of a truth value function. Object kinds to be considered are: common sense objects, technical objects, humanities object kinds (social, psychical, ...), objects of art, ... , be they abstract, concrete, or in this respect mixed objects. -/- Then have a comment on the just referenced label abstract objects. -/- Next try to get an idea wrt the ontological significance of the fact, that pure math objects and functions in some important classical cases can be uniquely defined by means of categorical theories. Here, in the course of my argument, I have a little corollary wrt the standard model of first order Peano arithmetic, reducing the epistemological significance of the existence of the non standard models. -/- Next, wrt a special concept of a formalized empirical theory, I care for whether the impure math objects and mixed objects described here, and complying best with truth value function mapping, are also reliable candidates for the ontological commitment of such theories: and discuss an alternative, which reduces the ontological significance of the universe of discourse of the theories intended models. -/- In the end I sum up what is - from my point of view - the status quo, according to my respective findings. (shrink)

In this paper we study the model theory of extensions of models of first-order Peano Arithmetic by means of the arithmetized completeness theorem applied to a definable complete extension of PA in the original model. This leads us to many interesting model theoretic properties equivalent to reflection principles and ω-consistency, and these properties together with the associated first-order schemes extending PA are studied.

This paper offers an elementary proof that formal arithmetic is consistent. The system that will be proved consistent is a first-order theory R♯, based as usual on the Peano postulates and the recursion equations for + and ×. However, the reasoning will apply to any axiomatizable extension of R♯ got by adding classical arithmetical truths. Moreover, it will continue to apply through a large range of variation of the un- derlying logic of R♯, while on a (...) simple and straightforward translation, the classical first-order theory P♯ of Peano arithmetic turns out to be an exact subsystem of R♯. Since the reasoning is elementary, it is formalizable within R♯ itself; i.e., we can actually demonstrate within R♯ (or within P♯, if we care) a statement that, in a natural fashion, asserts the consistency of R♯ itself. The reader is unlikely to have missed the significance of the remarks just made. In plain English, this paper repeals Goedel’s famous second theorem. (That’s the one that asserts that sufficiently strong systems are inadequate to demonstrate their own consistency.) That theorem (or at least the significance usually claimed for it) was a mis- take—a subtle and understandable mistake, perhaps, but a mistake nonetheless. Accordingly, this paper reinstates the formal program which is often taken to have been blasted away by Goedel’s theorems— namely, the Hilbert program of demonstrating, by methods that everybody can recognize as effective and finitary, that intuitive mathematics is reliable. Indeed, the present consistency proof for arithmetic will be recognized as correct by anyone who can count to 3. (So much, indeed, for the claim that the reliability of arithmetic rests on transfinite induction up to ε0, and for the incredible mythology that underlies it.). (shrink)

In 'On interpretations of arithmetic and set theory', Kaye and Wong proved the following result, which they considered to belong to the folklore of mathematical logic.

THEOREM 1 The first-order theories of Peano arithmetic and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of infinity negated are bi-interpretable.

In this note, I describe a theory of sets that is bi-interpretable with the theory of bounded arithmetic IDelta0 + exp. Because of the weakness of this theory of sets, I (...) cannot straightforwardly adapt Kaye and Wong's interpretation of the arithmetic in the set theory. Instead, I am forced to produce a different interpretation. (shrink)

The complete characterisation of order types of non-standard models of Peano arithmetic and its extensions is a famous open problem. In this paper, we consider subtheories of Peano arithmetic (both with and without induction), in particular, theories formulated in proper fragments of the full language of arithmetic. We study the order types of their non-standard models and separate all considered theories via their possible order types. We compare the theories with and without (...) induction and observe that the theories without induction tend to have an algebraic character that allows model constructions by closing a model under the relevant algebraic operations. (shrink)

The complete characterisation of order types of non-standard models of Peano arithmetic and its extensions is a famous open problem. In this paper, we consider subtheories of Peano arithmetic (both with and without induction), in particular, theories formulated in proper fragments of the full language of arithmetic. We study the order types of their non-standard models and separate all considered theories via their possible order types. We compare the theories with and without (...) induction and observe that the theories without induction tend to have an algebraic character that allows model constructions by closing a model under the relevant algebraic operations. (shrink)

Reference [12] introduced a novel formula to formula translation tool that enables syntactic metatheoretical investigations of first-order modallogics, bypassing a need to convert them first into Gentzen style logics in order torely on cut elimination and the subformula property. In fact, the formulator tool,as was already demonstrated in loc. cit., is applicable even to the metatheoreticalstudy of logics such as QGL, where cut elimination is unavailable. This paper applies the formulator approach to show the independence of (...) the axiom schema ☐A → ☐∀ A of the logics M3and ML3 of [17, 18, 11, 13]. This leads to the conclusion that the two logics obtained by removing this axiom are incomplete, both with respect to their natural Kripke structures and to arithmetical interpretations. In particular, the so modified ML3 is, similarly to QGL, an arithmetically incomplete first-order extension of GL, but, unlike QGL, all its theorems have cut free proofs. We also establish here, via formulators, a stronger version of the disjunction property for GL and QGL without going through Gentzen versions of these logics. (shrink)

We study reducts of Peano arithmetic for which conditions of saturation imply the corresponding conditions for the whole model. It is shown that very weak reducts (like pure order) have such a property for κ-saturation in every κ ≥ ω 1 . In contrast, other reducts do the job for ω and not for $\kappa > \omega_1$ . This solves negatively a conjecture of Chang.

The system called F is essentially a sub-theory of Frege Arithmetic without the ad infinitum assumption that there is always a next number. In a series of papers (Systems for a Foundation of Arithmetic, True” Arithmetic Can Prove Its Own Consistency and Proving Quadratic Reciprocity) it was shown that F proves a large number of basic arithmetic truths, such as the Euclidean Algorithm, Unique Prime Factorization (i.e. the Fundamental Law of Arithmetic), and Quadratic Reciprocity, indeed (...) a sizable amount of arithmetic. In particular, F proves some (but not all) of the Peano Axioms; that is, F proves the axioms of a sub-theory - call it FPA - of second-order Peano-Arithmetic. This short technical note will demonstrate that the converse also holds, in the following sense. F has the same language as second-order Peano Arithmetic except that, in addition, it has a two-place predicate symbol “Μ”. Then it is possible to provide a definition, indeed a reasonable definition, for “Μ” such that FPA proves all the axioms of F. So F and FPA effectively have the same proof-theoretic strength. In particular FPA, which lacks the Successor Axiom stating that every natural number has a successor, is able to prove the Euclidean Algorithm, Unique Prime Factorization, and Quadratic Reciprocity, indeed (again) a sizable amount of arithmetic. (shrink)

This paper investigates the quantifier "there exist unboundedly many" in the context of first-order arithmetic. An alternative axiomatization is found for Peano arithmetic based on an axiom schema of regularity: The union of boundedly many bounded sets is bounded. We also obtain combinatorial equivalents of certain second-order theories associated with cuts in nonstandard models of arithmetic.

We study the first-order theory of polynomial rings over a GCD domain and of the ring of formal entire functions over a non-Archimedean field in the language $\{ 1, +, \bot \}$. We show that these structures interpret the first-order theory of the semi-ring of natural numbers. Moreover, this interpretation depends only on the characteristic of the original ring, and thus we obtain uniform undecidability results for these polynomial and entire functions rings of a fixed characteristic. (...) This work enhances results of Raphael Robinson on essential undecidability of some polynomial or formal power series rings in languages that contain no symbols related to the polynomial or power series ring structure itself. (shrink)

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction (...) rules for the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

A value space is a topological algebra equipped with a non-empty family of continuous quantifiers . We will describe first-order logic on the basis of . Operations of are used as connectives and its relations are used to define statements. We prove under some normality conditions on the value space that any theory in the new setting can be represented by a classical first-order theory.

This paper develops the philosophy and technology needed for adding a supremum operator to the interpretability logic ILM\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {ILM}$$\end{document} of Peano Arithmetic. It is well-known that any theories extending PA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {PA}$$\end{document} have a supremum in the interpretability ordering. While provable in PA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {PA}$$\end{document}, this fact is not reflected in the theorems of (...) the modal system ILM\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {ILM}$$\end{document}, due to limited expressive power. Our goal is to enrich the language of ILM\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {ILM}$$\end{document} by adding to it a new modality for the interpretability supremum. We explore different options for specifying the exact meaning of the new modality. Our final proposal involves a unary operator, the dual of which can be seen as a provability predicate satisfying the axioms of the provability logic GL\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {GL}$$\end{document}. (shrink)

Frege's development of the theory of arithmetic in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik has long been ignored, since the formal theory of the Grundgesetze is inconsistent. His derivations of the axioms of arithmetic from what is known as Hume's Principle do not, however, depend upon that axiom of the system--Axiom V--which is responsible for the inconsistency. On the contrary, Frege's proofs constitute a derivation of axioms for arithmetic from Hume's Principle, in (axiomatic) second-order logic. Moreover, though Frege (...) does prove each of the now standard Dedekind-Peano axioms, his proofs are devoted primarily to the derivation of his own axioms for arithmetic, which are somewhat different (though of course equivalent). These axioms, which may be yet more intuitive than the Dedekind-Peano axioms, may be taken to be "The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number", as Frege understood them. Though the axioms of arithmetic have been known to be derivable from Hume's Principle for about ten years now, it has not been widely recognized that Frege himself showed them so to be; nor has it been known that Frege made use of any axiomatization for arithmetic whatsoever. Grundgesetze is thus a work of much greater significance than has often been thought. First, Frege's use of the inconsistent Axiom V may invalidate certain of his claims regarding the philosophical significance of his work (viz., the establishment of Logicism), but it should not be allowed to obscure his mathematical accomplishments and his contribution to our understanding of arithmetic. Second, Frege's knowledge that arithmetic is derivable from Hume's Principle raises important sorts of questions about his philosophy of arithmetic. For example, "Why did Frege not simply abandon Axiom V and take Hume's Principle as an axiom?". (shrink)

We define a class of first-order formulas $\mathsf{P}^{\ast }$ which exactly contains formulas $\varphi$ such that satisfaction of $\varphi$ in any classical structure attached to a node of a Kripke model of intuitionistic predicate logic deciding atomic formulas implies its forcing in that node. We also define a class of $\mathsf{E}$-formulas with the property that their forcing coincides with their classical satisfiability in Kripke models which decide atomic formulas. We also prove that any formula with this property is (...) an $\mathsf{E}$-formula. Kripke models of intuitionistic arithmetical theories usually have this property. As a consequence, we prove a new conservativity result for Peano arithmetic over Heyting arithmetic. (shrink)

I give several characterizations of the set V₀ proposed in [3] as the set of meaningful and true sentences of first order arthimetic, and show that in Peano arithmetic the Σ₂ completeness of V₀ is provable.

I give several characterizations of the set V₀ proposed in [3] as the set of meaningful and true sentences of first order arthimetic, and show that in Peano arithmetic the Σ₂ completeness of V₀ is provable.

In this article I present HYPER-REF, a model to determine the referent of any given expression in First-Order Logic. I also explain how this model can be used to determine the referent of a first-order theory such as First-Order Arithmetic. By reference or referent I mean the non-empty set of objects that the syntactical terms of a well-formed formula pick out given a particular interpretation of the language. To do so, I will (...) class='Hi'>first draw on previous work to make explicit the notion of reference and its hyperintensional features. Then I present HYPER-REF and offer a heuristic method for determining the reference of any formula. Then I discuss some of the benefits and most salient features of HYPER-REF, including some remarks on the nature of self-reference in formal languages. (shrink)

Let \ be a class of formulas. We say that a theory T in classical logic has the \-disjunction property if for any \ sentences \ and \, either \ or \ whenever \. First, we characterize the \-disjunction property in terms of the notion of partial conservativity. Secondly, we prove a model theoretic characterization result for \-disjunction property. Thirdly, we investigate relationships between partial disjunction properties and several other properties of theories containing Peano arithmetic. Finally, we (...) investigate unprovability of formalized partial disjunction properties. (shrink)

An Introduction to Proof Theory provides an accessible introduction to the theory of proofs, with details of proofs worked out and examples and exercises to aid the reader's understanding. It also serves as a companion to reading the original pathbreaking articles by Gerhard Gentzen. The first half covers topics in structural proof theory, including the Gödel-Gentzen translation of classical into intuitionistic logic, natural deduction and the normalization theorems, the sequent calculus, including cut-elimination and mid-sequent theorems, and various applications of (...) these results. The second half examines ordinal proof theory, specifically Gentzen's consistency proof for first-order Peano Arithmetic. The theory of ordinal notations and other elements of ordinal theory are developed from scratch, and no knowledge of set theory is presumed. The proof methods needed to establish proof-theoretic results, especially proof by induction, are introduced in stages throughout the text. Mancosu, Galvan, and Zach's introduction will provide a solid foundation for those looking to understand this central area of mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

By a well-known result of Kotlarski et al., first-order Peano arithmetic \ can be conservatively extended to the theory \ of a truth predicate satisfying compositional axioms, i.e., axioms stating that the truth predicate is correct on atomic formulae and commutes with all the propositional connectives and quantifiers. This result motivates the general question of determining natural axioms concerning the truth predicate that can be added to \ while maintaining conservativity over \. Our main result shows (...) that conservativity fails even for the extension of \ obtained by the seemingly weak axiom of disjunctive correctness \ that asserts that the truth predicate commutes with disjunctions of arbitrary finite size. In particular, \ implies \\). Our main result states that the theory \ coincides with the theory \ obtained by adding \-induction in the language with the truth predicate. This result strengthens earlier work by Kotlarski and Cieśliński. For our proof we develop a new general form of Visser’s theorem on non-existence of infinite descending chains of truth definitions and prove it by reduction to Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, rather than by using the Visser–Yablo paradox, as in Visser’s original proof. (shrink)