This chapter examines the role of law in European Union (EU) external relations from two perspectives. First, it examines the EU as a rule‐based (international) actor Law and focuses mainly on EU law‐ governs both the extent of the European Union's external powers and their exercise, the constitutional foundations of EU external relations and the legal principles that govern external action. Second the chapter turns to the European Union's characteristic use of law as an (...) instrument and objective of its foreign policy, the European Union as a promoter of a rule‐based international order. The role of the Parliament in the conclusion of international treaties, which are often regulatory or quasi‐legislative in character, brings to the final theme of this contribution: the role played by law as both an instrument and a goal of EU foreign policy. (shrink)

I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of (...) identity—into the separate idea that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations. (shrink)

Joseph Schmid has proposed an account of existential inertia which says (among other things) that each existentially inert object is not ontologically dependent on anything that is not a part of itself. Using this account, I propose an argument that existential inertia cannot be enjoyed by external relations nor by their relata. I first draw from Arianna Betti’s case for relata-specific relations to argue that external relations cannot have existential inertia. Building on this conclusion, I (...) then propose an argument that the relata of external relations also cannot have existential inertia. (shrink)

An influential interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between public right and freedom is constitutive rather than instrumental. The focus has been on domestic right and members’ relations to their own state. This has resulted in a statist bias which has not adequately dealt with the fact that Kant regards public right as a system composed of three levels – domestic, international and cosmopolitan right. This article suggests that the constitutive relationship is between all levels (...) of right, on the one hand, and ‘freedom in the external relation’ of all human beings, on the other hand. (shrink)

For the greater part of this century Hegel was largely ignored by philosophers—and historians of philosophy—from the analytic tradition. No doubt many factors have shaped Hegel’s reception, but chief among them is the very origin of the analytic tradition. When Russell and Moore rebelled against the philosophical orthodoxy of their day and began the analytic movement, they argued against two Idealist doctrines: the doctrine of internal relations and the radical holistic claim that no part of the universe can be (...) understood on its own. The British Idealists, of course, claimed Hegel as the source and inspiration of these ideas, and Russell and Moore never doubted the veracity of their interpretation. From that point on, the analytic tradition thought of Hegel as a philosopher whose main doctrines had been demolished long ago by Russell and Moore. I want to argue in this paper that Hegel’s reception has been predicated on a mistake. Russell and Moore were wrong—not in their criticisms of the British Idealists but in their interpretation of Hegel, who advocated neither the standard internal relations doctrine nor a radical holism. The real views of Hegel, it seems to me, are largely immune to the criticisms of Russell and Moore. (shrink)

Baxter (Australas J Philos 79: 449-464, 2001) proposes an ingenious solution to the problem of instantiation based on his theory of cross-count identity. His idea is that where a particular instantiates a universal it shares an aspect with that universal. Both the particular and the universal are numerically identical with the shared aspect in different counts. Although Baxter does not say exactly what a count is, it appears that he takes ways of counting as mysterious primitives against which different numerical (...) identities are defined. In contrast, I defend the idea— suggested, though not quite endorsed, by Baxter himself—that counts are independent dimensions of numerical identity. Different ways of counting are explained by the existence of these different sorts of identity (i.e., counts). For the instantiation of a universal by a particular, I propose one dimension concerned with the individuation of particulars (the p-count) and another dimension concerned with the individuation of universals (the u-count). On that basis, I give a clear definition of cross-count identity that explains its asymmetrical nature (i.e., the fact that particulars instantiate universais, but not vice versa). I extend the theory to a third dimension—that of time, or the t-count—and thereby defend Baxter's ideas on change, and the contingency of instantiation. Baxter (Mind 97(388): 575-582, 1988; Australas J Philos 79: 449-464, 2001) proposes the related idea of composition as (cross-count) identity. Parts are individually cross-count identical with the wholes that they constitute, and they collectively share all aspects across counts with those wholes. I propose an innovation by which totality is shared distinctness across counts. The theory applies to both the totality of particulars that instantiate any given universal, and the totality of parts that constitute any given whole. I argue that this has several advantages over Armstrong's view, which is based on a dubious external totalling relation. I also argue that Armstrong's theory of numbers (or quantities) as internal relations ought to be rejected in favour of an account based on identity and distinctness. The paper concludes with a careful analysis of external relations in Baxter's framework. I argue that we must recognise one further dimension of identity in order to differentiate between, e.g., the aspects of Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise and Abelard insofar as he loves Isobel. Each of these aspects is identical with Abelard and identical with loving-by, yet they must be in some way distinct. I therefore propose the r-count, in which multiple distinct relational properties are the very same relation (-part). The existence of these four independent dimensions explains the fact that particulars, universals, relations, and times are fundamentally different sorts of things in the ontology. Each is individuated with respect to a different dimension of identity. (shrink)

Internal relations are those relations that are intrinsic to the nature of one or more of the relata. They are a kind of essential relation, rather than an essential property. For example, an arc of a circle is internally related to the center of that circle in the sense that.

The author asks whether intentionality could be described as an internal or an external relation. After he has shown that it is impossible to reduce intentionality to mere external relations, he emphasizes that it is not possible either to consider it to be an internal relation exclusively. There is no intentional internal relation without its context of external relations that permit it to work. The author tries to make a case for that by analyzing the (...) problem of the determination of intentionality as related to the anticipative structure of intentionality, with special attention on the one hand to the issue of ambiguities and on the other hand to the one of impossibilities. He tries to show that the ability for the intentionality to self-determine depends on conditions which pertain to circumstances. His demonstration is in line with some kind of externalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Autor pita može li se intencionalnost opisati kao unutarnji ili kao izvanjski odnos. Nakon što je pokazao da je nemoguće reducirati intencionalnost na puke izvanjske odnose, on naglašuje da nije moguće niti pojmiti ju ekskluzivno kao unutarnji odnos. Nema intencionalnog unutarnjeg odnosa bez njegova konteksta izvanjskih odnosa koji mu dopuštaju da djeluje. Autor pokušava pokazati primjer za to analizirajući problem determiniranja intencionalnosti kao povezane s anticipativnom strukturom intencionalnosti, s posebnom pozornošću, s jedne strane, prema stvari ambigviteta, te s druge strane, (...) prema onoj nemogućnosti. On pokušava pokazati da sposobnost intencionalnosti da sebe determinira ovisi o uvjetima koji pripadaju okolnostima. Njegova demonstracija je na liniji s nekom vrstom eksternalizma u filozofiji uma.The author asks whether intentionality could be described as an internal or an external relation. Afterhe has shown that it is impossible to reduce intentionality to mere external relations,he emphasizes that it is not possible either to consider it to be an internal relation exclusively.There is no intentional internal relation without its context of external relations that permit it towork. The author tries to make a case for that by analyzing the problem of the determination of intentionalityas related to the anticipative structure of intentionality, with special attention on theone hand to the issue of ambiguities and on the other hand to the one of impossibilities. He tries toshow that the ability for the intentionality to self-determine depends on conditions which pertain tocircumstances. His demonstration is in line with some kind of externalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

SummaryIn this paper Russell's discovery of external relations and his refutation of the doctrine of internal relations is traced to Hume's view on “philosophical” relations. Next the concepts of internal and external relation are applied to the analysis of knowledge. The most widely received analysis, the Justified True Belief‐conception, is investigated for its resources in answering the question whether knowledge is an internal or an external relation between a person and a believed proposition. There (...) are difficulties in each answer which can be partially resolved by analysing knowledge in terms of betting. (shrink)

I defend an ontological distinction between three kinds of relation: internal,external and grounded relations. Even though, as we shall see, this trichotomy is basic, it is not found in influential contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, the widespread tendency, exemplified notably by David Armstrong, of not recognizing grounded relations as distinct from external relations, can be shown to be mistaken. I propose a definition of each of the three kinds of relation. Of vital importance to the parsimony of (...) metaphysics, I also argue that only external relations are ontologically fundamental. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of (...) a concrete individual, then we will inevitably find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory) or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient. (shrink)

In the chapter on Observing Reason in the Phenomenology, as well as in §368 of the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel deals with the life sciences of his time. There, he labels the methodology of its representatives, namely zoology and comparative anatomy, as external teleology. In this paper I want to show that by doing so he is actually discussing a general kind of functionalism. Thereby, I want to highlight a line of thought in Hegel's texts which represents a productive (...) reading of external teleology contrary to a destructive reading on which scholars have mainly focussed. (shrink)

Prior research has demonstrated that antisocial behavior, substance-use disorders, and personality dimensions of aggression and impulsivity are indicators of a highly heritable underlying dimension of risk, labeled externalizing. Other work has shown that individual trait constructs within this psychopathology spectrum are associated with reduced self-monitoring, as reflected by amplitude of the error-related negativity (ERN) brain response. In this study of undergraduate subjects, reduced ERN amplitude was associated with higher scores on a self-report measure of the broad externalizing construct that links (...) these various indicators. In addition, the ERN was associated with a response-locked increase in anterior theta (4–7 Hz) oscillation; like the ERN, this theta response to errors was reduced among high-externalizing individuals. These findings suggest that neurobiologically based deficits in endogenous action monitoring may underlie generalized risk for an array of impulse-control problems. (shrink)

In this paper, we discern different types of possible relations. We focus on the distinction between internal and external relations and their various possible sub-types. In the first section, we present what is nowadays more or less the standard distinction between internal and external relations. In the second section, we make two contributions to the literature of internal relations: a new taxonomy of internal relations and a novel distinction between formal and material ontological (...) relations. In the third section, we discuss three distinctions among external relations, in particular the distinction between relata-specific and relata-unspecific relations. We argue that relata-specific external relations are a promising but incomplete solution to the vexed problem of Bradley’s relation regress. (shrink)

The thesis I wish to argue for in this article is that spatial relations such as occupying and being 1 km distant from are external. In the “Section 1” section, I shall introduce the distinction between external and internal relations and some other basic concepts in the ontology of relations. Afterwards, in the subsequent sections, I shall deal with different theories of space: substantivalism and relationism ; the spatial property theory ; super-substantivalism and super-relationism ; (...) and spatial essentialism. I shall demonstrate that, in all such theories, spatial relations need to be considered external. Otherwise, unacceptable consequences or spatial properties that are non-relational by mere façon de parler are in order. Finally, in the “Section 6” section, I shall briefly tackle length contraction in special relativity theory. (shrink)

My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. Second, I offer a (...) brief criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world". The two parts are tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally.One caveat:. (shrink)

Focusing on one of the most studied dimensions of Social Psychology, i.e., intergroup relations, this study analyzes its discursive accomplishment in a specific group-based intervention, i.e., the talk and work of an Italian group home, i.e., a small alternative care facility hosting a group of out-of-home children. Particularly, we focused on the fictionally called “Nuns’ Home,” a group home previously investigated for its ethnocentric bias, and its intergroup relations with “inside” and “outside” groups, such as schools, biological families, (...) and social services. By combining a qualitative and quantitative approach in analyzing one audio-recorded ethnographic interview with the whole team of professionals, we aimed at accounting for the multitude of internal and external stakeholders that participants refer to, analyzing the discursive accomplishment of ingroup and outgroup in talk-in-interaction and investigating ingroup bias and group qualification. To do so, we detected social categorization markers and qualifying devices that participants rely on when referring to groups. Results show that, among the numerous groups recognized, participants co-construct intergroup relations and ingroup bias implying negative assessment over external groups. Being different from traditional laboratory studies illustrating substantial contraposition between ingroup and outgroup, our qualitative analysis reveals the multitude of groups by which the ingroup is formed and their internal fragmentation. To conclude, we discussed the implications of qualitatively studying intergroup relations in group homes and indicated future lines of research. (shrink)

아리스토텔레스에게서 행복은 최고선으로서 ‘덕에 따른 영혼의 활동’으로 정의된다. 그런데 아리스토텔레스는 행복이 덕 이외에도 “외적으로 좋은 것들”(ta ektos agatha), 예를 들어 부나 명예 또는 좋은 태생이나 출중한 외모와 같은 것을 추가적으로 필요로 한다고 말한다. 행복에 대한 ‘덕의 충족성 원리’와 ‘외적인 좋음의 추가적 필요성 원리’는 행복의 구성원리가 무엇이 되어야 하는지에 대한 문제를 발생시킨다. 외적좋음의 자체적 가치를 인정하게 되면 덕의 충분성 원리가 훼손되고, 외적좋음의 가치가 인정되지 않으면 행복실현을 위한 추가필요성 원리가 부정될 수 있기 때문이다. 이 글은 아리스토텔레스의 행복론에 대한 보다 정확한 이해를 위해 (...) 그의 외적좋음에 대한 재평가를 시도한다. 이를 위해 ‘외적좋음이 없이는 덕에 따른 활동이 불가능하거나 쉽지 않다’는 아리스토텔레스의 언급에 주목하여, 이 말이 수단과 운적인 것으로 말해지는 외적좋음에 어떻게 적용되어야 할지를 규명한다. 특히 수단으로 말해지는 친구나 부와 같은 외적좋음과 덕활동의 상관관계는 아리스토텔레스의 질료와 형상 개념을 통해 이해를 시도한다. 이것은 수단으로 말해지는 외적좋음을 질료(hylē)에 상응하는 ‘가능태적 좋음’으로, 덕을 형상(eidos)적 원리로 보는 것이다. 결론적으로 외적좋음은 덕과 더불어 아리스토텔레스적인 행복을 실현하는 구성부분으로 이해될 수 있다. (shrink)

The paper explores the main competing interpretations of Aristotle's view of the relation between happiness and external goods in the Nicomachean Ethics. On the basis of a careful analysis of what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics (and other works such as the Eudemian Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, etc.) it is argued that it is likely that Aristotle takes at least some external goods to be actual constituents of happiness provided that (1) they are accompanied by virtuous activity and (...) (2) the agent enjoying and using those external goods does so in ways compatible with the continuous aim of acting virtuously. (shrink)

In this paper I provide a state of the art survey and assessment of the contemporary debate about relations. After (1) distinguishing different varieties of relations, symmetric from non-symmetric, internal from external relations etc. and relations from their set-theoretic models or sequences, I proceed (2) to consider Bradley’s regress and whether relations can be eliminated altogether. Next I turn (3) to the question whether relations can be reduced, bringing to bear considerations from the (...) philosophy of physics as well as metaphysics. Finally, (3) I consider in what sense relations have order, and whether to make sense of this we are required to conceive of relations as having direction or argument positions. (shrink)

Curry’s paradox is well known. The original version employed a conditional connective, and is not forthcoming if the conditional does not satisfy contraction. A newer version uses a validity predicate, instead of a conditional, and is not forthcoming if validity does not satisfy structural contraction. But there is a variation of the paradox which uses “external validity”. And since external validity contracts, one might expect the appropriate version of the Curry paradox to be inescapable. In this paper we (...) show that this is not the case. We consider two ways of formalising the notion of external validity, and show that in both of these the paradox is not forthcoming without the appropriate forms of contraction. (shrink)