Summary This paper examines the experimentum crucis under the light of the Duhem’s holistic thesis. This methodological instrument is not usable in physics, because physical theories are always logically connected to many assumptions. On the contrary, it is usable in psychological research oriented to perceptual laws, when these laws are, without any hypothetical term, isolated systems. An application of experimentum crucis in Experimental Phenomenology of perception is presented. In conclusion, the role of perceptual knowledge as an (...) essential assumption in other scientific disciplines that have a high degree of theoricity is also underlined. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider Newton’s use of the Baconian label experimentum crucis in his famous 1672 paper on Light and Colors. I take it to be a sort of ‘signpost’, or methodological clue, which, properly understood, can help us to assess the kind of ‘empiricist’ commitment that may be ascribed to Newton. In order to dispel persistent misunderstandings, the first part of the chapter shows how our present understanding of crucial experiments has been shaped by nineteenth-century philosophers (...) of science, as part of a characteristically anti-Baconian methodology. It also shed light on the particularly ambiguous character of Newton’s methodological legacy. In the remaining parts of the paper, muting these retrospective overtones, I show what crucial instances, or crucial experiments, really meant for Bacon, and for his heirs, in order to elucidate Newton’s usage in the light of its actual context. I argue that the crucial experiment in Newton’s 1672 paper is not devised to arbitrate between competing full-blown and empirically grounded theories, but rather to make the abstract structure of a new, and still unclear, phenomenon entirely transparent. It functions as a ‘perceptual’ index rather than a judgmental criterion. Finally, I explain why the expression has been dropped in the published text of the 1704 Opticks. The ‘exhibiting’ function of the experimentum crucis is now taken over by a long and complex pattern of experiments. It is the whole complex composition of these optical experiments that is now ‘crucially’ exhibiting the abstract structure of refraction. (shrink)

Newtons experimentum crucis hat ein komplementares Gegenstück, d.h. ein Experiment, in dem die Rollen von Licht und Schatten genau ausgetauscht sind. Statt wie Newton in der Dunkelkammer zu experimentieren, müssen wir das Komplement des experimentum crucis in einer Streulichtkammer aufbauen (deren Wände sog. Lambertstrahler sind). Wenn es dieses umgestülpte Experiment wirklich gibt, dann liefert es für jeden newtonischen Beweis einen umgestülpten Gegenbeweis, dessen Konklusion die Heterogenitat der Schatten wäre (also die Behauptung, dass nicht weißes Licht, sondern (...) schwarze Schatten eine heterogene Mischung verschiedenfarbiger Strahlen mit unterschiedlichen Brechungseigenschaften seien). Dass Newtons experimentum crucis in diesem Sinne umgestülpt werden kann, wird von Newtons eigener Theorie impliziert. Mehr noch, inzwischen ist der empirische Nachweis der Umstülpung gelungen. (shrink)

Hume invites would-be dissenters to produce an idea, whose content appears not to be ultimately derived or copies from impressions. Reid takes up this gauntlet in his experimentum crucis. This chapter analyzes Reid's central challenge to Hume's principles, and provides an interpretation of Reid's reasoning that withstands recent criticisms.

This book symposium contribution focuses on James Van Cleve's assertion that Reid's dualistic commitments are not essential to his other doctrines. I argue to the contrary that his critique of what he called the philosophy of ideas depends on a tacit assumption of dualism.

In the seventeenth century, Newton published his famous experimentum crucis, in which he claimed that light is heterogeneous and is composed of (colored) rays with different refrangibilities. Experiments, especially a crucial experiment, were important for justifying Newton’s theory of light, and eventually his theory of color. Goethe conducted a series of experiments on the nature of color, especially in contradistinction to Newton, and he defended his research with a methodological principle formulated in “Der Versuch als Vermittler.” Goethe’s principle (...) included a series of experiments and resultant higher empirical evidence as mediator between the objective (natural phenomena) and the subjective (theory or hypothesis). Although the notion of experimentum crucis became popular among scientists, even until today, in reconstructing experimental research and for justifying theories, especially for rhetorical purposes, I propose that Newton’s justification of his theory of light and color is best reconstructed in terms of Goethe’s methodological principle. Finally, Goethe’s principle has important consequences for the contemporary philosophical underdetermination thesis. (shrink)

In the seventeenth century, Newton published his famous experimentum crucis, in which he claimed that light is heterogeneous and is composed of rays with different refrangibilities. Experiments, especially the crucial experiment, were important for justifying Newton’s theory of light, and eventually his theory of color. A century later, Goethe conducted a series of experiments on the nature of color, especially in contradistinction to Newton, and he defended his research with a methodological principle formulated in “Der Versuch als Vermittler.” (...) Goethe’s principle included two elements: a series of experiments and resultant higher empirical evidence, which functioned as mediator between the objective and the subjective . Although the notion of experimentum crucis became popular among scientists for reconstructing experimental research and for justifying theories, especially for rhetorical purposes, Newton’s justification of his theory of light and color is best reconstructed in terms of Goethe’s methodological principle. Finally, Goethe’s principle has important consequences for the contemporary philosophical underdetermination thesis. (shrink)

Newton claims to have proven the heterogeneity of light through his experimentum crucis. However, Olaf Müller has worked out in detail Goethe’s idea that one could likewise prove the heterogeneity of darkness by inverting Newton’s famous experiment. Müller concludes that this invalidates Newton’s claim of proof. Yet this conclusion only holds if the heterogeneity of light and the heterogeneity of darkness is logically incompatible. This paper shows that this is not the case. Instead, in Quine’s terms, we have (...) two logically compatible theories based on mutually irreducible theoretical terms. From a Quinean point of view, this does no harm to the provability of the corresponding statements. (shrink)

The first part of this paper finds Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM) of constitution inadequate, as it definitionally ties constitution to the feasibility of idealized experiments, which, however, are unrealizable in principle. As an alternative, the second part develops an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), which exploits the fact that phenomena and their constituents are unbreakably coupled via common causes. The best explanation for this common-cause coupling is the existence of an additional dependence relation, viz. constitution. Apart from adequately (...) capturing the essential characteristics of constitution missed by MM, NDC has important ramifications for constitutional discovery—most notably, that there is no experimentum crucis for constitution, not even under ideal discovery circumstances. (shrink)

Mary Shepherd (1777–1847) was a fierce and brilliant critic of Berkeley and Hume, who moreover offered strikingly original positive views about the nature of reality and our access to it which deserve much more attention (and credit, since she anticipates many prominent views) than they have received thus far. By way of illustration, I focus on Shepherd's 1824 Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of that Relation (ERCE). After a (...) brief setup, I canvas certain of her trenchant objections to Hume’s argumentation; I then present the positive core of her response to Hume, which consists in providing novel accounts of how reason alone or reason coupled with experience can justify, first, that every effect must have a cause, and second, that it is necessary that like causes produce like effects. Among other contributions here, Shepherd provides a distinctively metaphysical argument for the claim that nothing can begin to exist 'of itself' (going beyond an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in particular), and leverages difference-making considerations to make the case that a single 'experimentum crucis' can justify causal belief (anticipating Mill's 'method of difference'). I close by highlighting salient features of Shepherd's metaphysics of causation, whereby causation is singularist and local (anticipating Ducasse and Anscombe) and involves synchronic interactions (anticipating Mill's and certain contemporary accounts), and according to which objects are essentially characterized by their causes and effects (anticipating contemporary causal or dispositional essentialist positions). (shrink)

The use of new paradigms of false belief tasks allowed to reduce the age of children who pass the test from the previous 4 years in the standard version to only 15 months or even a striking 6 months in the nonverbal modification. These results are often taken as evidence that infants already possess an—at least implicit—theory of mind. We criticize this inferential leap on the grounds that inferring a ToM from the predictive success on a false belief task requires (...) to assume as premise that a belief reasoning is a necessary condition for correct action prediction. It is argued that the FBT does not satisfactorily constrain the predictive means, leaving room for the use of belief-independent inferences. These heuristics, when applied to the FBT, can achieve the same predictive success of a belief-based inference because information provided by the test stimulus allows the recognition of particular situations that can be subsumed by their ‘laws’. Instead of solving this issue by designing a single experimentum crucis that would render unfeasible the use of non-representational inferences, we suggest the application of a set of tests in which, although individually they can support inferences dissociated from a ToM, only an inference that makes use of false beliefs is able to correctly predict all the outcomes. (shrink)

This paper restates and subjects to analysis the polemics in Russian pre-revolutionary Populist and Marxist thought that concerned Kant’s practical philosophy. In these polemics Kantian ideas influence and reinforce the Populist personalism and idealism, as well as Marxist revisionist reformism and moral universalism. Plekhanov, Lenin, and other Russian “orthodox Marxists” heavily criticize both trends. In addition, they generally view Kantianism as a “spiritual weapon” of the reactionary bourgeois thought. This results in a starkly anti-Kantian position of Soviet Marxism. In view (...) of this the 1947 Communist Party decision to preserve Kant’s tomb in Soviet Kaliningrad becomes something of an experimentum crucis that challenges the soundness of the theory. (shrink)

SummaryAccording to classical rationalism prejudiced people cannot conduct proper research. This is refuted by cases of prejudiced and even Nazi scientists. According to classical rationalism all error is prejudice. This was refuted when crucial experiment between Newton and Einstein favored Einstein. Contemporary popular irrationalists claim crucial experiments are impossible. Their ability to convince rests on the cowardice of the leadership of science which fails to admit openly the present need for a new theory of rationality.RésuméSelon la rationalisme classique, seuls des (...) individus sans préjuges peuvem faire de la bonne recherche. Ce qui est réfuté par des exemples de savants partisans et en particulier nazis. Selon le rationalisme classique, toute erreur est préjugé. Ce qui a été réfuté lorsqu'une expérience cruciale entre Newton et Einstein a tranché en faveur ?on;Einstein. Des irrationalistes contemporains populates prétendent qu'aucune expérience cruciale n'est possible. Leur force de persuasion ne tient Quà la couardise des ténors de la science qui refusent de reconnaître ouvertement le besoin ?on;une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité.ZusammenfassungDem klassischen Rationalismus gemass können voreingenommene Personen nicht wirkliche Forschung betreiben. Diese Ansicht wird widerlegt durch Fälle von voreingenommenen Wissen‐schaftlern – sogar unter der Herrschaft des Nazionalsozialismus. Dem klassischen Rationalismus gemass beruht jeder Irrtum auf Vorurteil. Dies wurde durch die Tatsache widerlegt, dass ein experimentum crucis zugunsten von Einstein gegen Newton entschied. Zeitgenössige populäre Irrationalisten behaupten, dass kein experimentum crucis möglich sei. Ihr Erfolg lasst sich nur durch die Feigheit der für die Wissenschaft Verantwortlichen erklären, die sich weigern, die Not‐wendigkeit einer neuen Theorie der Rationalität einzugestehen. (shrink)

In 1672, inspired by the wave theory of Ignace Gaston Pardies, Christiaan Huygens made his first attempt to explain the sine law of refraction, but in 1673 he abandoned his plans owing to difficulties concerning double refraction. Huygens was able to explain double refraction on 6 August 1677 after his discoveries of the axis of symmetry of the crystal and of ‘Huygens's principle’. On 6 August 1679, he wrote: ‘I have found the confirmation of my theory of light and of (...) refraction’, and then described an ‘experimentum crucis’ to decide between his theory and a rival hypothesis. A study of caustics may have led Huygens to the discovery of ‘Huygens's principle’. (shrink)

Different or conflicting accounts of the same episode in the history of science may arise from viewing that episode from different perspectives. The metaphor suggests that conflicting accounts can be seen as complementary, constructing a multi-dimensional understanding, if the different perspectives can be coordinated. As an example, I discuss different perspectives on the Stern-Gerlach experiment. In a static interpretation, the SGE has been viewed as an experiment that allows the determination of the magnetic moment of silver atoms. Based on the (...) concept of magnetic momentum arising from orbital angular momentum, the original experiment was designed in 1922 as an experimentum crucis to decide between Bohr’s quantum theory and classical electromagnetic theory, and its outcome was interpreted as a confirmation of the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantum postulates. After the advent of quantum mechanics, the SGE was reinterpreted in terms of magnetic moment arising from the electron’s spin angular momentum. In a dynamical interpretation, physicists have asked for the physical mechanism responsible for the quantization of the angular momentum with respect to the direction of the magnetic field. Although different suggestions were explored, none was ever accepted as fully satisfactory. Today this difficulty is seen as a paradigmatic instance of the unsolved quantum measurement problem. (shrink)

La philosophie de l’art de Danto se réclame expressément d’une conception à la fois historiciste et essentialiste ; elle se concentre sur la question des « indiscernables ». Le pop art, avec Warhol, joue à cet égard le rôle d’un experimentum crucis. Le présent essai s’efforce de mettre en lumière la complexité et les ambiguïtés des analyses et des positions défendues par Danto, en proposant une interprétation de l’« indiscernabilité » qui prend à revers les démarcations postulées. On (...) y soutient l’idée d’un continuum qui en constitue en réalité l’arrière-plan à la fois culturel et économique. (shrink)

Anhand der genaueren Analyse von Newtons experimentum crucis und der Argumentation, die er auf dieses Experiment stützt, sowie Goethes Kritik hieran sollen im Folgenden zwei verbreitete Vorurteile revidiert werden: -/- 1. Newton ist kein Dogmatiker, der methodische Ansprüche vertritt, die er nicht einlösen kann, sondern gründet seinen Anspruch, experimentelle Beweise führen zu können, auf einer vorbildlichen Methodologie kausaler Erklärungen, was seine Kritiker allerdings übersehen. 2. Goethe ist kein Antiwissenschaftler, der einen einzigartigen Kontrapunkt zur vorherrschenden wissenschaftlichen Tradition bildet, sondern (...) steht inmitten traditioneller Auffassungen zur Farbenlehre, deren experimentelle und methodologische Grundlagen bezüglich eines Erklärungsanspruches denen Newtons unterlegen sind. (shrink)

Die Frage: sind empirische Theorien falsifizierbar? ist natürlich trivialerweise zu verneinen, falls man Theorien nicht als Mengen von Aussagen, sonden z. B., wie Sneed/Stegmüller, als mengentheoretische Strukturen plus intendierte Anwendungsbereiche auffaßt. Daß die Antwort, zumindest dann, wenn man die Fragestellung auf bestimmte physikalische Theorien einschränkt, auch bei Zugrundelegung der sogenannten Aussagen-Konzeption (statement view) nicht anders lautet, ist hingegen schon weniger trivial — obgleich seit langem bekannt, spätestens nämlich seit Duhems berühmter Argumentation gegen die Möglichkeit eines experimentum crucis. Andererseits (...) beruht eine der derzeit einflußreichsten methodologischen Theorien, die von Popper, gerade auf der gegenteiligen Behauptung. Erst jüngst noch hat Popper seine Falsifizierbarkeits-Annahme, vor allem gegen Kritiken von Lakatos und Putnam, zu verteidigen versucht; die gleiche Intention verfolgen auch zwei Aufsätze von Musgrave. Es erscheint mir daher angebracht, kurz auf das Problem der Falsifizierbarkeit von empirischen Theorien zurückzukommen.Vorweg noch zwei Bemerkungen zur Terminologie: 1) Ich verwende, ohne mich auf den Versuch einer genaueren Explikation einzulassen, den Begriff (physikalische) Theorie in dem für den statement view geläufigen Sinne, wonach eine (deterministische) Theorie aus einer Menge von allgemeinen (deterministischen Natur-)Gesetzen besteht. Es sei ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, daß dies wenigstens partiell dem sonst üblichen Sprachgebrauch zuwider läuft: die Theorie des Planetensystems und die Mondtheorie, beispielsweise, sind keine Theorien im genannten Sinne, weil sie außer auf allgemeinen Naturgesetzen noch auf spezifischen nicht-gesetzesartigen Annahmen beruhen. Andrerseits dürfte diese Deutung des Begriffs Theorie zumindest mit derjenigen von Popper übereinstimmen. — 2) Daß eine Aussage bzw. Aussagenmenge T falsifizierbar ist, soll, wie bei Popper, bedeuten, daß Basissätze (wahre oder falsche) existieren, die zusammen mit T eine inkonsistente Satzmenge bilden; m.a.W.: falsifizierbar ist T in the simple logical sense of being logically incompatible with some basic statements. It has potential falsifiers. Basissätze sind dabei, grob gesagt, als Darstellungen von Beobachtungs-Befunden aufzufassen; Genaueres interessiert hier nur insoweit, als es sich umraum-zeitlich singuläre (Existenz-) Sätze handeln muß. Entsprechend soll schließlich T als falsifiziert gelten, wenn es wahre bzw. anerkannte oder akzeptierte Basissätze gibt, die T widersprechen. (Poppers Forderung, daß diese Basissätze ein reproduzierbares Phänomen beschreiben, also eine — allgemeine — falsifizierende Hypothese bewähren müssen, kann im vorliegenden Zusammenhang außer Betracht bleiben). (shrink)

In one of his arguments for taking compassion to be the basis of morality, Schopenhauer offers a thought experiment involving two characters: Titus and Caius. The 'Titus Argument,' as I call it, has been misunderstood by many of Schopenhauer's readers, but is, I argue, worthy of attention by contemporary ethicists and metaethicists. In this chapter, I clarify the argument's structure, methodology, and its key philosophical move, drawing comparisons with Newton's experimental methodology in optics and Raimond Gaita's moral parodies.

Inspired by Hannah Arendt, this contribution offers an exercise of thought as an attempt to distil anew the original spirit of what education means. It tries to articulate the event or happening that the word names, the experiences in which this happening manifests itself and the (material) forms that constitute it or make it find/take (its) place. Starting from the meaning of scholè as ‘free time’ or ‘undestined and unfinished time’ it further explores scholè as the time of attention which (...) is the time of the regard for the world, of being present to it (or being in its presence), attending it, a time of delivery to the experience of the world, of exposure and effacing social subjectivities and orientations, a time filled with encounters. Education, then, relates to forms of profanation, suspension and attention and can be articulated as the art (the doing) and technology that makes scholè happen. (shrink)

In the eulogy for the death of the Emperor Theodosius held on February 25, a.D. 395, Ambrose introduces the episode of the finding of the Holy Cross in Jerusalem for the interest of Helena, mother of Constantine. That allows the bishop of Milan to expose his political- religious conceptions. The article offers a systematic analysis of the excursus from a literary point of view.

Kniha Grégoira Chamayou, Les corps vils: Expérimenter sur les êtres humains aux 18e et 19e siècles vykresluje výzkumné praktiky v lékařství v 18. a 19. století a na pozadí příběhů zacházení s těly trestanců, galejníků nebo prostitutek abstrahuje kategorii „nešlechetného těla": tedy těla, vnímaného danými společenskými poměry jako nehodnotného. Autor knihy představuje pomocí této kategorie postulát kritické analýzy výzkumných praktik, jejichž povaha jde ruku v ruce s vývojem historicko-společenských konvencí. Tato recenzní stať představuje vývoj debaty v aktuálních pracích anglofonní STS, (...) lékařské sociologie a sociologie vědeckého poznání. Reflexi zužuje na subjekty a produkty lékařského výzkumu, pomocí nichž vykresluje koncept „argumentační koprodukce". Argumentační koprodukce upozorňuje na provázanost vědy a společnosti a zároveň zesíleně vnímá vnitřní dynamiku tohoto vztahu. (shrink)

The impact of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius on western arthistory has been neglected so far. We elaborate here that this figure, besides his historical and liturgical identity as restorer of the holy cross relic to Jerusalem, became also an important catalyst for eschatological models. Heraclius has been personified as the eschatological emperor and was described as the conqueror of Chosroës, the Antichrist. This image-making of the Byzantine emperor in the West was not only adopted by the crusaders, but became also (...) exemplified by important high-medieval dynasties . The franciscans attend the memory of Heraclius to the later Middle Ages by means of their special devotion to the cross and the holy sepulchre . In this context Heraclius became depicted in 14th- and 15th-century franciscan wallpaintings in Tuscanian churches as a part of the so-called legend of the True Cross. (shrink)

Experience played a key role in the natural science of the later Middle Ages. Both the terms “experience” and “experiment” can be found in medieval texts. However, the latter was mainly used as a synonym and there is only a slight allusion to the concept of experiments in the modern sense. In their arguments, medieval authors rather referred to day-to-day experience, to phenomena which were evident from simple observation. The medieval Latin meaning of expertus (or its close equivalent experimentator) was (...) thus closely related to the notion of everyday experience. An expert was someone who had a wide experience of natural phenomena and who always sought to extend his knowledge. During the later Middle Ages, this aspect slowly gained in importance (despite the fact that written authorities and the textbooks of natural philosophy remained dominant), thus opening up new ways of thinking, which finally led to the Scientific Revolution. (shrink)