Following Shelly Kagan’s useful terminology, foundational consequentialists are those who hold that the ranking of outcomes is at the foundation of all moral assessment. That is, they hold that moral assessments of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, morally good and morally bad, etc. are all ultimately a function of how outcomes rank. But foundational consequentialists disagree on what is to be directly evaluated in terms of the ranking of outcomes, which is to say that they disagree on what the (...) primary evaluative focal point is. Act-consequentialists take acts to be the primary evaluative focal point. They evaluate acts in terms of how their outcomes rank (the higher ranked the outcome, the morally better the act), but evaluate everything else in terms of the morally best acts. Thus, the morally best rules are those that would, if internalized, most reliably lead us to perform the morally best acts. Rule-consequentialists, by contrast, take rules to be the primary evaluative focal point. They evaluate rules according to how their outcomes rank and then assess everything else in terms of the morally best rules. Thus, the morally best acts are those that conform to the morally best rules. In this paper, I argue that foundational consequentialists should not take the primary evaluative focal point (or points) to be acts, rules, virtues, or even everything. In so doing, I argue against act-consequentialism, rule-consequentialism, and global consequentialism. But my project is not entirely negative, for I argue that the primary evaluative focal point should be a complex of acts and attitudes. In the end, then, I claim that foundational consequentialists should accept a new kind of consequentialism, which I call attitude-consequentialism. (shrink)

Le présent article examine la façon dont John Dewey a entrepris de poser le problème de la valuation et de ses conséquences au sein de sa théorie de l’éducation. Plus spécifiquement, nous voudrions montrer que son effort pour repenser l’articulation des moyens et des fins du processus de valuation contribue à repenser l’enquête morale. Celle-ci, si elle fait alors l’objet d’une pédagogie qui met au centre l’expérience vécue du sujet, nous oblige à concevoir à nouveaux frais les valeurs que nous (...) accordons aux connaissances apprises. Notre analyse entend démontrer que : 1) de même que dans le domaine éthique, rien n’a de valeur en soi pour le sujet agissant. Mais que 2) la valuation de tout acte est déterminée en situation, alors, 3) dans le domaine de la pédagogie, aucune connaissance n’a de valeur en soi pour l’élève. 4) Ainsi la première tâche de l’enseignant.e est de former l’élève à des processus de valuation efficaces. Cela dans le but que celui-ci puisse à son tour, clairement, déterminer pour lui-même les connaissances qui auront de la valeur. Si notre hypothèse est juste alors cette tâche devient à la fois un point de départ important de la pédagogie pragmatiste et un impératif incontournable de l’éthique enseignante. -/- The present article examines how Dewey addressed the problem of value, as well as the consequences that this solution had for his educational theory. More specifically, I aim to show that Dewey’s effort to rethink means and ends within the process of valuation contributes to a recasting of moral inquiry. If moral inquiry becomes part of a pedagogy that focuses upon the lived experience of the subject, this compels us to rethink the value we attribute to acquired knowledge. My analysis will demonstrate 1) that even within the ethical domain, nothing has value in itself for the acting subject, but that 2) the value of all acts must be determined within specific situations, and therefore 3) within the domain of pedagogy, no knowledge has value in and of itself for the student. 4) Thus the first task of the teacher is to teach students how to evaluate questions of value, which will push them to determine for themselves what knowledge has value. If my hypothesis is correct, this task becomes simultaneously an important starting place for pragmatist pedagogy and a cornerstone of a new ethic of teaching. (shrink)

Le féminisme est un mouvement théorique et politique pluriel et en perpétuelle évolution. Aussi ce travail se situe dans les champs de la philosophie de l’éducation et plus particulièrement au sein des débats entre plusieurs courants philosophiques se réclamant du féminisme. Il cherche à évaluer l’intérêt de deux de ces approches philosophiques au regard de la construction d’une pédagogie féministe. Se trouve ainsi comparées l’approche de la théorie critique (proche du marxisme matérialiste et de l’école de Francfort) et l’approche pragmatiste (...) (issue des travaux de Jane Addams et John Dewey) par rapport au problème du “consciousness-raising” en pédagogie. Ce dernier présente en effet des difficultés à l’approche critique qui seront exposées dans la première partie de l’argumentation. L’hypothèse de notre travail est que le pragmatisme peut apporter des outils théoriques répondant à ses difficultés et venant ainsi compléter ceux de la théorie critique au profit de la pédagogie féministe. Ainsi la deuxième partie de notre argumentation se concentre sur l’intérêt épistémique de ces outils pédagogiques que propose le pragmatisme. Ces derniers sont rendus possibles par la valorisation épistémique de la perplexité et de l’empathie, et nous verrons en quoi ils permettent d’augmenter l’efficacité du “consciousness-raising” lors des pratiques pédagogiques quotidiennes. (shrink)

I argue against the standard view that it is possible to describe extensionally different consequentialist theories by describing different evaluative focal points. I argue that for consequentialist purposes, the important sense of the word act must include all motives and side effects, and thus these things cannot be separated.

Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry (...) and a new notion of pay-off symmetry, which yields different predictions in a variety of games. The theory can explain why people do better than pure randomization in matching games. (shrink)

In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria for evaluating an evidence aggregator of this sort are. What is the (...) appropriate balance between explicitly coded algorithms and implicit reasoning involved, for instance, in the packaging of input evidence? In short: What is the optimal degree of ‘automation’? On the positive side: We propose the ability to perform an adequate robustness analysis as the focal criterion, primarily because it directs efforts to what is most important, namely, the structure of the algorithm and the appropriate extent of automation. Moreover, where there are resource constraints on the aggregation process, one must also consider what balance between volume of evidence and accuracy in the treatment of individual evidence best facilitates inference. There is no prerogative to aggregate the total evidence available if this would in fact reduce overall accuracy. (shrink)

In times of digitalization and globalization, social expectations change at an increasing pace. In order to provide orientation in times of frequent change, this article argues to reinforce the meaning of moral principles, norms, or values as focal points, which build the basis of mutually aligned behavioral expectations. Accordingly, the paper explains the abstract meaning of focal points – having reciprocal expectations as foundation for social cooperation – as well as the particular relevance of the (...) class='Hi'>focal point ‘do no harm’. (shrink)

The question of the origins of the cult of the fourth century martyr, Demetrius of Thessalonica has been the focal point of hagiographical research since the first publication of his passions by the Bollandists in 1780. Since then there were the most divergent hypotheses put forward to explain the obscure beginnings of his Thessalonican basilica and his alleged connection to Sirmium and its martyred deacon, Demetrius. Different ideas and assumptions were proposed based on various arthistorical, archaeological and literary observations, (...) or sometimes relying only on national ideologies or even pure fantasy. However, there were no attempts made to put the whole problem into the wider context of the Illyrian hagiographic tradition and to make a detailed comparison between St Demetrius' cult and the afterlife of other Pannonian and Illyrian martyrs. In the present paper, then, after a critical analysis of the problem and its proposed solutions, a number of comparative case-studies will be carried out aiming to map the basic tendences of the afterlife of the martyrs of Late Antique Illyricum which presumably will help us to have a better view of the whole problem of the migration of the Illyrian martyrs and to provide a fresh solution for the origin and development of St Demetrius' cult. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narcissism A Focal Point for Examining the Interrelatedness of Psychology and PhilosophyLydia Amir, PhD (bio)In a groundbreaking article, Aleksandar Fatic challenges the view that mental health is to be dissociated from morality or ethics. His argument targets cluster B personality disorders, such as Borderline and Narcissistic Personality Disorders, but focuses mainly on narcissistic disorders, whether diagnosed or not. Although these persons are not exempt of moral and legal (...) responsibility, they are diagnosed by and relegated to the mental health system, which is often ineffective in treating them. Fatic suggests that addressing their faulty morality is the best policy. In my commentary of his article, I further probe the viability and desirability of doing so. I point to narcissism as a focal point for examining the necessary impact of psychology and philosophy insofar as psychologists may be considered experts in emotions and philosophers in normative ethics. I question the interest in any ethics that does not also supply the means of its implementation and suggest that narcissists may have a morality of their own, ethical egoism.As psychiatrist Bennett Simon notes, Socrates did not inquire into the mental health field; his presence is missed as the questions, “what is mental illness?” and “what are psychiatry and psychiatrists?” are not addressed. It follows that it is up to us, as Simon attempts to do in the first chapter of Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry (1978), to define the psychiatrist’s proper area of professional competence (p. 28). That which makes matters even more confusing, he notes, is that psychiatrists are only one group of professionals who deal with the “mentally ill” and that they are “far from unanimous” about which problems “pertain to their particular sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). He thus lists a variety of problems which “a glance at both popular and professional literature…reveals that at one time or another, psychiatrists have claimed [End Page 169] (sometimes by public demand) for their proper sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). Among them is the issue that Fatic’s break grounding article tackles: “Psychiatrists at times consider it their proper task to deal with people who are excessively selfish and self-centered (narcissistic personality disorder)” (Simon, 1978, p. 29).Thus, Simon sees as a matter of controversy whether narcissism is a psychiatric issue, and defines the disorder in moral terms (“selfish,” “self-centered”). Fatic broadens the argument: he questions the validity of the psychological approach not only to narcissism as a personality disorder, but also to narcissistic traits, and the effectivity of this approach given that this is an area in which therapists usually do not have much success even if the patients look for help, which is rare. Fatic suggests that these personalities, either those with narcissistic traits or those with full-fledged narcissistic personality disorder, should be better understood (and maybe also addressed, although this point is not explicitly made) when viewed through moral lenses. In doing so, Fatic not only questions the validity of one form of personality disorder––still a controversial category––but re-kindles the view that correlates aspects of mental health with virtue, a view that was valid up until the nineteenth century and that made of philosophers (and priests) doctors of the soul.1That which made of philosophers’ teachings an important part of one’s life before the advent of scientific psychology has been often associated with this view, that the virtuous are also the healthy. Without going as far as to suggest that philosophers should teach virtue to narcissists, which could be a further argument in favor of the new field of philosophical practice and a broadening of its legitimate concerns, Fatic notes that moral categories are better suited to approach those who are plagued by narcissism.One way to explain the historical role that psychology played in relation to the traditional one upheld by morality is that psychology stepped in to explain the origins of failures in morality. If the narcissist is to be judged according to moral categories (a judgment that he necessarily fails in so far as right emotions as relevant to morality), what might be the consequences?Ascribing... (shrink)

In Finnis´s methodology it is very important to build the appropriate concepts to describe, analyse and define law. As a natural law theorist Finnis goes beyond Hart when considering that the internal point of view is useless for delimiting what law is if one does not define the internal point of view of the internal point of view, that is, the moral point of view. Only from a moral point of view it is possible, according to Finnis, to build an (...) authentic theory of law able not only to describe law but also to morally evaluate it. In Finnis methodology there is also the distinction between the focal and peripheral meanings of a term or concept, whichcorrespond, respectively, to the central and peripheral or secondary cases of and object referred by such term or concept. Because of this distinction Finnis is able to use a wide concept of law avoiding in this way many of the mistakes, which, according to legal positivism, are typical of natural law theories like, for example, confusing legal and moral validity. The importance given by Finnis to the internal point of view and the distinction between central and peripheral cases in order to analyse law is not original but Finnis introduces some particularities, which is what I try to present in this paper. (shrink)

Traditional analysis and reductionism put no value on direct experience. Negative Dialectic allows the human mind to return to an experience of mythical connectedness without falling into the trap of ideological isolation. The paper addresses the problem of truth claims of personal experiences by relating the truth of an experience to its context.The quintessential wholeness of the quantum world corresponds with the commonplace experience of the unity of our mind. Mind is an organic part of the growth process of ever-more (...) complex processes and events that comprise the natural world. Today science provides some support for the idea that all individuals embody spontaneity and experience. (shrink)

I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In Lewis’ (Convention, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Skyrms (Signals: evolution, learning & information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010a) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I (...) will refer to as a salience game—introduces a variable parameter into the atomic signaling game which allows for degrees of salience, thus filling in the continuum between Skyrms’ and Lewis’ models. The model does not presuppose any salience at the outset, but illustrates a process by which accidentally evolved salience is amplified, to the benefit of the players. It is shown that increasing degrees of salience allow populations to avoid sub-optimal pooling equilibria and to coordinate upon conventions more quickly. (shrink)

In this short excerpt from an Introduction to his celebrated book From the Doctrine of Science to the Logic of Culture, Bibler shows that the phenomenon of culture has shifted into the cente...

The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...) philosophy, I develop a focal point view to resolve these motivating questions. On the focal point view, traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms answer different types of normative questions. There is nevertheless a familiar type of evaluative tension between traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms, but this tension is an unavoidable feature of the normative landscape and not a sign that traditional epistemic norms need revision. But if traditional epistemic norms are not zetetic norms, then in what sense is zetetic epistemology a project for epistemologists? I conclude by articulating a sense in which some nontraditional epistemic norms are zetetic norms, and in which zetetic epistemology is an important part of the study of theoretical rationality. (shrink)

In 1948, A.J. Ayer was attacked on the pages of The New Statesman and Nation magazine where it was claimed that his views were partly responsible for increasingly Fascist attitudes at Oxford. Ayer...

This article focuses on the effects of nonbinding recommendations on bargaining outcomes. Recommendations are theorized to have two effects: they can create a focal point for final bargaining positions, and they can decrease outcome uncertainty should dispute persist. While the focal point effect may lower dispute rates, the uncertainty reduction effect is predicted to do the opposite for risk-averse bargainers. Which of these effects dominates is of critical importance in the design of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, which (...) are increasingly utilized in a variety of settings. We theoretically examine the effects of recommendations on the contract zone using a framework which allows bargainers’ final positions to influence a binding outcome should negotiations fail. This provides a more stringent test of focal points than previously considered. We also present data from controlled laboratory experiments consistent with our model. Recommendations are empirically shown to influence final bargaining positions and negotiated settlement values. In fact, recommendations significantly reduce dispute rates, even where they are completely ignored in final-stage arbitration. This highlights a potentially significant role for the use of nonbinding procedures, such as mediation, as a preliminary stage in more efficient ADR procedures. (shrink)

Cadherins are a large family of single‐pass transmembrane proteins principally involved in Ca2+‐dependent homotypic cell adhesion. The cadherin molecules comprise three domains, the intracellular domain, the transmembrane domain and the extracellular domain, and form large complexes with a vast array of binding partners (including cadherin molecules of the same type in homophilic interactions and cellular protein catenins), orchestrating biologically essential extracellular and intracellular signalling processes. While current, contrasting models for classic cadherin homophilic interaction involve varying numbers of specific repeats found (...) in the extracellular domain, the structure of the domain itself clearly remains the main determinant of cell stability and binding specificity. Through intracellular interactions, cadherin enhances its adhesive properties binding the cytoskeleton via cytoplasmic associated factors α‐ catenin, β‐catenin and p120ctn. Recent structural studies on classic cadherins and these catenin molecules have provided new insight into the essential mechanisms underlying cadherin‐mediated cell interaction and catenin‐mediated cellular signalling. Remarkable structural diversity has been observed in β‐catenin recognition of other cellular factors including APC, Tcf and ICAT, proteins that contribute to or compete with cadherin/catenin functioning. BioEssays 26:497–511, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In 1948, A.J. Ayer was attacked on the pages of The New Statesman and Nation magazine where it was claimed that his views were partly responsible for increasingly Fascist attitudes at Oxford. Ayer...

This paper discusses evaluations of distributive justice in two different situations. Focal point is the so-called equity axiom which lies at the heart of Rawls’ second principle of justice, the maximin rule. Our investigation which was run at a German university spans over a period of fifteen years. It seems to us that consideration for the worst-off (group) in society has become considerably weaker over the years. This and related observations are tested by using a probit model including several (...) demographic characteristics of the probands. The supposed time trend proves to be statistically robust. Several reasons for this observation are given. Obviously, depending on the underlying context, evaluations are to some degree influenced by current topics, including the ongoing discussion about the German educational system as well as about recent economic problems. We also briefly refer to findings that we obtained in the Baltics and in Israel. (shrink)

Thick concepts provide a focal point for several important issues in ethical theory. Separatists argue that the descriptive and evaluative elements of a thick concept can be separated out. Non-separatists deny this and claim that there are no descriptive boundaries delimiting a thick concept. A common strategy for both camps in the debate has been an appeal to armchair intuitions of various everyday thick concepts. My alternative strategy consists in a closer study of the professional practice of risk (...) analysis. As a well-developed practice, it provides substantial material for analysis. Moreover, its central concepts of risk and safety are typically seen as scientific concepts fitting the separatist analysis. Still, I argue that there are several evaluative aspects in risk and safety ascription that are hard to account for on a separatist analysis. I consider three separatist strategies, and conclude that they all fail. The result is a corroboration of the general non-separatist thesis put forward by theorists such as John McDowell and Bernard Williams. (shrink)

Paradigm Found brings together papers by renowned researchers from across Europe, Asia and America to discuss a selection of pressing issues in current archaeological theory and method. The book also reviews the effects and potential of various theoretical stances in the context of prehistoric archaeology. The 23 papers provide a discussion of the issues currently re-appearing in the focal point of theoretical debates in archaeology such as the role of the discipline in the present-day society, problems of interpretation in (...) archaeology, approaches to the study of social evolution, as well as current insights into issues in classification and construction of typologies. Taking a fresh, and often provocative, look at the challenges contemporary archaeology is facing, the contributors evaluate the effects of past developments and discuss the impact they are likely to have on future directions in archaeology as an internationally connected discipline. In its final part the volume reflects on current thinking on prehistory, using case-studies from a number of European regions and the Mediterranean, from the Neolithic to the Roman Period. The volume represents a tribute to the lifetime achievements of Professor Ev_en Neustupn_, a distinguished Czech archaeologist who contributed to the advancement of prehistoric studies in Europe and to archaeological theory and method in particular. (shrink)

In his work on internality, identification, and caring, Harry Frankfurt attempts to delineate the organization of agency peculiar to human beings, while avoiding the traditional overintellectualized emphasis on the human capacity to reason about action. The focal point of Frankfurt’s alternative picture is our capacity to make our own motivation the object of reflection. Building upon the observation that marginal agents (such as young children and Alzheimer’s patients) are capable of caring, I show that neither caring nor internality need (...) to depend on the phenomena of reflectiveness. I develop alternative interlocking accounts of caring and internality that are independent of both reflectiveness and evaluation, but that can still do justice to the central role of carings in the organization of agency characteristic of human persons. (shrink)

Advances in molecular biological research in the latter half of the twentieth century have made the story of the gene vastly complicated: the more we learn about genes, the less sure we are of what a gene really is. Knowledge about the structure and functioning of genes abounds, but the gene has also become curiously intangible. This collection of essays renews the question: what are genes? Philosophers, historians and working scientists re-evaluate the question in this volume, treating the gene as (...) a focal point of interdisciplinary and international research. It will be of interest to professionals and students in the philosophy and history of science, genetics and molecular biology. (shrink)

Digital contact tracing, in combination with widespread testing, has been a focal point for many plans to “reopen” economies while containing the spread of Covid‐19. Most digital contact tracing projects in the United States and Europe have prioritized privacy protections in the form of local storage of data on smartphones and the deidentification of information. However, in the prioritization of privacy in this narrow form, there is not sufficient attention given to weighing ethical trade‐offs within the context of a (...) public health pandemic or to the need to evaluate safety and effectiveness of software‐based technology applied to public health. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the fact that care ethics has received increased attention, it has also faced much criticism. One of the focal points of critics is the normativity of care. Only when the objective normative basis of care is sufficiently clarified can care practices be evaluated and optimized from an ethical point of view. We emphasize that two levels of normativity can be identified: the context level and the foundational anthropology level. The personalist approach to care ethics is normatively stronger, (...) at least on one level, namely the foundational anthropology level. This personalist approach to care ethics indicates in which direction action must be taken so that human action may be considered ethically sound. (shrink)

Pronouns often convey information about a person’s social identity (e.g., gender). Consequently, pronouns have become a focal point in academic and public debates about whether pronouns should be changed to be more inclusive, such as for people whose identities do not fit current pronoun conventions (e.g., gender non-binary individuals). Here, we make an empirical contribution to these debates by investigating which social identities lay speakers think that pronouns should encode and why. Across four studies, participants were asked to evaluate (...) different types of real and hypothetical pronouns, including binary gender pronouns, race pronouns, and identity-neutral pronouns. We sampled participants from two languages with different pronoun systems: English (N = 1,120) and Turkish (N = 260). English pronouns commonly denote binary gender (e.g., he for men), whereas Turkish pronouns are identity-neutral (e.g., o for anyone). Participants’ reasoning about pronouns reflected both a familiarity preference (i.e., participants preferred the pronoun type used in their language) and—critically—participants’ social ideologies. In both language contexts, participants’ ideological beliefs that social groups are inherently distinct (essentialism) and should be hierarchal (social dominance orientation) predicted relatively greater endorsement of binary gender pronouns and race pronouns. A preregistered experimental study with an English-speaking sample showed that the relationship between ideology and pronoun endorsement is causal: Ideologies shape attitudes toward pronouns. Together, the present research contributes to linguistic and psychological theories concerning how people reason about language and informs policy-relevant questions about whether and how to implement language changes for social purposes. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: (...) in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges. (shrink)

This article investigates structural aspects of source domains in metaphorical mappings with regard to their manifestation in public discourse data. Specifically, it analyses the organization of source concepts into mininarratives or "scenarios" that dominate the discourse manifestations of source domains. The material consists of examples from a bilingual corpus of British and German public debates about the &European Union.& The data show that while the two national samples share some basic mappings between the source and target domains, they each are (...) characterised further by specific scenarios that provide focal points for conceptualizing the target topic. The scenarios can also be shown to carry evaluative and attitudinal biases that are related to particular political dispositions and preferences of the respective national discourse communities. In conclusion, it will be argued that the analysis of scenarios is a necessary complement to the study of source domains and of domain-mappings in metaphorical language use. (shrink)

This introductory chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section characterizes the general approach to epistemology around which the volume revolves—purposeful epistemology—and examines the general motivation for that approach. The guiding idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. The second section explores the approach by characterizing some important versions of it. Several themes and issues that we see running through the volume are here articulated (...) and highlighted. The third section provides a brief summary of each contribution to the collection. (shrink)

A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive. It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be unpacked, but examples can help to convey the basic idea. Thick concepts are often illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and brilliant. These concepts seem to be evaluative, unlike purely (...) descriptive concepts such as red and water. But they also seem different from general evaluative concepts. In particular, thick concepts are typically contrasted with thin concepts like good, wrong, permissible, and ought, which are general evaluative concepts that do not seem substantially descriptive. When Jane says that Max is good, she appears to be evaluating him without providing much description, if any. Thick concepts, on the other hand, are evaluative and substantially descriptive at the same time. For instance, when Max says that Jane is courageous, he seems to be doing two things: evaluating her positively and describing her as willing to face risk. Because of their descriptiveness, thick concepts are especially good candidates for evaluative concepts that pick out properties in the world. Thus they provide an avenue for thinking about ethical claims as being about the world in the same way as descriptive claims. -/- Thick concepts became a focal point in ethics during the second half of the twentieth century. At that time, discussions of thick concepts began to emerge in response to certain disagreements about thin concepts. For example, in twentieth-century ethics, consequentialists and deontologists hotly debated various accounts of good and right. It was also claimed by non-cognitivists and error-theorists that these thin concepts do not correspond to any properties in the world. Dissatisfaction with these viewpoints prompted many ethicists to consider the implications of thick concepts. The notion of a thick concept was thought to provide insight into meta-ethical questions such as whether there is a fact-value distinction, whether there are ethical truths, and, if there are such truths, whether these truths are objective. Some ethicists also theorized about the role that thick concepts can play in normative ethics, such as in virtue theory. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the interest in thick concepts had spread to other philosophical disciplines such as epistemology, aesthetics, metaphysics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of law. -/- Nevertheless, the emerging interest in thick concepts has sparked debates over many questions: How exactly are thick concepts evaluative? How do they combine evaluation and description? How are thick concepts related to thin concepts? And do thick concepts have the sort of significance commonly attributed to them? This article surveys various attempts at answering these questions. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a widespread tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which acts violate the rule. This tendency’s strength varied markedly across (k = 15) field sites, owing to cultural variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared to laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether, and consequently exhibited more pronounced textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for (...) the emergence of textualism: In a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (Ntotal = 5495) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an easily identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers and judges. (shrink)

With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term 'truth' to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long-standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of propositional truth rather (...) than truth itself, what does it mean to say - as Heidegger does - that disclosedness is the "primordial phenomenon of truth" and what justifies that claim? The central aim of this paper is to show that Tugendhat's critique remains unanswered. Recent Heidegger scholarship, though it confronts Tugendhat, has not produced a viable answer to his criticism, in part because it overlooks his basic question and therefore misconstrues the thrust of his objections. Ultimately, the paper suggests that what is needed is a re-evaluation of Heidegger's analysis of truth in light of a more accurate understanding of Tugendhat's critique. The paper concludes by sketching the profile of a more satisfactory reply to Tugendhat's critical question, advocating a return to Heidegger's 'existential' analyses in Being and Time in order to locate the normative resources Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger's concept of truth. (shrink)

Focusing primarily on papers and books discussing the evolutionary and systematic interpretation of the Cambrian animal fossils from the Burgess Shale fauna, this paper explores the role of epistemic values in the context of a discipline striving to establish scientific authority within a larger domain of epistemic problems and issues . The focal point of this analysis is the repeated claims by paleontologists that the study of fossils gives their discipline a unique ‘historical dimension’ that makes it possible for (...) them to unravel important aspects of evolution invisible to scientists who study the extant biosphere. The first part of the paper explores the shifting of emphasis in the writings of paleontologists between two strategies that employ opposing views on the classical positivist and physicalist ideal of science. The second part analyzes paleontologists’ claims of privileged access to life’s historical dimension in a situation where a theoretical upheaval occurring independent of the epistemical problem at hand completely shifts the standards for evaluating the legitimacy of various knowledge claims. Though the various strategies employed in defending the privileged historical perspective of paleontology have been disparate and, to an extent contradictory, each impinges on the acceptance of a specific epistemic ideal or set of values and success or failure of each depends on the compatibility of this ideal with the surrounding community of scientists. (shrink)

The quest for real democracy is one of the components of sustainable degrowth. But the incipient debate on democracy and degrowth suffers from general definitions and limited connections to political philosophy and democracy theory. This article offers a critical review of democracy theory within the degrowth literature, taking as its focal point a relevant debate between Serge Latouche and Takis Fotopoulos. We argue that the core of their contention can be traced back to the relationship between the concepts of (...) democracy and autonomy as defined by philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, which both authors and generally the degrowth movement consider as one of their theoretical reference points. We show how both Latouche and Fotopoulos hold a misconception of Castoriadis' notions of autonomy, the social imaginary and politics, which in turn limits their cognisance of democracy and hence confuses their debate concerning the possibilities for a degrowth transition within the confines of a liberal parliamentary democracy. With a clarified theoretical understanding of the interconnected democracy-autonomy assemble, we proceed to an evaluation of the revolutionary potential of the degrowth movement and to a better understanding of a possible relationship between democracy and degrowth. (shrink)

Often ‘nationalism’ and ‘having a state proper to the nation’ are considered as inseparable. Relatedly, when these thoughts are applied to the reality of sub-state nations, such as Flanders, Catalonia Basque Country and Québec, sub-state nationalism (SSN) and separatism seem to be conceptually entangled in their aim for an independent state. This chapter considers sub-state nationalism and sub-state separatism as conceptually distinct, and aims at examining the relationship between sub-state separatist political parties and immigration policies. This requires, on the one (...) hand focusing on the integration policies, given that often immigration policies with regard to admission and removal lies beyond the competence of sub-state nations. On the other hand, it focuses on the two major Flemish pro-independence parties, namely the Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), and Vlaams Belang (VB). While sub-state separatist movements appear to be particularly opposed to increasing immigration, they operate under a particular ‘legitimacy dilemma’ with its paradoxical tendencies to both exclude and include immigrants. The chapter will show contextually that even the relatively more inclusive political party positions, such as the ones taken by the N-VA, are not sufficiently inclusive, when the normative distinction between ‘cultural assimilation’ and ‘cultural integration’ is taken seriously. Theoretically, it will engage with a renowned articulation of the legitimacy dilemma offered by Will Kymlicka, to argue that it is not sufficient to account for the normative necessity to respect the ‘autonomy of immigrants’. As I will demonstrate, this has to do with the inability of the dilemma to distinguish sufficiently ‘cultural assimilation’ from ‘cultural integration’. In other words, on the one hand the chapter contributes to the apparent absence of strong defenses for ‘moral autonomy of immigrants, by describing what such an autonomy might imply for designing of integration policies. On the other hand, it critically assesses Flemish pro-independence parties’ concrete policies with respect to integration. By offering a contextual political theory on these issues, it offers an example of how a moral principle might be implemented, and serve as a critical focal point to evaluate public policies. (shrink)

Recent work on evaluative discourse and judgements of personal taste in particular has focused on active interpersonal disagreements. I explore the communicative import of judgements of taste: why we issue them, why we sometimes get involved in disputes about taste, and what acceptance or rejection of such judgements consists of. The view developed here – that the core use of such judgements lies in seeking to align our attitudes in view of a shared project – makes it plausible that (...) the use of a sentence of the form ‘a is F’ (where F is a predicate of taste) semantically expresses the simple, semantically articulated proposition that a is F, is subject to an unrelativized truth predicate and not enriched by personal standards or perspectives. Our model shows that personal standards or perspectives are, contrary to a widely shared assumption in the debate, not the entities or objects that require coordination. What is shared among interlocutors are projects that require the coordination of the participant’s strategic choices. The semantically articulated proposition functions as a focal point, proposed by the speaker, for coordinating their choices. (shrink)