There has been widespread emphasis on the importance of trust amongst parties to the employment relationship, associated with a call for increased "integrative bargaining". Trust is bound up with ethical action, but there has been some debate about the ethics of deception in bargaining. Because it is possible for cooperative bargainers to be exploited, some writers contend that deceptive behavior is ethical and established practice. There are several problems about that view. It is questionable how clear and uniform (...) such a practice has been. An appearance of deceptive bluffing can often be explained as exchange of genuine concessions. Recent trends have seen increased devolution of bargaining from professionals to non-professionals, which dilutes any shared understandings there have been in the past, while practices that do exist may not be freely or voluntarily accepted and the existence of such practices is not enough to compensate for inequalities of power and skill. It is questionable to what extent bluffing and deception are necessary for self-defense. There other techniques available by which parties can guard themselves against exploitation. (shrink)

From a clinical ethics perspective, I explore several traditional arguments that deem deception as morally unacceptable. For example, it is often argued that deception robs people of their autonomy. Deception also unfairly manipulates others and is a breach of important trust-relations. In these kinds of cases, I argue that the same reasons commonly used against deception can provide strong reasons why deception can be extremely beneficial for patients who lack mental capacity. For example, (...) class='Hi'>deception can enhance, rather than impair, autonomy in certain cases. I argue that deception ought to only be used after considering several key morally relevant factors and provide a practical and morally justifiable framework for exploring these issues. (shrink)

Deception is common in dementia care, although its moral legitimacy is questionable. This paper conceptually clarifies when does dementia care involve deception and argues that care ethics is an appropriate ethical framework to guide dementia care compared with the mainstream ethical theories that emphasize abilities. From a perspective of care ethics, this paper claims that morally defensible deception is context-specific, embodied as a caring process that needs to be identified through instant, creative and interactive care (...) procedures. According to this argument, it further analyses and concludes the moral rationality of deception in five common cases. While deception is morally justified in many situations, another concern is that it is usually not the last resort but a means of convenience. As the ability to interact, autonomy and dignity of persons with dementia (PWDs) are generally ignored; nurses need more training and education to master the essential procedures to ensure that the value of authenticity and autonomy is maintained and considered throughout dementia care. (shrink)

Beneficence and integrity comprise two of the five principles of the American Psychological Association (American Psychological Association [APA], 2017) code of ethics. The connection between ethic...

In “Deception and the Clinical Ethicist,” Christopher Meyers argues that clinical ethicists sometimes ought to actively help deceive patients or their families, all...

Despite significant ethical advances in recent years, including professional developments in ethical review and codification, research deception continues to be a pervasive practice and contentious focus of debate in the behavioral sciences. Given the disciplines' generally stated ethical standards regarding the use of deceptive procedures, researchers have little practical guidance as to their ethical acceptability in specific research contexts. We use social contract theory to identify the conditions under which deception may or may not be morally permissible and (...) formulate practical recommendations to guide researchers on the ethical employment of deception in behavioral science research. (shrink)

This paper examines several issues regarding deception in advertising. Some generally accepted definitions are considered and found to be inadequate. An alternative definition is proposed for legal/regulatory purposes and is related to a suggested definition of the term deception as it is used in everyday language. Based upon these definitions, suggestions are offered for detecting and regulating deception in advertising. This paper additionally considers the grounds for the generally held but largely unquestioned assumption that deceptive advertising is (...) unethical. It is argued that deceptive advertising can be shown to be morally objectionable, on the weak assumption that it is prima facie wrong to harm others. Finally, the implications of this analysis with respect to current regulation of deceptive advertising by the FTC are considered. (shrink)

This informative and entertaining study addresses ethical considerations for deceptive works and proposes cataloging solutions that are provocative and designed to spark debate. An extensive annotated bibliography describes books that are not what they seem.

Albert Speer's life offers a paradigm of self-deception, and his autobiography serves to illustrate Fingarette's account of self-deception as a persistent failure to spell out our engagements in the world. Using both Speer and Fingarette, we show how self-deception becomes our lot as the stories we adopt to shape our lives cover up what is destructive in our activity. Had Speer not settled for the neutral label of "architect," he might have found a story substantive enough to (...) allow him to recognize the implications of his engagements with Hitler's Reich. This side of Auschwitz we require a story which allows us to appropriate our own capacities for evil and yet empowers us to go on. (shrink)

This commentary draws on the thoughtful contemplation and innovative procedures described in the special section articles as well as current professional codes and federal regulations to highlight ethical practices and paradoxes of deception research involving children. The discussion is organized around 4 key decision points for the conduct of responsible deception research involving children: (a) evaluating the scientific validity and social value of deception research within the context of alternative methodologies, (b) avoiding and minimizing experimental risk, (c) (...) the use of child assent procedures as questionable ethical safeguards, and (d) debriefing as both remedy and risk. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Does the fact that deception is widely practised – even though there is a general prohibition against deception – provide insight into the ethics of deceptive methods in research, especially for social‐behavioral research? I answer in the affirmative. The ubiquity of deception argument, as I will call it, points to the need for a concrete and nuanced understanding of the variety of deceptive practices, and thus promises an alternative route of analysis for why some (...) class='Hi'>deception may be permissible in social‐behavioral research. As an alternative argument it also promises to break the stalemate that emerges in debates on the ethics of deceptive methods in social‐behavioral research. In the current paper I (1) motivate and articulate the ubiquity argument in order to clarify the significance of ubiquity and discharge some initial objections. Then, on the recommendations of the ubiquity argument, I (2) highlight the importance of interpersonal relationships for understanding the ethics of deception. Following this insight I (3) provide an analysis of several features of the researcher‐participant relationship relevant to the understanding of the ethics of deception in research. I then (4) conclude the argument with some recommendations for the ethical use of deceptive methods in social‐behavioral research. (shrink)

Market relationships built on trust and governed by commonly accepted ethical norms are generally viewed as economically positive and beneficial to both parties; however, such relationships are occasionally the situs of a variety of unexpected and ethically questionable behaviours. This study examines the narratives provided by participants who share their experience as an exchange partner in a market relationship or as a close observer of an exchange partner in a market relationship to identify the use of short-term deceptions and (...) class='Hi'>ethics defections in managing these relationships. The data demonstrate a number of instances in which one exchange partner is willing to deceive another. Situations identified include deceiving current customers, new customers, current suppliers, governmental bodies, and employees and managers for the purposes of: protecting an existing relationship, pursuing a new relationship, ensuring product or service quality, and exerting control over a relationship. This research develops a general analytic framework for the occurrence of deception and defection from ethical norms in market relationships from elements of the study participants' narrative reports. This framework can be used by future researchers to design studies that examine the specific antecedents of these behaviours. (shrink)

Market relationships built on trust and governed by commonly accepted ethical norms are generally viewed as economically positive and beneficial to both parties; however, such relationships are occasionally the situs of a variety of unexpected and ethically questionable behaviours. This study examines the narratives provided by participants who share their experience as an exchange partner in a market relationship or as a close observer of an exchange partner in a market relationship to identify the use of short‐term deceptions and (...) class='Hi'>ethics defections in managing these relationships. The data demonstrate a number of instances in which one exchange partner is willing to deceive another. Situations identified include deceiving current customers, new customers, current suppliers, governmental bodies, and employees and managers for the purposes of: protecting an existing relationship, pursuing a new relationship, ensuring product or service quality, and exerting control over a relationship. This research develops a general analytic framework for the occurrence of deception and defection from ethical norms in market relationships from elements of the study participants' narrative reports. This framework can be used by future researchers to design studies that examine the specific antecedents of these behaviours. (shrink)

In this entry, I seek to show the interdependence of questions about self-deception in philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. I taxonomize solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception, present possible psychological mechanisms behind it, and highlight how different approaches to the philosophy of mind and psychology will affect how we answer important ethical questions. Is self-deception conducive to happiness? How does self-deception affect responsibility? Is there something intrinsically wrong with self-deception? The entry, on the (...) one hand, is a tour of the literature; on the other, it is a case for more work that crosses traditional sub-disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

Locke’s critique of enthusiastic religion is an attempt to undermine a form of supernaturalist belief. In this paper, I argue for a novel interpretation of that critique. By opening up a middle path between the views of John Passmore and Michael Ayers, I show that Locke is accusing the enthusiast of being a self-deceived believer. First, I demonstrate the manner in which a theory of self-deception squares with Locke’s intellectualist epistemology. Second, I argue that Locke thinks he can show (...) that the enthusiasts’ most cherished beliefs are in fact contrary to manifest evidence. In “matters of ultimate concern” to us---i.e., our religious beliefs---the critique is thus meant tobuttress Locke’s commitment to a naturalistic ethics of belief. (shrink)

Product placement, the practice of placing brands into non‐advertising media, is a growing marketing phenomenon, which has received relatively little attention from business ethicists. Such attention is timely because the UK regulatory framework for television product placement is under review at the time of writing. In this paper, we seek to locate product placement in relation to traditional frameworks of marketing ethics. We suggest that this location is problematic because product placement is a form of marketing communication in which (...) the message, the sender and the precise intention behind a brand seen in a television (TV) show, movie or computer game are often implicit. We suggest that the possibilities for an ethically principled regulation of product placement rest on two key issues: (1) the extent to which programme makers, media owners and brand owners make their product placement strategies explicit to audiences, and (2) the degree of commercial sophistication, which regulators attribute to non‐expert entertainment audiences. (shrink)

Product placement, the practice of placing brands into non‐advertising media, is a growing marketing phenomenon, which has received relatively little attention from business ethicists. Such attention is timely because the UK regulatory framework for television product placement is under review at the time of writing. In this paper, we seek to locate product placement in relation to traditional frameworks of marketing ethics. We suggest that this location is problematic because product placement is a form of marketing communication in which (...) the message, the sender and the precise intention behind a brand seen in a television (TV) show, movie or computer game are often implicit. We suggest that the possibilities for an ethically principled regulation of product placement rest on two key issues: (1) the extent to which programme makers, media owners and brand owners make their product placement strategies explicit to audiences, and (2) the degree of commercial sophistication, which regulators attribute to non‐expert entertainment audiences. (shrink)

This article examines when deceptive withholding of information is ethically acceptable in research. The first half analyses the concept of deception. We argue that there are two types of accounts of deception: normative and non-normative, and argue that non-normative accounts are preferable. The second half of the article argues that the relevant ethical question which ethics committees should focus on is not whether the person from whom the information is withheld will be deceived, but rather on the (...) reasonableness of withholding the information from the person who is deceived. We further argue that the reasonableness of withholding information is dependent on the context. The last section examines how the context of research should shape our judgements about the circumstances in which withholding information from research participants is ethically acceptable. We argue that some important features of research make it more difficult to justify withholding information in the context of research than elsewhere. (shrink)

If a robot sends a deceptive signal to a human user, is this always and everywhere an unethical act, or might it sometimes be ethically desirable? Building upon previous work in robot ethics, this article tries to clarify and refine our understanding of the ethics of robotic deception. It does so by making three arguments. First, it argues that we need to distinguish between three main forms of robotic deception (external state deception; superficial state (...) class='Hi'>deception; and hidden state deception) in order to think clearly about its ethics. Second, it argues that the second type of deception – superficial state deception – is not best thought of as a form of deception, even though it is frequently criticised as such. And third, it argues that the third type of deception is best understood as a form of betrayal because doing so captures the unique ethical harm to which it gives rise, and justifies special ethical protections against its use. (shrink)

The use of deception in research is generally permitted so long as participants are debriefed at the conclusion of their participation. Several authoritative research ethics guidelines allow investigators to omit debriefing under certain circumstances, however. Here we examine various justifications for forgoing debriefing in deceptive research, including concerns about subject pool contamination, the risk that revealing the deception will be harmful or distressing to participants, and issues of practicability. We conclude that, contrary to current practice, omitting debriefing (...) is ethically acceptable only when debriefing is impracticable, the deception is innocuous, and no reasonable person would object to involvement in the research. (shrink)

Habilitation thesis, book proposal in preparation.

The ethics of describing and indexing works which have an element of deception is an important topic within the arena of knowledge organization (KO). However, what happens if the unreal element is for artistic purposes and is part of the experience of the document? The focus of this article is on the KO of art documentation. It considers art documents where unreality and mistruth are part of a document’s creative and artistic purpose. Three examples of exhibition documentation for (...) contemporary art are explored. These illuminate the KO implications of unreal elements in artworks, exhibitions and documents, and the interplay between them. Three models are then presented relating to the KO of unreality. Model one shows how the wishes of the creator are a significant part of ethical KO for art and the ethical KO decisions which result from the performative and experiential aspects of art documentation. Model two illustrates how the placement of the unreality in relation to metadata creation can have a critical impact on ethical decisions in KO. Model three posits unreal-ness as a novel type of information about metadata creation, introducing categories such as motive for the deception. It shows how this original way of contemplating applied ethics in KO is vital for all ethically challenging works. Ultimately, considering the KO ethics of art documentation extends our thinking about how to deal with deception and unreality and adds an important aesthetic-ethical dimension to the corpus of work on KO ethics. (shrink)

Does undercover police work inevitably wrong its targets? Or are undercover activities justified by a general security benefit? In this article I argue that people can make themselves liable to deception and manipulation. The debate on undercover policing will proceed more fruitfully if the tactic can be conceptualised along those lines, rather than as essentially ‘dirty hands’ activity, in which people are wronged in pursuit of a necessary good, or in instrumentalist terms, according to which the harms of undercover (...) work are straightforwardly overcome by its benefits. This article motivates the ‘liability view’ and describes its attractions, challenges, and implications. (shrink)

On taking the common distinction between the legal and the ethical as a point of departure, and in an effort to understand Marshall's approach to self-interest, and thereby to his conception of an ethics of commerce, I read three of his essays in the light of some non-technical writings of Frank Hahn and three other Cambridge intellectuals. My larger project connects self-interest and self-deception to a possible ethics of theorizing in economics, and thereby to the ethics (...) of the relationship between the theorist and the theorized, the analyst and the analyzed. (shrink)

The use of placebos in therapy or research poses ethical questions. What are the benefits and the costs in ethical terms of condoning deception of the patient or subject? What does the deception mean for the patient's or subject's right to give informed consent to his treatment? Doctors are rightly expected to disclose to their patient facts which would in their judgement best enable him to give informed consent to treatment. On occasion, the degree of this disclosure may (...) be limited by the need to avoid hazarding the success of treatment of an unstable patient whose condition threatens his life, but doctors should have no right to withhold information just to prevent a patient refusing consent to therapy. No such limitation should apply in experiments where full disclosure must operate to enable the subject to give his informed consent. The potential medical benefits for the patient of placebo therapy have to be weighed against all the ethical costs of the deception and dishonesty involved, including the longer term repercussions on doctor/patient trust: similar ethical costs may arise in experiments involving the use of placebos without disclosure of this as a possibility to the subject. Deception is ethically degrading to both parties not only being a breach of trust, but denying the moral autonomy of the patient or subject to make his own choice. The writer concludes that placebos should be used only with full disclosure and consent whether in therapy or in research, and that this need not impede the success of either. (shrink)

While the ethical use of deception has been discussed in literature, the ethics and acceptability of nursing deception has yet to be studied. The current study examined nurses’ and nursing students’ ratings of the ethics and acceptability of nursing deception. We predicted that nurses and nursing students would rate a truthful vignette as more ethical than a deceptive vignette. We also predicted that participants would rate nursing deception as unethical and unacceptable. A mixed design (...) was used to examine ethics scores as a within-subjects factor and order as a between-groups design factor. A total of 131 nurses and nursing students were recruited from university nursing programs and hospitals in Texas. Participants were provided with a truthful vignette and deceptive vignette and used the Multidimensional Ethics Scale-Revised 1 to rate each vignette. Participants also completed the Lies in Nursing Ethics Questionnaire. The truthful nursing vignette was rated as more ethical than the deceptive vignette. Results indicated that most participants rated nursing deception as unethical, unacceptable, and a violation of the ANA ethical code. Some participants deemed that nursing deception may be acceptable within some cases. Age and years of experience were not related to the perceived ethics and acceptability of nursing deception. Nurses and nursing students believe that using deception with patients is unethical and unacceptable. However, some participants believed that deception may be warranted within some cases. These findings may reflect nurses’ placing the patient at the core of their values and viewing honesty as important for the nurse-patient relationship. Further implications and directions are discussed. (shrink)

Deception has recently received a significant amount of attention. One of main reasons is that it lies at the intersection of various areas of research, such as the evolution of cooperation, animal communication, ethics or epistemology. This essay focuses on the biological approach to deception and argues that standard definitions put forward by most biologists and philosophers are inadequate. We provide a functional account of deception which solves the problems of extant accounts in virtue of two (...) characteristics: deceptive states have the function of causing a misinformative states and they do not necessarily provide direct benefits to the deceivers and losses to the targets. (shrink)

This article explains and assesses a particular method of loving others that is espoused by Søren Kierkegaard. In his later works, Kierkegaard advocates a kind of deceptive love whereby one mystifies or deceives another person for that other person's own good. The theological underpinning of this mode of love is found in the imitation of Christ. In other words, just as Jesus adopted an incognito, so also Christians should, at times, appear different or lowlier in order to help others by (...) meeting them where they are. After explaining this form of love, I argue that there are considerable reasons not to follow Kierkegaard in his support of outright deception within personal relationships. I conclude with some brief reflections on whether the deceptive structure of Kierkegaard's own authorship is thereby condemned or whether it can be exonerated. (shrink)

The core of Australia’s response to asylum seekers who arrive in an unauthorised manner has been to detain them in immigration detention centres until they are judged to engage Australia’s protection obligations or, if they do not, until they are returned to their country of origin. For a number of asylum seekers this has resulted in very prolonged detention. This policy has aroused a storm of controversy with very polarised positions being taken by participants in the debate. In particular, the (...) claim has frequently been made (including by this author) that the circumstances and duration of immigration detention cause substantial harm to the mental health of a significant number of detained asylum seekers. A rational debate on the effects of detention has been hampered by the fact that the Australian government has not allowed researchers access to the detention centres in spite of persistent requests for access by professional bodies. This paper is written in response to the following questions posed by the Journal: Is there a case to be made for individuals agreeing to participate in research studies and for the wider population of current and future detainees to be involved in research without informing either the detention provider or the host nation? Is it legitimate for a researcher to engage in potentially deceptive actions in order to obtain access to such detention facilities to undertake research? What ethical framework should underpin such research? Although there is very little guidance in the literature on the ethical conduct of research in settings such as immigration detention centres, a consideration of the ethical implications of carrying out research in the manner raised by these questions leads this author to conclude that such research cannot be ethically justified. Governments must be persuaded to allow, and to provide substantial support for, ethically conducted research on all aspects of detention. There is also a need for the development of an explicit ethical framework for the conduct of research in settings characterised by a very problematic human rights context. (shrink)

The ability of leaders to be perceived as trustworthy and to develop authentic and effective relationships is largely a function of their personal identities and their self-awareness in understanding and making accommodations for their weaknesses. The research about self-deception confirms that we often practice denial regarding our identities without being fully aware of the ethical duties that we owe to ourselves and to others. This article offers insights about the nature of identity and selfawareness, specifically examining how self-deception (...) can create barriers to self-awareness within both a personal and a business context. (shrink)

Deception is common in the marketplace where individuals pursue self-interests from their perspectives. Extant research suggests that perspective-taking, a cognitive process of putting oneself in other’s situation, increases consumers’ ethical tolerance for marketers’ deceptive behaviors. By contrast, the current research demonstrates that consumers who take the dishonest marketers’ perspective become less tolerant of deception when consumers’ moral self-awareness is high. This effect is driven by moral self-other differentiation as consumers contemplate deception from the marketers’ perspective: high awareness (...) of the “moral self” motivates consumers to distance themselves from the “immoral other.” The findings shed new light on how self-morality can vicariously shape social consideration in ethical judgments. (shrink)

The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived (...) in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self-deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors. (shrink)

The use of deception in medical care is highly suspect in this country. Yet there is one condition for which deception is often used as a diagnostic tool. Nonepileptic seizures, a psychiatric condition in which emotional or psychological conflicts manifest themselves unconsciously through bodily symptoms, are currently diagnosed by a procedure called “provocative saline infusion.” The test is fundamentally deceptive, requiring the physician to intentionally and directly lie to the patient, causing the patient to believe that the administered (...) solution caused his seizures. Without such deception, the test might be useless. (shrink)