Results for 'epistemic absolutism'

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  1.  61
    Against Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3945-3967.
    Epistemic absolutism is an orthodox view that propositional knowledge is an ungradable concept. Absolutism is primarily grounded in our ungradable uses of “knows” in ordinary language. This paper advances a thorough objection to the linguistic argument for absolutism. My objection consists of two parts. Firstly, arguments for absolutism provided by Jason Stanley and Julien Dutant will be refuted respectively. After that, two more general refutation-strategies will be proposed: counterevidence against absolutism can be found in (...)
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  2.  32
    Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):1-22.
    Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘threshold concept’ or a ‘spectrum concept’. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge (...)
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  3. Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.
    This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlight—by taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case study—a surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. What we find is that the metaepistemological commitments at play on both sides of this dogmatism/conservativism debate (...)
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  4. Epistemic Relativism. A Constructive Critique.Markus Seidel - 2014 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Are our beliefs justified only relatively to a specific culture or society? Is it possible to give reasons for the superiority of our scientific, epistemic methods? Markus Seidel sets out to answer these questions in his critique of epistemic relativism. Focusing on the work of the most prominent, explicitly relativist position in the sociology of scientific knowledge – so-called 'Edinburgh relativism' or the 'Strong Programme' –, he scrutinizes the key arguments for epistemic relativism from a philosophical perspective: (...)
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  5. Why the Epistemic Relativist Cannot Use the Sceptic’s Strategy. A Comment on Sankey.Markus Seidel - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):134-139.
    In two recent papers in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Howard Sankey has argued that there is an intimate relationship between Pyrrhonian skepticism and recent approaches to epistemic relativism.Though the general argument and idea of Sankey’s papers is very much appreciated, it is argued that the epistemic relativist’s recourse to the skeptical strategy outlined by the Pyrrhonian is not a good one. This diagnosis gives rise to an objection against the epistemic relativist who argues on (...)
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  6.  62
    Between Relativism and Absolutism? – The Failure of Kuhn’s Moderate Relativism.Markus Seidel - 2013 - Was Dürfen Wir Glauben? Was Sollen Wir Tun? Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
    In this paper I argue that a moderate form of epistemic relativism that is inspired by the work of Thomas Kuhn fails. First of all, it is shown that there is evidence to the effect that Kuhn already in his 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' proposes moderate relativism. Second, it is argued that moderate relativism is confronted with a severe dilemma that follows from Kuhn’s own argument for his relativistic conclusion. By focusing on the work of moderate relativists like (...)
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  7.  12
    Relativism Versus Absolutism.David Bloor - 2016 - Common Knowledge 22 (3):488-499.
    This essay is a follow-up to a previous article by the author, “Epistemic Grace: Antirelativism as Theology in Disguise,” published in Common Knowledge 13, nos. 2–3 : 250–80. Its central claim was that relativism and absolutism should be understood as categories that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; the two categories form a dichotomy, and thus the rejection of absolutism is a necessary and sufficient condition for the embrace of relativism and vice versa. Daniel Paksi, in a (...)
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  8. How the Epistemic Relativist May Use the Sceptic’s Strategy: A Reply to Markus Seidel.Howard Sankey - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):140-144.
    This paper is a response to an objection that Markus Seidel has made to my analysis of epistemic relativism. Seidel argues that the epistemic relativist is unable to base a relativist account of justification on the sceptical problem of the criterion in the way that I have suggested in earlier work. In response to Seidel, I distinguish between weak and strong justification, and argue that all the relativist needs is weak justification. In addition, I explain my reasons for (...)
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  9.  4
    Relativism or Absolutism?Daniel Paksi - 2016 - Common Knowledge 22 (3):473-487.
    This essay responds to an article, “Epistemic Grace: Antirelativism as Theology in Disguise,” by the philosopher and sociologist of knowledge David Bloor that was published in Common Knowledge 13, nos. 2–3 : 250–80. Bloor's main argument was that there is no third way between relativism and absolutism—that all philosophical positions must fall under one or the other heading. Daniel Paksi's response is that Bloor covertly subscribes to a trichotomy of umbrella headings: idealist relativism, materialist relativism, and absolutism. (...)
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  10. The Case Against Epistemic Relativism: Replies to Rosen and Neta.Paul A. Boghossian - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):49-65.
    Unlike the relativistic theses drawn from physics, normative relativisms involve relativization not to frames of reference but to something like our standards, standards that we have to be able to think of ourselves as endorsing or accepting. Th us, moral facts are to be relativized to moral standards and epistemic facts to epistemic standards. But a moral standard in this sense would appear to be just a general moral proposition and an epistemic standard just a general (...) proposition. Pulling off either relativism, then, requires not just relativizing the facts in the domain in question to the relevant standards; it requires taking a non-absolutist view of the standards themselves. Otherwise a commitment to absolute truths in the domain in question will show up in one’s attitude towards the standards themselves. But it is very hard to see how to take a genuinely non-absolutist attitude towards the standards themselves. That, in essence, is the difficulty for a relativistic view of a normative domain that I tried to develop in Chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge. In their commentaries, Gideon Rosen and Ram Neta come up with ingenious ways of attempting to circumvent that difficulty. In my reply, I try to explain why I don’t believe they succeed. (shrink)
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  11.  65
    Against a Mahāyāna Absolute: Why Absolutism Need Not Be a Conclusion of Mahāyāna Philosophy.Gary Donnelly - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Liverpool
    This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman. Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva). The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through (...)
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  12. Scylla and Charybdis of the Epistemic Relativist: Why the Epistemic Relativist Still Cannot Use the Sceptic’s Strategy.Markus Seidel - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):145-149.
    In a reply to Howard Sankey I have maintained that the epistemic relativist cannot use the strategy of the sceptic since the relativist is at pains not to draw the sceptical solution. Sankey has objected to my argument by distinguishing between weak and strong justification: according to Sankey, the relativist using the sceptic’s strategy aims to provide an argument against the latter form of justification but still maintains that we can have the former.In this counter-response I argue that if (...)
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  13.  8
    What's Wrong with Self‐Serving Epistemic Strategies?Richard Double - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):343-350.
    Abstract This paper contrasts two views on the ethics of belief, the absolutist position that adopting self?serving epistemic strategies is always morally wrong, and the holist position that non?epistemic factors may legitimately be consulted whenever we adopt epistemic strategies. In the first section, the absolutist view is shown to be untenable because of the holistic nature of moral questions in general. In the second section, the nagging appeal of the absolutist position is explored. An account of our (...)
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  14. Science, Epistemological Relativism and Truth: Some Comments on Roy Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism.C. Allan - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):37-49.
    This paper sets out to assess the internal coherence of Roy Bhaskar's transcendental realist account of science. Whilst fully supporting his transcendental derivation of a stratified ontology of structures and generative mechanisms from the scientific practice of experimentation, I argue that Bhaskar's adoption of the stance of epistemic relativism results in his inability to defend the generalizability of this ontology. My argument against his epistemic stance turns on the fact that it rests on a false dichotomy between (...) relativism and epistemic absolutism, and, moreover, that it is quite unnecessary for his efforts to avoid the excesses of epistemological foundationalism. The net result of this stance, in my view, is an inability to sustain the normative force of the concepts of truth and scientific explanation precisely at a time when postmodern authors are denying their privileged status. (shrink)
     
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  15.  32
    Concept of Gradable Knowledge.Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    An orthodox view in epistemology holds that propositional knowledge is an absolute ‘yes or no’ affair, viz, propositional knowledge is ungradable. Call this view epistemic absolutism. This thesis purports to challenge this absolutist orthodoxy and develop an underexplored position—epistemic gradualism, which was initially proposed by Stephen Hetherington. As opposed to epistemic absolutism, epistemic gradualism argues that propositional knowledge can come in degrees. This thesis will examine motivations for endorsing absolutism and then, drawing on (...)
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  16.  8
    Review of Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge. [REVIEW]Erik J. Olsson - unknown
    In this book, Stephen Hetherington attacks what he thinks are two "dogmas" of epistemology. One he calls "epistemic absolutism" which amounts to the claim that knowledge is absolute: you can be with or without it, but once you have it, it is not possible to have more or less. The other is "justificationalism" which is the view that some sort of justification is necessary for knowledge.
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  17.  12
    Relativism in the Philosophy of Science.Martin Kusch - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.
    'Relativism versus absolutism' is one of the fundamental oppositions that have dominated reflections about science for much of its history. Often these reflections have been inseparable from wider social-political concerns regarding the position of science in society. Where does this debate stand in the philosophy and sociology of science today? And how does the 'relativism question' relate to current concerns with 'post truth' politics? In Relativism in the Philosophy of Science, Martin Kusch examines some of the most influential relativist (...)
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  18.  76
    Assertoric Force Perspectivalism: Relativism Without Relative Truth.Lionel Shapiro - 2014 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1.
    According to relativist accounts of discourse about, e.g., epistemic possibility and matters of taste, the truth of propositions must be relativized to nonstandard parameters. This paper argues that the central thrust of such accounts should be understood independently of relative truth, in terms of a perspectival account of assertoric force. My point of departure is a stripped-down version of Brandom’s analysis of the normative structure of discursive practice. By generalizing that structure, I make room for an analogue of the (...)
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  19. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 2: The New Problem of Religious Luck.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    One main kind of etiological challenge to the well-foundedness of someone’s belief is the consideration that if you had a different education/upbringing, you would very likely accept different beliefs than you actually do. Although a person’s religious identity and attendant religious beliefs are usually the ones singled out as targets of such “contingency” or “epistemic location” arguments, it is clear that a person’s place and time has a conditioning effect in all domains of controversial views, and over all of (...)
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  20. Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
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  21. Problems of Religious Luck, Ch. 4: "We Are All of the Common Herd: Montaigne and the Psychology of Our 'Importunate Presumptions'".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    As we have seen in the transition form Part I to Part II of this book, the inductive riskiness of doxastic methods applied in testimonial uptake or prescribed as exemplary of religious faith, helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will now speak less about luck, but more about the manner in which highly risky cognitive strategies are correlated with psychological studies of bias studies and (...)
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  22. Translating the Idiom of Oppression: A Genealogical Deconstruction of FIlipinization and the 19th Century Construction of the Modern Philippine Nation.Michael Roland Hernandez - 2019 - Dissertation, Ateneo de Manila University
    This doctoral thesis examines the phenomenon of Filipinization, specifically understood as the ideological construction of a “Filipino identity” or ‘Filipino subject-consciousness” within the highly determinate context provided by the Filipino ilustrado nationalists such as José Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar and their fellow propagandists inasmuch as it leads to the nineteenth (19th) century construction of the modern Philippine nation. Utilizing Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive thinking, this study undertakes a genealogical critique engaged on the concrete historical examination of what is meant by (...)
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  23.  46
    Mistaken Morality? : An Essay on Moral Error Theory.Emma Beckman - 2018 - Dissertation, Umeå University
    This dissertation explores arguments and questions related to moral error theory – the idea that morality inevitably involves a fundamental and serious error such that moral judgments and statements never come out true. It is suggested that the truth of error theory remains a non-negligible possibility, and that we for this reason should take a version of moral fictionalism seriously. I begin by defining error theory as the claim that moral judgments are beliefs with moral propositions as content, moral utterances (...)
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  24. Three Kinds of Relativism.Paul Boghossian - 2011 - In Steven Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. Blackwell.
    The paper looks at three big ideas that have been associated with the term “relativism.” The first maintains that some property has a higher-degree than might have been thought. The second that the judgments in a particular domain of discourse are capable only of relative truth and not of absolute truth And the third, which I dub with the oxymoronic label “absolutist relativism,” seeks to locate relativism in our acceptance of certain sorts of spare absolutist principles. -/- The first idea (...)
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  25. Scientific Perspectives, Feminist Standpoints, and Non-Silly Relativism.Natalie Ashton - 2020 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.
    Defences of perspectival realism are motivated, in part, by an attempt to find a middle ground between the realist intuition that science seems to tell us a true story about the world, and the Kuhnian intuition that scientific knowledge is historically and culturally situated. The first intuition pulls us towards a traditional, absolutist scientific picture, and the second towards a relativist one. Thus, perspectival realism can be seen as an attempt to secure situated knowledge without entailing epistemic relativism. A (...)
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  26. Relativism 2: Semantic Content.Max Kölbel - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.
    In the pair of articles of which this is the second, I present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. These problems are related to the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their correctness should be thought (...)
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  27.  46
    Rationality and the Objectivity of Values.Michael Bradie - 1984 - The Monist 67 (3):467-482.
    One of the central themes of Hilary Putnam’s recent book, Reason, Truth and History, is the objectivity of values. The objectivity of values is a central component of the position Putnam calls “internal realism.” Internal realism is an attempt to delimit a point of view which is, on the one hand, objective, and, on the other, non-absolutistic. Internal realism is located precariously between an absolutist position which Putnam calls “metaphysical realism” and a sceptical relativism. The trick is to maintain the (...)
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  28.  47
    Relativism and Foundationalism: Some Distinctions and Strategies.Michael Krausz - 1984 - The Monist 67 (3):395-404.
    Various issues are characteristically associated with discussions about relativism. The first concerns defining relativism—which is not an easy matter, since there seems to be no clear and well established usage to which one might appeal. Some stipulation is required, though this need not be arbitrary. One may proceed by distinguishing relativism from its putative contrast: absolutism, although defining this latter notion is as difficult as defining the former. Absolutism, however, at least, holds that the truth or the truth (...)
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  29.  32
    12 If There is No One Right Answer?Iris Tabak & Michael Weinstock - 2011 - In Jo Brownlee, Gregory J. Schraw & Donna Berthelsen (eds.), Personal Epistemology and Teacher Education. New York: Routledge. pp. 61--180.
    In a typical classroom interaction, the teacher asks questions, students answer, and the teacher—knowing the answer—evaluates the responses. This structure might cultivate a view of knowledge as objective, uncontested, and immutable. In response to criticisms of such models, teachers increasingly encourage students’ self-expression, communicating the validity of multiple solutions and perspectives. Stressing that there is "no one right answer,” might be important in countering absolutist and encouraging relativist understandings of knowledge. Cultivating more qualified and critical perspectives that seek to use (...)
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  30. A Critical Realist Perspective on Aesthetic Value.Ian Verstegen - 2006 - Journal of Critical Realism 5 (2):323-343.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 323 - 343 The following article attempts to bring critical realism to bear on the changing nature of aesthetic value. Beginning with the transitive-intransitive distinction, it is advised that we withhold judgment on the possibility of aesthetic judgment, lest we commit the epistemic fallacy. Without hoping to attain a form of aesthetic value absolutism, a strategy of ‘eliminative realism’ is introduced, which seeks to remove false causes of apparent judgmental relativism. Then (...)
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  31.  37
    Reply to Lynch, Miščević, and Stojanović.Mark Richard - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):197-208.
    This paper responds to discussions of my book When Truth Gives Out by Michael Lynch, Nenad Miščević, and Isidora Stojanović. Among the topics discussed are: whether relativism is incoherent (because it requires one to think that certain of one’s views are and are not epistemically superior to views one denies); whether and when sentences in which one slurs an individual or group are truth valued; whether relativism about matters of taste gives an account of “faultless disagreement” superior to certain “absolutist” (...)
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  32. Potrzeby poznawcze a relatywizm.Włodzimierz Zięba - 2003 - Filozofia Nauki 3.
    This paper considers Adam Grobler's fallibilism as an attractive alternative for both epistemological fundationalism and nihilism. Fallibilism claims that science is only a collection of temporary opinions, which entails rejecting of the idea of justification in aid of establishing critical preferences. In Grobler's thought that role is played by the conclusion to the best explanation (abductionism). Grobler's ideas dismantle the belief that relativity implies relativism. This paper deals with several Grobler's problems, such as theory-ladeness thesis (interpretation of observation), problems of (...)
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  33.  23
    Pragmatic Democracy: Inquiry, Objectivity, and Experience.David L. Hildebrand - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):589-604.
    This essay argues that to understand Dewey's vision of democracy as “epistemic” requires consideration of how experiential and communal aspects of inquiry together produce what is named here “pragmatic objectivity.” Such pragmatic objectivity provides an alternative to absolutism and self-interested relativism by appealing to certain norms of empirical experimentation. Pragmatic objectivity, it is then argued, can be justified by appeal to Dewey's conception of primary experience. This justification, however, is not without its own complications, which are highlighted with (...)
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  34. Kant's Newtonianism.Andrew Janiak - 2001 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    Kant's understanding of two significant philosophical issues, the status of space and the nature of scientific explanation, can be illuminated by considering his reaction to the emergence of Newtonian gravitational physics. Although Kant accepts---with important provisos---the view that space bears an absolute status, he rejects Newton's philosophical interpretation of that status. Characterizing this rejection poses a problem. It is commonly thought that Kant's conception of space can be understood as a competitor to Newtonian absolutism and Leibnizian relationalism per se, (...)
     
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  35. On the True and the Real.Michael P. Lynch - 1995 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    I argue for the consistency of the following views. First, there can be irreconcilable but equally true ways to categorize or "carve up" the world into objects; second, truth is an objective concept. In short, I claim that one can be a metaphysical pluralist, but an absolutist about truth. ;The first part of the work is taken up with explaining metaphysical pluralism. This is said to be the thesis that all propositions and all facts are relative to conceptual schemes. Thus, (...)
     
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  36. Epistemic Advantage on the Margin: A Network Standpoint Epistemology.Jingyi Wu - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-23.
    ​I use network models to simulate social learning situations in which the dominant group ignores or devalues testimony from the marginalized group. I find that the marginalized group ends up with several epistemic advantages due to testimonial ignoration and devaluation. The results provide one possible explanation for a key claim of standpoint epistemology, the inversion thesis, by casting it as a consequence of another key claim of the theory, the unidirectional failure of testimonial reciprocity. Moreover, the results complicate the (...)
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  37. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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  38. Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph (...)
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  39. Axiological Absolutism and Risk.Seth Lazar & Chad Lee-Stronach - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):97-113.
    Consider the following claim: given the choice between saving a life and preventing any number of people from temporarily experiencing a mild headache, you should always save the life. Many moral theorists accept this claim. In doing so, they commit themselves to some form of ‘moral absolutism’: the view that there are some moral considerations that cannot be outweighed by any number of lesser moral considerations. In contexts of certainty, it is clear what moral absolutism requires of you. (...)
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  40. Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.
    This paper provides a critical overview of recent work on epistemic blame. The paper identifies key features of the concept of epistemic blame and discusses two ways of motivating the importance of this concept. Four different approaches to the nature of epistemic blame are examined. Central issues surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic blame are identified and briefly explored. In addition to providing an overview of the state of the art of this growing but controversial (...)
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  41. Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.
    The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have developed a number of strategies for responding to the problem. A popular line of response involves distinguishing between a belief’s being epistemically justified and a subject’s being epistemically blameless for holding it. The apparently problematic intuitions the New Evil Demon Problem elicits, proponents of this response claim, track the fact that the deceived subject is epistemically blameless for believing as (...)
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  42. Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  43. Absolutism Vs Comparativism About Quantity.Shamik Dasgupta - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:105-150.
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  44. An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics.Carl Baker & Jon Robson - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):429-448.
    Some philosophers writing on the possibility of faultless disagreement have argued that the only way to account for the intuition that there could be disagreements which are faultless in every sense is to accept a relativistic semantics. In this article we demonstrate that this view is mistaken by constructing an absolutist semantics for a particular domain – aesthetic discourse – which allows for the possibility of genuinely faultless disagreements. We argue that this position is an improvement over previous absolutist responses (...)
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  45. The Epistemic Value of Photographs.Catharine Abell - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford University Press.
    There is a variety of epistemic roles to which photographs are better suited than non-photographic pictures. Photographs provide more compelling evidence of the existence of the scenes they depict than non-photographic pictures. They are also better sources of information about features of those scenes that are easily overlooked. This chapter examines several different attempts to explain the distinctive epistemic value of photographs, and argues that none is adequate. It then proposes an alternative explanation of their epistemic value. (...)
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  46. Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
    Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's paradox. I set out the puzzling phenomena, explain why a standard relational semantics for these operators cannot handle them, and recommend an alternative semantics. A pragmatics appropriate to the semantics is developed and interactions between the semantics, the pragmatics, and the definition of consequence are investigated. The semantics is then extended to probability operators. Some problems and prospects for probabilistic representations of content and context are (...)
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  47. Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.Roderick Firth - 1951 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (3):317-345.
    The moral philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century, at least in the English-speaking part of the world, has been largely devoted to problems of an ontological or epistemological nature. This concentration of effort by many acute analytical minds has not produced any general agreement with respect to the solution of these problems; it seems likely, on the contrary, that the wealth of proposed solutions, each making some claim to plausibility, has resulted in greater disagreement than ever before, (...)
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  48. Epistemic Norms as Social Norms.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 425-436.
    This chapter examines how epistemic norms could be social norms, with a reliance on work on the philosophy and social science of social norms from Bicchieri (on the one hand) and Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin and Southwood (on the other hand). We explain how the social ontology of social norms can help explain the rationality of epistemic cooperation, and how one might begin to model epistemic games.
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  49. Dynamic Absolutism and Qualitative Change.Bahadır Eker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):281-291.
    According to Fine’s famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic (...)
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  50. The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all. Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic justification.
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