This article discusses the relation between features of empirical data and structures in the world. I defend the following claims. Any empirical data set exhibits all possible patterns, each with a certain noise term. The magnitude and other properties of this noise term are irrelevant to the evidential status of a pattern: all patterns exhibited in empirical data constitute evidence of structures in the world. Furthermore, distinct patterns constitute evidence of distinct structures in the (...) world. It follows that the world must be regarded as containing all possible structures. The remainder of the article is devoted to elucidating the meaning and implications of the latter claim. (shrink)

James McAllister’s 2003 article, “Algorithmic randomness in empirical data” claims that empirical data sets are algorithmically random, and hence incompressible. We show that this claim is mistaken. We present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for compressibility, and discuss the matter in the framework of Minimum Message Length (MML) inference, which shows that the theory which best compresses the data is the one with highest posterior probability, and the best explanation of the data.

This paper is an extended response to Machery, Olivola and De Blanc (2009). I argue that the concerns I raised about Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (2004) in Marti (2009) still stand.

Ethicists differ considerably in their reasons for using empirical data. This paper presents a brief overview of four traditional approaches to the use of empirical data: “the prescriptive applied ethicists,” “the theorists,” “the critical applied ethicists,” and “the particularists.” The main aim of this paper is to introduce a fifth approach of more recent date (i.e. “integrated empirical ethics”) and to offer some methodological directives for research in integrated empirical ethics. All five approaches are (...) presented in a table for heuristic purposes. The table consists of eight columns: “view on distinction descriptive-prescriptive sciences,” “location of moral authority,” “central goal(s),” “types of normativity,” “use of empirical data,” “method,” “interaction empirical data and moral theory,” and “cooperation with descriptive sciences.” Ethicists can use the table in order to identify their own approach. Reflection on these issues prior to starting research in empirical ethics should lead to harmonization of the different scientific disciplines and effective planning of the final research design. Integrated empirical ethics (IEE) refers to studies in which ethicists and descriptive scientists cooperate together continuously and intensively. Both disciplines try to integrate moral theory and empirical data in order to reach a normative conclusion with respect to a specific social practice. IEE is not wholly prescriptive or wholly descriptive since IEE assumes an interdepence between facts and values and between the empirical and the normative. The paper ends with three suggestions for consideration on some of the future challenges of integrated empirical ethics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, (...) the empirical data consist of the moral experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

Simulation of brain dynamics requires the use of accurate empirical data. This commentary points out major errors in some of the empirical data used in Wright & Laley's simulation. The simulation is quantitatively very different from the real cortex, and may also have important qualitative differences.

According to a traditional view, scientific laws and theories constitute algorithmic compressions of empirical data sets collected from observations and measurements. This article defends the thesis that, to the contrary, empirical data sets are algorithmically incompressible. The reason is that individual data points are determined partly by perturbations, or causal factors that cannot be reduced to any pattern. If empirical data sets are incompressible, then they exhibit maximal algorithmic complexity, maximal entropy and zero (...) redundancy. They are therefore maximally efficient carriers of information about the world. Since, on algorithmic information theory, a string is algorithmically random just if it is incompressible, the thesis entails that empirical data sets consist of algorithmically random strings of digits. Rather than constituting compressions of empirical data, scientific laws and theories pick out patterns that data sets exhibit with a certain noise.Author Keywords: Algorithmic randomness; Compression; Empirical data; Information; Law; Pattern. (shrink)

In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the (...) empirical data consist of the moral experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions?In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate about the ethical acceptability of using placebo-controls in clinical research. Although this debate has been rich in rhetoric, considering that much of this research is predicated upon the assumption that data from this research is vital to clinical decision-making, it is ironic that researchers have introduced little data into these discussions. Using some published research concerning the use of placebo-controls in clinical research in hypertension and psychiatric drug trials, I suggest some ways that (...) such data might be incorporated into the ethical analysis concerning placebo use in clinical trials. This approach promises to be important for enhancing conceptual and scientific understanding as well as public policy decision-making. (shrink)

This article investigates epistemological aspects of scientists’ reuse of empirical data over decades and centuries. Giving examples, I discuss three respects in which empirical data are historical entities and the implications for the notion of data reuse. First, any data reuse necessitates metadata, which specify the data’s circumstances of origin. Second, interpretation of historical data often requires the tools of humanities disciplines, which produce a further historicization of data. Finally, some qualitative (...) social scientists hold that data are personal to the researcher who coconstructs them in the research process and are therefore skeptical about the prospects of reusing data. (shrink)

Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert (...) that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of four experiments, this question is addressed empirically. Contrary to previous findings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the norm of assertion is not factive either. The studies here presented provide empirical evidence in favour of the view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justified. (shrink)

According to contextualism, the extension of claims of personal taste is dependent on the context of utterance. According to truth relativism, their extension depends on the context of assessment. On this view, when the taste preferences of a speaker change, so does the truth value of a previously uttered taste claim, and the speaker might be required to retract it. Both views make strong empirical assumptions, which are here put to the test in three experiments with over 740 participants. (...) It turns out that the linguistic behaviour of ordinary English speakers is consistent with contextualist predictions and inconsistent with the predictions of the most widely discussed form of truth relativism advocated by John MacFarlane. (shrink)

According to contextualism, the extension of claims of personal taste is dependent on the context of utterance. According to truth relativism, their extension depends on the context of assessment. On this view, when the tastes of a speaker change, so does the truth value of a previously uttered taste claim, and if it is false, the speaker is required to retract it. Both views make strong empirical assumptions, which are here put to the test for the first time in (...) three experiments with over 740 participants. It turns out that the linguistic behaviour of ordinary English speakers is consistent with contextualist predictions and inconsistent with the predictions of the most widely discussed form of truth relativism advocated by John MacFarlane. (shrink)

This discussion note responds to objections by Twardy, Gardner, and Dowe to my earlier claim that empirical data sets are algorithmically incompressible. Twardy, Gardner, and Dowe hold that many empirical data sets are compressible by Minimum Message Length technique and offer this as evidence that these data sets are algorithmically compressible. I reply that the compression achieved by Minimum Message Length technique is different from algorithmic compression. I conclude that Twardy, Gardner, and Dowe fail to (...) establish that empirical data sets are algorithmically compressible.Keywords: Algorithmic compression; Algorithmic randomness; Empirical data; Huffman compression; Minimum Message Length technique. (shrink)

Contextualism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims (involving e.g. predicates of personal taste or epistemic modals) depends on the context of utterance. Relativism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context of assessment. Both views make concrete, empirically testable predictions about how such claims are used by ordinary English language speakers. This chapter surveys some of the recent empirical literature on the topic and presents four new experiments (total N=724). Consistent with (...) contextualism and inconsistent with relativism, the results suggest that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context of utterance, not the context of assessment. (shrink)

According to a traditional view, scientific laws and theories constitute algorithmic compressions of empirical data sets collected from observations and measurements. This article defends the thesis that, to the contrary, empirical data sets are algorithmically incompressible. The reason is that individual data points are determined partly by perturbations, or causal factors that cannot be reduced to any pattern. If empirical data sets are incompressible, then they exhibit maximal algorithmic complexity, maximal entropy and zero (...) redundancy. They are therefore maximally efficient carriers of information about the world. Since, on algorithmic information theory, a string is algorithmically random just if it is incompressible, the thesis entails that empirical data sets consist of algorithmically random strings of digits. Rather than constituting compressions of empirical data, scientific laws and theories pick out patterns that data sets exhibit with a certain noise. (shrink)

Recent experimental studies dispute the position that commonsense morality accepts ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, the view that, necessarily, if an agent ought to perform some action, then she can perform that action. This paper considers and supports explanations for the results of these studies on the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive and true.

In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This 'empirical turn' is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the (...) empirical data consist of the moral experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self-justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Re-examining Empirical Data on Conflicts of Interest Through the Lens of Personal NarrativesEmily E. Anderson and Elena M. KrausIntroductionThe personal stories submitted by physicians and researchers for this symposium add much–needed dimension to conversations on conflicts of interest in medicine and research. Narratives from individuals living with conflicts of interest can serve as a unique lens through which to consider psychological and economic theories and survey (...) class='Hi'>data on physician and patient views. In our reading of these personal narratives, we identified four primary themes that will serve as springboards for our commentary. We aim to triangulate clusters of meaning drawn from the narratives with relevant data from published empirical studies and identify gaps in knowledge where more research is needed. These themes are: the unique environments of medicine and research; weighing the potential benefits of conflicts of interest against the risks; conflict of interest management; and the roles and responsibilities of diverse stakeholder groups.The Unique Challenges of the Medical and Research EnvironmentsThe reflections of the narrative authors draw attention to many of the unique environmental aspects of medicine and medical research that make physicians and researchers especially vulnerable to conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest may be more ubiquitous in medicine than in any other industry (Kassirer, 2006). As the narratives demonstrate, conflicts of interest emerge across a range of health care delivery and research activities. Surveys have shown that 94 percent of physicians have some kind of relationship with industry (Campbell, Gruen, Mountford, et al., 2007). There is also evidence that physician interactions with medical industry begin early and are a regular part of a physician’s professional practice along the career continuum (Wazana, 2000).Medicine as a profession is distinct from banking or law. It is often said that medicine is an art; in treating patients, creative individualized solutions and gut instinct are as (if not more) important than the application of scientific knowledge. Uncertainty surrounds medical decision making. There is limited precision with respect to diagnoses and prognoses, limited data regarding the effectiveness of many treatments, and a range of patient values and preferences. Because of this uncertainty, rules about practice standards, especially with respect to avoidance and management of conflicts of interest, cannot be as explicit as they are in law or business. As demonstrated by the story presented by Sal Cruz–Flores, research and practice often intersect. And, there is no system in greater need of reform—and no system about which there are more divergent opinions as to what shape that reform should take—than the United States health care [End Page 91] system. The narratives of Tony Mikulec, Govind Nagaldinne, and David M. Zientek demonstrate how various aspects of the structure of healthcare service provision and third–party payer arrangements have the potential to harm patients. Conflicts of interest comprise more than relationships with pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers.The narratives of Laura Jean Bierut and David M. Zientek also discuss examples of conflicts of interest that arise from factors beyond relationships with industry or the direct potential for financial gain. This may be somewhat unique to the medical milieu. Non-financial conflicts such as a desire for the prestige bestowed upon scientists who make key discoveries, a requirement to publish for tenure and promotion, the need to maintain one’s license or other privileges, or simply the pressure of a competitive environment can influence physician and researcher behavior. As noted by Bierut, more research on how to identify and manage non-financial conflicts is needed.The Potential Benefits and Harms of Conflicts of InterestConflicts of interest are usually presented in a negative light, particularly those that involve physician relationships with the pharmaceutical industry. To “have a conflict of interest” is to be in a situation or role where there is potential for personal interests to be prioritized over professional responsibilities. However, in terms of public perception, it seems that conflicts of interest have become almost synonymous with wrongdoing. Perhaps this is due to the barrage of media reports during the last decade on significant harms caused by financial conflicts of interest in business, journalism, and sports as well as in medicine (Steinbrook, 2004). Amidst... (shrink)

In an attempt to determine the epistemic status of computer simulation results, philosophers of science have recently explored the similarities and differences between computer simulations and experiments. One question that arises is whether and, if so, when, simulation results constitute novel empirical data. It is often supposed that computer simulation results could never be empirical or novel because simulations never interact with their targets, and cannot go beyond their programming. This paper argues against this position by examining (...) whether, and under what conditions, the features of empiricality and novelty could be displayed by computer simulation data. I show that, to the extent that certain familiar measurement results have these features, so can some computer simulation results. (shrink)

This article defends the following claims. First, for patterns exhibited in empirical data, there is no criterion on which to demarcate patterns that are physically significant and patterns that are not physically significant. I call a pattern physically significant if it corresponds to a structure in the world. Second, all patterns must be regarded as physically significant. Third, distinct patterns must be regarded as providing evidence for distinct structures in the world. Fourth, in consequence, the world must be (...) conceived as showing all possible structures. (shrink)

Psychopathy is one of the most frequently cited disorders in discussions of moral and criminal responsibility. Many philosophers and psychologists have argued that psychopaths’ impaired capacity for empathy, diminished responses to fear-inducing stimuli, and failure to conform to social norms indicate that they are not responsible for their actions. In “Philosophers on psychopaths: A cautionary tale in interdisciplinarity,” Jarkko Jalava and Stephanie Griffiths cite psychological data from case studies, the moral/conventional distinction task, fear conditioning and facial affect recognition experiments (...) in arguing that philosophers systematically misinterpret or simplify the data to support their conclusions... (shrink)

The Prosecutor's Fallacy is a well-known hazard in the assessment of probabilistic evidence that can lead to faulty inferences. It is perhaps best known via its role in the assessment of DNA match evidence in courts of law. A prosecutor, call him Burger, presents DNA evidence in court that links a defendant, Crumb, to a crime. The conditional probability of a DNA match given that Crumb is not guilty, or p(M | ~G), is very low: according to Burger, one chance (...) in tens of millions. Burger goes on to argue that this very low probability entails another low probability. He asserts that it is very improbable that Crumb is not guilty given the match, and so p(~G | M) is also very low. As this latter probability is precisely what the jury is called upon to assess, Burger's assertion is likely to lead the jury into convicting Crumb. (shrink)

There are a number of ethical issues that may arise in the care of patients with epilepsy. One approach, when attempting to summarize such information, may be to first carry out a systematic review...

Bowman-Smart et al. (2023) suggest that the current ethical frameworks used to evaluate the use of noninvasive prenatal technologies (e.g., NIPT) are inconsistent when used to analyze the ethics of...

Several quantitative techniques for choosing among data models are available. Among these are techniques based on algorithmic information theory, minimum description length theory, and the Akaike information criterion. All these techniques are designed to identify a single model of a data set as being the closest to the truth. I argue, using examples, that many data sets in science show multiple patterns, providing evidence for multiple phenomena. For any such data set, there is more than one (...) data model that must be considered close to the truth. I conclude that, since the established techniques for choosing among data models are unequipped to handle these cases, they cannot be regarded as adequate. ‡I presented a previous version of this paper at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vancouver, November 2006. I am grateful to the audience for constructive discussion. I thank Leiden University students Marjolein Eysink Smeets and Lenneke Schrier for suggesting the cortisol example, and Remko van der Geest for comments on a draft. †To contact the author, please write to: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Leiden, P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss calls for access to empirical data within controversies about climate science, as revealed and highlighted by the publication of the e-mail correspondence involving scientists at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia in 2009. I identify several arguments advanced for and against the sharing of scientific data. My conclusions are that, whereas transparency in science is to be valued, appeals to an unproblematic category of ‘empirical data’ in (...) climate science do not reflect the complexities of scientific practice in this field. (shrink)

Appropriate information and consent has been one of the most intensely discussed topics within the context of biobank research. In parallel to the normative debate, many socio-empirical studies have been conducted to gather experiences, preferences and views of patients, healthy research participants and further stakeholders. However, there is scarcity of literature which connects the normative debate about justifications for different consent models with findings gained in empirical research. In this paper we discuss findings of a limited review of (...) socio-empirical research on patients’ and healthy research participants’ experiences and views regarding consent to biobank research in light of ethical principles for appropriate information and consent. (shrink)

Objective Some researchers claim that the quality of informed consent of clinical research participants in developing countries is worse than in developed countries. To evaluate this assumption, we reviewed the available data on the quality of consent in both settings. Methods We conducted a comprehensive PubMed search, examined bibliographies and literature reviews, and consulted with international experts on informed consent in order to identify studies published from 1966 to 2010 that used quantitative methods, surveyed participants or parents of paediatric (...) participants in actual trials, assessed comprehension and/or voluntariness, and did not involve testing particular consent interventions. Forty-seven studies met these criteria. We compared data about participant comprehension and voluntariness. The paucity of data and variation in study methodology limit comparison and preclude statistical aggregation of the data. Results and Discussion This review shows that the assertion that informed consent is worse in developing countries than in developed countries is a simplification of a complex picture. Despite the limitations of comparison, the data suggest that: (1) comprehension of study information varies among participants in both developed and developing countries, and comprehension of randomisation and placebo controlled designs is poorer than comprehension of other aspects of trials in both settings; and (2) participants in developing countries appear to be less likely than those in developed countries to say they can refuse participation in or withdraw from a trial, and are more likely to worry about the consequences of refusal or withdrawal. (shrink)

The Argument from Disagreement (AD) (Mackie, 1977) depends upon empirical evidence for ‘fundamental’ moral disagreement (FMD) (Doris and Stich, 2005; Doris and Plakias, 2008). Research on the Southern ‘culture of honour’ (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996) has been presented as evidence for FMD between Northerners and Southerners within the US. We raise some doubts about the usefulness of such data in settling AD. We offer an alternative based on recent work in moral psychology that targets the potential universality of (...) morally significant distinctions (e.g. means vs. side-effects, actions versus omissions). More specifically, we argue that a recent study showing that a rural Mayan population fails to perceive as morally significant the distinction between actions and omissions provides a plausible case of FMD between Mayans and Westerners. (shrink)

Susan Hurley has argued against a well known argument for freedom of speech, the argument from autonomy, on the basis of two hypotheses about violence in the media and aggressive behaviour. The first hypothesis says that exposure to media violence causes aggressive behaviour; the second, that humans have an innate tendency to copy behaviour in ways that bypass conscious deliberation. I argue, first, that Hurley is not successful in setting aside the argument from autonomy. Second, I show that the (...) class='Hi'>empirical data are irrelevant to statutory regulation of media violence. They do not yield a sufficiently strong correlation between exposure to media violence and non-autonomously copied criminal violence, and they do not yield a way ex ante to individuate the viewers who will be affected by media violence. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that a necessary condition on moral blameworthiness is that the wrongdoer can reasonably be expected to avoid the action for which she is blamed. Those who think so assume as a matter of course that the expectations at issue here are normative expectations that contrast with the non-normative or predictive expectations we form concerning the probable conduct of others, and they believe, or at least assume, that there is a clear-cut distinction between the two. In this paper (...) I put this widespread assumption under scrutiny and argue that it’s mistaken: although predictive and normative expectations are indeed distinct, there is no sharp separation between them. On the contrary, predictive expectations can have a substantial bearing on normative expectations in two related ways: they can recalibrate what is reasonable to expect of agents when responsibility attributions are at stake and they can help to uncover previously undetected excusing conditions. I illustrate my claims with the famous bystander effect from social psychology and show that it yields predictive expectations that affect normative expectations in these two ways. (shrink)

The author critiques one of the arguments commonly used by opponents of scientific realism—namely, the thesis that scientific theories are underdetermined by empirical data.

Objectives To investigate empirically the motivations for not consenting to DNA biobanking in a Swedish population-based study and to discuss the implications. Design Structured questionnaires and semistructured interviews. Setting A longitudinal epidemiological project (PART) ongoing since 1998 in Stockholm, Sweden. The DNA-collection wave took place during 2006–7. Participants 903 individuals completed the questionnaire (participation rate 36%) and 23 were interviewed. All individuals had participated in both non-genetic waves of the project, but refused to contribute saliva samples during the DNA-collection wave. (...) Main outcome measures Motivations behind refusing to consent to DNA biobanking, with subsequent focus on participants' explanations regarding this unwillingness. Results Public refusal to consent to DNA biobanking, as revealed by the questionnaire, was mainly explained by a lack of personal relevance of DNA contribution and feelings of discomfort related to the DNA being used for purposes other than the respective study. Interviews of individuals representing the second motivation, revealed a significant mistrust of DNA biobank studies. The underlying beliefs and attitudes were associated with concerns about integrity, privacy, suspiciousness and insecurity. However, most interviewees were supportive of genetic research per se and interpreted their mistrust in the light of distressing environmental influences. Conclusion The results suggest a need for guidelines on benefit sharing, as well as trustworthy and stable measures to maintain privacy, as a means for increasing personal relevance and trust among potential participants in genetic research. Measures taken from biobanks seem insufficient in maintaining and increasing trust, suggesting that broader societal measures should be taken. (shrink)

In qualitative interviews with a diverse group of experts, the vast majority believed unregulated researchers should seek out independent oversight. Reasons included the need for objectivity, protecting app users from research risks, and consistency in standards for the ethical conduct of research. Concerns included burdening minimal risk research and limitations in current systems of oversight. Literature and analysis supports the use of IRBs even when not required by regulations, and the need for evidence-based improvements in IRB processes.

The Polish researcher in the field of logic and philosophy, Jan Woleński, in one of his recent articles, "Metalogical Observations About the Underdetermination of Theories by Empirical Data," logically formalized two weak and strong versions of the underdetermination of theories by empirical data (or UT by abbreviation) and with these formalization has metalogically analyzed these two versions. Finally he has deducted that the weak version is defensible while the strong version is not. In this paper we (...) will critically study Woleński’s analysis of the strong version of UT. (shrink)