It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it is argued that causal (...) explanations do not license the sort of inferences to theoretical entities that would embarass the anti-realist. Section IV examines the epistemic commitments involved in accepting a causal explanation. Section V presents my conclusions: contra Cartwright, the anti-realist may incorporate a causal account of explanation into his vision of science in an entirely natural way. (shrink)

Intro to what "first person" and "third person" mean. (outline the probs of the first person) (convenience of third person vs absoluteness of first person) (explain terminology) Dominance of third person, reasons. (embarassment with first person) (division of reactions) (natural selection - those who can make the most noise) (analogy with behaviourism) Reductionism, hard line and soft line Appropriation of first person terms by reductionists.

I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the hole argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an (...) investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists. 1 Introduction2 The Hole Argument3 Limits of Spacetimes4 Pointless Constructions5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists6 Existence and Physicality: An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism, and the Structure of Our Knowledge of Physics. (shrink)

I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the hole argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an (...) investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists. 1 Introduction2 The Hole Argument3 Limits of Spacetimes4 Pointless Constructions5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists6 Existence and Physicality: An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism, and the Structure of Our Knowledge of Physics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SPLUTTERING UP THE BEACH TO NINEVEH... James Alison Rio de Janeiro I. Fleeing from the Word Jonah, ifyou remember, was a most unwilling prophet. The word of God came to him, telling him to go and preach against the great city ofNineveh, for its wickedness had come up before God. Jonah immediately went in the opposite direction. Rather than heading across the fertile crescent to Nineveh, he rushed down (...) to Jaffa and booked passage on a ship. Scripture tells us that he went on board, to go with them to Tarshish, away from the presence of the Lord (Jon 1,3) Not only was Tarshish quite the wrong way to go, it was a serious attempt to get away from the presence of the Living God. Why was Jonah so frightened? What was it about Nineveh that scared him? We get a clue later, when Jonah gets cross with Nineveh for repenting on cue. He hated Nineveh. He wanted it to be destroyed. He knew it to be wicked. Why go somewhere which should be destroyed and shout at its inhabitants to change their ways? They will probably give the messenger a rough time! Jonah did not appreciate that he was being sent to Nineveh for the good ofthe people there, yes, but also for his own good. At the end ofthe story he tells God that he hadn't wanted to go because he knew God was a loving God, and was too 'This talk originated as a presentation for the third annual conference ofthe Roman Catholic Caucus of the Gay and Lesbian Christian Movement held in London in March 1999. James Alison109 angry at the thought that the people ofNineveh would get off so lightly. But we're not told that at this stage. Jonah is the son of Amittai, which is to say son of "My Truth." So the whole story is set up from the beginning as one in which someone who is wedded to their own truth comes to learn God's truth the hard way. He knows what is wrong with the gentile world, but was at first able to hear only half of the word of God. He heard it as he was able to receive it: as a stern word of rebuke that he was to pass on to others. That was the state of his soul. Luckily, God had chosen someone who, invincible as he was in his righteousness, knew perfectly well that it is a terrible thing to fall into the presence ofthe living God, and suspected, at some level ofhis being that if, he, Jonah were to obey God, God would certainly break through the carapace ofordered adhesion to true religion, and come into contact with a much more turbulent, stormy world, the world of shame and fear and hatred that is the underside ofall ordered righteousness. Shame is a compulsion which heeds only one command: flee! And Jonah fled. Thank heaven for Jonah's flight! Think how much more damage is caused by those who are not vulnerable to their own shame, who really do manage to fool themselves that their righteousness and God's are cut from the same cloth. Something in Jonah's being was vulnerable to the suspicion that the word ofthe living God would wreak havoc with his own carefully covered hatred and fear, the suspicion that that hatred ofothers and fear of himselfwere aspects ofthe same as yet unredeemed dimension ofhis own life. In that vulnerability was his flight, and through it, ultimately, he was reached so as to be taught how to be a bearer ofGod's word. Andrew Sullivan has a line which catches this dynamic exactly: "Shame forces you prematurely to run away from yourself; pride forces you prematurely to expose yourself. Most gay lives, I'm afraid, are full of an embarassing abundance ofboth."2 Faced with the prospect ofshouting at an incomprehending Nineveh with the hollow pride of those who love neither themselves nor those whom they must convince, Jonah, who knew at the root ofhis heart that he had been giveln something to say, went, as many of us do, into exile. Shame forced him prematurely to... (shrink)

Although philosophers have considered some of the implications of the nature of quantum statistics of many-particle systems for the interpretation problem, e.g., Reichenbach, they have not produced a complete analysis of the relationship between aspects of quantum statistics and complications and/or possible solutions of the interpretation problem. While the present work by no means provides a complete account, it does explore some heretofore uncharted regions. One of the latter is an analysis of a situation that I call 'The Paradox of (...) Identical Particles ,' which arises in Bose-Einstein statistics. PIP refers to the fact that Elementary Quantum Mechanics seems to be committed to the thesis that systems of particles of the same species, "identical" particles, exhibit behavior differing from that of systems of particles of different species, simply in virtue of the fact that the former contain entities of the same species while the latter do not. Taken at face value this is tantamount to the Empedoclean "axiom" that like attracts like, while like and unlike repel, a somewhat embarassingly naive proposition for modern physicists to embrace, and one which, furthermore, poses a host of perplexing problems, e.g., how do the particles "know" whether they are of the same species or not? A result proven in the present work is that any "pluralistic" interpretation of quantum theory is unable to provide a satisfactory way of ridding quantum physicists of this appeal to what I call "species sensitivity." Arguing that Quantum Field Theory is most naturally and plausibly interpreted as a "monistic" theory--which means, inter alia, that for a system of n identical particles to exist is not for n distinct objects of any kind to exist, but rather for one unified underlying entity, a quantum field, to be in a certain kind of state or condition--I show that from this point of view PIP can be dissolved. On the basis of this and other considerations, I argue that the interpretation problem is more amenable to solution if we take the QFT point of view as the fundamental expression of quantum theory. (shrink)

There was one kind of equality, one sort of liberation about which nineteenth-century feminists found it embarassing to speak. Higher education for women, better employment opportunities for women, protection at law for women—those were all good, clean, decent issues. Nobody was afraid to voice opinions upon them, nobody ashamed to sign their name on a petition. But the attack on that infamous 'double-standard', which so bedevilled relationships between the sexes in Victorian times did not attract such eager support. Even the (...) bravest of the self-confessed feminists trembled at the implications of involving themselves in that particular fight. (shrink)

My interpretation of the argument, then, fully generalized, is this:To do one's own is to act in such a way as to aim for each having his own.For each to have his own is justice(h) and to act in such a way as to aim for justice(h) is justice(d).Therefore, the having of one's own is justice(h) and the doing of one's own is justice(d).The advantage of this view is that it, unlike that of Vlastos, does not need to supply problematic (...) premisses, such as (S2), in order to render Plato's argument valid. Moreover, I have argued that there is good reason to suppose that a proper reading of Plato's first premiss contains a notion that Vlastos' interpretation had to supply in an additional premiss (S1). One aspect of what I have argued is the correct understanding of Plato's argument does need to be supplied, however, namely, that for one to do one's own one must accomplish one's beneficent aims. Although it is true that Plato only talks of the rulers' aims in the law courts, I think there is good reason to supply the accomplishment condition, for without it, Plato leaves open two possibilities that would embarass his view. First, without this added condition, we could have a case where A did his own with reference to B and C, yet B and C did not have their own as a result of A 's action. Secondly, there could be a case where A did his own, and B and C had their own as a result of A's doing something, yet B and C would not have their own as a result of A's doing his own with reference to B and C.The reason Plato does not consider these problems, I think, is because he would not have considered cases in which his rulers had beneficent aims, but were ineffective in achieving them purposefully. The guarantee of justice in Plato's just state is that it would be administrated by rulers who are both utterly beneficent and utterly efficient. Under these conditions, all will have their own, for all will do their own. This implication, I have argued, is all we need to protect Plato's utopian state from the potential for πλεoνεξία, and it is all we need to provide a valid reading of the argument from 433E6–434A1. (shrink)

Ever since the beginning of the modern era of science, more than 300 years ago, the scipntist has been embarassed at times when he undertook to describe the scope and objectives of science. Part of this embarassment was due to the difficulty of setting up the scope and objectives in such a way as to leave room for future development, and at the same time to permit of seeing the limitations of science clearly and truthfully. Recently in an article (...) “On the possible philosophies of science”, Professor Malisoff made use of the old practise in philosophical discussion of using conjugate terms. These terms as used are so selected that complementary pairs characterize or describe an entity or whole of some kind. The difficulty in describing the scope, objectives and especially the limitations of science, arises chiefly from the difficulty of establishing some simple entity that will contain all of this as well, as the remainders that must be included, and that involve the limitations of science, chiefly. This use of conjugate terms offered a solution of this difficulty. (shrink)

Les formules qui mentionnent une allagè ne sont pas rares dans les papyri ptolémaïques et ont leur prolongement dans celles où figure le participe diagraphomena à l’époque impériale. Traditionnellement interprétées comme impliquant un change entre monnaies d’argent et monnaies de bronze, elles embarassent autant les papyrologues que les numismates. Dans les expressions pros chalkon et pros argyrion, l’une et l’autre indissociables de l’allagè, il n’est pas question de paiements en bronze ou en argent, mais d’étalons de référence articulés sur le (...) bronze ou l’argent. Deux appendices sont consacrés à évoquer, en premier lieu, la réintroduction à l’époque impériale d’une péréquation de même type que l’allagè hellénistique et, ensuite, la «réforme » du monnayage en bronze dans les années 200 av. J.-C. (shrink)

The central theme of this collection of essays, first published in 1978, is the basic tension in Nietzsche, and so in his work, between the urge to weave a satisfying web out of reality and the equally strong compulsion to expose its painful truths. The book aims to stress, not to play down, the embarassing and fruitful fact that he cannot be neatly pigeonholed either as a literary figure or as a professional philosopher. The book meets a long-felt need for (...) a study in English of both the literary and the philosophical aspects of Nietzsche's work, based on his authentic texts, and will be welcomed by all students of modern European thought and Literature. (shrink)

The central theme of this collection of essays, first published in 1978, is the basic tension in Nietzsche, and so in his work, between the urge to weave a satisfying web out of reality and the equally strong compulsion to expose its painful truths. The book aims to stress, not to play down, the embarassing and fruitful fact that he cannot be neatly pigeonholed either as a literary figure or as a professional philosopher. The book meets a long-felt need for (...) a study in English of both the literary and the philosophical aspects of Nietzsche's work, based on his authentic texts, and will be welcomed by all students of modern European thought and Literature. (shrink)

In this book the author explains only that in which he feels permanently under his skin, to speak unashamedly of his embarassments, candidly about his manias and passions, to bind together lies and truths until they are made inextricable. "I only write", says the author, "when the sensations or ideas become intimate demons that I attempt to expel with literature".

This paper makes two essential claims about the nature of shame and shame punishment. I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of shame, that it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, & Fabrice Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of shame and embarrassment that connects both (...) emotions to “whole-self” properties. Shame and embarrassment, I claim, are products of the same underlying emotion. I distinguish between moralized and nonmoralized shame in order to show when, and how, moral and non-moral shame may be justly deployed. Shame is appropriate, I argue, if and only if it targets malleable moral or non-moral normative imperfections of a person’s ‘whole-self.’ Shame is unjustifiable when it targets durable aspects of a person’s “whole-self.” I conclude by distinguishing shame punishments from guilt punishments and show that my account can explain why it is wrong to shame individuals on account of their race, sex, gender, or body while permitting us to sometimes levy shame and shame punishment against others, even those otherwise immune to moral reasons. (shrink)

I‘m a materialist, and not too embarassed about it. It would be nice to have a knock down argument to defend materialism, but not having one, I instinctively fight off idealists, dualists, skeptics, or whatever, with the same punches and feints used by materialists from time immemorial. Like, say, the snide observation that a material like liquor gets even my idealist friends drunk, or that the senile dualists I have known don't seem at all to consist of ageless minds trapped (...) in aging bodies. I will not resort to ad baculum, because all non-materialists I‘ve known, of whatever stripe, act as though tampering with their bodies is the same as tampering with their very selves. (shrink)

I‘m a materialist, and not too embarassed about it. It would be nice to have a knock down argument to defend materialism, but not having one, I instinctively fight off idealists, dualists, skeptics, or whatever, with the same punches and feints used by materialists from time immemorial. Like, say, the snide observation that a material like liquor gets even my idealist friends drunk, or that the senile dualists I have known don't seem at all to consist of ageless minds trapped (...) in aging bodies. I will not resort to ad baculum, because all non-materialists I‘ve known, of whatever stripe, act as though tampering with their bodies is the same as tampering with their very selves. (shrink)

I‘m a materialist, and not too embarassed about it. It would be nice to have a knock down argument to defend materialism, but not having one, I instinctively fight off idealists, dualists, skeptics, or whatever, with the same punches and feints used by materialists from time immemorial. Like, say, the snide observation that a material like liquor gets even my idealist friends drunk, or that the senile dualists I have known don't seem at all to consist of ageless minds trapped (...) in aging bodies. I will not resort to ad baculum, because all non-materialists I‘ve known, of whatever stripe, act as though tampering with their bodies is the same as tampering with their very selves. (shrink)