Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)

Aesthetics has typically been regarded as an arena where claims about truth cannot be made as questions about art seem to involve more matters of taste than knowledge. In _Real Beauty_, however, Eddy Zemach maintains that beauty, ugliness, gracefulness, gaudiness, and similar aesthetic properties are real features of public things and argues that whether these features are present is a matter of fact that can be empirically investigated. By examining the opposing nonrealistic views of Subjectivism, Noncognitivism, and Relativism, (...) class='Hi'>Zemach attempts to show how antirealistic interpretations of art generate absurd results and leave the realistic reading as the only cogent semantic interpretation of aesthetic statements. By discussing what inclines most people to hold nonrealistic views in aesthetics, such as the fluctuations of taste in fashion, Zemach argues that Realism can account for these fluctuations. He proposes that the aesthetic value of some things is due to their relations to other things and that relation may be temporal, resulting in the need for a temporal point for the correct temporal angle from which to view things. Zemach concludes that great art reveals significant truths about reality and that significantly true statements are aesthetically valuable, hence truth is an aesthetic merit. (shrink)

I defend a slightly modified version of geach's rule r, I.E., That although both a and b are g, It is possible for a to be the same f as b and a different h than b, Provided that the question whether a and b are the same g is undecidable. Answering those who object to relative identity I claim that they tacitly adhere to a false fregean view, I.E., That one cannot use a singular term to denote an entity (...) x if it is not true that for every y, X=y or not x=y. I show, However, That such terms are, And must be, Used by every empirically oriented language with finite or infinite predicative arsenal, And hence relative identity is more handy than absolute identity. Finally I give a version of leibniz's law for relative identity. (shrink)

This book is based on two new nominalistic theses: first, that material things (houses, cats, people, symphonies, and also hair, milk, red, and love) are ...

Exhaustive study of philosophy of Advaita Vedanta with reference to Bhāmatī of Vācaspatimiśra, active 976-1000.

Wittgenstein’s first account of meaning was that sentences are pictures: the meaning of a sentence is a state of affairs it portrays. States of affairs are arrangements of some basic entities, the Objects. Sentences consist of names of Objects; an arrangement of such names, i.e., a sentence, shows how the named Objects are arranged. A sentence says that the state of affairs it thus pictures exists, hence it is true or false. That theory of meaning as picturing is based on (...) a primitive relation of naming, but what it is for an item to name another the Tractatus does not say. (shrink)

The author argues that what wittgenstein says in the "tractatus" about "the mystical" depends heavily upon what he says about facts, Objects, Logic, And language, And that any interpretation which introduces alien mystical doctrines to clarify his intentions misses the mark. To establish his thesis, He first examines wittgenstein's concepts of the world and the I as godheads. Within this metaphysical framework, He then discusses wittgenstein's ethical theory, Centering on his notions of happiness and the will, And considers the identity (...) of the ethical and the aesthetic in wittgenstein's early thought. (staff). (shrink)

Rescher has presented a proof that a completed science is logically impossible; not every truth can be known. I show that the proof is valid only if it is read de re. One of its premises, however, is an obvious truth only on a de dicto reading; read de re it is false. What the proof shows, therefore, is that science has no limits and any true proposition can be known. We can, however, know it only in the meagre de (...) re, and not in the informationally rich de dicto, sense of 'know'. (shrink)

I believe that the world is a totality of things: there are no properties, or relations, or sets, or states of affairs, or facts, or events; there are only particular things. I also believe that all true statements can be expressed in a canonical language which includes names of things and logical terms only: there will be no predicates in this language. For what is a predicate? Some say that predicates are names of universals which individual things exemplify, or names (...) of sets of which individual things are members. If this is so, it is obvious that a nominalist's canonical language cannot have any predicates. Others say that predicates name nothing, but are satisfied by particular things. What, however, is satisfaction, and how is it different from naming? Semantic relations such as satisfaction, we are told, are not ‘in’ the world. But then a nominalist has no use for them. (shrink)

IT IS POSSIBLE to discern three main types of answers commonly given to the question about the nature of sensations. The first is the classical "private access" theory, according to which I can sense my own pain, while the pains of others can never be subject to direct inspection by me. The presence of overt pain behavior may inductively confirm the hypothesis that the body thus behaving is besouled [[sic]] and subject to a sensation of pain, but I can never (...) be sure that such pain really exists. I can feel only my own pain, and every pain I feel is necessarily my own. One token of this view is Cartesian dualism, but it is also adopted by most kinds of interactionism, epiphenomenalism, and their ilk. One of the notorious consequences of this theory is, that it makes the problem of Other Minds practically insoluble. Do the other humanoids have minds like my own, do they experience raw feelings similar to mine? The question remains logically unanswerable. The argument from analogy was often shown to be very tenuous, and one is therefore driven to accept the conclusion that sensation words must mean one thing in the context of egocentric sentences and quite another thing when the subject of the sentence is other than I. But if this is the case, mentalistic attributes proper are only I-ascriptive: that is, it would be a logical howler to apply them to anything other than myself; grammar thus forces me to adopt a position similar to that of the solipsist. (shrink)

Like frege, I claim that any singular term (a name, A definite description, Or an indexical) has a sense, And it refers to what satisfies that sense. Unlike frege, I say that this referent is the real world entity that satisfies the said sense in some belief world, Usually, The utterer's. Reference is a function from senses to transworld heirlines. Thus, My token of 'plato' may have a different sense than your token of 'plato', Yet both may refer to plato. (...) My token of 'the f' may have the same sense as your token of 'the f', Yet they may have different referents. My semantics constitutes, I believe, A new argument for the tenability of metaphysical realism. (shrink)

It has been persuasively argued that music refers. For example, a passage that resembles the demeanour of people under the sway of emotion E is seen as itself being E and, thus, as referring to E. Yet what is the purpose of such reference? Serious music, I say, works as a proof. A passage that refers to E is cast as a well-formed formula in a calculus. That formula is then creatively developed in accordance with the rules of that calculus (...) (e.g. harmony and counterpoint in classical music). As in scientific proofs, intermediary generated formulae need not have external meaning over and above the character they have due to their role in the formal sequence. Yet finally a formula is derived that does have external meaning; for example, it refers to emotion F. The composer has thus fictionally proved that E is equal to F, e.g. that hope is futile or that love conquers all. (shrink)