Responds to two other chapters that describe what they identify as the "Socratic Method." Our claim is that the elenchos is not sufficiently methodical as to qualify as a "method.".

This paper examines the terms ‘elenchos’ and ‘elenchō’ as they occur in the Sophist in order to reveal a refined view of elenchos as a philosophical method. The explicit discussion of elenchos as a method in 226a6–231b8 must be read together with other passages described by these terms. Once this is done, it shall be seen that there are two types of elenchus employed in several ways. The first type, which I identify with the familiar Socratic elenchus, (...) is used to purge false opinions or to arrive at plausible answers to philosophical difficulties. The second type, which appears to be the Stranger’s own method, is used to positively disclose relations between Forms. On this reading, elenchos is not merely destructive or preparatory for dialectic; it also forms a part of it. (shrink)

The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues typically practiced elenchos (or cross examination), but neither the term nor the activity originated with him. In fragment 7.3-6 Parmenides of Elea had already spoken off a goddess who directs a youth to judge by reason the poludêrin elenchon spoken by her. Although the meaning of the phrase has been variously understood, I argue that it is properly taken to mean ‘a much-contested testing’ (of the ways of thinking available for inquiry). In characterizing the (...) elenchos as poludêris or ‘much contested’ the goddess was asserting that the decision to follow the ‘it is’ road of inquiry must be continually reaffirmed against the pull of custom and sense experience. Thus, by the time Socrates had begun to practice elenchos on his fellow citizens, there was already a tradition of putting ideas and persons ‘to the test’ to refute their assertions or to certify them as correct. (shrink)

El propósito del presente trabajo es en primer término el relevamiento de los principales desarrollos conceptuales y argumentativos del elenchos entre Sócrates y Agatón en Smp. 199c-201a, y su relación con los desarrollos de la teoría erótica del discurso de Sócrates/Diotima que prologa. A este respecto nos concentraremos en analizar cómo se elabora allí la pregunta sobre la naturaleza de eros y se formulan, a modo de primera respuesta, afirmaciones sobre su carácter intencional, su carencia constitutiva en cuanto necesariamente (...) inscripto en la temporalidad, y su tendencia a lo bueno y lo bello. Posteriormente, se complementa este análisis con el examen de este ejemplo de elenchos en particular a la luz de diversas cuestiones de debate respecto al elenchos en general. A este respecto se atiende especialmente a la conexión entre elenchos y eros en este pasaje del Banquete, en tanto el primero constituye una herramienta metodológica particularmente apropiada para, a la vez, enunciar las bases de la teoría platónica del eros y estimular el surgimiento del amor por la verdad. (shrink)

This article proposes an analysis of the use of emotions, in particular the shame, characterizing the elenctic method performed by Socrates in the dialogue with Callicles in the third part of Plato’s Gorgias. The elenchus aims at improving the interlocutor through a process of purification that is capable of changing his whole existence. However, Plato’s dialogues only rarely give testimony of a successful transformation occurring in the interlocutor. This is due to the interlocutor’s attitude towards shame : the feeling of (...) shame can be accepted as a mean for self-transformation or hidden to protect a social status. The article will explore the way in which this fundamental difference is delineated within the dialogue by providing appropriate textual examples. Arguably, by outlining the distinction between the types of shame, it is possible to notice how the purification of the interlocutor implies a turning point for the public. This is what I call „outreach elenchus”, a specific hermeneutic figure that allows to understand a form of purification of the audience and the spectators witnessing the debate. This type of elenchus steps in at the very moment in which the Socratic interlocutor attempts to protect his social image, concealing his shame. The audience, thanks to Plato’s literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished. (shrink)

This is an edition of an extensive Latin commentary on Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations composed about 1205 by an anonymous Parisian master who was a philosophically perceptive close reader of the Aristotelian text. The only extant manuscript of his work is now in Cambridge. The commentary is an important source of information about the development of logic at the time when the masters in Paris were beginning to organize themselves into what was to become the University of Paris.

From my ongoing "Metalogical Plato" project. The aim of the diagram is to make reasonably intuitive how the Socratic elenchos (the logic of refutation applied to candidate formulations of virtues or ruling knowledges) looks and works as a whole structure. This is my starting point in the project, in part because of its great familiarity and arguable claim to being the inauguration of western philosophy; getting this point less wrong would have broad and deep consequences, including for philosophy’s self-understanding. (...) -/- (i.) is the first pass at elenchos in which the Socratic interlocutor does not reflect on knowledge being the crux of the problem. (ii.) is the second, rarer, reflective pass in which they are, making the investigation explicitly about knowledge. Its centrality in the Charmides makes that neglected dialogue of superlative importance. This structure is also the gateway through which the discussion/dialectic crosses into the Agathology (discussion of the form of the good) at Republic 505. -/- The problem of elenchos, then, grasped as a whole structure, is that it seems that knowledge can neither satisfactorily be included in nor excluded from its own scope. The development of the ti esti (“what is ---?”) question leads to the introduction of knowledge into its own scope (i. implicitly, as goodness contrasted with blind rule-following ii. explicitly qua knowledge) while the development of the dual peri tinos (“----about what?) question leads to K’s elimination from its own scope. The introductions are motivated to avoid contradiction, but produce regress; the eliminations are motivated to avoid regress, but produce contradiction. In scholarship, and in the history of philosophy, the ti esti question is universally recognized, to the point of being identified with philosophy’s origin and essence; the peri tinos question is neglected textually and never recognized as the equal dual to the ti esti. This, I claim, has blocked the development of a nontrivial logical appreciation of what Plato's Socrates is up to. (One rather disastrous effect of this neglect is taking Aristotle as the beginning of the development of logic, rather than, correctly, for the beginning of logic’s fatal separation from mathematics and dialectic.) -/- Further, because of this monopticism of the ti esti, the function of consistency in the elenchos has not been understood, even with respect to the ti esti. The ti esti is actually in search of completeness, given a norm of consistency; the peri tinos is in search of consistency, given a norm of completeness. Only appreciating the two questions as dual allows space in the structure to clarify these different orientations relative to consistency. (And, dually, to completeness, whose function in the elenchos is generally entirely missed by scholars and relegated to discussions of eros; it's not out of place there, of course, but its significance is secured here.) Recognizing the duality of the ti esti and peri tinos questions is thus the royal road, in the Socratic-Platonic context, to catching sight of what we post-Cantorians can recognize as the metalogical duality of consistency and completeness. (The salutary disruptive effects of this Plato-Cantor proximity have, of course, been traced in complementary ways by Badiou.) -/- Note that the diagram is supposed to provide a relatively accessible orientation, not to stand on its own, and certainly not to be the last word on any subject. An important qualification (telegraphed in the previous paragraph) is that what elenchos shows is not finally circular or paradoxical, though the problem first presents as such (stubbornly, obdurately, as "difficult" Plato's Socrates always says with characteristic understatement). What is depicted here is meant, at a first pass, to be the shape of that first presentation, the form of the problem of elenchos, rather than of its solution. It's not an accident that this problem strongly resembles "Russell's paradox" (not Russell's not a paradox.) Problem is to solution as RP is to the diagonal theorems. (shrink)

En este trabajo tomo como eje el concepto de ironía para analizar el elenchos que Sócrates practica sobre las opiniones de Calicles en el diálogo Gorgias. Asumo como punto de partida que Sócrates aspira a que su interlocutor modifique su disposición anímica y adopte un modo de vida filosófico, abandonando el retórico. Para ello, desarrolla un elenchos irónico que posee tres momentos: una fingida aceptación por parte de Sócrates de la dicotomía presentada por Calicles entre la vida del (...) político, digna de imitación, y la del filósofo, merecedora de reproche; una inversión de dicha dicotomía; y finalmente una puesta en cuestión de dicha inversión. Concluiré sosteniendo que este tercer momento constituye una nueva maniobra socrática para instar a Calicles a que suspenda sus actividades políticas y examine previamente con él, de manera filosófica, el camino para volverse virtuoso. (shrink)

The central problem of this dissertation arises from reflecting on Euthyphro’s often neglected final attempt to define piety and the discussion (elenchos) that follows. He claims that piety is knowledge of how to give to the gods what is pleasing in prayer and sacrifice. Socrates, without much argument, reduces Euthyphro’s answer to his earlier, already refuted one – that piety is what is dear to the gods – inviting the question of whether this is all the elenchos is (...) meant to accomplish. If it is not, we should expect to find its purpose in the brief discussion that falls between Euthyphro’s definition and the final reduction of this definition to its predecessor. At the center of this discussion Socrates compares Euthyphronic piety to commerce. This comparison has classically been interpreted as showing Euthyphro’s definition to imply that humans can benefit gods, and since Euthyphro has elsewhere rejected this idea, his definition is refuted by contradiction. But this strands the reduction withoutpurpose, and scrutiny of the text suggests this is not the correct way to interpret the inference structure of this intervening discussion. In this dissertation I argue for two main theses: (i) the disambiguation thesis, which claims that the comparison to commerce is not the philosophical point of the elenchos, and does not result in the refutation of Euthyphro’s definition. It is instead intended to elicit which of two possible models of piety Euthyphro means to describe, the language of his definition being equivocal in at least one important respect, namely whether or not a met need necessarily confers a benefit upon the recipient; (ii) the translation thesis, which claims that there are some important observations to be made about the Greek of Euthyphro’s definition, observations that will make the dis- ambiguation thesis more plausible, and which are obscured by traditional translations of the passage under discussion. These observations concern kecharismena, a word often translated as ‘pleasing’, but is better understood as denoting a broad set of social and religious norms, and for which there is no simple English equivalent. Together, these two theses allow us to see that the main philosophical lesson of the last elenchos is that Euthyphro’s account of piety as ritual is an application of his more famous third attempt to define piety voluntaristically, and that any philosophical concerns over the last definition are consequences of it being an extension of the third one. This is why Plato puts the two side-by-side to close the dialogue, and we are kept from seeing this clearly when we take the comparison to commerce to be accomplishing the main work of the elenchos, rather than as clarifying Euthyphro’s answer so that its conceptual similarities to the previous answer are plainly visible. I conclude the project by defending the venerable view that Socratic piety is service to the gods instantiated by rational inquiry, and show how this model of piety is the antithesis to, and moral remedy for, Euthyphronic piety. (shrink)

A new assessment of the philosophical traditions Hippolytus depends on and of his method of presentation. This book deals with the reception of the Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle in the first centuries CE, and is a major contribution to our knowledge of the various currents in Pre-Neoplatonic Greek philosophy.

En la primera parte del Teeteto Sócrates refuta tres tesis que considera estrechamente vinculadas entre sí: la tesis de Teeteto que identifica conocimientoy percepción, la tesis relativista y la tesis movilista. El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar que en tres de las refutaciones ofrecidas contra estas posiciones se exhibe una misma estrategia tendiente a remitis a un prerrequisito dialéctico vinculado a la pretensión de verdad. ESta constituiría una estrategia radical, en el sentido de que pone en cuestión la misma (...) posibilidad de enmitir la propia tesis por parte del adversario. (shrink)

Refutaciones Sofísticas ha sido usualmente interpretado como un intento de clasificación de sofismas. Este acercamiento, sin embargo, corre el riesgo de oscurecer la dimensión de sus propias intenciones confrontativas. El presente trabajo se propone enfatizar la importancia de las Refutaciones Sofísticas como parte de un programa antierístico que tiene por objetivo prioritario la filosofía megárica, en las antípodas de Aristóteles en el terreno epistemológico. Bajo esta luz, la resolución de argumentos erísticos excede el estudio lógico así como también la denuncia (...) sobre sus efectos prácticos y se erige como parte de una discusión entre líneas de inspiración socrática sobre los alcances y fines de la dialéctica y la filosofía en general. (shrink)

In contrast to the abundance of discussion of Plato’s portrayal of the Socratic elenchos, relatively little work has been done on the elenchos as it appears in Xenophon. The reason is obvious: Xenophon makes much less use of the elenchus than Plato and what he does offer is not as interesting philosophically. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to look more closely at Xenophon’s portrait. It provides a corrective to the excessively intellectualizing portrait of the elenchus found in Plato’s (...) writings, and exhibits an educational quality that is characteristic of ancient Greek attitudes but not always stressed in treatments of Socrates. In the introduction to Bandini and Dorion 2000-2010, cxviii-clxxxii, Louis-André Dorion offers a probing analysis of the term elenchos as used by Xenophon and a broad survey of the elenchoi in Xenophon’s Socratic writings. Although Xenophon’s Socrates sometimes uses argumentation reminiscent of his Platonic cousin, this is only a minor part of his over-all conversational repertoire. Education is accomplished not by interrogation but by the direct and open communication of doctrine and by the practice of virtue (askēsis: see Mem. i 2.23, ii 1.1). Rather than employing the elenchos, Xenophon’s Socrates generally spends his time offering abundant useful advice to his friends. According to Dorion, Xenophon’s scant use of the elenchos is a result of his deep skepticism about its educational value. As a result of this skepticism, Xenophon creates an alternative portrait of Socrates in which interrogation plays a much smaller role. Dorion is certainly right to note that the elenchos is far less important for Xenophon than for Plato, but his conclusion is somewhat extreme. Although Xenophon does not focus on the Socratic elenchos, he does offer some portraits of it and he does not contest Plato’s fuller portrait of it either. This is because the elenchos does have some value for Xenophon, even if this value differs from what we may assume is its value in the Platonic portrait. As Morrison 1994 has shown, the elenchos serves a valuable role in selecting or preparing students for more substantive lessons. It can also play a valuable role in training for and acting in political affairs. And the elenchos can serve an educational role in another way, by contributing directly to the acquisition of virtue (sophrosune) by the interlocutor. I shall trace these significant roles of the elenchos for Xenophon. (shrink)

The Socratic elenchos in Xenophon's work plays a central role even though it may seem to have a secondary part. The following article aims to work on the xenophontic characterization of the Socratic elenchos, as well as his assessment from the point of view of its educational qualities. In this sense, the socratic elenchos potentialities will be analyzed in three directions: first, the strictly formative dimension; secondly, its role for acting in political affairs; and, finally, his contribution (...) to the acquisition of the sophrosyne. Through this analysis I will explain why the portrait made by Xenophon of the Socratic elenchos should be understood as supplementary to the portraits made by others and not as an alternative to them. (shrink)

Parmenides may fairly be said to have undertaken two parallel efforts: first, to offer a persuasive account of the nature of ‘what-is’ (to eon); and second, to establish ‘it is’ as the only true and trustworthy way of speaking and thinking about what-is. Fragment 7.3-6 plays a crucial role in this latter effort when Parmenides’ goddess directs the youth to put aside all information obtained through sense perception and instead ‘judge by reason the poludêris elenchos spoken by me.’ Although (...) the meaning of the phrase has been variously understood, I argue that it is properly taken to mean ‘a much-contested testing’ (of the possible ways of inquiry). In characterizing the elenchos as poludêris or ‘much contested’ the goddess is asserting that the decision to follow the ‘it is’ route of inquiry must be continually reaffirmed against the pull of custom and sense experience. (shrink)

Seit dem 2. nachchristlichen Jahrhundert werden die Schriften von Aristoteles kommentiert. Diese Ausgabe enthält griechische Kommentare zu seinem Werk vom 3. bis 8. Jahrhundert n. Chr., u. a. von Alexander von Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in griechischer Sprache.