Economic sanctions are envisaged as a sort of punishment, based on what should be an institutional decision not unlike a court ruling. Hence, the conditions for their lifting should be clearly stated and once those are met sanctions should be lifted. But this is generally not what happens, and perhaps is precluded by the very nature of international sanctioning. Sanctions clearly have political, economic, military and strategic consequences, but the question raised here is whether (...) class='Hi'>sanctions can also have moral justification. Illustrated by the example of international sanctions against Yugoslavia, the authors show how the process of escalating demands on a target country, inherent to the very process of sanctioning, can lead ultimately even to overt aggression. As a result of this logic of escalation, economic sanctions cannot be articulated properly in any law-like system. Economic sanctions have much more in common with war than legal punishment, and in fact represent a form of siege. As such, they cannot be ended simply on the basis of their initial rationale, for the very process of sanctions implementation opens up possibilities for setting new goals and a continuous redefinition of the goal that sanctions are seen to have. (shrink)

Despite triggering one of the largest civilian death tolls in modern history, the policy and human consequences of economic sanctions on Iraq between 1990-2003 remain largely unexamined. This lack of scrutiny mirrors the euphemism and mis-information surrounding the embargo itself and the Oil-for-Food program ostensibly adopted to protect Iraq's civilian population. But it also reflects incomprehension among Western publics - long removed from the realities of hunger and economic destitution - of the intimate link between economic (...) conditions and mortality. Iraq suffered an estimated 1.5 million excess deaths because of a catastrophic undermining of civilian livelihood triggered by the embargo; an outcome termed slow famine in the demographic literature. With much of the population fully dependent on daily food rations of less than 21 cents per person for much of the sanctions period, OfF `relief' was inherently incapable of substituting for a functioning civil economy. Recent positive accounts of the impact of OfF, in the form of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the Oil-for-Food Program, are refuted by close analysis of malnutrition and mortality rates across the sanctions period. The example of Iraq reveals the danger in treating economic sanctions as a cheap, `non-violent' tool for conflict resolution. In reality their deadly power is terrorizing for societies not protected from their application by permanent member status on the UN Security Council, a threat which continues to generate global insecurity. The Iraq experience reveals how current, narrowly framed, international law prohibitions on starvation as a weapon of war need to be extended to cover interference with civilian livelihood and hence access to food. (shrink)

As part of the roundtable “Economic Sanctions and Their Consequences,” this essay examines unilateral coercive measures. These types of sanctions are applied outside the scope of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and were developed and refined in the West in the context of the Cold War. Yet the eventual collapse of the Berlin Wall did not herald the demise of unilateral sanctions; much to the contrary. While there are no incontrovertible data on the extent (...) of these measures, one can safely say that they target in some way a full quarter of humanity. In addition to being a major attack on the principle of self-determination, unilateral measures not only adversely affect the rights to international trade and to navigation but also the basic human rights of innocent civilians. The current deterioration of the situation, with the mutation of embargoes into blockades and impositions on third parties, is a threat to peace that needs to be upgraded in strategic concern. (shrink)

This article offers a thorough analysis of the unintended impact economic sanctions have on political repression—referred to in this study as the level of the government respect for democratic freedoms and human rights. We argue that economic coercion is a counterproductive policy tool that reduces the level of political freedoms in sanctioned countries. Instead of coercing the sanctioned regime into reforming itself, sanctions inadvertently enhance the regime’s coercive capacity and create incentives for the regime’s leadership to (...) commit political repression. Cross-national time series data support our argument, confirming that the continued use of economic sanctions (even when aimed at promoting political liberalization and respect for human rights) will increase the level of political repression. These findings suggest that both scholars and policy makers should pay more attention to the externalities caused by economic coercion. (shrink)

The Ethics of Economic Sanctions Economic sanctions involve the politically motivated withdrawal of customary trade or financial relations from a state, organisation or individual. They may be imposed by the United Nations, regional governmental organisations such as the European Union, or by states acting alone. Although economic sanctions have long been a feature of international … Continue reading Ethics of Economic Sanctions →.

Pierce challenges the argument that economic sanctions are always morally preferable to the use of military force. He argues that such sanctions inflict suffering and physical harm on noncombatants and that small-scale military operations are sometimes preferable.

Economic sanctions are emerging as one of the major tools of international governance in the post-Cold War era. Gordon considers the issue of sanctions within three ethical frameworks: just war doctrine, deontological ethics, and utilitarianism.

The UN Security Council adopted sanctions as a means of addressing unrest in Haiti, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia. Damrosch examines this shift from unilateral to collective enforcement and assesses the moral legitimacy and conclusive results of this policy.

Unilateral coercive international political, diplomatic, and economic sanctions are regular events of international relations and international law within the landscape of foreign affairs. However, while they may be prescribed by international law, or national legal systems, for peace and security reasons they have also been imposed for political grounds by powerful States such as the United States. The US sanctions are now targeting science, academic and university domains. When applied in this way, these sanctions violate international (...) law, principles of human rights, ethics, the autonomy of scientific institutions, and the norm of universalism in science. All of which protect and promote scientific freedom of expression. It is vital that international and domestic law be correctly applied to uphold proper ethical standards and scientific independence in order to protect the work and the freedom of scholarship. In this way, law is the solution, rather than the problem. (shrink)

As part of the roundtable “Economic Sanctions and Their Consequences,” this essay discusses whether economic sanctions are morally acceptable policy tools. It notes that both conventional and targeted sanctions not only often fail to achieve their stated objectives but also bring about significant negative externalities in target countries. Economic dislocation and increases in political instability instigated by sanctions disproportionately affect the well-being of opposition groups and marginalized segments of society, while target elites and (...) their support base remain insulated from the intended costs of foreign pressure. Sanctions might also incentivize target governments to use repressive means to consolidate their rule and weaken the opposition. Given these serious shortcomings, I argue that sanctions are ethically problematic tools of foreign policy. Nonetheless, this does not mean that sanctions should be rejected outright, as there might be cases where sanctions are the only viable option, and they might work effectively under certain circumstances. Rather, the essay suggests that policymakers should apply more caution in considering the use of sanctions given their low probability of success, and should be more concerned with the delicate balance between political gain and civilian pain before levying sanctions, whether comprehensive or targeted. (shrink)

At least since Athenian trade sanctions helped to spark the Peloponnesian War, economic coercion has been a prominent tool of foreign policy. In the modern era, sovereign states and multilateral institutions have imposed economic sanctions on dictatorial regimes or would-be nuclear powers as an alternative to waging war. They have conditioned offers of aid, loans, and debt relief on recipients’ willingness to implement market and governance reforms. Such methods interfere in freedom of trade and the internal (...) affairs of sovereign states, yet are widely used as a means to advance human rights. But are they morally justifiable? -/- Drawing on human rights theories, theories of justifiable harm, and examples such as IMF lending practices and international sanctions on Russia and North Korea, Fabre offers a defense of economic statecraft in some of its guises. An empirically attuned work of philosophy, Economic Statecraft lays out a normative framework for an important tool of diplomacy. (shrink)

This article analyzes the question of how the size of bribes should impact criminal sanctions. In contrast to the commonly held view that punishment should increase with the size of the bribe, we argue to the contrary: that the punishment of the bribee should decrease with the size of the bribe. Our conclusion is based both on a philosophical argument and an economic argument. We argue that all else being equal, as an agent’s reservation price for selling public (...) interests decreases, the culpability of the agent willing to receive a bribe increases. In addition, from an economic perspective, the expected social harm of an official acting with a low reservation price for bribes is much greater than one acting with a high reservation price: both the susceptibility of being bribed as well as the potential for social harm is much greater when the reservation price is low. (shrink)

A Critical Notice of Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality, by Cécile Fabre.

This article examines when economic sanctions should be imposed on liberal democracies that violate democratic norms. The argument is made from the social-liberal standpoint, which recognises the moral status of political communities. While social liberals rarely refer to the use of economic sanctions as a pressure tool, by examining why they restrict military intervention and economic aid to cases of massive human rights violations or acute humanitarian need, the article is able to show why they (...) are likely to impose strong restrictions on the use of economic sanctions as well. After reconstructing the social-liberal case against economic sanctions, the article develops the argument that liberal democracies have reasons to support sanctions on other liberal democracies, even when they perpetrate injustices on a smaller scale. Liberal democracies share especially strong ideological, cultural and institutional bonds, and these peer group relations open them to mutual influence. When one liberal democracy commits serious injustices while still proclaiming allegiance to the democratic ethos, it can adversely affect the vitality of the democratic culture in those other liberal democracies with which it maintains close relations. Other liberal democracies therefore have the right and the obligation to condemn this behaviour, in order to preserve their allegiance to their values. The article defends the use of economic sanctions in light of some recent critiques, and concludes by providing an overall assessment of the factors which liberal democracies ought to take into account when they consider imposing economic sanctions on other liberal democracies. (shrink)

Sanctions such as those applied by the United Nations against Yugoslavia, or rather the actions of implementing and maintaining them, at the very least implicitly purport to have moral justification. While the rhetoric used to justify sanctions is clearly moralistic, even sanctions themselves, as worded, often include phrases indicating moral implication. On May 30, 1992, United Nation Security Council Resolution 757 imposed a universal, binding blockage on all trade and all scientific, cultural and sports exchanges with Serbia (...) and Montenegro. In addition to expressing the usual "concern' and "dismay" regarding various events, the language of this Resolution also includes, on three occasions, unmistakably moral language "deploring" failures in meeting the demands of earlier resolutions.' There is no question that sanctions have political, economic, military and trategic consequences for the sanctioned state, perhaps exactly as desired by the sanctioning party. However, the question raised in this essay is whether in addition to these consequences, sanctions also produce morally reprehensible consequences that undermine their often-cited moral justification. If so, international economic sanctions are an immoral means of achieving primarily political goals. Six morally significant consequences are: 1) The unethical, elevated susceptibility of the sanctioned to olitical (and other forms of) manipulation, 2) the inherent and unjust paternalism in the process of sanctioning, 3) the abandonment of strict moral criteria on virtually all levels of evaluation, primarily inside the sanctioned country, but also in sanctioning states best exhibited in the attitudes toward the sanctioned, 4) the general decline in moral consciousness, 5) the subsequent rise of many forms of violence within the sanctioned state in connection with the increase in lawlessness, and a general decline of expectations in all areas of life, and 6) the continual, arbitrary redefining of conditions for a final lifting of sanctions. In light of this moral phenomenology we shall argue that sanctions, lacking in moral justification, are simply a means for achieving the mentioned immoral goals. Furthermore, the argument will be that sanctions are a form of siege and, as such, an act of war, requiring the sort of justification that would be needed to justify a war. (shrink)

In her recent article in this journal, Joy Gordon provides an astute history and critique of the evolution and application of smart sanctions within the United Nations system since the mid-1990s. Her analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the discrete types of smart sanctions is part of a growing discussion among both academics and practitioners about the future and the utility of these measures. As always, her continued skepticism about the effectiveness and ethical dimensions of economic (...) sanctions deserves serious consideration and evaluation. In particular, Gordon raises three central concerns: (1) smart sanctions are no more successful than traditional trade sanctions; (2) each type of targeted mechanism has serious flaws; and (3) targeted sanctions did not end the humanitarian damage or the related ethical dilemmas that are embedded into sanctions design and implementation. (shrink)

Joy Gordon has made a major contribution to both the ethical analysis and the policy evaluation of economic sanctions. Her claims against sanctions should be understood as critique rather than condemnation of sanctions on ethical grounds.

It is sometimes objected that we cannot adopt skepticism about moral responsibility, because the criminal justice system plays an indispensable social function. In this paper, I examine the implications of moral responsibility skepticism for the punishment of those convicted of crime, with special attention to recent arguments by Saul Smilansky. Smilansky claims that the skeptic is committed to fully compensating the incarcerated for their detention, and that this compensation would both be too costly to be practical and would remove the (...) deterrent function from incarceration. I argue that the skeptic is not committed to full compensation of the offender, and that the costs of such compensation would in any case be far smaller than Smilansky thinks. In fact, I claim, the costs of the criminal justice system to which the skeptic is committed might be very much lower than the costs – economic, social and moral – we currently pay as a consequence of our system of punishment. (shrink)

Economic sanctions are a primary tool the US government and international organizations use to promote human rights abroad, yet they have proven to be largely ineffective and harmful to civilians. There is accumulating evidence that this paradox may be explained by the expressive purposes of sanctions and domestic politics. This article further explores these explanations by examining human rights sanction policy debates. Specifically, I analyzed 27 US Congressional hearings on human rights policy toward China. I argue that (...) moral pressure enabled support for human rights sanctions, high costs fueled opposition to them, and discussions of effectiveness were marginal to the debate. The findings contribute to past studies by identifying the psychological and sociological mechanisms by which legislators circumvent arguments of sanction ineffectiveness and harmfulness and delineating the role of business, human rights, and ethnic interest groups in enabling and constraining support for human rights sanctions. (shrink)

Cambodia’s GDP contributed 0.03 percent of the world economy. Cambodia economy has grown around seven percent. Cambodia’s economy was led by growth in garment exports. Cambodia’s economy was related with other countries through exports and imports. The Trump administration has imposed visa sanctions against Cambodia and likely to make economic sanction on Cambodia. To understand the potential impact of the sanction, a research into “Potential Impact of Foreign Sanction on Cambodia’s Economy” has been proposed. Two research objectives were (...) (1) to analyze potential impacts of foreign investment in Cambodia and (2) to analyze potential impacts on employment of Cambodians. This research focuses only trade sanction that limits or potential restriction of textile, clothing and footwear export from Cambodia to EU and US as independent that would potentially impact on seven independent variables including garment and footwear valued added to GDP, Cambodia’s exports, products exported to US and EU, worth of textile, clothing and footwear exports, garment and footwear investment factories, employments in garment and footwear, workers’ wages in garment factories and footwear factories. The secondary data was collected. The data was collected from varied sources. After the data and information collected, data entry was done into MS excel. The descriptive statistics like table and bar-charts were used for this research. The research found out that Cambodia’s economy was likely to be negatively impact from EU’s and US’s sanctions on Cambodia. The impacts included reduction of GDP value, potential loss of Cambodia export of textile, closure of garments and footwear factories, unemployment and loss of workers’ incomes in textile, clothing factories and footwear factories. There are some recommends: maintaining good relation with EU and US, exploring new markets of garments and footwear products, exploring impact of the close of visa of some top government officials to US on Cambodia’s economy, the impacts of products imported from EU on Cambodia. The more studies on other scenario of sanction on Cambodia and indirect impact and impacts of foreign aid reduction or withdrawal on Cambodia’s economy should be done. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the highly contested Israeli restrictions on the importation of civilian goods into the Gaza Strip, with reference to a wide range of principled questions within military ethics regarding sieges, sanctions and blockades. Beginning with Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and culminating in its recent easing of sanctions, the paper attempts to bring out the central issues of principle embedded in the political polemic: unilaterally terminated occupation; the responsibilities of a former, though recent, (...) occupier; the semantic distinction between siege and sanction and their respective ramifications; harm to civilians; necessity and proportionality. Overall, it argues in the specific case that Israel's restrictions on Gaza were not indefensible from the start as a first attempt to halt terrorism while avoiding full-scale conflict. In view of their ineffectiveness in achieving these goals, however, the harm they inflicted on civilians increasingly proved unnecessary and therefore excessive. There could then be no justification for continuing to restrict the flow of civilian goods into Gaza, as Israel itself eventually recognized. Nonetheless, Israel retains the right to search and regulate the passage of all relief supplies into Gaza, whether by land or by sea, as well as to secure its own borders for the safety of its citizens. (shrink)

This paper critically engages the legal and political framework for responding to democracy and rule of law backsliding in the EU. I develop a new and original critique of Article 7 TEU based on it being democratically illegitimate and normatively incoherent qua itself in conflict with EU fundamental values. Other more incremental and scaleable responses are desirable, and the paper moves on to assess the legitimacy of economic sanctions such as tying access to EU funds to performance on (...) democratic and rule of law indicators or imposing fines on backsliding states. I hold such sanctions to be a priori legitimate, and argue that in some cases economic sanctions are even normatively required, given that EU material support of backsliding member states can amount to material complicity in their backsliding. However, an economic conditionality mechanism would need to be designed to minimize unjust and counterproductive effects. One way to pursue this could be to complement sanctions against the backsliding government with investment for prodemocratic actors in that state. (shrink)

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a baseline treatment, the level of effort increases substantially once ex post sanctioning opportunities are introduced, that is, when one can assign costly punishment points to other group members to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication, which (...) in contrast to the punishment treatment increases efforts only temporarily and fails to bring the players to higher payoff equilibria permanently. Our results indicate that decentralized sanctions can play an important role as a coordination device in Pareto-ranked coordination settings. They also suggest that the motivations behind voluntary sanctions may be more general than usually put forth in the literature on cooperation games. (shrink)

Accountability is present in many types of social relations; for example, the accountability of elected representatives to voters is the key characteristic of representative democracy. We distinguish between two institutional mechanisms of accountability, i.e., opportunity to punish and requirement of a justification, and examine the separate and combined effects of these mechanisms on individual behavior. For this purpose, we designed a decision-making experiment where subjects engage in a three-player trust game with two senders and one responder. We ask whether holding (...) the responder accountable increases senders’ and responders’ contributions in a trust game. When restricting the analysis to the first round, the requirement of justification seems to have a positive impact on senders’ contributions. When the game is played repeatedly, the experience of previous rounds dominates the results and significant treatment effects are no longer seen. We also find that responders tend to justify their choices in terms of reciprocity, which is in line with observed behavior. Moreover, the treatment combining punishment and justification hinders justifications that appeal to pure self-interest. (shrink)

The focus of the present study was the rationality of moral behaviour and moral conviction. Assumptions like "morality pays" or "good ethics is good business" are not a priori right. Whether morality as personal conviction is also economically rational or not depends in large part on the institutional setting of a society and the likelihood that immoral behaviour will be sanctioned. The systematic approach to morality thus appears to be political economy and the institutional setting: rules and laws. However, the (...) conditions for morality depend not only on the formal structures but also on the informal structures of rules and sanctions. Hence, the systematic approach to morality is most closely linked with the culture of a society; the efficiency of individual morality depends on social conditions. It is costly for individuals and societies to establish and entertain conditions that set clear incentives for moral behaviour. In this context, moral competencies, learning, and education play a crucial role. (shrink)

This article reports the results of an exploratory investigation of a particular area of moral tension experienced by MBA students in a graduate school of business. During the first phase of the study, MBA students'' own perceptions about the moral climate and culture of the business school were examined. The data gathered in this first part of the study indicate that the students recognize that a central part of this culture is constituted by a shared familiarity with a set of (...) institutionally reinforced premises about human behavior and motivation including the ideas that: 1) people are self-interested utility-maximizers, 2) individuals should be unimpeded in their pursuit of their own self-interest through economic transactions, and 3) virtually all human interactionsare economic transactions. The data further indicated that the business students experience a degree of tension between this ethic of self-maximizing and the everyday ethics prevalent in our broader culture, in which altruism and selflessness are central elements. The final section of the study was an effort to see whether and how these institutionally sanctioned premises were integrated into the students'' arguments about the relationship between self-interest and social responsibility. (shrink)

What is the relationship between electoral and economic performance? Previous literature posits that poor economic performance hurts the incumbent at the ballot box because overall economic performance serves as a competence signal, which voters can readily access at low costs. Building on an emerging economic voting literature exploring heterogeneity in the electorate, this article argues that social groups are affected differently by various dimensions of economic performance and that their sociotropic sanctioning of incumbents is contingent (...) on the retrospective performance of these dimensions. It theorizes how four social groups—low-skilled workers, pensioners, public sector employees, and high-income individuals—are differently affected by each of four economic dimensions: unemployment, inflation, stock market performance, and public spending; as a result, they penalize the incumbent to varying extents. Results from a multilevel logistic regression analysis from four modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems containing around seventy electoral contexts are consistent with the argument. (shrink)

In Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk About It), Elizabeth Anderson argues that most people in the United States and other liberal societies spend their working lives under the kind of autocratic rule we would normally associate with communist dictatorships. They are forced to work in oppressive environments, deprived of many freedoms, and given practically no say over working conditions. Even in their nonworking lives workers are frequently subjected to employer scrutiny and sanction. And (...) the legal framework and economic realities surrounding employment are such that exit is viable for only a small minority. Anderson’s work has generated great interest and, along with it, several criticisms that take exception to her observations, economic assumptions, and conclusions. This paper delineates the various economic claims made against Private Government so as to facilitate further inquiry of these issues. (shrink)

The subprime mortgage crisis which was caused to a large degree by questionable mortgage lending and securitization practices that were furthered by deregulatory policies devastated the economy, led to large scale unemployment, and caused the foreclosure of millions of homes. There is evidence that numerous mortgage companies, financial firms, rating agencies, and high-level professionals were involved in unethical and often fraudulent business practices leading to the most severe economic meltdown since the Great Depression. In spite of the great (...) class='Hi'>economic and social harm, there was a lack of criminal sanctions against those companies and individuals, who were involved in creating the crisis that reached even global dimensions. This article analyses the reasons for and the possible social impacts of the lack of criminal sanctions against those who crossed the line between unethical and criminal business practices. (shrink)

The work of Karl Popper has had extraordinary influence across the fields of scientific and social thought. Widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the twentieth century, he was also a highly influential social and political philosopher, a proponent and defender of the "open society". "Popper's Legacy" examines Popper in the round, analysing in particular his moral and psychological insights. Once Popper's scientific legacy is couched in political and moral terms, it becomes apparent that his concern (...) for individual autonomy does not come at the expense of institutional guidelines and social conventions. Instead, these guidelines turn out to be essential sanctions for individual freedom. Popper envisions the conduct of the scientific community as paralleling the conduct of any democratically established community. Critical rationality guides the words and actions of all participants and leadership can be replaced without violence. In presenting a critical overview, "Popper's Legacy" reveals the debt many intellectual movements - such as Marxism, feminism, and postmodernism - still owe to Popper. (shrink)

The most severe economic crisis in post-revolutionary Cuba has forced the country to adopt an austere conservation program. Resource-wise measures have been instituted in the energy, transportation, housing, and agricultural sectors because of a rapid drop in Soviet aid, significant loss of trade with the Eastern Bloc, a halving of oil imports in a one-year period, and stepped-up U. S. sanctions. The economic crisis is also causing negative environmental impacts, in part because pollution abatement projects have been (...) deferred and the tourism industry is being developed to bring in hard currency. However, it is anticipated that many environmentally-sound initiatives will help Cuba through the crisis and will remain in place. (shrink)

Setting aside its conceptual issues, it remains an open question whether the internal point of view is a good descriptive tool for the behaviour of ordinary citizens or if a sanction‐based explanation of legal compliance is sufficient. This paper will discuss strains of experimental literature corroborating Hart’s criticism of sanction‐based accounts and suggesting that compliance with norms is indeed a shared practice sensitive to social influence. Legal institutions can interact with this shared practice in a way that cannot be reduced (...) to pure incentives. Sanction‐based theories cannot account for norm compliance: They face a challenge in explaining the complex behavioural patterns observed in the minimalistic setting of laboratories. (shrink)