Comment la notion aristotelicienne de puissance s'est-elle constituee? Comment Aristote peut-il designer du meme nom de dynamis a la fois le principe du changement et l'etre en puissance en tant qu'il est distingue de l'etre en acte? L'histoire de la dynamis correspond-elle a l'effacement d'un sens primitivement intensif, qui serait celui de la force, au profit du sens aristotelicien de potentialite? Plutot que d'aborder ces questions dans les limites d'une lecture interne du Livre Theta de la Metaphysique sur (...) la puissance et l'acte, ou meme du corpus aristotelicien, la presente recherche plonge d'abord la notion de puissance dans son histoire pre-aristotelicienne, philosophique et non-philosophique. Si les termes d'energeia et d'entelekheia, par lesquels Aristote designe ce qui est en acte, sont des neologismes qui possedent la precision du vocabulaire technique, le mot dynamis appartient au grec courant et comporte une polysemie qui complique la comprehension de son usage. Ce livre veut articuler les sens philosophiques de cette notion chez Aristote a partir de son histoire depuis Homere et Hesiode, a travers Democrite, Xenophon ou encore le corpus hippocratique. Mais l'etude des principaux textes (poetiques, politiques, medicaux, mathematiques, philosophiques) est conduite selon un fil conducteur precis, dicte par l'emploi dominant de ce terme dans la clause restrictive kata dynamin (autant que je le peux). Les significations et l'histoire de la dynamis sont reevaluees a partir de ce nouveau point de depart. L'heritage platonicien est aussi pris en compte pour degager finalement le sens de la critique aristotelicienne de la puissance, qui met en lumiere son indetermination axiologique et ontologique, sans renoncer aux sens de capacite et de force. Nous ne cherchons pas a proposer une etude lexicographique, mais a situer la pensee aristotelicienne de la puissance et de l'acte dans une histoire conceptuelle, en esperant qu'elle gagnera ainsi en coherence et en clarte. (shrink)

This book offers a new and original hypothesis on the origin of modal ontology, whose roots can be traced back to the mathematical debate about incommensurable magnitudes, which forms the implicit background for Plato’s later dialogues and culminates in the definition of being as dynamis in the Sophist. Incommensurable magnitudes – also called dynameis by Theaetetus – are presented as the solution to the problem of non-being and serve as the cornerstone for a philosophy of difference and becoming. This (...) shift also marks the passage to another form of rationality – one not of the measure, but of the mediation. The book argues that the ontology and the rationality which arise out of the discovery of incommensurable constitutes a thread that runs through the entire history of philosophy, one that leads to Kantian transcendentalism and to the philosophies derived from it, such as Hegelianism and philosophical hermeneutics. Readers discover an insightful exchange with some of the most important issues in philosophy, newly reconsidered from the point of view of an ontology of the incommensurable. These issues include the infinite, the continuum, existence, and difference. This text appeals to students and researchers in the fields of ancient philosophy, German idealism, philosophical hermeneutics and the history of mathematics. (shrink)

From its beginning, Critical Theory aimed to explore the laws governing social life as a formational totality and the forces shaping and driving its historical evolution. So the attempt to develop a comprehensive conception of ‘society’ encompassing both its structural as well as its cultural components can be considered one of the defining hallmarks of Critical Theory through all its theoretical and generational variations. But what, then, is Critical Theory’s conception of society? To answer this question, the authors make use (...) of a three-tiered heuristic model distinguishing synthesis (what is society?), dynamis (what are the driving forces of social change?) and praxis ((how) can social change be motivated or influenced by social actors?). In this way, they are able to reconstruct not only the divergences and controversies between the different versions and approaches in Critical Theory across the four generations of authors writing in this tradition, but also four core points of convergence which can serve to differentiate between Critical Theory in the Frankfurt School tradition and other critical theories. These four points, we suggest, should be seen to form the backbone of any valid conception of society in contemporary Critical Theory. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s concepts of dynamis and energeia (commonly translated as potentiality and actuality), and of the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX. I first raise the question of where motion fits in Aristotle’s categories and argue that the locus of motion in the system of categories are the categories of doing and suffering, in which case dynamis and energeia in respect of motion can also be understood as the dynamis and energeia of doing (...) and suffering. Next, I argue that the analogy that Aristotle draws in IX.6 is an analogy between the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering and the dynamis and energeia of substance. Finally, I try to show that it is this analogy between the kinetic and non-kinetic variants of dynamis and energeia—and not the distinction between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities—that provides the key to understanding the structure of Metaphysics IX. (shrink)

In Plato’s Sophist (247e), the Eleatic Stranger seems to propose to define being by means of the notion of dynamis. Although some recent papers have claimed that his dynamis-proposal should be taken seriously (at least as an explication of Plato’s concept of being, if not as a definition in the strict sense) it is still far from clear what this claim amounts to – especially in the case of the being of the forms. This paper shows that, regarding (...) forms, a modal and a formal interpretation of the dynamis-proposal is possible. While the latter interpretation is preferable on philosophical and hermeneutical grounds, it seems to conflict with the principle that a form is a being by participating in the form of being. By distinguishing between direct and indirect participation in the form of being, the paper resolves this conflict, concluding that the formal interpretation of the dynamis-proposal can indeed be read as a philosophically attractive holistic explication of Plato’s concept of the being of forms. (shrink)

Seit jeher bilden »dynamis« und »energeia« das wohl schillerndste Begriffspaar in der Geschichte der Philosophie: In ihrem spannungsgeladenen Wechselspiel kommen Materialismus und Metaphysik, Vermögen und Verwirklichung zusammen. Doch können sie auch als historisch-politische Kategorien verstanden werden? Als solche zeigen gerade die Wendepunkte und Differenzen in ihrer Begriffsgeschichte einen Wandel im Geschichtsdenken und neue Möglichkeiten für politisches Handeln auf. Von Aristoteles über Martin Heidegger bis hin zu Jacques Derrida zeigt Nassima Sahraoui in ihrer eindringlichen Lektüre, dass ein neues Verständnis der (...) antiken »dynamis« aktueller und notwendiger denn je ist, denn sie birgt ein kritisches Potential, durch das auch und gerade heute Momente der Freiheit für uns und unser Denken ermöglicht werden. (shrink)

Images are not neutral conveyors of messages shipped around the globe to achieve globalized spectatorship. They are powerful forces that elicit very diverse responses and can resist new visual hegemonies of our global world. Bringing together case studies from the field of media, art, politics, religion, anthropology and science, this volume breaks new ground by reflecting on the very power of images beyond their medial exploitation. The contributions by Hans Belting, Susan Buck-Morss, Georges Didi-Huberman, W.J.T. Mitchell, and Ticio Escobar among (...) others testify that globalization does not necessarily equal homogenization, and that images can open up alternative ways of picturing what is to come. (shrink)

"This is a full original version of Makowski's work on Aristotelian dunamis (shortened & revised version has been previously published as "Metaphysics of Practical Philosophy" paper). The author presents the Aristotelian conception of capacity/potentiality (dunamis) – one of the most important in Aristotle’s metaphysics. A closer inspection allows to draw conclusion, that the concept of capacity is an important link between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ (metaphysics on the one side, and practical – ethical, rhetorical, political – skills, on the other). A (...) picture of the connection between theory and practice is based on the most important parts of Metaphysics (books delta and theta), it relates metaphysical definitions to an essential element of Aristotelian practical philosophy – the concept of virtue (aretê). In the practical works of Aristotle, we can find different definitions of aretê: in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines aretê using the notion of disposition (hexis), but in Rhetoric he formulates a definition based on the concept of capacity. Distinctive analysis of this inconsistency shows the significance of capacity in The Stagirite’s philosophy.". (shrink)

Responding to the provocative phrase ‘The Age of Grammatology’, I propose to question the notion of ‘age’, and to interrogate the powers or forces, the dynameis or dynasties attached to the interpretative model of historical periodisation. How may we think the undeniable actuality of the event beyond the sempiternal history of ages, and beyond the traditional, onto-teleological chain of power, possibility, force or dynamis that undergirds such history?

On ne peut que saluer la parution de cet ouvrage important, dont le sous-titre exprime d’emblée l’originalité et la force : élucider le sens de la notion aristotélicienne de dynamis par l’étude de son histoire ou de sa genèse (cf. p. 7 et 32). Cette méthode de travail répond à la volonté de débrouiller les fils d’une ambiguïté bien connue de la notion aristotélicienne de puissance, qui se partage entre deux acceptions principales, explicitées en Metaph. Θ : d’une part, (...) la puissance kata kines... (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

Chiurazzi launches a new salvo into the debate over the fundamentality of modality, and, fascinatingly, he does so by using the enemy's artillery. Though Chiurazzi's response is recognizably within...

On the standard interpretation of Metaphysics IX, Aristotle proceeds from the original sense of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια to an ontological conception of these terms. This should raise the question of what is not ontological about the former and what is ontological about the latter. To address these questions I discuss the commentaries by Heidegger and Menn, which alone come close to addressing these issues. But their readings cannot neatly distinguish between the two senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια that we find (...) in the Aristotelian text, thus compelling us to seek a better way of clarifying the standard interpretation, which I argue can be more precisely understood in the following way: δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in their customary meaning cannot be considered ontological in the sense that they have a particular locus among the categories, which is what sets them apart from their newer, ontological meaning. I conclude therefore that the text of Metaphysics IX can be understood as proceeding from an intracategorial conception of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια toward a transcategorial conception of these terms. (shrink)

The essay shows how Heidegger's understanding of physis in Aristotle lays the foundation for his understanding of Ereignis. The essay draws on Heidegger's lecture courses, published and unpublished, particularly "On the Being and Conception of Physis." After introductory remarks on how Heidegger reads Aristotle "phenomenologically" in general, the essay focuses on how Heidegger reads physis as a mode of Being (ousia) by reading kinesis as a mode of Being, specifically as energeia ateles (incomplete Being). But energeia ateles is characterized by (...) Heidegger as Wiederholung (retrieve of possibility) and as Eignung (appropriation of dynamis for appearance). On the basis of that crucial reading of physis, the essay goes on to show how physis-as-dynamis is the foundation for Ereignis in Sein und Zeit through the radical transformation of Wiederholung in natural beings into resolve in Dasein. (shrink)

Guang Yangs Arbeit nimmt die zentrale Frage des heideggerschen Denkens nach dem Wesen des Logos und der Sprache wieder auf, verbindet sie aber mit dem Begriff der Dynamis. So erweist sich der Logos als diejenige Kraft, die zwischen Bewegung und Ruhe vermitteln und damit die Bewegtheit des Seins in sich versammeln kann. Mit dieser in sich gesammelten Kraft hängt auch das Phänomen der Ruhe zusammen, welches die Bewegung auffängt und entsprechend aufgewertet werden muss. Dieser in der Heidegger-Forschung selten beachtete (...) Gedanke der Ruhe deutet auf die privative Dimension des Seins hin, die auch bei Phänomenen wie räumlicher Leere und der Stille zum Tragen kommt und dabei nicht negativ zu fassen ist. In dieser Untersuchung wird zudem - mit und gegen Heidegger - der Möglichkeitscharakter des Seins hervorgehoben, der nicht allein in der vollzugshaften Bewegung aufgeht. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo principal esclarecer a concepção da tradição megárica acerca do conceito de capacidade (δύναμις), tal como apresentada no livro Theta da Metafísica de Aristóteles. A análise se faz necessária devido à falta de atenção aristotélica na formulação da tese adversária dos megáricos, pois em nenhum momento Aristóteles parece nos oferecer argumentos plausíveis que justifiquem de maneira adequada a tese de seus oponentes. Partindo desta dificuldade de reconstrução do argumento megárico e visando lhe oferecer uma maior (...) dignidade, o estudo irá, em primeiro lugar, destrinchar possíveis argumentos que sustentem a tese no contexto da referida obra. Em seguida, irá provar que, mesmo a tese megárica não sendo tão facilmente refutável como uma primeira leitura poderia sugerir, há em sua estrutura problemas graves, que se evidenciam diante da concepção aristotélica da capacidade. (shrink)

El presente volumen está dedicado a la reflexión filosófica inter-cultural y, por ello, con nombre propio, a Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, figura prominente en este ámbito del pensar contemporáneo en Latinoamérica, El Caribe y Europa. Es en gran parte gracias al Prof. Fornet-Betancourt que la voz de los pueblos hispanohablantes de América es escuchada actualmente como expresión de un modo de pensar propio que, sin abandonar el profundo y amplio conocimiento de la tradición, asume nuevas problemáticas y objetos de reflexión, como también (...) permanentes y antiguos dilemas de la existencia hu-mana, desde una perspectiva de diálogo entre culturas. Esta perspec-tiva, abierta a la sensibilidad creativa de la rica mixtura afrodescen-diente, indígena y europea que configura el amplio ethos espiritual de Centroamérica, el Caribe y América Latina, habla al mundo desde lo propio que no se encierra en sus límites, sino que, por el contrario, se atreve en igualdad de condiciones a entrar en diálogo con otras culturas en torno a lo sido del mundo, del hoy que nos compete y de lo que adviene desde ya en el presente. Este es el legado que ya desde hace algunos años construye el Prof. Fornet-Betancourt, y que sirve de marco de referencia a la mayoría de artículos que conforman este número especial de nuestra revista en su honor. (shrink)

Neste e no próximo artigo, buscamos articular a visão compreensiva arquitetônica de Peirce a respeito do fenômeno da retórica relacionando sua abordagem em Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing com seu tratamento na classificação muito negligenciado das ciências práticas. Neste artigo, primeiro, reconstruímos o principal eixo conceitual de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, que é erguido pelos termos ‘arte universal da retórica’, ‘retórica ordinária’, e ‘retórica especulativa’. Na medida em que este eixo nos guia para a classificação dos estudos especiais (...) da retórica que Peirce propõe na seção final de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, a cuidadosa reconstrução deste eixo constitui um dever hermenêutico, a negligência do qual impediria uma compreensão adequada do que Peirce está classificando no fim de sua abordagem mais madura da Retórica Especulativa. Em seguida, procedemos à exposição das raízes aristotélicas da concepção de Peirce da arte universal da retórica e analisamos a relação intrínseca que a semiose retórica tem com o summum bonum como uma de suas formas evolutivas históricas. Se esta interpretação da concepção de retórica do Peirce é adequado, no entanto, devemos esperar que ele nos dê em algum lugar uma descrição da capacidade de evolução da retórica – e portanto, de crescer – antes de tudo. Será a tarefa de um segundo artigo subsequente mostrar que e de que maneira a concepção de Peirce da a retórica como ciência prática e faculdade instintiva enraizado no “instinto gráfico” responde pela sua capacidade para o crescimento. (shrink)

This piece considers especially the concept of potentiality in Agamben, and how it is indebted to and present in Foucault’s thought. It draws on Aristotle to highlight important aspects of potentiality and to consider Agamben’s interpretation of it. The paper thus indicates some of the important ontological and methodological aspects of the relations between Foucault and Agamben.

This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental for the Western tradition of political thought: (1) that between the bare fact of being alive and "qualified" living (associated by Agamben with an alleged distinction between zōē and bios) and (2) that between potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). Agamben's concept of form-of-life (forma-di-vita), a life that is never "bare" (...) but always in the process of qualifying itself, is designed to deactivate and overcome these distinctions. In the final volume of the series, The Use of Bodies (2014), this is done with the help of the Aristotelian concepts of use (chrēsis) and habit (hexis). (shrink)

El presente trabajo ofrece un análisis de una serie de artículos de GiorgioAgamben en los que se presenta una lectura del problema de la dynamis queresulta fundamental para comprender no sólo su posterior participación engran parte de los debates filosófico-políticos sino también las implicanciasconceptuales del concepto de “vida” en el marco de su filosofía. Se evalúa,en primer lugar, la lectura del tópico aristotélico del intelecto pasivo a la luzde la interpretación del averroísmo latino y las consecuencias que Agambenextrae para (...) el pensamiento y la política. Y se construye, en segundo lugar,una interpretación de lo que llamaremos una “vida potencial”, uno de cuyosejemplos eminentes será “Bartleby”, figura literaria de la potencia que seperfila como una de los modos posibles de la resistencia política. (shrink)

Proceedings of two study days held in Paris and Oxford about a recurring conceptual triad: ousia, dynamis and energeia, active in Ancient thought and practices, either philosophical or not.

En este trabajo partimos de la hipótesis de que Heidegger tiene en miras las nociones aristotélicas de _δύναμις_ (_dýnamis_) y _δυνατóν_ (_dynatón_) al momento de tematizar su concepto de posibilidad (_Möglichkeit_) en _Sein und Zeit_ (1927), pero no con el sólo propósito de asimilar las reseñadas conceptualizaciones –apropiación que, como veremos subsiguientemente, no es plena-, sino también, para radicalizarlas, asumiendo un punto de vista francamente superador. Sustentamos esta tesis, en principio, en el hecho que Aristóteles haya pensado que la _ἐνέργεια_ (...) (_enérgeia_) o _ἐντελέχεια_ (_entelécheia_) es, en términos generales, anterior (_πρότερον_/_próteron_) respecto de la _dýnamis_, siendo esta posición teórica revisada y renovada por Heidegger en el texto reseñado. Por otra parte, Heidegger cuestiona la tesis aristotélica de la fundamentalidad de la realidad efectiva (_Wirklichkeit_) o de la realidad a secas (_Realität_) y como consecuencia de ello, el concepto aristotélico de ser (_εἶναι/eînai_), _ἐστίν_ (_estín_) o lo que es (_ὄν/ón_), señalando no sólo que la posibilidad es más originaria que la realidad efectiva, sino también, que la realización de una posibilidad no implica nunca la transición a una realidad efectiva. Además, el vínculo de Heidegger con Aristóteles se inicia muy tempranamente -más específicamente, en el año 1907-, merced a la lectura de la tesis doctoral de Franz Brentano y se prolonga constantemente desde 1921, cuando Heidegger dicte un seminario sobre _De Anima_ en la Universidad de Friburgo. (shrink)

Dynamis: Acta Hispanica ad Medicinae Scientiarumque Historiam Illustrandum. Guillermo Olague Llull: Boletin de la Sociedad Espanola de Historia de las Ciencias. Mariano Hormigon Quipu: Revista Latinoamercana de Historia de las Ciencias y la Tecnologia. Juan Jose Saldana.