Results for 'dogmatism'

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  1. The Dogmatist, Moore's Proof and Transmission Failure.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):382-389.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.
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  2. The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.
    According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle relies on called (...)
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  3. If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.
    Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have (...)
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  4.  75
    The Struggle Against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy.Oskari Kuusela - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
    Wittgenstein on philosophical problems : from one fundamental problem to particular problems -- The Tractatus on philosophical problems -- Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophical problems -- Examples of philosophical problems as based on misunderstandings -- Tendencies and inclinations of thinking : philosophy as therapy -- Wittgenstein's notion of peace in philosophy : the contrast with the Tractatus -- Two conceptions of clarification -- The Tractatus's conception of philosophy as logical analysis -- Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractatus's notion of logical (...)
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  5. Phenomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism and the Distinctiveness Problem.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.
    Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if $S$ has a perceptual experience that $p$ , then $S$ has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that $p$ in virtue of the experience’s phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, in (...)
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  6. The Perils of Dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    "Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could (...)
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  7. Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.
  8. Dogmatism Repuzzled.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):307 - 321.
    Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic (...)
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  9. The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
    Dogmatism is sometimes thought to be incompatible with Bayesian models of rational learning. I show that the best model for updating imprecise credences is compatible with dogmatism.
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  10. Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):611-633.
    Suppose that you and I disagree about some non-straightforward matter of fact (say, about whether capital punishment tends to have a deterrent effect on crime). Psychologists have demonstrated the following striking phenomenon: if you and I are subsequently exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on the question, doing so tends to increase the extent of our initial disagreement. That is, in response to exactly the same evidence, each of us grows increasingly confident of his or her original (...)
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  11. The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
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  12. Dogmatism, Probability, and Logical Uncertainty.David Jehle & Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 95--111.
    Many epistemologists hold that an agent can come to justifiably believe that p is true by seeing that it appears that p is true, without having any antecedent reason to believe that visual impressions are generally reliable. Certain reliabilists think this, at least if the agent’s vision is generally reliable. And it is a central tenet of dogmatism (as described by Pryor (2000) and Pryor (2004)) that this is possible. Against these positions it has been argued (e.g. by Cohen (...)
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  13. In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects (...)
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  14. Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.
    I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience (...)
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  15.  13
    Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives.Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) - 2021 - London, UK: Routledge.
    Introduction / Alessandra Tanesini and Michael P. Lynch -- Reassessing different conceptions of argumentation / Catarina Dutilh Novaes -- Martial metaphors and argumentative virtues and vices / Ian James Kidd -- Arrogance and deep disagreement / Andrew Aberdein -- Closed-mindedness and arrogance / Heather Battaly -- Intellectual trust and the marketplace of ideas / Allan Hazlett -- Is searching the Internet making us intellectually arrogant? / J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon -- Intellectual humility and the curse of knowledge (...)
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  16. Dogmatism Without Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):195-211.
    One common way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes (or perhaps entails) Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. This paper is an attempt to articulate the latter view.
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  17. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology.Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat & Jonathan Barnes (eds.) - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
    THE PROTAGONISTS David Sedley The primary object of this historical introduction1 is to enable a reader encountering Hellenistic philosophy for the first ...
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  18. Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism.Matthew Mcgrath - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.
  19. The Toxin and the Dogmatist.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740.
    According to the dogmatist, knowing p makes it rational to disregard future evidence against p. The standard response to the dogmatist holds that knowledge is defeasible: acquiring evidence against something you know undermines your knowledge. However, this response leaves a residual puzzle, according to which knowledge makes it rational to intend to disregard future counterevidence. I argue that we can resolve this residual puzzle by turning to an unlikely source: Kavka’s toxin puzzle. One lesson of the toxin puzzle is that (...)
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  20.  73
    The de Lagunas’ Dogmatism and Evolution, Overcoming Modern Philosophy and Making Post-Quinean Analytic Philosophy.Joel Katzav - 2022 - In Eric Schliesser (ed.), Neglected Classics of Philosophy 2. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 192-214.
    Willard V. Quine’s 1951 article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Two Dogmas) was taken to be revolutionary because it rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and the thesis that empirical statements are confirmed individually rather than holistically. The present chapter, however, argues that the overcoming of modern philosophy already included the overcoming of these theses by Hegelians, pragmatists and two critics of Hegelianism and pragmatism, Grace and Theodore de Laguna. From this perspective, Two Dogmas offers a Hegelian epistemology that was already superseded in (...)
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  21. Against Emotional Dogmatism.Brogaard Berit & Chudnoff Elijah - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):59-77.
    It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from (...)
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  22. Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.
    ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the (...)
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  23. Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 270.
  24.  51
    Metaphysical Dogmatism, Humean Scepticism, Kantian Criticism.Robert Stern - 2006 - Kantian Review 11:102-116.
    In this article, I want to argue that scepticism for Kant must be seen in ancient and not just modern terms, and that if we take this into account we will need to take a different view of Kant's response to Hume from the one that is standardly presented in the literature. This standard view has been put forward recently by Paul Guyer, and it is therefore his view that I want to look at in some detail, and to try (...)
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  25.  23
    A Defense of Dogmatism.Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
    Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters (...)
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  26.  5
    Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy.Theodore de Laguna & Grace A. de Laguna - 1910 - New York: Macmillan.
    This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...)
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  27. On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation.Peter Kung - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.
    Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes' and Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences (...)
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  28.  29
    Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nick Hughes - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):591-596.
  29.  82
    On Synchronic Dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the (...)
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  30.  60
    The prospects of emotional dogmatism.Eilidh Harrison - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2535-2555.
    The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant support in recent years. The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies my belief that I’ve been wronged putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative beliefs. However, despite the fact that this justificatory thesis of emotion is fundamentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little (...)
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  31. Dogmatism and the Epistemology of Covert Selection.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - In Nathan Ballantyne & David Dunning (eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual dogmatism is a prominent theory in epistemology concerning the relationship between perceptual experience and reasonable belief. It holds that, in the absence of counterevidence, it is reasonable to believe what your perceptual experience tells you. Thus, if you are not aware of your experience’s casual history, then it doesn’t matter. Critics object that the causal history does matter: when a perceptual experience is caused in certain ways, it is unreasonable to trust what it tells you. These objections regularly (...)
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  32. Knowledge and Dogmatism.Peter Baumann - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):1-19.
    There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a (...)
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  33.  91
    Grounding Perceptual Dogmatism: What Are Perceptual Seemings?Harmen Ghijsen - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):196-215.
    Perceptual Dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that p, then S has immediate prima facie justification for the belief that p. Various philosophers have made the notion of a perceptual seeming more precise by distinguishing perceptual seemings from both sensations and beliefs to accommodate a) the epistemic difference between perceptual judgments of novices and experts, and, b) the problem of the speckled hen. Using somewhat different terminology, perceptual seemings are supposed to be high-level percepts instead of (...)
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  34. Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because (...)
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  35. Phenomenal Dogmatism, Seeming Evidentialism and Inferential Justification.Berit Brogaard - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer Verlag.
     
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  36. Closed-Mindedness and Dogmatism.Heather Battaly - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):261-282.
  37.  25
    Drama, Dogmatism, and the 'Equals'argument in Plato's Phaedo.David Lee - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 44:1.
  38. Drama, Dogmatism, and the ‘Equals’ Argument in Plato’s Phaedo.David C. Lee - 2013 - In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 44. Oxford University Press UK.
    Mainstream interpretations of the Phaedo take the dialogue to have a metaphysical theory at its core, primarily disagreeing on whether this theory is assumed without argument in the dialogue, or whether an attempt is made to justify it. This disagreement particularly bears on the interpretation of the ‘equals argument’ at 74a–c. The present discussion brings out a commitment shared by these different interpretations: they adopt a ‘top-down’ method, according to which the Phaedo must be understood in terms of premises and (...)
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  39. The Perils of Dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
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  40. Heuristic Dogmatism.Clark Butler - unknown
    This article distinguishes between dogmatism as usually understood, unconditional dogmatism, and "dogmatism" in good sense, heuristic dogmatism. Reprinted as "Philosophy: What it is and Why" in Statements, edited for classroom use by Kathleen Squadrito, pp. 1-10.
     
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  41.  18
    Relativism, Dogmatism, and Rationality.David R. Hiley - 1979 - International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):133-149.
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  42.  53
    The Dogmatists and Wright on Moore’s “Proof”.Mark McBride - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):1-20.
    Suppose one has a visual experience as of having hands, and then reasons as follows: I have hands, If I have hands an external world exists; An external world exists. Suppose one’s visual experience gives one defeasible perceptual warrant, or justification, to believe – that is, one’s experience makes it epistemically appropriate to believe . And suppose one comes to believe on the basis of this visual experience. The conditional premise is knowable a priori. And can be established by modus (...)
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    Bootstrapping, Dogmatism, and the Structure of Epistemic Justification.Shyam Nair - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Dogmatism is the view that perceptual experience provides immediate defeasible justification for certain beliefs. The bootstrapping problem for dogmatism is that it sanctions a certain defective form of reasoning that concludes in the belief that one's perceptual faculties are reliable. This paper argues that the only way for the dogmatist to avoid the bootstrapping problem is to claim that epistemic justification fails to have a structural property known as cut. This allows the dogmatist to admit that each step (...)
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  44. Two Dogmatists.Charles Pigden - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (1 & 2):173 – 193.
    Grice and Strawson's 'In Defense of a Dogma is admired even by revisionist Quineans such as Putnam (1962) who should know better. The analytic/synthetic distinction they defend is distinct from that which Putnam successfully rehabilitates. Theirs is the post-positivist distinction bounding a grossly enlarged analytic. It is not, as they claim, the sanctified product of a long philosophic tradition, but the cast-off of a defunct philosophy - logical positivism. The fact that the distinction can be communally drawn does not show (...)
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  45.  2
    Dogmatism, Criticism, Divine Ideals: Rav A. I. Kook’s Concept of God in Light of H. Cohen.Yehuda Oren - 2021 - Naharaim 15 (2):153-177.
    This paper examines the claim that the two final articles of Rav Kook’s book Ikvei Hatzon were written as a response to a lecture given by Hermann Cohen. It first reviews Cohen’s lecture showing that, regarding the concept of God, Cohen argues for the compatibility of Judaism and Kantianism in denying the dogmatic-mythological preoccupation with the existence of God in favor of understanding God as the basis of morality. Second, it analyzes Kook’s articles, demonstrating that he accepts the compatibility of (...)
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    Blasphemy, Dogmatism and Injustice: The Rough Edges of on Certainty. [REVIEW]Robert Plant - 2003 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (2):101-135.
    On Certainty remains one the mostprovocative and challenging parts ofWittgenstein's intellectual legacy.Philosophers generally read this text as anassault on the traditional sceptic/anti-scepticdebate. But some commentators identifypolitical – specifically `conservative' –sentiments at work here. Others embraceWittgenstein's (alleged) `pluralism', whilethose less enthused think the latter collapsesinto relativism. Although this mixed receptionis, I will argue, partly due to Wittgenstein'sown troubled engagement with the central themesof On Certainty, the real difficultyand value of this text lies in itsintertwining questions of epistemology,religious belief and ethical-politicaljudgement.
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  47.  41
    Between Dogmatism and Relativism: André Comte-Sponville’s Cynicism.Sébastien Charles - 1998 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (1):38-45.
    This essay introduces the work of Andre Comte-Sponville to an English audience by explaining his ethical position. Comte-Sponville calls this position “cynicism,” and intends it as a correction of the excesses of both relativism and dogmatism. The distinction critical for understanding cynicism is that between value and truth, which are here used to explain all three: cynicism, dogmatism, and relativism.
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    Between Dogmatism and Relativism: André Comte-Sponville’s Cynicism.Sébastien Charles - 1998 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (1):38-45.
    This essay introduces the work of Andre Comte-Sponville to an English audience by explaining his ethical position. Comte-Sponville calls this position “cynicism,” and intends it as a correction of the excesses of both relativism and dogmatism. The distinction critical for understanding cynicism is that between value and truth, which are here used to explain all three: cynicism, dogmatism, and relativism.
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  49. Against Dogmatism: Dwelling in Faith and Doubt.Madhuri M. Yadlapati - 2013 - University of Illinois Press.
    Many contemporary discussions of religion take an absolute, intractable approach to belief and non-belief, which privileges faith and dogmatism while treating doubt as a threat to religious values. As Madhuri M. Yadlapati demonstrates, however, there is another way: a faith that embraces doubt and its potential for exploring both the depths and heights of spiritual reflection and speculation. Through three distinct discussions of faith, doubt, and hope, Yadlapati explores what it means to live creatively and responsibly in the everyday (...)
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  50. Dogmatism and Moorean Reasoning.Markos Valaris - manuscript
    According to dogmatism, one may know a proposition by inferring it from a set of evidence even if one has no independent grounds for rejecting a skeptical hypothesis compatible with one’s evidence but incompatible with one’s conclusion. Despite its intuitive attractions, many philosophers have argued that dogmatism goes wrong because they have thought that it licenses Moorean reasoning — i.e., reasoning in which one uses the conclusion of an inference as a premise in an argument against a skeptical (...)
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