Perhaps no philosopher has so fully explored the nature and conditions of historical understanding as Wilhelm Dilthey. His work, conceived overall as a Critique of Historical Reason and developed through his well-known theory of the human studies, provides concepts and methods still fruitful for those concerned with analyzing the human condition. Despite the increasing recognition of Dilthey's contributions, relati vely few of his writings have as yet appeared in English translation. It is therefore both timely and useful to have available (...) here two works drawn from different phases in the development of his philosophy. The "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology" (1894), now translated into English for the first time, sets forth Dilthey's programma tic and methodological viewpoints through a descriptive psychology, while "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life" (ca. 1910) is representative of his later hermeneutic approach to historical understanding. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN STUDIES Dilthey presented the first mature statement of his theory of the human studies in volume one of his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Studies), published in 1883. He argued there that for the proper study of man and history we must eschew the metaphysical speculation of the absolute idealists while at the same time avoiding the scientistic reduction of positivism. (shrink)

Franz Brentano (1838-1917) is a key figure in the development of Twentieth Century thought. It was his work that set Husserl on to the road of phenomenology and intentionality, that inspired Meinong's theory of the object which influenced Bertrand Russell, and the entire Polish school of philosophy. ^Descriptive Psychology presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887; they were the culmination of his work, and the clearest statement of his mature thought. It was this later period (...) which proved to be so important in the work of his student, Husserl. This is the first English translation of his work. Benito Muller has added a concise introduction which places Brentano within the history of philosophy and psychology, and locates his influence in contemporary thought. (shrink)

Franz Brentano is a key figure in the development of Twentieth Century thought. It was his work that set Husserl on to the road of phenomenology and intentionality, that inspired Meinong's theory of the object which influenced Bertrand Russell, and the entire Polish school of philosophy. ^Descriptive Psychology presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887; they were the culmination of his work, and the clearest statement of his mature thought. It was this later period which (...) proved to be so important in the work of his student, Husserl. This is the first English translation of his work. Benito Muller has added a concise introduction which places Brentano within the history of philosophy and psychology, and locates his influence in contemporary thought. (shrink)

Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective—to offer a description of our mental functions and of their relations to objects—and both called their respective research programs ‘descriptive psychology’, they seem to have used the term to refer to two different methods of psychological research. In this article, I compare analyses of these differences. Against the reading of Orth but also against a possible application of recent relativist accounts of the epistemology of peer (...) disagreement to this case, I argue that their apparent shared objective is not enough to support an understanding of their views as two alternatives within a given historical or scientific context, or as a mutual peer disagreement. I show that the impression of a shared objective can be explained away as stemming from the influence of their teacher Adolf Trendelenburg, and I stress that the case of introspection strongly suggests that an account in terms of peer disagreement is not plausible. Finally, I conclude that the opposition between two traditions, Austrian philosophy and historicism, might be better suited to account for the dispute and its apparent common historical context. (shrink)

In defining his phenomenology as descriptive psychology in the introduction to the first edition of his Logical Investigations 1, Husserl suggests that the field study of his phenomenology as his methodology are very close to that of Brentano’s psychology, and that the research in the book somehow contributes to Brentano’s philosophical program, one of whose main axes is psychology or philosophy of mind.

This article defends the thesis that in theorizing about the mind we need to accord first-person (“introspective” or “reflective”) judgments about experience a “selective provisional trust.” Such an approach can form part of a descriptive psychology. It is here so employed to evaluate some influential interpretations of research on attention to conclude that—despite what conventional wisdom suggests—an “introspection-positive” policy actually offers us a better critical perspective than its contrary. What supposedly teaches us the worthlessness of introspection actually shows (...) us why we need to take it seriously. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the different views of the founders of descriptive psychology in the 19th century about the meaning and purpose of this discipline and sketch a new plan for connecting descriptive psychology with the language-critical tradition of analytic philosophy. I will show that the goals Hermann Lotze, Franz Brentano, and Wilhelm Dilthey set for descriptive psychology were too lofty for different reasons. The common problem they faced was how to reconcile the (...) ideal of autonomous philosophical knowledge with the empirical relevance that descriptive psychology should have. Faced with this dilemma, I outline a new plan to conceive of descriptive psychology as a critical project aimed at overcoming the obstacles that language places in the way of our knowledge of mental phenomena. (shrink)

Is phenomenology nothing else than descriptive psychology? In the first edition of his Logical Investigations (LI), Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a description and analysis of the experiences of knowledge, unequivocally stating that “phenomenology is descriptive psychology.” Most interestingly, although the first edition of the LI was the reference par excellence in phenomenology for the Munich phenomenologists, they remained suspicious of this characterisationof phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the reception (...) of descriptive psychology among Munich phenomenologists and, at the same time, to offer a re-evaluation of their understanding of realist phenomenology. (shrink)

This article reevaluates Hermann Ebbinghaus’s famous criticisms of Wilhelm Dilthey’s 1894 essay “Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology,” to determine how Dilthey’s diverse approaches toward philosophy and the human sciences are related to experimental psychology and to hypothetico-deductive science. It turns out that Ebbinghaus falsely accuses Dilthey of rejecting experimental psychology overall, while, in fact, Dilthey rejects only a specific misuse of experimental psychology: as a way to provide a foundation for the humanities. At (...) the same time, Dilthey recognizes several ways in which philosophy and the human sciences might benefit from experimental psychology. Although it clearly rules out experimental psychology, Dilthey’s descriptive psychology involves a hypothetico-deductive standpoint that intermediates, with some success, between modern social science and nineteenth-century hermeneutics. (shrink)

Entry on the influence of Stumpf et Brentano on Husserl's early phenomenology during the Halle period.

The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning and value of the criticism that Stumpf address to Husserl's phenomenology in Ideas I. My presentation is divided into four parts: I briefly describe the relationship between Stumpf and the young Husserl during his stay in Halle (1886-1901); then I will comment Stumpf's remarks on the definition of Husserl's phenomenology as descriptive psychology in his Logical Investigations; in the third part, I examine Husserl's notice in section 86 of (...) Ideas I where he compares his own terminology to that of Stumpf; finally I comment on Stumpf's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology in his last book Erkenntnislehre. (shrink)

We have attempted to delineate various components of the researcher's participation in the reflection phase of descriptive psychology. The characteristic attitude or posture, operations for the comprehension of a particular event, and activities which achieve general knowledge have been touched upon. This presentation is a preliminary attempt to bring into view the complex process of analysis in descriptive research and is intended as an invitation to more faithful and detailed accounts of the process in the future.

The past few decades have seen an explosion of research on causal reasoning in philosophy, computer science, and statistics, as well as descriptive work in psychology. In Causation with a Human Face, James Woodward integrates these lines of research and argues for an understanding of how each can inform the other: normative ideas can suggest interesting experiments, while descriptive results can suggest important normative concepts. Woodward's overall framework builds on the interventionist treatment of causation that he developed (...) in Making Things Happen. Normative ideas discussed include proposals about the role of invariant or stable relationships in successful causal reasoning and the notion of proportionality. He argues that these normative ideas are reflected in the causal judgments that people actually make as a descriptive matter. Woodward also discusses the common philosophical practice-particularly salient in philosophical accounts of causation--of appealing to intuitions or judgments about cases in support of philosophical theses. He explores how, properly understood, such appeals are not different in principle from appeals to results from empirical research, and demonstrates how they may serve as a useful source of information about causal cognition. (shrink)

This paper, like its companion explores some ways in which, on the one hand, normative theorizing about causation and causal reasoning and, on the other, empirical psychological investigations into causal cognition can be mutually illuminating. The topics considered include the connection between causal claims and claims about the outcomes of interventions and the various ways that invariance claims figure in causal judgment.

Discusses the phenomenological foundations for qualitative research in psychology which operates out of the intersection of phenomenological philosophy, science, and psychology; challenges long-standing assumptions about the practice of grounding the science of psychology in empiricism and asserts that the broader philosophy of phenomenological theory of science permits more adequate psychological development"--Provided by publisher.

This paper explores Dilthey's "descriptive psychology "and its significance for the anthropology of consciousness. To do justice to the complexities of Dilthey's project a significant portion of the paper is devoted to an exposition of the basic tenets of his"descriptive psychology." Most notably, his views on"experience,""aconsciousness,""introspection,"and"objectified mind"are discussed before turning to examine his concept of the"acquired psychicnexus." After outlining these basic tenets the paper turns to explore how Dilthey's "descriptive psychology"can serve to shed light (...) on current anthropological research on the experience of pain. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the contemporary relevance of Dilthey's project as it explores how his ideas may further inform current theoretical perspectives in anthropology about the relationship between consciousness, culture, and experience. (shrink)

Abstract: In this study, I propose to examine Marty’s reconstruction of the general framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. My starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of Brentano’s Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena, which constitute the basis of Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects. In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised against Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary (...) objects and Marty’s interpretation of Brentano’s theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. Here, I analyse Marty’s principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in 1874. The last section is an examination of Marty’s conception of consciousness as self-consciousness with respect to his principle of individuation. (shrink)

There is a narrow thread in the vast literature on Kafka which pertains to Kafka’s knowledge of philosophy, and more precisely to Kafka’s use in his fictional writings of some of the main ideas of Franz Brentano. Kafka attended courses in philosophy at the Charles University given by Brentano’s students Anton Marty and Christian von Ehrenfels, and was for several years a member of a discussion-group organized by orthodox adherents of the Brentanian philosophy in Prague. The present essay summarizes what (...) is known about Kafka’s relations to the Brentanist movement. It draws on Brentanian ideas on the evidence of inner perception, on oblique consciousness, on active introspection, on correct and incorrect judgment, and on consciousness as a species of inner tribunal, in order to throw light on central features of Kafka’s writings, including stylistic features. Special attention is directed towards Die Verwandlung and Der Prozess, and a reading of the latter is offered according to which the trial of Joseph K. occurs entirely within the mind of K. himself. The revisions in the 1997 version of the paper relate especially to the treatment of Kafka and Brentano in Arnold Heidsieck’s book The Intellectual Contexts of Kafka’s Fiction: Philosophy, Law, Religion, of 1994. (shrink)

This article looks back at some aspects of the heritage of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations on the occasion of that work's centennial, following some clues Husserl offered in his own 1925 retrospective evaluation. The themes pursued are: Dilthey's surprisingly enthusiastic appreciation of the work; Husserl's subsequent recognition of the kernel of truth in psychologism; the complex question of phenomenology as descriptive psychology; and, finally, the distinctive view of mental life introduced in that work.

In this paper I will discuss Barry Smith’s and Kevin Mulligan’s revision of Husserl’s phenomenology, starting from the fact that many Italian scholars seem to follow them in a sense, by dealing with phenomenology as a sort of a priori ontology. Therefore, I will first reconstruct Smith’s and Mulligan’s attempt and its objectives, then I will show how it is rooted in the school of Brentano and, in particular, in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will provide some arguments against this attempt (...) : first of all that it does not attain a better description of the world, secondly that phenomenology does the job of formal ontology better than the latter. (shrink)

The paper tries to analyze two notions, namely 'proterosis' ('Proterose') and 'proteraethesis' ('Proterasthese'), as used in these lectures to describe certain psychical phenomena, and to suggest a symbolic notation as a means of representing the results of this analysis. These results (and the notation) will be put to use in an interpretation of an uncharacteristically difficult passage of these lectures concerning the methodology of bringing someone to 'notice' something.

Um aspecto central dos debates da filosofia da cultura nos anos entre 1860 e 1914 foi a pergunta pela origem da linguagem. Se a origem da linguagem reside na natureza, então existem motivos exclusivamente naturais para o surgimento e desenvolvimento da linguagem. Entretanto, se a linguagem humana já for originalmente um artefato humano, então a história natural geral tampouco nos pode oferecer ajuda para compreender a forma de vida humana. A essas opções podemos chamar, abreviadamente, de “naturalismo” e “culturalismo”. Que (...) aqui observemos um terreno cultural-filosófico e cultural-político disputado, já era completamente sabido por Anton Marty (1847-1914), quando ele tentava se posicionar no mundo acadêmico com a sua dissertação, publicada no ano de 1875 sob o título de Sobre a Origem da Linguagem. Marty não adere a um partido, mas sim se volta tanto contra o naturalismo e contra o culturalismo de seu tempo. Marty dá à sua concepção o título de “empirismo”, ainda que seja surpreendente que ele não opere nenhuma pesquisa empírica sobre o uso linguístico, mas sim que busque uma maneira necessária de explicação para o desenvolvimento da linguagem e cultura. Sua hipótese antropológica de que o homem seja comunicativo por natureza está localizada na fronteira de interpretações naturalistas e culturalistas da cultura do homem. No meu artigo, quero mostrar que a resposta de Marty à pergunta pela origem da linguagem não dá fim ao debate, mas sim o deixa mais afiado. (shrink)

The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and (...) Merleau-Ponty. This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

This book provides an overview of behavioral decision theory and related research findings. In brief, behavioral decision theory is a general term for descriptive theories to explain the psychological knowledge related to decision-making behavior. It is called a theory, but actually it is a combination of various psychological theories, for which no axiomatic systems, such as the utility theory widely used in economics, have been established; it is often limited to qualitative knowledge. However, as suggested in the studies of (...) H. A. Simon, who won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1978, and D. Kahneman, who won the prize in 2002, the psychological methodology and knowledge of behavioral decision theory have been applied widely in such fields as economics, business administration, and engineering, and are expected to become more useful in the future. This book explains various behavioral decision theories related to decision-making processes. Numerous models have been proposed to explain the psychological processes related to such a selection of decision strategies, and this book also introduces some new models that are useful to explain decision-making processes. The book concludes with speculation about the future of modern behavioral decision theories while referring to their relation to fields associated with neuroscience, such as neuroeconomics, that have been developed in recent years. In addition, each chapter includes a bibliography that can be referred to when studying more details related to behavioral decision theory. Reading this book requires no advanced expertise; nonetheless, an introductory knowledge of psychology, business administration, and economics, and approximately a high school graduate’s level of mathematics should facilitate the reader’s comprehension of the content. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é o de explorar as relações entre psicologia, metafísica e literatura, a partir do exame do Ensaio sobre os dados imediatos da consciência; mais exatamente, a partir da compreensão dos "sentimentos profundos", que representa, no Ensaio, o momento privilegiado para apreender a estrutura temporal da consciência. Porém, o presente estudo não abordará unicamente o texto de Bergson, suas descrições dos sentimentos profundos (como as emoções estéticas e morais), o que muito provavelmente seria repetitivo. O uso de (...) um exemplo extraído da própria literatura (no caso, o romance Grande sertão: veredas, de Guimarães Rosa) será imprescindível aqui para compreender a possibilidade de uma descrição qualitativa do "fluxo da consciência", revelando sua estrutura temporal. A partir disso, espera-se determinar com um pouco mais de clareza as interações entre psicologia, metafísica e literatura, na filosofia de Bergson. This paper aims to explore the relation between psychology, metaphysics and literature, through an examination of Bergon's Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, or, more precisely, through the description of "deep feelings", which represent in the Essay a privileged moment for understanding the temporal structure of consciousness. However, this study will not be restricted only to Bergson's text and its descriptions of deep feelings (such as aesthetic and moral emotions), which would probably be repetitive. Instead, we shall use a work of literature (Guimarães Rosa's novel, Grande sertão: veredas) to exemplify the possibility of a qualitative description of "stream of consciousness", revealing its temporal structure. We hope in this way to clarify the interaction between psychology, metaphysics and literature in the philosophy of Bergson. (shrink)

Cross-domain descriptions are descriptions of features pertaining to one domain in terms of vocabulary primarily associated with another domain. Notably, we routinely describe psychological features in terms of the sensory domain and vice versa. Sorrow is said to be ‘bitter’ and fear ‘cold’. Music can be described as ‘happy’, ‘sad’, ‘mournful’, and so on. Such descriptions are rife in both everyday discourse and literary writings. What is it about psychological features that invites descriptions in sensory terms and what is it (...) about the sensory that invites descriptions in terms of the psychological? Drawing on the literature on polysemy, this paper sheds light on cross-domain descriptions pertaining to the sensory and the psychological domains. (shrink)

There is no descriptive science of the stream of consciousness in the literature of the social sciences, and as a result, we do not have an empirical understanding of the nature of the healthy human mind.This paper will:(1)demonstrate that an empirically valid theory of the healthy mind must be a theory that isderived from a descriptive science ofthe stream of consciousness (2) present the rationale and methodology for doing interviews with a specific group ofTibetan lamas who have been (...) using meditation for over ten and a half centuries todevelop a descriptive science/if the streamofconsciousnessand (3) present briefexcerpts from some ofthe interviews I have been doing with these lamas. In these interviews, the lamas discuss their experiences of their own mind in meditation for the purpose of: (1) developing a descriptive science ofthe stream of consciousness and (2) using that descriptive science to discuss and describe the defining characteristics ofthe healthy human mind. (shrink)

By a logical theory I mean a formal system together with its semantics, meta-theory, and rules for translating ordinary language into its notation. Logical theories can be used descriptively (for example, to represent particular arguments or to depict the logical form of certain sentences). Here the logician uses the usual methods of empirical science to assess the correctness of his descriptions. However, the most important applications of logical theories are normative, and here, I argue, the epistemology is that of wide (...) reflective equilibrium. The result is that logic not only assesses our inferential practice but also changes it. I tie my discussion to Thagard's views concerning the relationship between psychology and logic, arguing against him that psychology has and should have only a peripheral role in normative (and most descriptive) applications of logic. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to describe a methodology for revising logical principles in the light of empirical psychological findings. Historical philosophy of science and wide reflective equilibrium in ethics are considered as providing possible models for arguing from the descriptive to the normative. Neither is adequate for the psychology/logic case, and a new model is constructed, employing criteria for evaluating inferential systems. Once we have such criteria, the notion of reflective equilibrium becomes redundant.

Most psychological research consists of experiments that put people in artificial situations that elicit unnatural behavior whose ecological validity is unknown. Without knowing the psychocultural meaning of experimental situations, we cannot interpret the responses of WEIRD people, let alone people in other cultures. Psychology, like other sciences, needs to be solidly rooted in naturalistic observation and description of people around the world. Theory should be inductively developed and tested against real-world behavior.