The most widely debated conception of democracy in recent years is deliberativedemocracy--the idea that citizens or their representatives owe each other mutually acceptable reasons for the laws they enact. Two prominent voices in the ongoing discussion are Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. In Why DeliberativeDemocracy?, they move the debate forward beyond their influential book, Democracy and Disagreement.What exactly is deliberativedemocracy? Why is it more defensible than its rivals? By offering (...) clear answers to these timely questions, Gutmann and Thompson illuminate the theory and practice of justifying public policies in contemporary democracies. They not only develop their theory of deliberativedemocracy in new directions but also apply it to new practical problems. They discuss bioethics, health care, truth commissions, educational policy, and decisions to declare war. In "What DeliberativeDemocracy Means," which opens this collection of essays, they provide the most accessible exposition of deliberativedemocracy to date. They show how deliberativedemocracy should play an important role even in the debates about military intervention abroad.Why DeliberativeDemocracy? contributes to our understanding of how democratic citizens and their representatives can make justifiable decisions for their society in the face of the fundamental disagreements that are inevitable in diverse societies. Gutmann and Thompson provide a balanced and fair-minded approach that will benefit anyone intent on giving reason and reciprocity a more prominent place in politics than power and special interests. (shrink)
One of the main reasons that liberal democratic societies are not ill-prepared to confront the present challenge presented by disaffection with democratic institutions, is that the type of political theory currently in vogue is dominated by an individualistic, universalistic, and rationalistic framework. This erases the dimension of the political and impedes envisaging in an adequate manner the nature of a pluralistic democratic public sphere. This paper examines the most recent paradigm of liberal democracy: 'deliberativedemocracy', in order (...) to bring to the fore its shortcomings. Then, the authos puts forward some element for the elaboration of an alternative model that she proposes to call 'agonistic pluralism'. (shrink)
Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberativedemocracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberativedemocracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? (...) Or does it recommend that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Deliberative-democratic theory has not addressed this issue, and this is a problem. The discursive dilemma of my title--a generalisation of the doctrinal paradox from analytical jurisprudence--shows that the procedures distinguished can come apart. Thus deliberative democrats must make up their minds on where they stand in relation to the issue; they cannot sit on the fence. This paper is an attempt to address the issue and look at the grounds on which it may be resolved. (shrink)
One of the key questions to have exercised green political theorists in recent years concerns the relationship of the environment 'agenda' and democracy. Both environmentalists and democrats have a tendency to think of each other as natural bedfellows but in fact there is little theoretical or practical reason why they should be. Indeed some theorists have argued that the environmental movement has grown from fundamentally authoritarian roots and it is arguable that the only really effective way of implementing environmental (...) politics is by imposing them in an authoritarian manner. This book deals with the tensions between democracy and environmentalism from a variety of theoretical and empirical perspectives. (shrink)
Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberativedemocracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberativedemocracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? (...) Or does it recommend that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Is deliberativedemocracy to enforce the discipline of reason at the individual level, as in the first possibility, or at the collective level, as in the second? (shrink)
The contributions in this anthology address tensions that arise between reason and politics in a democracy inspired by the ideal of achieving reasoned agreement among free and equal citizens.
Advocates of ?deliberativedemocracy? want citizens to actively participate in serious dialogue over political issues, not merely go to the polls every few years. Unfortunately, these ideals don't take into account widespread political ignorance and irrationality. Most voters neither attain the level of knowledge needed to make deliberativedemocracy work, nor do they rationally evaluate the political information they do possess. The vast size and complexity of modern government make it unlikely that most citizens can ever (...) reach the levels of knowledge and rationality required by deliberativedemocracy, even if they were better informed than they are at present. (shrink)
A common objection to deliberativedemocracy is that available evidence on public ignorance makes it unlikely that social deliberation among the public is a process likely to yield accurate outputs. The present paper considers—and ultimately rejects—two responses to this objection. The first response is that the correct conclusion to draw from the evidence is simply that we must work harder to ensure that the deliberative process improves the deliberators’ epistemic situation. The main problem for this response is (...) that there are non-deliberative alternatives—most prominently information markets—available that do a better job from an epistemic point of view than does social deliberation. So why keep bothering with deliberation? The second response attempts to answer this question by arguing that only socially deliberative practices can confer legitimacy on the resulting policies. In response to this, it is argued that information markets actually carry more promise than does social deliberation when it comes to offering the kinds of justifications that are relevant to legitimacy. (shrink)
For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the recent rise of deliberativedemocracy (in practice as well as theory) coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This essay considers how deliberativedemocracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the author makes the case for a power-sharing state (...) with attenuated sovereignty and a more engaged deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semidetached from the state and situated transnationally. (shrink)
The article elaborates an original intertwined reading of republican theory, deliberativedemocracy and political equality. It argues that republicans, deliberative democrats and egalitarian scholars have not paid sufficient attention to a number of features present in these bodies of scholarships that relate them in mutually beneficial ways. It shows that republicanism and deliberativedemocracy are related in mutually beneficial ways, it makes those relations explicit, and it deals with potential objections against them. Additionally, it elaborates (...) an egalitarian principle underpinning the resulting model that I label Equality of Access and Deliberation. The upshot of these considerations is a novel and mutually reinforcing interrelated three-tiered theoretical and institutional proposal. (shrink)
It is often assumed that democracies can make good use of the epistemic benefi ts of diversity among their citizenry, but difficult to show why this is the case. In a deliberativedemocracy, epistemically relevant diversity has three aspects: the diversity of opinions, values, and perspectives. Deliberative democrats generally argue for an epistemic form of Rawls' difference principle: that good deliberative practice ought to maximize deliberative inputs, whatever they are, so as to benefi t all (...) deliberators, including the least eff ective. The proper maximandum of such a principle is not the pool of reasons, but rather the availability of perspectives. Th is sort of diversity makes robustness across different perspectives the proper epistemic aim of deliberative processes. Robustness also offers a measure of success for those democratic practices of inquiry based on the deliberation of all citizens. (shrink)
Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberativedemocracy. I then propose a version of deliberativedemocracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I (...) claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn’t have truth as its primary goal. (shrink)
Debating DeliberativeDemocracy explores the nature and value of deliberation, the feasibility and desirability of consensus on contentious issues, the implications of institutional complexity and cultural diversity for democratic decision making, and the significance of voting and majority rule in deliberative arrangements. Investigates the nature and value of deliberation, the feasibility and desirability of consensus on contentious issues, the implications of institutional complexity and cultural diversity for democratic decision making, and the significance of voting and majority rule (...) in deliberative arrangements. Includes focus on institutions and makes reference to empirical work. Engages a debate that cuts across political science, philosophy, the law and other disciplines. (shrink)
This article defends deliberativedemocracy against the problem of tacit knowledge. It has been argued that deliberativedemocracy gives a privileged position to linguistic communication and therefore excludes tacit forms of knowledge which cannot be expressed propositionally. This article shows how the exclusion of such knowledge presents important challenges to both proceduralist and epistemic conceptions of deliberativedemocracy, and how it has been taken by some to favour markets over democratic institutions. After pointing to (...) the limitations of market alternatives, deliberativedemocracy is defended by arguing that tacit knowledge can be brought into deliberation through the mechanism of trust in testimony. By trusting the testimony of a speaker, deliberators are able to act on knowledge even without it being explicitly expressed. The article then goes on to discuss the implications of this defence for deliberative theory, and particularly, the forms of reason which deliberative democrats must see as legitimate. (shrink)
In spite of the global diffusion of democracy and a general commitment to democratic values, there is a widespread alienation from the political process in advanced democracies. Deliberativedemocracy has received much attention in recent years as a possible solution to this malaise. Its promise of a more engaged and collective form of politics has drawn the interest of policy makers and political philosophers – generating new avenues of thought in contemporary democratic theory as well as heated (...) debates about its utility in practice. -/- This book provides an ideal starting point in understanding the core concepts of deliberativedemocracy. It is the first text to offer a systematic introduction to the theories and debates in the field and to combine this with a detailed critique of both the theory and the practice of deliberativedemocracy. It examines the core values of deliberative democrats and evaluates the implementation of deliberative practices at the local, national and global level – considering, along the way, how far it is possible to introduce meaningful deliberative reform in existing democracies. Giving readers a state-of-the-art account of the field, this book addresses fundamental questions about deliberativedemocracy and also charts the future directions for contemporary democratic thought. (shrink)
Any workable ideal of deliberativedemocracy that includes elections will need modern democracy's ever-present ally, parties. Since the primary function of parties is to win office rather than to reflect on public questions, parties are potential problems for the deliberative enterprise. They are more at home in aggregative models of democracy than in deliberative models. While deliberativedemocracy will need its moments of aggregation?and therefore, must have parties?partisans as they actually arise in (...) the political world possess traits that undermine the deliberative ideal. If partisans of partisanship are to be unembarrassed by (or are to correct) these defects, even workable ideals of deliberativedemocracy need to stand at some distance from the partisan imperative. (shrink)
In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning (...) the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision. (shrink)
The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberativedemocracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that (...) deliberation can promote these conditions, and hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect. (shrink)
Deliberativedemocracy grounds its legitimacy largely in the ability of speakers to participate on equal terms. Yet theorists and practitioners have struggled with how to establish deliberative equality in the face of stark differences of power in liberal democracies. Designers of innovative civic forums for deliberation often aim to neutralize inequities among participants through proportional inclusion of disempowered speakers and discourses. In contrast, others argue that democratic equality is best achieved when disempowered groups deliberate in their own (...) enclaves before entering the broader public sphere. Borrowing from each perspective, the authors argue that there are strong reasons to incorporate enclave deliberation among the disempowered within civic forums. They support this claim by presenting case study evidence showing that participants in such forums can gain some of the same benefits of deliberation found in more heterogeneous groups, can consider a diversity of viewpoints rather than falling into groupthink and polarization, and can persuade external stakeholders of the legitimacy of the group’s deliberations. (shrink)
In this paper, we examine whether it is possible to improve democracy by encouraging ordinary citizens to participate in political decision-making and if participation in deliberative institutions can make citizens more competent decision-makers. By using qualitative data, we analyze the discussion from the Belgrade citizens? assembly focused on the topic of expanding the pedestrian zone in the city center. The CA was organized in Serbia for the first time, as part of a research project aimed at promoting and (...) advancing innovative democratic practices in the Western Balkans. The goal was to encourage the involvement of citizens in discussions of public interest. Our hypothesis was that, through the process of participation and deliberation in CA, ordinary citizens can make reasonable and informed choices, increase their knowledge of the issue discussed, and become more motivated to participate in political decision-making on the local level. Our qualitative content analysis suggests that deliberation had a positive impact on participants? knowledge of the chosen topic of the assembly. It also shows that citizens used exhaustive explanations rather than brief statements, could differentiate the good arguments from the bad, and more often appealed to general rather than private interests. Participants in the assembly reported a significant increase in interest in political decision-making that affects their lives, as well as a sense of being informed about politics. Finally, we wanted to draw attention to the challenges and open questions that remain, namely those that concern the impact of a deliberative body on political decision-making in the real world. (shrink)
Is it possible to advance democracy by empowering ordinary citizens to make key decisions about the design of political institutions and policies? In 2004, the government of British Columbia embarked on a bold democratic experiment: it created an assembly of 160 near-randomly selected citizens to assess and redesign the province's electoral system. The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly represents the first time a citizen body has had the power to reform fundamental political institutions. It was an innovative gamble that has (...) been replicated elsewhere in Canada and in the Netherlands, and is gaining increasing attention in Europe as a democratic alternative for constitution-making and constitutional reform. In the USA, advocates view citizens' assemblies as a means for reforming referendum processes. This book investigates the citizens' assembly in British Columbia to test and refine key propositions of democratic theory and practice. (shrink)
This book describes a new method of consulting the public that has been tried successfully around the world. The book combines the theory of democracy with actual practice. Fishkin lays out a theory of "deliberativedemocracy" and shows with practical examples, how it can be realized.
The internet could be an efficient political instrument if it were seen as part of a democracy where free and open discourse within a vital public sphere plays a decisive role. The model of deliberativedemocracy, as developed by Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, serves this concept of democracy best. The paper explores first the model of deliberativedemocracy as a ‘two-track model’ in which representative democracy is backed by the public sphere and (...) a developing civil society. Secondly, it outlines the normative concept of the public sphere and its basic ideas, namely the uncoerced communication of equal participants with equal access and equal rights to intervene or propose themes. The third part for discussion shows how the internet could fit into this concept of public sphere and influence the quality of political debates, and emphasizes the important role it can play in the political process. (shrink)
In modern pluralist societies, political disagreement often reflects moral disagreement, as citizens with conflicting perspectives on fundamental values debate the laws that govern their public life. Any satisfactory theory of democracy must provide a way of dealing with this moral disagreement. A fundamental problem confronting all democratic theorists is to find a morally justifiable way of making binding collective decisions in the face of continuing moral conflict.
Deliberativedemocracy, it is claimed, is essential for the legitimisation of public policy and law. It is built upon an assumption that citizens will be capable of constructing and defending reasons for their moral and political beliefs. However, critics of deliberativedemocracy suggest that citizens’ emotions are not properly considered in this process and, if left unconsidered, present a serious problem for this political framework. In response to this, deliberative theorists have increasingly begun to incorporate (...) the emotions into their accounts. However, these accounts have tended to focus only upon the inclusion of emotions in the external-collective exchange of reason between citizens. Little work has been done on how the individual will actually cope with emotions internally within their own minds. There has been no consideration of the capacities that citizens will need to perceive, understand and regulate emotions as they formulate reasons both by themselves and with others. Moreover, there has been little consideration of how these capacities might be educated in children so that emotionally competent deliberative citizens can be created. In this paper, emotional intelligence is presented as an essential capacity that can fulfil this role for the deliberative citizen and deliberativedemocracy more generally. The ‘deliberative school’ is suggested as a potential site for this transformation that can progress from generation to generation, cultivating citizens that are increasingly better equipped to handle emotionally-laden deliberative engagement. (shrink)
Public reason liberals disagree about the relationship between public justification and deliberativedemocracy. My goal is to argue against the recent suggestion that public reason liberals seek a ‘divorce’ from deliberativedemocracy. Defending this thesis will involve discussing the benefits of deliberation for public justification as well as revisiting public reason’s standard Rawlisan restraint requirement. I criticize Kevin Vallier’s alternative convergence-based principle of restraint and respond to the worry that the standard Rawlsian restraint requirement reduces the (...) likelihood of public justification by limiting the diversity of inputs into the justificatory process. (shrink)
Deliberativedemocracy aspires to secure political liberty by making citizens the authors of their laws. But how can it do this in the face of deep disagreement, not to mention imperfect knowledge and limited altruism? Deliberativedemocracy can secure political liberty by affording each citizen an equal position as a co-author of public laws and norms. Moreover, fundamental deliberativedemocracy—in which institutional design is ultimately accountable to public deliberation but not necessarily subject to its (...) direct control—does not strain knowledge or altruism. Thus, there is a place for deliberativedemocracy in a robust political economy. (shrink)
Democracy is usually justified either on intrinsic or instrumental, particularly epistemic, grounds. Intrinsic justifications stress the values inherent in the democratic process itself, whereas epistemic ones stress that it results in good outcomes. This article examines whether epistemic justifications for deliberativedemocracy are superior to intrinsic ones. The Condorcet jury theorem is the most common epistemic justification of democracy. I argue that it is not appropriate for deliberativedemocracy. Yet deliberative democrats often explicitly (...) state that the process will favour the best argument. This can only be the case if deliberation improves the overall competence of the group and of the individuals that constitute it. I analyse when deliberation will increase competences and when it will not do so and find that individual competences will not reliably increase as a result of deliberation. In order for deliberativedemocracy to be epistemically more effective than representative democracy, strong procedural assumptions need to be made and deliberativedemocracy needs to be justified based on a combination of epistemic and intrinsic elements. (shrink)
Deliberative democrats seek to link political choices more closely to the deliberations of common citizens, rather than consigning them to speak only in the desiccated language of checks on a ballot. Sober thinkers from Plato to today, however, have argued that if we want to make good decisions we cannot entrust them to the deliberations of common citizens. Critics argue that deliberativedemocracy is wildly unworkable in practice. DeliberativeDemocracy between Theory and Practice cuts across (...) this debate by clarifying the structure of a deliberative democratic system, and goes on to re-evaluate the main empirical challenges to deliberativedemocracy in light of this new frame. It simultaneously reclaims the wider theory of deliberativedemocracy and meets the empirical critics squarely on terms that advance, rather than evade, the debate. Doing so has important implications for institutional design, the normative theory of democracy, and priorities for future research and practice. (shrink)
IN the last decade deliberativedemocracy has developed rapidly from a “theoretical statement” into a “working theory.”1 Scholars and practitioners have launched numerous initiatives designed to put deliberativedemocracy into practice, ranging from deliberative polling to citizen summits.2 Some even advocate deliberation as a new “revolutionary now.”3 Deliberativedemocracy has also experienced the beginning of an empirical turn, making significant gains as an empirical (or positive) political science. This includes a small, but growing (...) body of literature tackling the connection between the normative standards of deliberation, how well they are met, and the empirical consequences of meeting them.4 This trend has, for instance, included the use of methods and frameworks borrowed from other fields, such as political and social psychology. Such studies suggest that cases approaching ideal deliberation are rare, but that group interaction sometimes works surprisingly well according to such ideals.5. (shrink)
Philosophy's “linguistic turn” was destined to find its way into derivative disciplines such as political theory. In the last two decades, this turn has led to an absurd reductionism extrapolating the essence of existing democracies from their mode of communication. Flattening political theory, followers of this fashion rarely relinquish their fixation with the communicative component of modern democracies to the level of a multifaceted analysis. The central notion here is “deliberativedemocracy.” But is this a distinct model of (...)democracy? For Seyla Benhabib, it means “elucidating the already implicit principles and logic of existing democratic practices” (p. 84) There are…. (shrink)
Given its contribution to enhancing the inclusiveness, responsiveness, transparency and accountability of socio-political decision-making, the deliberative model has achieved considerable prominence in recent times as a basis for revitalizing democracy. But notwithstanding its strengths, it has also become clear that the deliberative proposal exhibits certain weaknesses that stand in need of correction if it is to realize its potential for revitalizing democracy in our contemporary pluralistic and multicultural world. Not surprisingly, then, there have been calls for (...) significant modifications to the core proposal. Of particular interest for present purposes is Iris Marion Young’s call for a ‘communicative’ reappropriation of the standard model with a view to rendering it more inclusive of and responsive to difference. While Young’s call for reconfiguring the deliberative template in a manner conducive to treating difference as a resource rather than as a barrier to unity is judicious and timely, the present article contends that her communicative proposal does not go far enough to achieve the envisaged outcomes. Instead, to enhance inclusiveness and responsiveness to difference in a manner conducive to promoting mutual understanding and potentially transformative learning, a thoroughgoing dialogical reappropriation is called for, along the lines defended here. Only in this way can the deliberative proposal live up to its pluralistic as well as inclusive intent. Moreover, far from being an external imposition, a dialogical reconfiguration of the requisite sort is rather a means of liberating potentials inherent in the deliberative proposal from the outset but typically suppressed by an undue emphasis on homogeneity, uniformity and consensus. (shrink)
The literature on the democratic legitimacy of judicial review and also on institutionalizing deliberativedemocracy neglects the possibility of employing juries rather than judges to determine bill-of-rights matters. This neglect is unfortunate, for there are findings emerging especially from deliberative polling that support the feasibility of such juries. Such feasibility would raise a new countermajoritarian concern with judicial review. The argument supporting this new concern also casts fresh light on the traditional countermajoritarian concern.
Democracy is usually justified either on intrinsic or instrumental, particularly epistemic, grounds. Intrinsic justifications stress the values inherent in the democratic process itself, whereas epistemic ones stress that it results in good outcomes. This article examines whether epistemic justifications for deliberativedemocracy are superior to intrinsic ones. The Condorcet jury theorem is the most common epistemic justification of democracy. I argue that it is not appropriate for deliberativedemocracy. Yet deliberative democrats often explicitly (...) state that the process will favour the best argument. This can only be the case if deliberation improves the overall competence of the group and of the individuals that constitute it. I analyse when deliberation will increase competences and when it will not do so and find that individual competences will not reliably increase as a result of deliberation. In order for deliberativedemocracy to be epistemically more effective than representative democracy, strong procedural assumptions need to be made and deliberativedemocracy needs to be justified based on a combination of epistemic and intrinsic elements. (shrink)
Many states in the U.S. have adopted policies regarding human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research in the last few years. Some have arrived at these policies through legislative debate, some by referendum, and some by executive order. New York has chosen a unique structure for addressing policy decisions regarding this morally controversial issue by creating the Empire State Stem Cell Board with two Committees—an Ethics Committee and a Funding Committee. This essay explores the pros and cons of various policy arrangements (...) for making public policy decisions about morally controversial issues in bioethics (as well as other issues) through the lens of DeliberativeDemocracy, focusing on the principles of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability. Although New York's unique mechanism potentially offers an opportunity to make policy decisions regarding a morally controversial subject like hESC research in accord with the principles of DeliberativeDemocracy, this essay demonstrates its failure to do so in actual fact. A few relatively simple changes could make New York's program a real model for putting DeliberativeDemocracy into practice in making policy decisions regarding controversial bioethical issues. (shrink)
This article examines the relationship of pragmatism to the theory of deliberativedemocracy. It elaborates a dilemma in the latter theory, between its deliberative or epistemic and democratic or inclusive components, and distinguishes responses to this dilemma that are internal to the conception of deliberation employed from those that are external. The article goes on to identify two models of pragmatism and critically examines how well each one deals with the tension identified in deliberativedemocracy.
Deliberativedemocracy is now an influential approach to the study of democracy and political behaviour. Its key proposition is that, in politics, it is not only power that counts, but good discussions and arguments too. This book examines the interplay between the normative and empirical aspects of the deliberative model of democracy. Jürg Steiner presents the main normative controversies in the literature on deliberation, including self-interest, civility and truthfulness. He then summarizes the empirical literature on (...) deliberation and proposes methods by which the level of deliberation can be measured rather than just assumed. Steiner's empirical research is based in the work of various research groups, including experiments with ordinary citizens in the deeply divided societies of Colombia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Belgium, as well as Finland and the European Union. Steiner draws normative implications from a combination of both normative controversies and empirical findings. (shrink)
Deliberativedemocracy is one of the best designs that could facilitate good public policy decision making and bring about epistemic good based on Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) theory of reasoning. However, three conditions are necessary: (1) an ethic of individual epistemic humility, (2) a pragmatic deflationist definition of truth, and (3) a microscopic framing power analysis during group reasoning.
Deliberativedemocracy holds that, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by deliberation among decision-makers. This means that democratic decision cannot be merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. Thus, citizens may change their initial opinions and preferences as a result of the reflection induced by deliberative communication and by taking into account other people?s opinions. The aim of this paper is to outline the view of deliberativedemocracy developed (...) by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson as well as to address some of the concerns raised by the critics regarding its practical implementation. Stanoviste deliberativne demokratije jeste da se legitimnost demokratskih odluka zasniva na prethodnoj deliberaciji onih koji ucestvuju u procesu odlucivanja. Ovo znaci da se demokratske odluke ne mogu donositi samo na osnovu proste agregacije preferencija koje se izrazavaju prilikom glasanja. Kao rezultat promisljanja podstaknutih deliberativnom komunikacijom i uzimanjem u obzir stanovista drugih ljudi, gradjani mogu da promene svoje prvobitne stavove i preferencije. Cilj ovoga rada jeste da izlozi stanoviste deliberativne demokratije, kakvo zastupaju Ejmi Gatman i Denis Tompson, kao i da iznese kritike koje nastaju kao rezultat razmisljanja o prakticnoj primeni takve zamisli. (shrink)
Deliberativedemocracy is often celebrated and endorsed because of its promise to include, empower, and emancipate otherwise oppressed and excluded social groups through securing their voice and granting them impact in reasoned public deliberation. This article explores the ability of Habermas’ theory of deliberativedemocracy to accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups in democratic plural societies. It argues that the inclusive, transformative, and empowering potential of Habermas’ theory of deliberativedemocracy falters when (...) confronted with particular types of historical injustices. It falters because it pays little attention to the historical dimension of injustices and the demands to which it gives rise. The historical dimension of longstanding injustices, it is argued, gives rise to a set of distinctive demands, such as collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, taking responsibility, and offering apology and reparations for causing these injustices, which go beyond the type of democratic inclusion that is often offered by deliberativedemocracy. Yet, the solution is not to abandon the model of deliberativedemocracy. Quite the contrary, it remains a valuable basis for forward-looking political decision making. The article concludes that in order to achieve inclusive, empowering and transformative deliberation in consolidated democracies that have experienced historical injustices, the politics of reconciliation is indispensable. (shrink)