In this paper an improved formulation of the classical tripartite view of knowledge is proposed and defended. This formulation solves Gettier's problem by making explicit what is concealed by the symbolic version of the tripartite definition, namely, the perspectival context in which concrete knowledge claims are evaluated.

This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his (...) pocket shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to suggest a new interpretation to the Gettier problem by showing that the standard JTB definition of knowledge is not epistemologically incomplete, being at the same time formally incomplete. The Gettier problem is shown to emerge through the implicit self-application of the JTB definition of knowledge to prove its own incompleteness. A conclusion is drawn, which runs counter to the traditional view that the problem necessarily requires a conceptual amendment of (...) the standard defi nition, in spite of the formal incompleteness of the latter. The Gettier problem is construed to be related to the ancient Meno problem within a contemporary justifi cational discourse. (shrink)

Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference. Starting from ‘Is skepticism a problem for epistemology’, the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering memory and perception.

This study discusses the treatise of Jalāl al-Dīn Davvānī (d. 908/1502) named Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm. This treatise criticizes a definition of knowledge adopted by some theologians in the late period (mutaʾakhkhirīn). The definition of knowledge at issue consists of three components: Attribution, discernment, no possibility of contradiction. Knowledge is an attribute as a category and with this attribution, a discernment is obtained. As a result of this process knowledge is acquired and there should (...) be no possibility of this knowledge to be inconsistent. Davvānī examines eight possibilities of the definition on knowledge. In each of these eight possibilities a different problems arises. According to Davvānī, the definition mentioned is problematic in all probability. Nonetheless, Davvānī does not propose another definition of knowledge that can replace the definition of knowledge that he criticizes. This article represents the process of reaching the definition of knowledge stated in the history of theological thought. The definitions on knowledge made from the first period (al-mutaqaddimīn) are summarized and the strengths and weaknesses of these definitions are explained. There are two main approaches regarding the nature of knowledge in Islamic thought: According to the first approach pioneered by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 606/1202), absolute knowledge is a priory (badīhī) and undefinable. According to the second one, the nature of absolute knowledge is a posteriori (naẓarī) and definable. The first part of this article includes the definitions and criticisms of knowledge in Islamic thought. The second part discusses the claim of originality. In the second part, Davvānī’s treatise will be evaluated for the first time. According to the conclusion of the treatise, the definition made to find the essence of knowledge is unfounded in all respect. It is important to evaluate the treatise as a reflection of anti-essentialism in the history of Islamic thought. Most contemporary studies do not count this treatise among Davvānī’s works. In the biography book al-Aʿlām written by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (d. 1976), Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm is counted among the works of Davvānī. In the introduction of more than one manuscript, the work is clearly attributed to Davvānī. As a result of the double-sided research, it has been ensured that the work belongs to Davvānī. However, in other two manuscripts containing the same treatise, the work is shown as belonging to an unknown person named Şāirzāda. But there is no information found about this person. This name seems more like a copyist (mustansıh) than an author. Possibly, such a mistake occurred as a result of confusing the two names. Davvānī’s small volume treatise sheds light on the intellectual atmosphere and level of its period. The definition of knowledge mentioned in the classical theology book of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) called al-Mawāqif is superior to other definitions of knowledge. Instead of this definition of knowledge, which is presented as perfect, Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) preferred the definition of knowledge attributed to al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) in the Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. This preference has been accepted as an implicit criticism for future generations, including Davvānī. Those who claimed that Jurjānī did not taken a random choice, carried on their criticism by going over the definition. The fine craftsmanship revealed in the treatise reveals that critical thinking is used intensively. The properly understanding of the treatise depends on knowing the science of logic and following it with intense attention. The definition of knowledge is examined from various angles with the help of concepts such as conception, ratification, judgment and contradiction (nakz) of the science of logic. In the science of logic, every layer of knowledge such as certainty, conjecture, imitation, doubt is investigated one by one. In the science of kalām, attention is paid that the ideal level of knowledge is precise. An uncertain knowledge is not considered knowledge according to kalām. Because the main goal of theologians is to build religious beliefs on the obtained certain knowledge. It is not accepted to base knowledge to a probable information on imprecise knowledge. For a knowledge among the knowns to reach the level of certainty, it must be correct and exclude other possibilities. Another condition is required for certainty in the definition of knowledge that Davvānī examines in his treatise is that the opposite is wrong. The fact that a piece of information is considered true depends on the fact that its reverse is false. In this treatise, it is discussed how to look for the contradictions or discrepancy that are wanted to be excluded. Knowledge is inseparable from the human mind, from outside of the world, or from the relationship between the two. (shrink)

The problem of definition of knowledge has been discussed in the tradi-tion of kalām and philosophy. Especially with the inclusion of logic definition theory in the discipline of kalām, the definitions put forward were criticized by later thinkers. Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322), who was included in this discussion, which was mainly shaped around the question of whether knowledge is necessary (ḍarūrī) or acquired (kasbī), wrote the ideal definition and features in al-Meārif and commentary of (...) Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt wa altanbīhāt. In addition, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī examined the problem of whether knowledge can be defined and -like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210)- argued that the meaning of knowledge is very clear. In this context, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, who criticizes the definition of knowledge put forward by the Peripatetic tradition in particular Avicenna (d. 428/1037), determined the ont and non-existent definitions of knowledge and criticized them. This study deals with how the ideal definition theory, which Avicenna founded, was handled by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī and the problem of definition of knowledge according to Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. In addition, with this article, it has been argued that Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī did not define knowledge. In this direction, at the beginning of the article, the discussions on the definition of knowledge in the pre-Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī kalām tradition and the sides of the issue were examined. Then, in this article, in which the characteristics of the ideal definition according to Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī are determined, it is also examined whether he defines knowledge or not. (shrink)

C. K. Grant; X*—On a Definition of Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 73, Issue 1, 1 June 1973, Pages 157–166, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

A common criticism of Locke’s ideational definition of knowledge is that it contradicts his accounts of knowledge’s reality and sensitive knowledge. Here it is argued that the ideational definiton of knowledge is compatible with knowledge of idea-independent reality. The key is Locke’s notion of the signification. Nominal agreements obtain if and only if the ideas’ descriptive contents are the ground for truth; real agreements obtain only if their total denotation are the grounds for truth. (...) The signification of the ideas determine whether they denote real or fantastical objects. Three types of ideas, simple quality-ideas, modal ideas, and relational ideas, necessarily signify real objects. The fourth type, the ideas of substances, are real only if those particular combinations of qualitites have been perceived to co-exist. Locke’s ideas are intrinsically either real or fantastical and thus, it is argued, his models of truth and knowledge’s reality are far from typical correspondence theories. (shrink)

During the last decades the question of defining life has gained increased interest but, at the same time, the difficulty in reaching consensus on a possible answer has led many to skeptical positions. This, in turn, has raised a wider debate about why defining life is so hard and controversial. Such a debate introduces additional aspects to be considered, like the role and nature of a definition of life itself. In this paper, we will focus on those aspects, arguing (...) that progress can be made if we conceive definitions of life as open heuristic tools that contribute to develop specific research strategies in the biological sciences and, more generally, to increase our understanding of life’s complexity. In contrast with pragmatic or operationalist approaches, we will defend that definitions of life comprise a set of ontological assumptions, together with an inherent unifying vocation, so they should be subject to comparison and critical assessment, closely related to the success or failure of the corresponding research programs, but also to the success or failure in establishing well-grounded interconnections among the latter. We consider that the search for a more coherent, integrated and generalized theory of biology cannot be pursued without keeping an empirical standpoint, and the exercise of defining life should not be taken as an obstacle but as a valuable instrument to achieve that goal. (shrink)

This paper analyses two definitions of contingency. Both definitions have been widely accepted and used as to identify contingent events. One of them is primarily of a philosophical character, whereas the other is more commonly used in mathematics. Evidently, these two definitions do not describe the same set of phenomena, and neither of them determines the completely intuitive notion of contingency.Namely, carefully selected examples testify that the first definition is too narrow and the second too wide. These facts have (...) certain epistemological consequences. They must, therefore, serve as a warning for using the definitions only in a restrictive and cautious way when detecting random beliefs – those we cannot identify as knowledge. (shrink)

In the sixth chapter of his Theory of Knowledge Roderick Chisholm refers to an example suggested by Alexius Meinong in order to show that the traditional definition of knowledge is in need of some modification. In this paper I should like to show that Chisholm's argument rests on a mistaken assumption as to what an individual's doxastic responsibilities are.

In Posterior Analytics 71b9 12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying (...) due attention to this contrast and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause. (shrink)

Religion is a phenomenon of the spiritual life of mankind, its world-view basis, which regulates the daily life and behavior of man, and also allows communication with the "supernatural" through the rites.The overwhelming majority of definitions of the religious phenomenon relies mainly on two categories of religious studies: "supernatural" and "faith." For example, religion is defined as: "a spiritual phenomenon, which expresses not only the belief in the existence of a supernatural Beginning, which is the source of existence of all (...) existing, but also acts as a means of communicating with him, entering into his world.". (shrink)

v. 1. Opponents' position (Pūrvapakṣa) -- v. 2. Pramā-lakṣaṇa-siddhānta.

In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold in the actual world and merely (...) possible, non-actual a priori propositions, as we will see when considering cases like Euclidean geometry. Furthermore, contrary to what Kripke seems to suggest, a priori knowledge is intimately connected with metaphysical modality, indeed, grounded in it. The task of a priori reasoning, according to this account, is to delimit the space of metaphysically possible worlds in order for us to be able to determine what is actual. (shrink)

We propose that, for the purpose of studying theoretical properties of the knowledge of an agent with Artificial General Intelligence (that is, the knowledge of an AGI), a pragmatic way to define such an agent’s knowledge (restricted to the language of Epistemic Arithmetic, or EA) is as follows. We declare an AGI to know an EA-statement φ if and only if that AGI would include φ in the resulting enumeration if that AGI were commanded: “Enumerate all the (...) EA-sentences which you know.” This definition is non-circular because an AGI, being capable of practical English communication, is capable of understanding the everyday English word “know” independently of how any philosopher formally defines knowledge; we elaborate further on the non-circularity of this circular-looking definition. This elegantly solves the problem that different AGIs may have different internal knowledge definitions and yet we want to study knowledge of AGIs in general, without having to study different AGIs separately just because they have separate internal knowledge definitions. Finally, we suggest how this definition of AGI knowledge can be used as a bridge which could allow the AGI research community to import certain abstract results about mechanical knowing agents from mathematical logic. (shrink)

In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge,the work of Platinga, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories, contextualism, and recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful (...) examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal factors to yield knowledge. This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer’s new coherence theory of undefeated justification. In addition to doing justice to the living epistemological traditions, the text smoothly integrates several new lines that will interest scholars. Also, a feature of special interest is Lehrer’s concept of a justification game.This second edition of Theory of Knowledge is a thoroughly revised and updated version that contains several completely new chapters. Written by a well-known scholar and contributor to modern epistemology, this text is distinguished by clarity of structure, accessible writing, and an elegant mix of traditional material, contemporary ideas, and well-motivated innovation. (shrink)

In this important new text, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the accepted definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories as well as recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must (...) be matched by appropriate internal ones to yield knowledge. Readers of Professor Lehrer's earlier book _Knowledge_ will want to know that this text adopts the framework of that classic text. But _Theory of Knowledge_ is a completely rewritten and updated version of that book that has been simplified throughout for student use. (shrink)

In this important new text, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the accepted definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories as well as recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must (...) be matched by appropriate internal ones to yield knowledge. Readers of Professor Lehrer's earlier book _Knowledge_ will want to know that this text adopts the framework of that classic text. But _Theory of Knowledge_ is a completely rewritten and updated version of that book that has been simplified throughout for student use. (shrink)

In this important new text, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the accepted definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories as well as recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must (...) be matched by appropriate internal ones to yield knowledge. Readers of Professor Lehrer's earlier book _Knowledge_ will want to know that this text adopts the framework of that classic text. But _Theory of Knowledge_ is a completely rewritten and updated version of that book that has been simplified throughout for student use. (shrink)

In the past, the European social sciences labelled and discredited knowledge that did not follow the definition for scientific knowledge as applied by the European social sciences as an alternative concept of knowledge, as “indigenous” knowledge. Perception has changed with time: Not only has indigenous knowledge become an entrance ticket to the European social science world, but the indigenization of European theories is seen by some as the contribution of “peripheral” social sciences to join (...) the theories of the “centers”. This book offers contributions to the discourses about alternative concepts of knowledge, inviting the reader to decide if they are alternative, indigenous, or European types of knowledge. However, in order to make this decision, the reader must know what the nature of the European concepts of science and of scientific knowledge is; this might be a motivation to read a book that presents thoughts claiming to be alternative concepts of knowledge, alternative to the European concept of science. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood defined historical knowledge as essentially ‘scientific’, and saw the historian's task as the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’. The author argues the need to go beyond Collingwood, first by demonstrating the authenticity of available evidence, and secondly, using Namier as an example, by considering methodology as well as epistemology, and the need to relate past thoughts to their present context. The ‘law of the consumption of time’ encourages historians to focus on landmark events, theories and generalisations, thus breaking (...) from Collingwood's emphasis on fidelity to past ideas and interpreting the past from the concepts of the present. This conflict can only be reconciled by the study of historiography. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood defined historical knowledge as essentially ‘scientific’, and saw the historian's task as the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’. The author argues the need to go beyond Collingwood, first by demonstrating the authenticity of available evidence, and secondly, using Namier as an example, by considering methodology as well as epistemology, and the need to relate past thoughts to their present context. The ‘law of the consumption of time’ encourages historians to focus on landmark events, theories and generalisations, thus breaking (...) from Collingwood's emphasis on fidelity to past ideas and interpreting the past from the concepts of the present. This conflict can only be reconciled by the study of historiography. (shrink)

Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive—admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics, I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: a real definition that distinguishes it from some, but not all other things. I demonstrate (...) that this position is attractive; it evades concerns that its rivals face. (shrink)

This book consists of seven chapters containing multiple questions of the global socially epistemological situation in science and higher education. Despite the progress of techno-sciences, we are facing blind flaws in leading systems of knowledge and perception. The global era, in a paradox way, connects the new knowledge of economics, postpolitics, postdemocracy, and biopolitical regulation of live and unpresentable forms of the global geo-located violence. Techno-optimism and techno-dictatorship in the twenty-first century coincide with the ideology of market, biopolitics (...) of mandatory satisfaction, religious revivalism, and collapse of higher education. In order for sciences to recover, it is necessary to make a globally epistemological and moral turn toward the truth. The book shows that, when joint desires of the new economics of knowledge and technology erase epistemology (in a way to assign definitions of knowledge and rules and practices of the public usage of the mind), then the time for epistemology is on its way"--https://www.intechopen.com/books/epistemology-and-transformation-of-knowledge-in-global-age, accessed 06/07/2020. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Is Technology? Explicit Knowledge and Tacit Knowledge References and Further Reading.

Fitch's Paradox and the Paradox of the Knower both make use of the Factivity Principle. The latter also makes use of a second principle, namely the Knowledge-of-Factivity Principle. Both the principle of factivity and the knowledge thereof have been the subject of various discussions, often in conjunction with a third principle known as Closure. In this paper, we examine the well-known Surprise Examination paradox considering both the principles on which this paradox rests and some formal characterisations of the (...) surprise notion, crucial in this paradox. Standard formalizations of the Surprise Examination paradox in modal logic do not seem, at first glance, to depend on either factivity or knowledge-of-factivity, but we will argue that both factivity and knowledge-of-factivity play a key implicit role in the paradox. Namely, they are implicitly, perhaps unintentionally, used in order to simplify the definition of surprise. We analyze modal logical formalizations of three versions of the paradox concluding that the Surprise Examination paradox is the result of two flaws: the assumption of knowledge-of-factivity, and the over-simplification of the definition of "surprise" accordingly. By fixing these two flaws, the Surprise Examination paradox vanishes. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Knowledge presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But Keith Hossack argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic (...) in terms of knowledge. Hossack provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. He also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of a content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, Hossack argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the "I"-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The Metaphysics of Knowledge concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it. (shrink)

Most current work in epistemology deals with the evaluation and justification of information already acquired. In this book, Jaakko Hintikka instead discusses the more important problem of how knowledge is acquired in the first place. His model of information-seeking is the old Socratic method of questioning, which has been generalized and brought up-to-date through the logical theory of questions and answers that he has developed. Hintikka also argues that philosophers' quest for a definition of knowledge is ill-conceived (...) and that the entire notion of knowledge should be replaced by the concept of information. He offers an analysis of the different meanings of the concept of information and of their interrelations. The result is a new and illuminating approach to the field of epistemology. (shrink)

Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. (...) This definition is compatible with “internalism” about rationality, and with a form of “pragmatic encroachment” on the conditions of rational outright belief. An interpretation is given of this definition, and especially of the sense of ’because’ that it involves. On this interpretation, this definition entails that both safety and adherence are necessary conditions on knowledge; it supports a kind of contextualism about terms like ‘knowledge’; and it provides resources to defend safety, adherence, and contextualism, against some recent objections. (shrink)