The present monograph is devoted to the principal problems of quantum mechanics and is based on the conception first stated in my course on 'Fundamentals of Quantum Mechanics'. The scope and purpose of the above course did not allow some principal questions to be brought out as fully as they deserved, and besides, some important points were only very recently developed to a sufficient extent. This refers especially to the analysis of the action of the measuring instrument, whose dual role (...) as an analyser of a quantum ensemble and as a detector of individual events was insufficiently elucidated. The reader will find that the present monograph is concerned more with theoretical physics than with philosophy. However, I have never separated Weltanschauung from science (and particularly theoretical physics) so that the philosophical implications are also discussed, justi fying publication in the philosophical series. In conclusion, I should like to thank the publisher and the translator, whose initiative and effort have made it possible for the book to reach the English-speaking reader. (shrink)

T'Challa, the Black Panther, wears many hats, both at home and abroad. He is the chieftain of the Panther Tribe, which makes him the spiritual leader of his people as well as the king of Wakanda and its head of state. One key aspect that separates virtue ethics from its rival moral theories, consequentialism and deontology, is its focus on character. Judgment, or what Aristotle called "practical wisdom", is the ability to decide how best to act on one's virtues in (...) a particular situation. When T'Challa believed that agents within the US government were helping to overthrow his own, he and the Dora Milaje drove a truck into a building and abducted a businessman involved in the operation. T'Challa's duties as an Avenger come into conflict with his role as king of Wakanda, but other conflicts result from his role as a spiritual leader, which he regards as more important. (shrink)

The concept of first-personness is well defined in grammar, but it has developed two discrepant senses in common usage and in the psychology and philosophy literatures. First-personness is taken to mean phenomenal experience , and also to mean a person's point of view. However, since we can nonconsciously perceive, judge and behave, all from a point of view which we must name ‘our own', these acts can be called first-person acts even though they are nonconscious. Therefore, I propose that the (...) main idea behind first-personness is the point of view; that it is not a unique property of consciousness; and that consciousness will be easier to understand if it is not freighted with extraneous issues. This essay explores the concepts underlying point of view and entity. Entiticity is viewed as a matter of degree and as a matter of convention. It is found most coherent to consider an entity's point of view as the total set of discriminations or interactions made possible by the entity's present state and context. Whether or not an entity is a person or is conscious is irrelevant to its having a point of view referenced to itself. Even inanimate objects can receive input and act only in so far as they are enabled or limited by their points of view. Since humans find it awkward at first to say that non-human or non-biological entities have a first-person point of view, it would be best to drop the reference to person in this context. C.S. Peirce's term ‘firstness', developed in 1891, might do nicely. This analysis of first-personness applies equally to agents as it does to subjects. Once these terms are clarified, it is easier to see how a superordinate entity reconciles conflict when its relatively autonomous subsystems have points of view discrepant from each other or from the whole. This has application in untangling confusions concerning the duality of the cerebral hemispheres and the results of their disconnection in relation to the popular assumption of personal unity. (shrink)

Physicians have developed a number of implicit and explicit approaches to complex medical decisions. Decision analysis is an explicit, quantitative method of clinical decision making that involves the separation of the probabilities of events from their relative values, or utilities. Its use can help physicians make difficult choices in a manner that promotes true patient participation. Decision analysis also provides a framework for the incorporation of data from multiple sources and for the assessment of the impact of uncertain data (...) on the final decision. Although this approach is imperfect, it represents a significant advance in clinical decision making. (shrink)

“To be” or “to be found”? Some contributions relative to this modern variant of Hamlet's question are presented here. They aim at better apprehending the differences between the points of view of the physicists who consider that present-day quantum measurement theories do reach their objective and those who deny they do. It is pointed out that these two groups have different interpretations of the verbs “to be” and “to have” and of the criterion for truth. These differences are made explicit. (...) A notion of “empirical reality” is constructed within the representation of which the physicists of the first named group can consistently uphold their claim. A detailed way of sharpening this definition so as to make empirical reality free of nonlocal actions at a distance is also described. (shrink)

To say that coronavirus is highly visible is a massive understatement in terms of its omnipresence in our lives and media coverage concerning it, yet also clearly untrue in terms of the virus itself. COVID-19 is our invisible enemy, changing our lives radically without ever revealing itself directly. In this paper I explore its invisibility and how it relates to and exposes other invisible enemies we are and have been fighting, in many cases without even realizing. First, I analyse the (...) virus itself and how its stealthy nature has transformed our lives. Second, I describe how the invisible epidemic of social media sharing of fake news about the virus worsens the situation further. Third, I explore how the virus has revealed to us what really matters in our lives and has forced us to re-evaluate our priorities. Fourth, I go on to explore the underlying structural weaknesses and disparities in society that have been exposed by the virus but previously remained unconsidered for so long that they too have become camouflaged, even if their effects are all too apparent; like the virus, neoliberal capitalism is an invisible enemy that has made prisoners of us all. I conclude by suggesting that the coronavirus pandemic represents a hidden opportunity to overcome perhaps the biggest invisible enemy of all: the moral distance that separates us from others. Only by rendering the rest of humanity morally visible to ourselves can we overcome capitalism and stop treating other people as invisible enemies. (shrink)

A diagonal version of the strong reflection principle is introduced, along with fragments of this principle associated with arbitrary forcing classes. The relationships between the resulting principles and related principles, such as the corresponding forcing axioms and the corresponding fragments of the strong reflection principle, are analyzed, and consequences are presented. Some of these consequences are “exact” versions of diagonal stationary reflection principles of sets of ordinals. We also separate some of these diagonal strong reflection principles from related axioms.

Distinguishing “business” concerns from “ethical” values is not only an unfruitful and meaningless task, it is also an impossible endeavor. Nevertheless, fruitless attempts to separate facts from values produce detrimental second-order effects, both for theory and practice, and should therefore be abandoned. We highlight examples of exemplary research that integrate economic and moral considerations, and point the way to a business ethics discipline that breaks new groundby putting ideas and narratives about business together with ideas and narratives about ethics.

This article is a preliminary presentation of conjunctive paraconsistency, the claim that there might be non-explosive true contradictions, but contradictory propositions cannot be considered separately true. In case of true ‘p and not p’, the conjuncts must be held untrue, Simplification fails. The conjunctive approach is dual to non-adjunctive conceptions of inconsistency, informed by the idea that there might be cases in which a proposition is true and its negation is true too, but the conjunction is untrue, Adjunction fails. While (...) non-adjunctivism is a well-known option, the other view is not so much studied nowadays, but it was not unknown in the tradition, and there are some positive suggestions, in recent literature, that the position is plausible and deserves to be developed. The article compares conjunctivism, non-adjunctivism and dialetheism, then focuses on some possible justifications, costs and benefits of the conjunctive view. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical critique of professional stereotypes in medicine. In the course of this critique, we also offer a detailed analysis of the concept of care in health care. The paper first considers possible explanations for the traditional stereotype that caring is a province of nurses and women, while curing is an arena suited for physicians and men. It then dispels this stereotype and fine tunes the concept of care. A distinction between ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about’ is (...) made, and concomitant notions of parentalism are elaborated. Finally, the paper illustrates, through the use of cases, diverse models of caring. Our discussion reveals the complexity of care and the alternative modes of caring in health care. (shrink)

What makes Jehovah's Witnesses tick? What motivates practitioners of medicine? How is benevolent human behaviour to be interpreted? The explanation that fear of censure, mind-control techniques or enlightened self-interest are the real motivators of human conduct is questioned. Those who believe that man was created in "God's image", hold that humanity has the potential to rise above selfishly driven attitudes and actions, and reflect the qualities of love, kindness and justice that separate us from the beasts. A comparison of general (...) medical ethics and disciplines, and those of the Jehovah's Witness community, is made in this context. The easy charge that frequent deaths result from refusal of blood transfusions is examined. The central source of antipathy towards Jehovah's Witnesses, namely the alleged imposition of extreme and even harmful refusal of blood therapy on our children is addressed. Of course, "...few dilemmas are likely to be resolved wisely or satisfactorily by a blinkered adherence to abstract principles alone. Solutions to most cases will be dictated by a combination of factors. The support of medical ethics by Jehovah's Witnesses, and their willingness to share in reasoned and ethical debate, while at the same time holding firm to their religious and conscientious principles are emphasised. (shrink)

"You have to come to my wedding," Kavita told me, turning to face me where I sat next to her on the couch. "You can come with the other people from the street. You will get everything you need for your *research* there." "I will come, I will come!" I replied enthusiastically. I had only met Kavita and her two younger sisters, Arthi and Deepti (see Figure 2.1), mere minutes before this invitation was extended. I had initially come to Pulan (...) that day in October 2012 to meet another woman, Heena, whose family rents a room on the third story of Kavita's family's home. Heena and I had been sitting in the furniture refurbishing store she operates with her husband on the main street of Pulan when Deepti, Kavita's youngest sister, passed by. Heena introduced us and told me to go with Deepti to meet her family. When we reached the family's three-story house-the largest in the gali-Deepti led me past the empty rooms on the ground floor, which I would eventually begin renting, to the second-story living room. There, we found Kavita and Arthi organizing clothing and jewelry they had purchased earlier in the day for the upcoming wedding festivities. Kavita made room for me to sit next to her on the couch and began asking me about myself. I immediately warmed to her because of her open, friendly smile and sharp, staccato Hindi, which I delighted in being able to understand. I explained that I had come to India to study how women's lives are different in rural and urban areas, and Kavita assured me that she and her family could help. She noted that her parents had come to Udaipur from Ram Nagar, a large village thirty-five kilometers north of the city, and that the family would be returning for her and her older brother Krishna's weddings the following month. Their weddings would be held five days apart to help reduce the difficulties of family members traveling from outside Udaipur. Prompted by the description of my research, Kavita commented on differences that she recognized between the village and the city. The biggest difference, she suggested, was the experience of caste, namely that in the village, people from different jatis live separately, whereas in the city, people are "mixed." As I would come to learn when visiting Ram Nagar for various functions, there is a fair amount of caste and religious diversity in the village. Although spatial and ritual segregation was rather strictly maintained during religious observances, it is likely more flexible in everyday life. The segregation during ritual functions-the occasions for which Kavita also traveled to the village-likely informed her sense of a lack of "mixing" in the village as. The majority of residents in the area of Ram Nagar where the family maintains a home were also from the Mali (lit: gardener) jati, although Mali was not a majority jati in Pulan. (shrink)

For upwards of 25 years, Yemi D. Prince (also known as Yemi D. Ogunyemi) has systematically devoted himself to the education, research and reason of Creative Writing and from Creative Writing to Creative Thinking and from Creative Thinking to Yoruba narrative, cultural, folk philosophy. On realizing that Creative Thinking has become his area of focus and interest, he succeeds in cultivating big ideas, combining them with his life-long experiences in the Humanities, transforming them into new ways of writing, thinking or (...) reasoning. (Some of his big ideas have led to the publication of booklets such as Yoruba Idealism, We Should All Be Philosophers, The Artist-Philosophers in Yoruba land, Codes of Morality and Pursuit of Wisdom.) Thus his big ideas have helped him separate Yoruba folk philosophy from Yoruba autochthonous religion. With his love for big ideas, born out of Creative Thinking and Critical Thinking, he has been able to put a new face on Yoruba Philosophy. (shrink)

Discusses the sense of separability in Aristotle and how they apply to the separability of mind or nous.

Ontological realism is a philosophical stance that provides a definitional framework for ontologies and is referred to by various applied ontologists. From a computer science perspective, ontologies are often associated with formal languages for the representation of ontologies like the Web Ontology Language (OWL). It has, however, not been made explicit how the realist framework is related to the representation formalism. We analyse how the representational units of OWL can be used for modelling realist ontologies. While OWL is sufficiently close (...) to the realist framework of ontologies to describe them, there are categories in OWL that are alien to realist ontologies or duplicate categories in realist ontologies. This clarification allows separating talk about ontologies in general from talk about their specific representation. (shrink)

Purpose. The aim of the article is to clarify the content of the concept of culture as an explication of vitality within the philosophy of life and its further modifications in current problems of contemporary. The analysis performed standing from the point, that contrasting of nature and culture is irrelevant, since culture does not contradict natural determinants and patterns, but rather qualitatively alters them. So, are justified the idea of culture as a phenomenon that exist accordingly and in proportion to (...) nature, need to form its potential and content and not contradict the axioms and values of life. Theoretical basis. In the theoretical field of philosophy of life, the local development of the problem of culture as an explication of vitality produces grounds for analytical and prognostic activity concerning meaningful transformations in a separate historical and social horizon. The fundamental categories of culture: spirit, value, symbol, freedom, justice and harmony receive the requested content and meaning. The idea of the constancy and super-naturality of cultural universals is illusory and dangerous. The consequences of such a "non-cosmological" justification of freedom and will, and the assertion of values, that contradict the logic of life, are the global environmental, economic and social crisis of our time. Originality. The originality of the authors’ thought lies in the interpretation of the essence of culture as an explication of vitality, as a logical and natural extension of life. In this formulation of the problem of culture, the possibility of reconciling the natural, social and value determinants of human life is formed. Theorists of the philosophy of life substantiated the primacy and supremacy of the values of life over the values and meanings of culture. The position of authors position consists in the need to understand culture as an environmentally appropriate and dimensional phenomenon, the content and strategies of which are determined by a single ontology. Conclusions. The analysis let authors understand the voluntarily chaotic element of life. Culture in its philosophical analysis took on a clearer anthropomorphic dimension: the immanent logic of being in substantiating the essence and purpose of man and the value of his being localized the universe of transcendence in the concept of "living world", "inhabited space", "human, too human". Accordingly, the range of cultural evaluations has been polarized: from the approving statement of its vital essence, to the disparaging calls for its reform. The chaotic state of voluntarily acts is transformed into cultural codes and stereotypes by rationalization. The modern global nature of crisis phenomena, both in the worldview, in the social, and in the ecological dimension, requires reformatting the understanding of culture as a continuation of nature, and not its antipode. (shrink)

We develop a truism of commonsense psychology that perception and action constitute the boundaries of the mind. We do so however not on the basis of commonsense psychology, but by using the notion of a Markov blanket originally employed to describe the topological properties of causal networks. We employ the Markov blanket formalism to propose precise criteria for demarcating the boundaries of the mind that unlike other rival candidates for “marks of the cognitive” avoids begging the question in the extended (...) mind debate. Our criteria imply that the boundary of the mind is nested and multiscale sometimes extending beyond the individual agent to incorporate items located in the environment. Chalmers has used commonsense psychology to develop what he sees as the most serious challenge to the view that minds sometimes extend into the world. He has argued that perception and action should be thought of as interfaces that separate minds from their surrounding environment. In a series of recent papers Hohwy has defended a similar claim using the Markov blanket formalism. We use the Markov blanket formalism to show how both of their objections to the extended mind fail. (shrink)

We present a novel variant of decision making based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to describe a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision making of real human beings. The theory characterizes entangled decision making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage’s sure-thing principle, known (...) as the disjunction effect, can be explained quantitatively as a result of the interference of intentions, when making decisions under uncertainty. The disjunction effects, observed in experiments, are accurately predicted using a theorem on interference alternation that we derive, which connects aversion-to-uncertainty to the appearance of negative interference terms suppressing the probability of actions. The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. A series of experiments are analyzed and shown to be in excellent agreement with a priori evaluation of interference effects. The conjunction fallacy is also shown to be a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect, and novel experiments testing the combined interplay between the two effects are suggested. (shrink)

1. The label conjunctive paraconsistency has been adopted to mean a consequence relation whereby ‘p and not p’ does not imply ‘p’ and ‘not p’ separately, so that Simplification in case of contradic...

This paper looks into the known evidence on the origins of the type of argument called the circumstantial ad hominemargument in modern logic textbooks, and introduces some new evidence. This new evidence comes primarily from recent historical work by Jaap Mansfeld and Jonathan Barnes citing many cases where philosophers in the ancient world were attacked on the grounds that their personal actions failed to be consistent with their philosophical teachings. On the total body of evidence, two hypotheses about the roots (...) of the circumstantial ad hominem are considered. One is that it came from Aristotle through Locke. The other is that it may have had separate roots in these ancient philosophical writings that criticized philosophers for not practicing what they preached. (shrink)

Stratified properties such as ‘happy unhappiness’, ‘ungrounded ground’, ‘fortunate misfortune’, and evidently ‘true falsity’ may generate dialetheias (true contradictions). The aim of the article is to show that if this is the case, then we will have a special, conjunctive, kind of dialetheia: a true state description of the form ‘Fa and not Fa’ (for some property F and object a), wherein the two conjuncts, separately taken, are to be held untrue. The particular focus of the article is on happy (...) unhappiness: people suffering from (or enjoying) happy unhappiness (if there is some situation or state of mind of this kind) cannot be truly said ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’, but we can say they are both. In the first section three cases of conjunctive stratification are presented; in the second section the logic of stratified contradictions is explored. The last section focuses on eudemonistic ascriptions: stated that a is happy to be unhappy (or unhappy to be happy), should we say a is happy? unhappy? both? neither? (shrink)

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure , and guess responses were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. (...) Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition and metacognition. (shrink)

Issues surrounding human embryos are poignant and profound. Should research be conducted on them? Should they be discarded? Should they be donated to infertile couples? The Warnock Report was a landmark in providing guidelines limiting experimentation on human embryos to the first 14 days after fertilization, at which time implantation of the embryo is complete and the primitive streak has appeared.2 However, these embryological features were not considered sufficiently distinctive to bestow upon this 14‐day period a separate classification. This situation (...) changed when, in 1986, Anne McLaren suggested the use of the terms ‘pre‐embryo’ or ‘conceptus' to designate “the entire product of the fertilized egg up to the end of the implantation stage” and the term ’embryo‘ for “that small part of the pre‐embryo or conceptus, first distinguishable at the primitive streak stage, that later develops into the foetus.”3 In this paper we look critically at the term ‘pre‐embryo’, and we shall present the case for an alternative set of terms, namely, embryo‐placenta and embryo‐fetus. We consider this latter to be biologically‐based terminology, that does not have any connotation of restricted moral value as the term pre‐embryo does for some. (shrink)

Concomitant to the renaissance of the concept of virtue in contemporary moral philosophy was the return to the traditional theories of virtue. The author offers a comparison of the theories of virtue with Aristotle, Spinoza and Hume, focusing on two questions: First, what do such diverse conceptions as Aristotle's eudaimonism, Spinoza's ethical rationalism and Hume's theory of moral sense have in common? Her argument is, that in spite of different principles and different conceptual means these conceptions could be covered by (...) the same moral - philosophical tradition in which that, what ought to be is not strictly separated from that, what is . Thus the good and the virtue are not seen as divergent objectives or two mutually alienated worlds - as the Kantian tradition later tried to suggest. The second question conerns some of the specific incentives of the contemporary theories of virtue, especially the concept of character and its philosophical interpretation. (shrink)

L'essai de Piaget est de ceux qu'on ne peut négliger, car il pose en termes lucides et incisifs l'un des problèmes essentiels de la philosophie. Ses conclusions sont nettes, et il faudra bien que l'on prenne position à leur égard. Il nous semble pourtant que l'on pourrait discerner dans ses propos deux conclusions distinctes, et qu'il ne serait dès lors pas impossible d'en accepter l'une sans pour autant souscrire à l'autre. La séparation des deux thèmes devrait en tout cas clarifier (...) le problème, et permettre une assimilation plus aisée du contenu complexe et tourmenté de cette œuvre profondément engagée. (shrink)

Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, (...) we extend our inductive reach by supplying more localized inductive inference schemes. Since a material theory no longer separates the factual and schematic parts of an induction, it proves not to be vulnerable to Hume's problem of the justification of induction. (shrink)

Jonathan Mann was a pioneer in establishing communication between the world of public health and that of human rights activism. At the very start, he strongly believed that although each of these two fields was in the midst of separate paradigm shifts, these shifts are essential, perhaps causal, to the combined health and human rights movement.

An axiomatic basis for a social preference ordering with interval-scaled utility levels satisfying the principles of anonymity and pareto superiority is elaborated. The ordering is required to be sensitive to distributional equality: Redistribution of utility income from poor to rich persons without changing their social rank should lead to a superior evaluation. The axiom of separability is weakened in order to make it compatible with distributional equality. We prove that every continuous ordering satisfying the upper axioms can be represented by (...) a utility function which is positively linear on the convex cone of rank-ordered utility vectors. A modified unnormalized Gini coefficient is one possible choice, but it contradicts, as well as related proposals, the principle of adequacy of means for some distribution problems. (shrink)

The working situation prevailing in theoretical and experimental physics today is held to be inseparable from the interpretation of quantum theory, and constitutes an embodiment of its implicit difficulties. Such an understanding of the present situation in fundamental physics provides a quite different basis for ideas than the formulation of alternative courses of action (experiments) or alternative forms of knowledge (theories), which proceeds from the belief in a full separation of theory from experiment in this field. It is argued (...) that this underlying belief is not well founded. One must therefore consider the technical details of the field together with its foundations, and thus especially the situation produced by fundamental physics, including, in particular, the growth of high-energy technology, which exerts a determining influence on the further course of the subject. (shrink)

In this essay I deal with two conceptions of the political—one that entails a clash of civilizations associated with an Schmittian critique of liberalism, and a second that envisions the political as an emerging domain in relationship to the idea of overlapping consensus. The discovery of the emerging domain of the political in the later work of John Rawls separates the comprehensive from the political in a way that breaks the link between modernization and secularization. In so doing Rawls accommodates (...) the rise of religion that has become a major issue in the twenty-first century. I follow Rawls's development from…. (shrink)

House of Lords authority in Tesco v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 has reinforced the well-established principle that judicial review will distinguish between relevant and irrelevant considerations pertaining to the exercise of a power, and leave the weighing of the relevant ones to the decision-maker. It has also problematized the principle by insisting that relevant factors may adequately be taken into account even where the decision-maker allows them no influence (subject to challenge for irrationality). It (...) is difficult to accept that a legislative identification of relevant factors need not influence the decision-maker, and the article begins by observing that this proposition would probably not have been accepted at the time of Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578. It is argued in the article, however, that the proper influence of the relevant can be accommodated within the decision-making process while upholding the Tesco principle. The article therefore charts the activities which are logically implicit in a decision-making process including the consideration and weighing of relevant factors, and locates opportunities for legal challenge. The influence of the expressly relevant must be felt when the decision-maker has to decide whether other factors are impliedly relevant. It will equally be registered when a basis for the assessment of weight is established (weight being impossible to gauge without the prior formulation of criteria of influence). The process of weighing itself is shown to require two separate assessments; the first particular to each factor, the second comparative. This distinction allows explanation of those explanation of those authorities which require substantial weight to be given to certain protected factors, and helps to define the nature of irrationality challenges to absurd weighing. In summary, the article takes a rigorous look at what weight is, how it is assessed, how it differs from relevance, and to what extent a flawed assessment of it can be challenged. (shrink)

Although classical probability theory, as it is encapsulated in the axioms of Kolmogorov and in his criterion for the independence of two events, can consistently be employed in quantum mechanics, this can only be accomplished at an exorbitant price. By considering first the classic two‐slit experiment, and then the passage of one photon through three polarizers, the applicability of Kolmogorov's last axiom is called into question, but the standard rebuff of the Copenhagen interpretation is shown to be adequate to this (...) challenge. In the EPR experiment of Aspect, and the violation of the Bell inequalities, the matter is more delicate: it is not directly Kolmogorov's last axiom, but rather his criterion of independence that is at issue. It is explained how two events with space‐like separation cannot be independent in Kolmogorov's sense, even in the presence of hidden variables. The escape route of supposing the variables to be nonlocal, with a heavy metaphysical ballast of holism, which however is cosmically censored to prevent superluminal information transfer, has all the trappings of an ad hoc makeshift. The adoption of quantum mechanical probability, which does not obey the rules of Kolmogorov, but does survive empirical testing in terms of relative frequencies of events, is more economical. The solution is simple: correlations obey the rules of quantum mechanics and probability is a theory laden concept that is tested by, but not defined in terms of, the relative frequency of selected classes of events. Quantum mechanics appears to be nonlocal only if one tries to force it into a classical, realist straitjacket. However, this is a shortcoming of the straitjacket: it is not a property of quantum mechanics. That follows from the fact that a Bell telephone does not work! (shrink)

This volume is part one of a two-volume set. It may be purchased separately or in conjunction with volume two. A reprint of the 1969 Oxford University Press edition. Volume I: Hobbes—Gay: Thomas Hobbes, Richard Cumberland, Ralph Cudworth, John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Samuel Clarke, Bernard Mandeville, William Wollaston, Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, John Balguy, John Gay.

The volumes that comprise this set are also available for purchase individually: please see their separate listings for further information. A reprint of the 1969 Oxford University Press edition. Volume I: Hobbes—Gay: Thomas Hobbes, Richard Cumberland, Ralph Cudworth, John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Samuel Clarke, Bernard Mandeville, William Wollaston, Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, John Balguy, John Gay. Volume II: Hume—Bentham: David Hume, David Hartley, Richard Price, Adam Smith, William Paley, Thomas Reid, Jeremy Bentham.

Within anthropology, as elsewhere in the human sciences, there is a tendency to divide knowledge making into two separate poles: conceptual (theory) vs. empirical (ethnography). In Theory Can Be More than It Used to Be, Dominic Boyer, James D. Faubion, and George E. Marcus argue that we need to take a step back from the assumption that we know what theory is to investigate how theory—a matter of concepts, of analytic practice, of medium of value, of professional ideology—operates in anthropology (...) and related fields today. They have assembled a distinguished group of scholars to diagnose the state of the theory-ethnography divide in anthropology today and to explore alternative modes of analytical and pedagogical practice. Continuing the methodological insights provided in Fieldwork Is Not What It Used to Be, the contributors to this volume find that now is an optimal time to reflect on the status of theory in relation to ethnographic research in anthropology and kindred disciplines. Together they engage with questions such as, What passes for theory in anthropology and the human sciences today and why? What is theory's relation to ethnography? How are students trained to identify and respect anthropological theorization and how do they practice theoretical work in their later career stages? What theoretical experiments, languages, and institutions are available to the human sciences? Throughout, the editors and authors consider theory in practical terms, rather than as an amorphous set of ideas, an esoteric discourse of power, a norm of intellectual life, or an infinitely contestable canon of texts. A short editorial afterword explores alternative ethics and institutions of pedagogy and training in theory. Contributors: Andrea Ballestero, Rice University; Dominic Boyer, Rice University; Lisa Breglia, George Mason University; Jessica Marie Falcone, Kansas State University; James D. Faubion, Rice University; Kim Fortun, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Andreas Glaeser, University of Chicago; Cymene Howe, Rice University; Jamer Hunt, Parsons The New School for Design and the Institute of Design in Umea, Sweden; George E. Marcus, University of California, Irvine; Townsend Middleton, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Deepa S. Reddy, University of Houston–Clear Lake; Kaushik Sunder Rajan, University of Chicago. (shrink)

It is hard to define cultural modernity. Nonetheless, apparently there is no match between biological and cultural evolution, between biological and archaeological data. The features of cultural modernity cannot be seen as a direct consequence of the biological origin of our species. A second crucial aspect is that the subsistence strategies, technological and symbolic traditions of Neanderthals are not significantly different from those of modern humans living in Africa and the Near East at the same period. Europe, at the level (...) of human evolution, was a cul-de-sac and not a disseminating centre. Bifaces reached Europe a million years after their invention in Africa. Homo sapiens and Neanderthals thus evolved in parallel, even though speed and cultural forms varied from one population to another. It now seems clear that the features we recognize as ‘modern’ appeared in different regions and in different human groups. It would be the same later with the invention of agriculture, writing, state societies, which appeared separately at several points on the planet. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis study explores, historically and conceptually, the idea of separating governmental powers to institute a system that superintends the legitimate acquisition and exercise of those power...

This book provides an introduction to metaphysics. At the outset Professor Hamlyn distinguishes two conceptions of metaphysics running through the history of the subject. One, which goes back to Aristotle, is concerned with ontology, and with what has to exist for beings such as we are; the other separates appearance and reality and attempts to establish what really exists. Professor Hamlyn's account of metaphysics conforms with the first tradition. This is not, however, primarily a historical exposition. The discussion concentrates on (...) central metaphysical concepts and problems, including the principles of ontology, substance, particulars and universals, monism and pluralism, space and time, minds, selves and personal identity. Throughout, Professor Hamlyn's thoroughly informed and argued consideration of the topics presents both a persuasive view of the subject and an excellent grounding in it. (shrink)

Ontologies are being used by information scientists in order to facilitate the sharing of meaningful information. However, computational ontologies are problematic in that they often decontextualize information. The semantic content of information is dependent upon the context in which it exists and the experience through which it emerges. For true semantic interoperability to occur among diverse information systems, within or across domains, information must remain contextualized. In order to bring more context to computational ontologies, we introduce culture as an essential (...) concept for information science. Culture helps to focus our attention on and make meaning of relevant extrapersonal structures and their qualities and dimensions that comprise the context and background of the world. In our approach, culture is integral to the study of semantics and, consequently, the study of ontologies and information technologies. The meaning we make of entities and phenomena in the world is always shaped by our cultural experience. If we understand culture as the emergent interplay of intrapersonal cognitive structures and extrapersonal structures of the world, then the notion of cognitive and cultural schemas becomes essential to understanding ontology and the ways in which we might achieve authentic semantic interoperability among diverse information systems. We explore the nature of ontologies and reconceptualize them as cultural schemas. Our proposal is an alternative to the historical path from philosophical ontology to computational ontologies as one that adheres primarily to the notion of ontology as a categorization and classification system. The obvious implication for ontology as categorization is that there is a single objective world that exists and that it can be described as entirely separate from the person observing it. We draw upon Heidegger’s examination of ontology to ground ontology in a phenomenological perspective, enabling it to remain flexible and adaptable and to accommodate context. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of children‘s genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed 'female genital mutilation' or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed 'male circumcision‘). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children - whether female, male, or indeed intersex - should be free from (...) having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication. (shrink)

This paper was first presented at the London Medical Group's Annual Conference entitled Death: the last taboo held in February 1980. Dr Vere comments on the evidence of research done by him and his colleagues on the pain and discomfort suffered by patients who are dying and are in hospital. He contrasts this with the situation in hospices, analyses the differences, and attributes much of the unnecessary pain suffered in hospitals to attitudes of staff, as well as to a reluctance (...) by relatives to allow patients with terminal pain to die at home. He deprecates the tendency in hospitals to separate 'curing' and 'caring' and suggests that sometimes the best help involves 'doing' less, not more. (shrink)