In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For once, (...) Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to derive a perfectly general criterion of identity through time from Locke’s Principle, which says that two things of the same kind cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In this way, the paper pursues a suggestion made by Peter F. Strawson almost thirty years ago in an article called ‘Entity and Identity’. The reason why the potential of this suggestion has so far remained unrealized is twofold: firstly, the (...) suggestion was never properly developed by Strawson, and secondly, it seemed vulnerable to an objection that he himself raised against it. Consequently, the paper’s aim is to further develop Strawson’s suggestion, and to show that the result is not vulnerable to the objection that seemed fatal to its underdeveloped predecessor. In addition, the paper aims to defend Locke’s Principle against alleged counterexamples such as those produced by Leibniz, Fine and Hughes. (shrink)

In 1907 Einstein had the insight that bodies in free fall do not “feel” their own weight. This has been formalized in what is called “the principle of equivalence.” The principle motivated a critical analysis of the Newtonian and special-relativistic concepts of inertia, and it was indispensable to Einstein’s development of his theory of gravitation. A great deal has been written about the principle. Nearly all of this work has focused on the content of the principle and whether it has (...) any content in Einsteinian gravitation, but more remains to be said about its methodological role in the development of the theory. I argue that the principle should be understood as a kind of foundational principle known as a criterion of identity. This work extends and substantiates a recent account of the notion of a criterion of identity by William Demopoulos. Demopoulos argues that the notion can be employed more widely than in the foundations of arithmetic and that we see this in the development of physical theories, in particular space–time theories. This new account forms the basis of a general framework for applying a number of mathematical theories and for distinguishing between applied mathematical theories that are and are not empirically constrained. (shrink)

According to Locke’s Principle, material objects are identical if and only if they are of the same kind and once occupy the same place at the same time. There is disagreement about whether this principle is true, but what is seldom disputed is that, even if true, the principle fails to constitute an applicable criterion of identity. In this paper, I take issue with two arguments that have been offered in support of this claim by arguing (i) that (...) we can have knowledge of past whereabouts, and so verify the right hand side of Locke’s Principle, without having to assess concrete identity claims first; (ii) that even under conditions of incomplete knowledge of past whereabouts we can use Locke’s Principle to decide concrete identity problems. (shrink)

Standardly, a one-level criterion of identity 1 is given in the form: ∀ x∀ y )where ‘ K’ denotes the kind of thing for which the criterion is being given and ‘ R’ denotes the criterial relation.Thus, we have, for example, the criterion of identity for sets: ∀ x∀ y))and for composites: ∀ x∀ y))and for events: ∀ x∀ y)). is equivalent to the conjunction of: ∀ x and ∀ x )),which just give two necessary (...) 2 conditions for application of the predicate ‘ K’. 3Consider now the reading of ‘ Kx’ as ‘ x is a member of the Theology Department’ and ‘ Rxy’ as ‘ x admires y and y admires x’. On this reading says that every theologian admires himself and admires no other member of the department. In other words it tells us that the theologians are a bunch of narcissists bound together only by mutual contempt or indifference . Suppose that this is 4 true of the theologians. It might also be …. (shrink)

One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that (...) the bodily criterion is an important view which anyone thinking about personal identity must consider. (shrink)

According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property identity is unsatisfactory, because it fails to provide a sufficient condition for the identification of properties. My argument for this claim is based on the observation that the summing of properties does (...) not entail the summing of the conditional powers that they bestow on an object, but, rather, in some cases their subtraction. If so, the following causal structure seems possible: There are two properties, A and B. Each bestows a different set of conditional powers on its bearer, but the conjunctive property A-and-B bestows exactly the same set of conditional powers as either A or B. If this causal structure is possible, then it creates a serious problem for the causal criterion of property identity. (shrink)

I propose an argument for the thesis that laws of nature are necessary in the sense of holding in all worlds sharing the properties of the actual world, on the basis of a principle I propose to call the Causal Criterion of Reality . The CCR says: for an entity to be real it is necessary and sufficient that it is capable to make a difference to causal interactions. The crucial idea here is that the capacity to interact causally (...) - or to contribute to determining causal interactions - is not only the ultimate metaphysical ground for the existence of an entity, but it also provides a criterion for determining the nature of that entity, i.e. its properties. The alternative is to conceive of laws of nature as contingent: they could be different from what they are like in the actual world, where that possibility is understood to be metaphysical, not only epistemic. For the sake of this paper, I shall accept Armstrong's thesis that laws of nature are relations between universals. I also follow Armstrong in the view that both the existence and the properties of particulars are metaphysically independent of the existence and identity of other particular. However, what is controversial and what I shall challenge is his thesis that universals are like particulars in the following respect: according to Armstrong, each universal is a logically distinct entity whose existence and identity is independent of the existence and identity of other universals. My aim in this paper is to show that the identity of a universal is entirely determined by its lawful relations to other universals. The crucial premise I use is the thesis that the CCR is a universal criterion, which applies both to particulars and universals. From the thesis that the identity of a universal is exclusively determined by laws, it follows that laws are necessary in the sense that they cannot differ without the universals they link also being different. This creates a difficulty for those authors who, as Armstrong, accept the CCR but nevertheless defend the view that laws are contingent. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Impredicative identity criteria and Davidson's criterion of event identity, Analysis, Volume 49, Issue 4, 1 October 1989, Pages 178–181, https://doi.

In this paper, we take another look at the reasons for which the causal criterion of event identity has been abandoned. We argue that the reasons are not strong. First of all, there is a criterion in the neighborhood of the causal criterion—the counterfactual criterion—that is not vulnerable to any of the putative counterexamples brought up in the literature. Secondly, neither the causal criterion nor the counterfactual criterion suffers from any form of vicious (...) circularity. Nonetheless, we do not recommend adopting either the causal or the counterfactual criterion because, given a sufficiently lax principle of event composition, neither criterion can be applied to complex events. This we regard as a (prima facie) undesirable restriction on their applicability. (shrink)

John Locke’s account of personal identity is usually thought to have been proved false by Thomas Reid’s simple ‘Gallant Officer’ argument. Locke is traditionally interpreted as holding that your having memories of a past person’s thoughts or actions is necessary and sufficient for your being identical to that person. This paper argues that the traditional memory interpretation of Locke’s account is mistaken and defends a memory continuity view according to which a sequence of overlapping memories is necessary and sufficient (...) for personal identity. On this view Locke is not vulnerable to the Gallant Officer argument. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that the criteria of identity over time for ordinary objects entail that such objects are permanent members of certain sortal kinds. The sortal kinds in question have come to be known as substance sortal kinds. But in this article, I defend a criterion of identity that is suited to phasalism, the view that alleged substance sortals are in fact phase sortals. The criterion I defend is a sortal‐weighted version of a change‐minimizing criterion (...) first discussed by Eli Hirsch. I present this criterion and then argue that it withstands attempts to show that it is inferior to non‐phasalist rivals. (shrink)

In this article I revisit earlier stages of the discussion of personal identity, before Neo-Lockean psychological continuity views became prevalent. In particular, I am interested in Bernard Williams’ initial proposal of bodily identity as a necessary, although not sufficient, criterion of personal identity. It was at this point that psychological continuity views came to the fore arguing that bodily identity was not necessary because brain transplants were logically possible, even if physically impossible. Further proposals by (...) Shoemaker of causal relations between mental states in our memory and Parfit’s discussion of branching causal chains created additional complications. My contention in this paper is that psychological continuity views deflected our attention from what should have remained in the spotlight all the time: the intersubjective character (or not) of criteria proposed to decide personal identity in our language game, and ultimately our form of life concerning ourselves as persons. B. Williams’ emphasis on the body was not just common sense. It was also recognition of the importance of giving priority to criteria that could be kept under intersubjective control. (shrink)

'Object' and 'criterion of identity' are philosophical terms of art whose application lies at a considerable theoretical remove from the surface phenomena of everyday linguistic usage. This partly explains their highly controversial status, for their point of application lies precisely where the concerns of linguists and philosophers of language merge with those of metaphysicians. This chapter explains the possession of determinate identity‐conditions. It argues that the distinction between 'abstract' and 'concrete' objects is itself a highly controversial one, (...) and although it has indeed been argued that this distinction turns ultimately upon differences between the criteria of identity governing objects of these two broad categories. It examines the role which criteria of identity play in our talk about objects of the least controversial varieties. The chapter concerns the problem of identity over time and the paradoxes to which identity criteria often appear to give rise when time is brought into the picture. (shrink)

We show that finitely axiomatized first-order theories that involve some criterion of identity for entities of a category C can be reformulated as conjunctions of a non-triviality statement and a criterion of identity for entities of category C again. From this, we draw two conclusions: First, criteria of identity can be very strong deductively. Second, although the criteria of identity that are constructed in the proof of the theorem are not good ones intuitively, it (...) is difficult to say what exactly is wrong with them once the modern metaphysical view of identity criteria is presupposed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: This chapter attempts to clarify the confused notion of the phrase ‘criterion of identity’. The first section of this chapter upholds the distinctiveness of the form, on which a criterion of identity for F s is a relation between non‐F s. The second section begins to unpick metaphysical and epistemic strands in the use of the phrase ‘criterion of identity’. In the relevant sense, a criterion of identity (...) is a metaphysical principle apt to explain epistemic facts. (shrink)

Modern analytical metaphysics contains many theories and approaches regarding the problem of personal identity. This diversity inevitably leads to the emergence of various classifications, the authors of which are trying to develop a compact way of typologizing existing views. Most of the classifications involve a significant simplification of the theories and approaches under consideration, and some of them are not taken into account at all. As such global classifications, one can single out an approach based on the identity (...) criterion used in the theory (psychological, biological, narrative views). However, numerous local classifications allow one to point out potential differences in theories, even if formally they use a common criterion of identity. Other possible classifications are the division into endurantism and perdurantism, as well as simple (non-reductionist) and complex (reductionist) theories of identity. Special attention is paid to M. Shechtman‘s approach, which offers a local classification of narrative theories. Its main classification is the presentation of the views of researchers in the form of a possible spectrum. The place of a particular philosopher on this spectrum characterizes his views in relation to other supporters of the narrative approach. The purpose of this article is, based on the classification of narrative theories proposed by Shechtman, to propose a classification option for all theories and approaches to the problem of personal identity, which would be sensitive to conceptual details and differences that are important to them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Misprision of IdentityHarold Merskey (bio)Misprision the deliberate concealment of one's knowledge of a crime...A misreading, misunderstanding, etc.A failure to appreciate the value of a thing...(Concise Oxford Dictionary)There are options in the forms of identity that Charland's subjects assume. There are options as well in the meaning of this title, which may apply severally or individually to the choices under consideration. Are those who change their identity with (...) labels—or reject labels—correctly assuming accurate descriptions, or incorrectly misleading themselves and some others? In which of these cases are observation and intervention ethical, and do they pose demands on medical ethicists, or should they simply be ignored?Types of AutonomyParticipants in chat rooms on the Internet may justifiably be considered to be individuals who are seeking a current method of communication to promote a view of themselves, or ideas that they possess, or projects that they endorse. In this they may resemble others who have used more traditional methods of presenting their ideas, their claims, their wares, hard merchandise, literary material, or political or philosophical propositions to the public at large. These others may be sales persons, advertisers, poets, singers, clowns, buskers, politicians, preachers, missionaries, learned public speakers, television presenters, news commentators (but not necessarily reporters), and anyone indeed who talks to other people in public about matters that she or he wishes to bring forward. They have a point they want to make. They may be grouping themselves as 'survivors' or pro-anorexia, or Multiple Personality Disorder victims, but they are not necessarily operating as patients who are looking for a fiduciary relationship with physicians or other health care practitioners. It is thus a long step to turn them into individuals who may have a claim on the doctor–patient relationship.Do we wish to undertake research on them? Research or study in the first instance for these circumstances must be in the field of social science. The rules of what it is ethical for a sociologist to do apply first. The rules of situations where one person has more power and the other depends on that individual for assistance without exploitation may differ considerably from case to case. In so far as there may be some special rules as to what is fair, reasonable, just, kind, merciful, or prudent to study individuals who expose themselves and their interests publicly, this is perhaps best done first by reference to standards for journalists.That criterion may be too lenient a standard for most health professionals because journalists seem to be quite willing to expose the subjects of their observations to public obloquy and to [End Page 351] present information about many individuals—information that the persons themselves do not consent to see in the public domain, but that the journalist, having acquired, feels entitled to make known. Still there are believed to be some standards that journalists observe and these tend to protect the weak and the more vulnerable, although that does not mean that they are regularly followed. They tend to emphasize not printing material that is salacious or very lewd and would have personal reference, but they do not withhold comparable information if they consider that it is accurate and describes the behavior of individuals who are of interest to the public which, in certain circumstances, may mean almost anybody.So up to this point it seems that our normal respect for the autonomy of the individual in chat rooms can be balanced against our interest in freedom of speech, which leads to open and very broadly based publication of information and observations.The Burden of the LabelOnce the medical label is affixed, a different level of stringency begins to apply to what may be studied or published. Because we feel that individuals' self-esteem is at risk and perhaps their lives, we hesitate to make cutting or pejorative comments about distressed people. Such diagnoses as cancer or depression may be held back from the patient (and, certainly, in the case of depression, even more may be kept from others around the patient). Likewise unspoken thoughts may be automatically acknowledged and, like radical material, may be carefully segregated and... (shrink)

‘When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. … Consciousness … is inseparable from thinking, and essential to it. …’John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding ‘Psycho-analysis … cannot accept the identity of the conscious and the mental. It defines what is mental as processes such as feeling, thinking and … willing. … ’Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis.In this paper I shall provide a novel version of a traditional epistemic (...) class='Hi'>criterion for distinguishing mental entities from nonmental ones, and defend it from likely sorts of objections. By the phrase ‘criterion of the mental’ I mean a set of conditions which is necessary and sufficient for an entity's being mental. (shrink)

Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used (...) to empirically establish local identities between mental and neural properties. If successful, such an account would settle the debate on the mind-body problem. In this paper, I argue that Glymour’s approach falls short of its aims. The causal criterion which he proposes does not provide a sufficient condition for the local identification of properties. Moreover, his account does not succeed in rendering local mind-brain identities empirically testable. Therefore, the mind-body problem cannot be solved as easily as Glymour assumes. (shrink)

I discuss E. J. Lowe's conception of criteria of identity and sketch a different and, I think, more adequate conception. On my view, criteria of identity are some of the things we can do. They are what we do when distinguishing between single entities of the kind in question and pairs of entities of the relevant domain. And they enable us to make such distinctions because they are applicable to all single and to all pairs of entities of (...) the relevant domain but fulfilled only by all single entities of the kind in question. This feature of criteria of identity allows us to define these criteria, to explain how to identify a particular criterion of identity and to determine the logical form in which to express such identifications. (shrink)

Dag Prawitz (1971) put forward the idea that an admissible reduction process does not affect the identity of proofs represented by derivations in natural deduction. The idea relies on his conjecture that two derivations represent the same proof if and only if they are equivalent in the sense that they are reflexive, transitive and symmetric closure of the immediate reducibility relation. Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini (2017) accept Prawitz’s conjecture and propose the triviality test as the criterion for admissible reductions. (...) In the present paper, we will consider two main troubles of the triviality test. The first is the obscurity of a method of evaluating admissible reductions. The second is the circularity problem that the triviality test already assumes the set of admissible reduction procedures. For the solution of the problems, we will propose the spoiler test which immunes the problems of the triviality test and has the role of the criterion for admissible reductions. At last, we shall cover a plausible problem of the spoiler test that can be caused by Crabbé’s case. (shrink)

Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death (...) is the correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist. (shrink)

Abstract Nancy Fraser raises serious doubts about the critical potential of identity theories of recognition on the ground that they encourage the reduction of personal identity to cultural identity. Based on a comparative analysis of Charles Taylor's and Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, this paper argues that Fraser's critique is justified with respect to some aspects of Taylor's theory of identity, but not with respect to his conception of recognition, or to Honneth's conception of both (...) class='Hi'>identity and recognition. Taylor's theory of identity recognition is vulnerable to Fraser's critique because under certain conditions of pathological socialization it cannot prevent the normative subordination of strong evaluation to whatever dominant goods are acquired through acculturation. Honneth's theory of identity recognition overcomes this normative weakness in three ways. First, Honneth differentiates between three types of self-relation that cannot be reduced to cultural identity. Second, he operates with a mixed, attributive?responsive model of recognition that normatively underwrites all these types of self-relation. Third, he makes the condition of reciprocity in recognition the criterion for successful self-realization that enables one to distinguish between misrecognition and non-normative experiences of human suffering. (shrink)

When is there no fact of the matter about a metaphysical question? When multiple candidate meanings are equally eligible, in David Lewis's sense, and fit equally well with ordinary usage. Thus given certain ontological schemes, there is no fact of the matter whether the criterion of personal identity over time is physical or psychological. But given other ontological schemes there is a fact of the matter; and there is a fact of the matter about which ontological scheme is (...) correct. (shrink)

Fictional ersatz realism is the metaphysical stance that abstract fictional entities exist and are dependent on fiction and literary practices. Everett tackled the position of ersatz realism by claiming that the ersatz realist cannot provide an identity criterion for fictional entities that does not imply a contradiction. Although Woodward proposed a defense to Everett's argument, I will argue that ersatz realism is no tenable position, as it still cannot provide an adequate identity criterion. To establish this (...) result, I will provide a base frame for identity criteria available to the ersatz realist. Afterwards, I will show that to any identity criterion the ersatz realist may propose there is a story such that a fictional entity corresponding to this story is not self-identical, imposing a contradiction to the metaphysical account of ersatz realism. (shrink)

This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute (...) identity but by means of incompatible criteria of relative identity. After discussing the benefits of applying relative identity in ontological investigations I provide a formal framework in which to prove a counterpart of the identity criteria constraint. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to shed light on the problem of identity of particulars over time within the framework of Quinean analysis. First, it focuses on the relationship between essential and accidental property changes as a criterion for distinguishing cases when objects retain their identity from cases when they loose it. In this part it is shown, that a coherent distinction between essential and accidental properties is problematic. Quinean approach indicates that we do not need (...) to look for any kind of criterion of identity of particulars over time. Hence, the conclusion is that the identity of particulars over time should not be viewed as a problem of how to understand the concept of identity, but rather as a problem of how to understand certain general concepts, i.e. how to individualize certain parts of the world by the use of certain general terms. (shrink)