The possibility of acting for normative reasons calls for explanation, considering that such reasons are facts. Facing this issue, some argue that to act for a normative reason, the normative reason and the reason we act for (i.e. the motivating reason) need to be identical. Others reject the idea that normative reasons are facts in the first place. A conciliatory proposal is that by appealing to dispositions we can simultaneously accept that normative reasons are facts and that we can act (...) for them, without accepting the identity of the normative reasons and the motivating reason. After sketching an example of such a view, I mention an obstacle on its way. This view relies heavily on the correspondence relation, to make the action connected to the normative reason via a descriptive belief. It is argued that this is challenging since the correspondence relation might not be suitable to play the metaphysical role needed. (shrink)

The primitivist theory of truth, i.e., the view that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, has been cleverly revamped by Jamin Asay, who has combined a primitivist approach to the concept of truth with a deflationary approach to the (metaphysical) property of being true. This paper aims to adjust Asay’s primitivist theory to consistently include the primitiveness of the (pre-theoretical) correspondence relation, grasped by our correspondence intuition, alongside the primitiveness of truth. In the process, I (...) apply a thesis by Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, according to which the correspondence of beliefs to facts (broadly construed) can occur with no commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. Then I argue why Asay’s theory might not be able to account for the primitiveness of the pre-theoretical correspondence relation. Finally, I use a suggestion by André Kukla concerning the possible entailment between an ineffable insight and its effable consequences, to build a revised primitivist theory of truth. (shrink)

We present a general framework for proof systems for relational theories. We discuss principles of the construction of deduction rules and correspondences reflecting relationships between semantics of relational logics and the rules of the respective proof systems. We illustrate the methods developed in the paper with examples relevant for the Lambek calculus and some of its extensions.

In this paper we give the gist of our reconstructed notion of (limiting case) correspondence. Our notion is very general, so that it should be applicable to all the cases in which a correspondence has been said to exist in actual science.

Relationships between current theories, and relationships between current theories and the sought theory of quantum gravity (QG), play an essential role in motivating the need for QG, aiding the search for QG, and defining what would count as QG. Correspondence is the broad class of inter-theory relationships intended to demonstrate the necessary compatibility of two theories whose domains of validity overlap, in the overlap regions. The variety of roles that correspondence plays in the search for QG are illustrated, (...) using examples from specific QG approaches. Reduction is argued to be a special case of correspondence, and to form part of the definition of QG. Finally, the appropriate account of emergence in the context of QG is presented, and compared to conceptions of emergence in the broader philosophy literature. It is argued that, while emergence is likely to hold between QG and general relativity, emergence is not part of the definition of QG, and nor can it serve usefully in the development and justification of the new theory. (shrink)

While recognizing the theoretical importance of context, current research has treated naming as though semantic meaning were invariant and the same mapping of category exemplars and names should exist across experimental contexts. An assumed symmetry or bidirectionality in naming behavior has been implicit in the interchangeable use of tasks that ask subjects to match names to stimuli and tasks that ask subjects to match stimuli to names. Examples from the literature are discussed together with several studies of color naming and (...) basic emotion naming in which no such symmetry was found. A more complete model of naming is proposed to account for flexible mapping of names to items. Principles of naming are suggested to describe effects of stimulus sampling, differing access to terms, task demands, and other impacts on naming behavior. (shrink)

The Normative Competence Account characterizes acting for a normative reason as action which manifests the agent’s complex normative competence. But which role does the correspondence between the n...

In formal theories of measurement meaningfulness is usually formulated in terms of numerical statements that are invariant under admissible transformations of the numerical representation. This is equivalent to qualitative relations that are invariant under automorphisms of the measurement structure. This concept of meaningfulness, appropriately generalized, is studied in spaces constructed from a number of conjoint and extensive structures some of which are suitably interrelated by distribution laws. Such spaces model the dimensional structures of classical physics. It is shown that this (...) qualitative concept corresponds exactly with the numerical concept of dimensionally invariant laws of physics. (shrink)

In the literature we have found correspondence of several significant traits of Jewish mysticism with traits of Buddhism and other systems of Indian religion-philosophy. Among the corresponding traits is the fundamental idea of emptiness or nothingness, shuunyataa in Sanskrit, ayin in Hebrew. Also corresponding are attempts to harmonize the idea and experience of emptiness with fullness, and with the experience of the secular world with its many things and concepts. We list eight significant traits of Jewish mysticism, which we (...) find correspond with traits of Indian religion-philosophies. We also discuss some important relations of these Indian and Jewish belief systems with modern science. We contend, that natural science is built on spontaneous sensory experiences; on this basis concepts and theories are constructed. Likewise we think, that spiritual experiences occur spontaneously and contribute to the basis of religious, mystic and some philosophical belief systems. We thus think, there are important parallels between scientific and spiritual cognition. Key words: Comparative religion; Emptiness/fullness; nothingness; God; compassion; reincarnation; cognition, scientific spiritual; spiritual experiences; Buddhism. (shrink)

The paper deals with a generalization of the notion of partition for wider classes of binary relations than equivalences: for quasiorders and tolerance relations. The counterpart of partition for the quasiorders is based on a generalization of the notion of equivalence class while it is shown that such a generalization does not work in case of tolerances. Some results from [5] are proved in a much more simple way. The third kind of “partition” corresponding to tolerances, not occurring in [5], (...) is introduced. (shrink)

In recent years, neologicists have demonstrated that Hume's principle, based on the one-to-one correspondence relation, suffices to construct the natural numbers. This formal work is shown to be relevant for empirical research on mathematical cognition. I give a hypothetical account of how nonnumerate societies may acquire arithmetical knowledge on the basis of the one-to-one correspondence relation only, whereby the acquisition of number concepts need not rely on enumeration (the stable-order principle). The existing empirical data on the (...) role of the one-to-one correspondence relation for numerical abilities is assessed and additional empirical tests are proposed. In the final part, it is argued that the fact that the successor relation and the one-to-one correspondence relation can play independent roles in number concept acquisition may be a complication for testing the Whorfian hypothesis. (shrink)

First, this article provides a survey of the kind of relationship that existed between Kepler and the Jesuits. Afterwards, it is pondered upon the likelihood of their having been in direct contact with each other while Kepler lived in Prague. The second part of the article is devoted to an investigation into the correspondence between Kepler and Paul Guldin as an example. Thus, the paper describes the key issues of those letters and concludes from this Guldin's attitude to Kepler (...) and the resulting commitment to Kepler's affairs. Finally, the article examines whether the assumption that Kepler and Guldin later discontinued their correspondence intensionally is verifiable and plausible. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose la première édition intégrale des lettres retrouvées à ce jour entre les philosophes Jacques Maritain et Emmanuel Mounier. Cette correspondance enrichit largement, de 133 à plus de 200 lettres, la première édition partielle de 1973, qui n'était qu'une sélection de lettres illustrant la genèse de l'ouvrage collectif sur Péguy et celle de la revue Esprit. Elle est éclairée par la connaissance des Carnets personnels de Maritain, et du Journal complet de Mounier qui sont en cours de parution. (...) Cette publication réévalue très largement l'image que l'on pouvait se faire de leur relation, révélant davantage encore la profondeur humaine et spirituelle de cette grande amitié. A l'instar d'Yves Simon ou de Henry Bars, Emmanuel Mounier se donne le beau titre de "filleul" de Jacques Maritain, de "fils aimant" : un fils libre et indépendant. Il prolonge à sa manière la philosophie politique, sociale et culturelle de Jacques Maritain, s'appuyant sur les jalons forts de sa pensée - tels l'humanisme intégral, les moyens pauvres, "l'exister avec le peuple" ou l'amitié civique, l'ouverture aux autres religions et aux incroyants, la participation à une oeuvre commune - mais aussi réalisant un travail personnel, parfois en décalage avec celle du philosophe de Meudon. N'est-il pas symbolique qu'emprisonné par le régime de Vichy, Emmanuel Mounier ait choisi de présenter à ses camarades de cellule, le 10 octobre 1942 "un soir Péguy, un soir Maritain"? (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length—and over a long period of time—on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the justification of belief. That they (...) remained close, relishing their differences through years of correspondence, shows their stature both as thinkers and as friends. The letters are presented here, in full, for the first time. The substantial introduction by Richard Creath offers a lively overview of Carnap's and Quine's careers and backgrounds, allowing the nonspecialist to see their writings in historical and intellectual perspective. Creath also provides a judicious analysis of the philosophical divide between them, showing how deep the issues cut into the discipline, and how to a large extent they remain unresolved. (shrink)

This paper is an essay review of Steven French and Harmke Kamminga (eds.), Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics. Essays in Honour of Heinz Post (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993). I distinguish a varity of correspondence relations between scientific theories (exemplified by cases from the book under review) and examine how one can make sense of the the prevailing continuity in scientific theorizing.

This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes (...) discussion of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts, and a number of students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realistic conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth, and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus. (shrink)

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to (...) be specified). During the last 2300 years this basic idea has been expressed in many ways, resulting in a rather extended family of views, theories, and theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. (shrink)

Quiconque, au cours de ses recherches, s’est aventuré dans le domaine des correspondances, sait que, quel qu’en soit l’auteur et quel qu’en soit le moment, il aborde là un continent aux limites inconnues. Aussi, sonder en quelque 150 pages ̶ comme le fait Jürgen Siess dans son ouvrage Vers un nouveau mode de relations entre les sexes ̶ les correspondances de six épistolières qui ont compté parmi les plus prolixes et les plus célèbres de leur temps, semble relever du défi. (...) L’auteur s’en exp... (shrink)

The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at (...) a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no go’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen–Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub–Clifton ‘uniqueness theorem’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences. (shrink)

Thomas Reid is now recognized as one of the towering figures of the Enlightenment. Best known for his published writings on epistemology and moral theory, he was also an accomplished mathematician and natural philosopher, as an earlier volume of his manuscripts edited by Paul Wood for the Edinburgh Reid Edition, Thomas Reid on the Animate Creation, has shown. The Correspondence of Thomas Reid collects all of the known letters to and from Reid in a fully annotated form. Letters already (...) published by Sir William Hamilton and others have been reedited, and roughly half of the letters included appear in print for the first time. Writing in 1802, Reid's disciple and biographer Dugald Stewart doubted that Reid's correspondence &"would be generally interesting.&" This collection proves otherwise, for the letters illuminate virtually every aspect of Reid's life and career and, in some instances, provide us with invaluable evidence about activities otherwise undocumented in his manuscripts or published works. Through his correspondence we can trace Reid's relations with contemporaries such as David Hume and his colleagues at both King's College, Aberdeen, and the University of Glasgow, as well as his engagement with the most controversial philosophical, scientific, and political issues of his day. If anything, the letters assembled here serve as the starting point for understanding Reid and his place in the Enlightenment. (shrink)

On the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to fact. Criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth have argued that such a strict interpretation of the correspondence relation will not be able to account for the truth of statements about fiction or mathematics. This challenge has resulted in the introduction of more permissive correspondence relations, such as Austin’s correspondence as correlation or Tarski’s correspondence as reference (...) satisfaction. Recently, some mediated correspondence theorists of truth have proposed that the correspondence relation holds not only between thought and world but also between thought and language. In this paper, I argue that correspondence truth, direct or mediated, is not a monistic theory of truth, the view that there is one and only way for a proposition to be true. To argue for this position, I will have to show that each of the correspondence theories accept direct and indirect ways of understanding the correspondence relation as well as address potential objections to the view that correspondence theory is not singular and monolithic. (shrink)

Thomas Reid is now recognized as one of the towering figures of the Enlightenment. Best known for his published writings on epistemology and moral theory, he was also an accomplished mathematician and natural philosopher, as an earlier volume of his manuscripts edited by Paul Wood for the Edinburgh Reid Edition, Thomas Reid on the Animate Creation, has shown. The Correspondence of Thomas Reid collects all of the known letters to and from Reid in a fully annotated form. Letters already (...) published by Sir William Hamilton and others have been reedited, and roughly half of the letters included appear in print for the first time. Writing in 1802, Reid's disciple and biographer Dugald Stewart doubted that Reid's correspondence &"would be generally interesting.&" This collection proves otherwise, for the letters illuminate virtually every aspect of Reid's life and career and, in some instances, provide us with invaluable evidence about activities otherwise undocumented in his manuscripts or published works. Through his correspondence we can trace Reid's relations with contemporaries such as David Hume and his colleagues at both King's College, Aberdeen, and the University of Glasgow, as well as his engagement with the most controversial philosophical, scientific, and political issues of his day. If anything, the letters assembled here serve as the starting point for understanding Reid and his place in the Enlightenment. (shrink)

In this paper we show that some orthogeometries, i.e. projective geometries each defined using a ternary collinearity relation and equipped with a binary orthogonality relation, which are extensively studied in mathematics and quantum theory, correspond to Kripke frames, each defined using a binary relation, satisfying a few conditions. To be precise, we will define four special kinds of Kripke frames, namely, geometric frames, irreducible geometric frames, complete geometric frames and quantum Kripke frames; and we will show that (...) they correspond to pure orthogeometries, irreducible pure orthogeometries, Hilbertian geometries and irreducible Hilbertian geometries, respectively. The discovery of these correspondences raises interesting research topics and will enrich the study of logic. (shrink)

First published in 1975, The Correspondence Theory of Truth examines the simplest statements of empirical fact and establishes what we can mean when we say that such statements are true. In particular, the author has considered whether any or all of beliefs, sentences, statements, or propositions are properly said to be true or false. He proceeds to examine what we mean by the term 'fact' and what possible relation between facts and beliefs could be meant by the term (...) 'correspondence'. The second part of the book is a critical survey of important contemporary accounts of truth. The author examines Tarski's semantic theory to see if it offers a satisfactory reconstruction of the essence of the traditional notion of correspondence, then J.L. Austin's recent and famous version of the correspondence theory and some criticisms of it by Professor P. E. Strawson. A final chapter summarizes the viable content of the correspondence theory and suggests what problems about truth still remain for discussion if the theory is accepted. This book will be an essential read for students and scholars of Philosophy. (shrink)

Most Gentzen systems arising in logic contain few axiom schemata and many rule schemata. Hilbert systems, on the other hand, usually contain few proper inference rules and possibly many axioms. Because of this, the two notions tend to serve different purposes. It is common for a logic to be specified in the first instance by means of a Gentzen calculus, whereupon a Hilbert-style presentation ‘for’ the logic may be sought—or vice versa. Where this has occurred, the word ‘for’ has taken (...) on several different meanings, partly because the Gentzen separator ⇒ can be interpreted intuitively in a number of ways. Here ⇒ will be denoted less evocatively by ⊲.In this paper we aim to discuss some of the useful ways in which Gentzen and Hilbert systems may correspond to each other. Actually, we shall be concerned with thededucibility relationsof the formal systems, as it is these that are susceptible to transformation in useful ways. To avoid potential confusion, we shall speak of Hilbert and Gentzenrelations. By aHilbert relationwe mean any substitution-invariant consequence relation onformulas—this comes to the same thing as the deducibility relation of a set of Hilbert-style axioms and rules. By aGentzen relationwe mean the fully fledged generalization of this notion in whichsequentstake the place of single formulas. In the literature, Hilbert relations are often referred to assentential logics. Gentzen relations as defined here are their exactsequentialcounterparts. (shrink)

I argue that one good reason for Scientific Realists to be interested in correspondence theories is the hope they offer us of being able to state and defend realistic theses in the face of well-known difficulties about modern physics: such theses as, that our theories are approximately true, or that they will tend to approach the truth. I go on to claim that this hope is unlikely to be fulfilled. I suggest that Realism can still survive in the face (...) of these difficulties, as a claim about the kind of theories we want to aim for. I relate this conception of Realism to various contemporary discussions, both by realists and antirealists. (shrink)

Two concepts of truth as correspondence of ideas with facts are analyzed. One of them is the thought-external fact relation, and the other is the fact-proposition one. The two maps are then composed, and the resulting map is assumed to formalize the concept of truth as adequacy or correspondence of ideas to facts. Besides, some desiderata for a correspondence theory of partial truth are proposed. Finally, the truth criteria employed in science and technology are recalled.

In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that the syntax of (...) the object language is specified exactly enough, and that the metatheory has a certain amount of set theoretic power,2 one can explicitly define truth in the object language. And what can be explicitly defined can be eliminated. It follows that the defined concept cannot give rise to any inconsistencies (that is, paradoxes). This gave new respectability to the concept of truth and related notions. Nevertheless, philosophers’ judgements on the nature and philosophical relevance of Tarski’s work have varied. It is my aim here to review and evaluate some threads in this debate. (shrink)

A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.G., Reference) between words and the extralinguistic world. What are the consequences of quine's doctrine of indeterminacy for correspondence theories? in "ontological relativity" quine implicitly claims that correspondence theories are impossible; that is what the doctrine of 'relative reference' amounts to. But quine's doctrine of relative reference is incoherent. Those who think the indeterminacy thesis valid should not try to relativize reference, They should (...) abandon the relation and replace it by certain more general correspondence relations between words and extralinguistic objects. Doing so will not interfere with the task of defining truth in terms of correspondence relations. (shrink)

Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant's notion of actual object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant's notions of truth, object, and actuality. I argue that's notion of actual object does not presuppose the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object.

Building computational models of engineered exemplars, or prototypes, is a common practice in the bioengineering sciences. Computational models in this domain are often built in a patchwork fashion, drawing on data and bits of theory from many different domains, and in tandem with actual physical models, as the key objective is to engineer these prototypes of natural phenomena. Interestingly, such patchy model building, often combined with visualizations, whose format is open to a wide range of choice, leads to the discovery (...) of new concepts and control structures. Two key questions are raised by this practice: how could discoveries arise from building external representations for which there is wide latitude in choice of the components from which they are built, and thus can be considered significantly arbitrary, and how could such discoveries allow engineering a real-world prototype system. To examine these questions, we present two case studies of discoveries that emerged from the building of such computational models in the bioengineering sciences. We then develop a process model that accounts for the discovery and transfer problems raised by both these cases, focusing on the process of building the model. Specifically, to account for the discovery problem, we propose that the process of building such models gradually leads to a close coupling between the modeler’s internal processes and the external dynamic model. To account for the transfer problem, we propose that the process of building the model leads to the creation of an enactive model that is generic, which closely enacts, and thus reveals, the way the system-level behavior of the engineered prototype emerges in time through the interaction of its parts. This enactive replication process leads to the model and the prototype forming a new class, which allows concepts and control structures developed for the computational model to be transfered to the real-world prototype. We argue that this account requires rethinking correspondence in engineering sciences as a plastic and enactive relation. A closer focus on the process of building models is required to develop a general account of this emerging approach to discovery. (shrink)

Properties of mental representation are related to findings in cognitive science and ideas in shamanism. A selective review of research in cognitive science suggests visual images and spatial memory preserve important functional information regarding physical principles and the behavior of objects in the natural world, and notions of second‐order isomorphism and the perceptual cycle developed to account for such findings are related to shamanic experience. Possible roles of implicit processes in shamanic cognition, and the idea that shamanic experience may involve (...) normally unconscious information becoming temporarily available to consciousness, are considered. The existence of a cognitive module dedicated to processing information relevant to social knowledge and social interaction is consistent with cognitive science and with shamanism, and may help account for the extension of intentionality and meaning that characterize shamanic practice. Overall, findings from cognitive science and ideas from shamanism exhibit a number of correspondences and similarities regarding basic properties of cognition, and this suggests that shamanic and nonshamanic cognition may not be fundamentally different. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to offer and defend a correspondence theory of truth. I begin by critically examining the coherence, pragmatic, simple, redundancy, disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories of truth. Special attention is paid to several versions of disquotationalism, whose plausibility has led to its fairly constant support since the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski, through that by W. V. Quine, and recently in the work of Paul Horwich. I argue that none of these theories meets the (...) correspondence intuition---that a true sentence or proposition in some way corresponds to reality---despite the explicit claims by each to capture this intuition. I distinguish six versions of the correspondence theory, and defend two against traditional objections, standardly taken as decisive against them, and show, plainly, that these two theories capture the correspondence intuition. Due to the importance of meeting this intuition, only these two theories stands a chance of being a satisfactory theory of truth. I argue that the version of the correspondence theory incorporating a simple semantic representation relation is preferable to its rival, for which the representation relation is complex. I present and argue for a novel version of this correspondence theory according to which truth is a correspondence property sensitive to semantic context. One consequence of this context-sensitivity is that an ungrounded sentence does not express a proposition. In addition to accounting for the similarity between the Liar and Truth-Teller sentences, this theory of truth is immune to the Liar Paradox, including empirical versions. It is argued that the Liar Paradox is devastating to all of the other theories above, and even formal theories of truth designed to solve it, such as the revision and vagueness theories. Customized versions of the Liar Paradox besetting this theory are handled by its context-sensitivity, and by enforcing the distinction between truth and truth value. This same pair of considerations also yields solutions to Lob's Paradox and Grelling's Paradox. Arguments similar to those given to defend this correspondence theory show that with one minor alteration, Kripke's fixed point theory may be used to model this correspondence notion of truth. (shrink)