Introduction -- "Every Legitimate Government is Republican": Rousseau's Debt to and Departure from Montesquieu on Republicanism -- What if There is no Legislator? Rousseau's History of the Government of Geneva -- Rousseau's Republican Citizenship: The Moral Psychology of The Social Contract -- Rousseau's negative liberty: Themes of domination and skepticism in The Social Contract -- Rousseau's Ancient Ends of Legislation: Liberty, Equality (& Fraternity) -- Property and Possession in Rousseau's Social Contract -- Political Equality Among Unequals -- (...) On the Primacy of Peoplehood: Nations and Nationalism in Rousseau's Social Contract -- Rousseau on Voting and Electoral Laws -- Rousseau and the puzzle of the Roman Republic -- Rousseau's Case against Democracy -- Rousseau's Dilemma or "Of Civil Religion" -- Entreating the Political: Politics and Theology in Rousseau's Social Contract -- Civil Religion and Political Unity: Social Contract 4.8. (shrink)

Language & Logic -- Glossary -- Aristotle's syllogisms -- Russell's paradox & Frege's logicism -- profile: Aristotle -- Russell's theory of description -- Frege's puzzle -- Gödel's theorem -- Epimenides' liar paradox -- Eubulides' heap -- Science & Epistemology -- Glossary -- I think therefore I am -- Gettier's counter example -- profile: Karl Popper -- The brain in a vat -- Hume's problem of induction -- Goodman's gruesome riddle -- Popper's conjectures & refutations -- Kuhn's scientific revolutions -- Mind (...) & Metaphysics -- Glossary -- Descartes mind-body problem -- Brentano's intentionality -- Fodor's language of thought -- Parfit's persons -- profile: René Descartes -- Chalmer's zombies -- Zeno's paradoxes -- Kant's left hand -- Theseus' ship -- Laplace's demon, determinism, & free will -- Ryle's ghost in the machine -- Ethics & Political Philosophy -- Glossary -- Aristotle's ethics -- States of nature and the social contract -- Kant's categorical imperative -- profile: Immanuel Kant -- Mill's utilitarianism -- Marx's historical materialism -- The trolley problem -- Religion -- Glossary -- Aquinas' five ways -- Anselm's ontological argument -- profile: Thomas Aquinas -- Epicurus' riddle -- Paley's watchmaker -- Pascal's wager -- Hume against miracles -- Grand Moments -- Glossary -- Socrates' method -- Plato's cave -- Aristotle's four causes -- Lucretius' atomism -- profile: Ludwig Wittgenstein -- Berkeley's idealism -- Kant's synthetic a priori -- Hegel's dialectic -- James' pragmatism -- Moore's common sense -- Wittgenstein's picture theory of language -- Continental Philosophy -- Glossary -- Nietzsche's Superman -- profile: Friedrich Nietzsche -- Derrida's deconstruction -- Heidegger's nothing -- Sartre's bad faith. (shrink)

This Major Reference series brings together a wide range of key international articles in law and legal theory. Many of these essays are not readily accessible, and their presentation in these volumes will provide a vital new resource for both research and teaching. Each volume is edited by leading international authorities who explain the significance and context of articles in an informative and complete introduction.

The Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Française and the Société de législation comparée joined the academic network on European Contract Law in 2005 to work on the elaboration of a "common terminology" and on "guiding principles" as well as to propose a revised version of the Principles of European Contract Law. The results of this work were sent to the European Commission and have already been published in French. The English translation is now being (...) published by sellier.elp. This work could contribute to the wider European project. The part on the guiding principles could be a component of the CFR, in the form of "black letter" model rules or recitals. The part on terminology is, in itself, useful for the elaboration of the final various linguistic versions of the CFR. It finds its place within the materials which will accompany the model rules. Last but by no means least, the revised version of the PECL should be considered by the European institutions as an alternative set of model rules on contract law. (shrink)

This article examines the implications for contract law of Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. It argues that contract law as an institution is part of the basic structure of society and as such subject to the principles of justice. Discussing the basic structure in relation to contract law is particularly interesting because it is instructive for both contract law and Rawlsian theory. On the one hand, justice as fairness has clear normative implications for the institution (...) of contract law. On the other hand, this discussion forces us to critically assess the meaning and appeal of the concept of a basic structure in justice as fairness. (shrink)

Liberalism’s concern with human freedom seems related to contractual freedom and thus contract law. There are, however, many strands of liberal thought and which of them best justifies contract is a difficult question. In The Choice Theory of Contracts, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller offer a vision of contract based on autonomy. Drawing on the work of Joseph Raz, they argue that extending autonomy should be the law’s primary concern, which requires that we extend the range of (...) contractual choices available. While there is much to admire in their work, I argue that autonomy as conceived by Dagan and Heller cannot justify contract law. First, there are reasons to doubt the coherence of autonomy as an ideal. Second, given the pluralism of liberal societies, which, for example, often include substantial numbers of religious believers who reject core assumptions of autonomy theory, it is doubtful that such a theory can legitimate contract law. A more modest version of liberalism concerned primarily with protection against cruelty and providing a modus vivendi in pluralistic societies is more tenable. Such a vision of liberalism yields a more modest vision of contract law. Rather than making it into another means of realizing the dream of a more autonomous self, it is enough that contract law facilitates commerce and the marketplace. Markets in turn can serve an important — albeit limited — role in sustaining the peaceful cooperation and coexistence toward which a more realistic liberalism should aim. (shrink)

This Article challenges Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller’s choice theory of contract, according to which contract law is autonomy-enhancing. I make three points: first, the choice theory of contract cannot clarify the critical normative distinction between enforceable formal contracts and unenforceable informal promises. Second, I develop the roads/contract-types analogy: instead of promoting individuals’ autonomy and enhancing their choice among different projects, most contract types are justified by the preexisting preferences of citizens. Finally, I outline a (...) teleological justification of contract law that is different from that propounded by Dagan and Heller. On this view, contract law should remain neutral as to which conception of the good is commendable and provide individuals with the means of shaping and pursuing a conception of a good life. (shrink)

The debate about the Strategic Foul has been rumbling on for several decades and it has predominantly been fought on moral grounds. The defenders claim that the rules of a game must be supplemented by the ‘ethos’ of the game, by its conventions or informal rules. Critics of the Strategic Foul argue that to break the rules deliberately, in order to gain an advantage, is morally wrong, spoils the game, or is a form of cheating. Rather than entering the moral (...) maze I will argue that the Strategic Foul rests on a conceptual mistake. I will contrast the Strategic Foul with the idea of Efficient Breach in the economic approach to law in order to bring out some of the salient features. While doing so I will attempt some cross-fertilisation between jurisprudential insights and philosophical reflection on game rules. Finally, I will re-cast Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules in order to bring out the conceptual mistake more clearly. (shrink)

In "Democracy and Tradition," Jeffrey Stout contends that American constitutional democracy constitutes a well-functioning moral and political tradition that is not hostile to religion, although it does not depend on any specifically religious claims. I argue that Stout's contention is supported by a consideration of the great common law subject of contracts, as taught to first-year law students across the United States. First, I demonstrate how contract law can fruitfully be understood as a Maclntyrean tradition. Second, I illustrate the (...) moral richness of this tradition, and the mutually interpreting nature of rules and facts, by close attention to one particularly colorful case, Syester v. Banta. I conclude by suggesting that both religious and secular ethicists might find common law cases in general and contract law cases in particular to be a source of moral reflection that is substantively rich without being religiously divisive. (shrink)

In the past few decades, scholars have offered positive, normative, and most recently, interpretive theories of contract law. These theories have proceeded primarily from deontological and consequentialist premises. In A Theory of Contract Law: Empirical Understandings and Moral Psychology, Professor Peter A. Alces confronts the leading interpretive theories of contract and demonstrates their interpretive doctrinal failures. Professor Alces presents the leading canonical cases that inform the extant theories of Contract law in both their historical and transactional (...) contexts and, argues that moral psychology provides a better explanation for the contract doctrine than do alternative comprehensive interpretive approaches. (shrink)

The law of contracts, at least in its orthodox expression, concerns voluntary, or chosen, legal obligations. When Brody accepts Susan’s offer to sell him a canoe for a set price, the parties’ choices alter their legal rights and duties. Their success at changing the legal landscape depends on a background system of rules that specify when and how contractual acts have legal effects, rules that give the offer and acceptance of a bargain-exchange a central role in generating obligations. Contract (...) law conceived as a body of rules empowering individuals to shape their own rights and responsibilities presents an object of philosophical study. The philosophy of contract includes two broad sets of projects. One set, the focus of the first part of this entry, targets the basic structure and normative justification of the law of contracts. The aim is to subsume a salient body of contract law rules under general principles in order to clarify contract law’s conceptual categories, distinguish it from other areas of law, and specify criteria relevant to its normative appraisal. This kind of philosophical work presupposes detailed knowledge of the law in existing legal regimes, and the entry begins by outlining the common law of contracts. A second set of projects draws on resources from the philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and moral and political philosophy to address debates within contract law. Questions about the nature of meaning and interpretation, intentionality, freedom in contract, and distributive justice drive contemporary legal debates concerning contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement. Philosophical work on these topics has attracted significant commentary which serves as the focus of the second part of this entry. (shrink)

Modern contract law is characterized by a certain kind of unity and multiplicity. On the one hand, it establishes fundamental principles that apply to all contracts in general. But at the same time, it specifies further principles and rules for particular kinds of contracts or transaction-types that mark out their distinctive features, incidents and effects. Clearly, a viable theory of contract law should be able to provide a suitable account of both aspects. The central critical contention of The (...) Choice Theory of Contracts is that all prior approaches, in particular rights-based theories, have failed to do so. Indeed, Dagan and Heller argue that only a theory that explains the settled rules of contract law as teleologically oriented toward facilitating individuals’ pursuit of their different substantive goods, and thus as primarily power-conferring in this particularly robust sense, can provide the needed account. Such a theory, they believe, would be not only interpretatively accurate with respect to the actual law but also fully acceptable as a liberal view of contract. This Article challenges the core contentions of choice theory, suggesting why it may be unable to meet its own goal of explaining how contract law coherently specifies and integrates the general and specific dimensions of enforceable agreements. The Article looks into basic contract doctrines in order to specify a general conception of the contractual relation that can meet this desideratum and it sketches how, beginning with that conception, contract law unfolds a rich multiplicity of transaction-types. The resulting view is liberal but rights-based rather than teleological, and it proposes an alternative understanding of how the rules of contract law are power-conferring as well as duty-imposing. (shrink)

This article considers the principles that ought to be used to determine the scope and content of contract law's «default rules», the rules that will, in the absence of express exclusion, govern parties» contractual relationships. It examines three, ostensibly competing, approaches discussed in the literature: that defaults be grounded in the subjective consent of contracting parties, in the customs and norms immanent within the parties» community, and in the value of economic efficiency. It argues that each has something of (...) value to tell us about default rules, but that none can, in isolation, offer a wholly compelling prescription for their design. Rather, the best such prescription must be an eclectic one, drawing something from all three accounts, but varying to reflect the institution promulgating the default. Where defaults are promulgated legislatively, the case for choosing rules that will promote efficiency is a strong one, and the main criticism of efficiency analysis is shown, in this particular context, to be misguided. Where, however, defaults are promulgated adjudicatively—in the context of settling individual cases—the normative appeal of efficiency is much reduced. The article, then, criticizes efficient adjudicative defaults against their defenders, whilst defending efficient legislative defaults against their critics. (shrink)

Contract law doctrines can be ranged along various spectra. One of these spectra runs from the static to the dynamic. A contract law doctrine lies at the static pole of this spectrum if its application turns entirely on what occurred at the moment in time when a contract was formed. A contract law doctrine lies at the dynamic pole if its application turns in significant part on a moving stream of events that precede, follow, or constitute (...) the formation of a contract. Another spectrum runs from the binary to the multifaceted. Contract law doctrines are binary if they organize the experience within their scope into only two categories. Contract law doctrines are multifaceted if they organize the experience within their scope into several categories, including one or more intermediate categories. Classical contract law was a rigid, rather than a supple, instrument. Its rules were often responsive to neither the actual objectives of the parties, the actual facts and circumstances of the partiesâ transaction, nor the dynamic character of contracts. Instead, the rules of classical contract law were centered on a single moment in time, the moment of contract formation. accordingly, classical contract law doctrines were almost wholly static and also tended to be binary. The twentieth century witnessed the development of a modern contract law that has largely overthrown classical contract law. This overthrow has occurred in two ways. To begin with, in many cases modern contract law has reversed or fundamentally modified the rules of classical contract law. More important than the overthrow of specific rules of classical contract law, however, has been the overthrow of the deep structure of classical contract law. Where classical contract law had an overriding preference for rules that were objective and standardized, modern contract law has been highly flexible in adopting rules that are individualized and even subjective. Where classical contract law rules were typically binary, modern contract law rules are often multifaceted. Finally, where classical contract law was largely static, modern contact law is, in large part, dynamic. So, for example, static rules of interpretation have been replaced by dynamic rules that take into account events before and after the moment of contract formation; the static legal-duty rule has withered almost completely away, to be largely replaced by a dynamic modification regime that takes into account the value of ongoing reciprocity; a static judicial review of liquidated damages provisions is giving way to a dynamic review that takes account of the actual loss; and static offer-and-acceptance rules have been replaced by dynamic rules, such as the duty to negotiate in good faith. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law.

This is a response to Seana Shiffrin’s recent and important contribution to the continuing debate whether there is a universal moral or economic truth at the heart of contract law. While she adopts an unduly simplistic view of the divergence of morality in promise-keeping and contract law, her most significant advance toward a general theory of promise and contract is her identification of the critical moment at which the interposition of the public in a private matter occurs (...) or is contemplated. This essay carries that theme forward, suggesting that a universal justification for contract law is not possible because the law, by its very nature, objectifies what was heretofore a private relationship. (shrink)

Private law theory must confront the plurality of values that inform the problems that private law addresses in practice. We consider Hanoch Dagan’s and Michael Heller’s The Choice Theory of Contracts as a case-study in the promise and perils that embracing plural values poses for private law theory. We begin by arguing that private law theory cannot ignore value pluralism and identify three approaches that theory might take to pluralism. We call these approaches capitulating to, leveraging, and embracing value pluralism. (...) We illustrate each approach and assess its strengths and weaknesses. Theories that capitulate to pluralism simultaneously limit their scope and hamper their persuasiveness even within their restricted domains. Theories that leverage pluralism limit their domains more dramatically still. And theories that embrace pluralism are difficult to operationalize in practice without abandoning their pluralist roots. We briefly illustrate the drawbacks of capitulating to and leveraging pluralism with examples from recent contract theory. We then take up theories that embrace pluralism in greater detail, by studying Dagan and Heller’s approach. We argue that Dagan and Heller do not solve the deep problems that operationalizing their embrace of pluralism inevitably engenders. (shrink)

Although the law of contract is largely settled, there appears to be no widely-accepted comprehensive theory of its main principles and doctrines or of its normative basis. Contract law theory raises issues concerning the relation between law and morality, the role and the importance of rights, the connection between justice and economics, and the distinction between private and public law. This collection of six full-length essays, written by some of the most eminent scholars in the field, explores the (...) general theory of contract law from a variety of theoretical perspectives. The volume addresses a wide range of issues, both methodological and substantive, in the theory and practice of contract law. While the essays build upon past theoretical contributions, they also attempt to take contract theory further and suggest promising ways to develop theory of contract law. (shrink)

The existing divergence between how we talk about contract law and actual contract experience, the parties moral obligation to keep contracts and the government’s role in regulating contracts, are the three main issues addressed in this article. The analysis of this article points to a narrower and more cautious approach to contract law, not towards a general theory, but one focused on the rules of a single time and place.Resumen:La divergencia que existe entre la forma en que (...) hablamos del derecho contractual y la actual experiencia contractual, la obligación moral de las partes contratantes de mantener un contrato, y el papel del gobierno en la regulación de los contratos, son los tres asuntos principales que se abordan en este artículo. El análisis señala la perspectiva de una más estrecha y cautelosa visión del derecho contractual, pues la teoría propuesta no es una más de las teorías generales, sino una teoría desafiante enfocada en las reglas de un tiempo y lugar específico. (shrink)

This article examines the claim that there are two different and often incompatible ‘worlds’ within which contractual relationships can be placed—a real world created by the parties and an artificial world created by contract law and formal contract documents. This distinction, often made by sociolegal scholars, is usually accompanied by the suggestion that legal reasoning might be improved by more attention to the real world of contracting at the expense of the artificial world of documents and classical doctrine. (...) After examining the relationship between trust and contract, the role of legal institutions in supporting agreement-making and the reasons parties might have for formalizing commercial relationships, the article argues that a sharp distinction between the real and paper deal cannot be drawn and that in many commercial agreements these must be understood as integrated phenomena, rather than wholly discrete aspects of contracting behaviour. The article then considers the capacity of contract law to respond to this finding, with particular reference to the law's approach to uncertainty in agreements and the contextual approach to contract interpretation as developed by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme and subsequent cases. (shrink)

In October 2008 the European Commission published its Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive which puts forward far-reaching changes to the core of consumer contract law: Four current directives are to be replaced by a new, overarching piece of legislation and in doing so full harmonisation for the most part is to take the place of the minimum standard presently in force in the EU. Although a welcome initiative, the extent and possible effects of the Proposal have certainly brought (...) a number of issues to the fore. In January 2009, legal experts from universities, practice and the civil service met to address the points raised by the Proposal and the question of the extent to which it can indeed contribute to the modernisation and harmonisation of European consumer contract law. The papers presented at this conference analysed, criticised and suggested improvements for the Proposal and are published in this volume. (shrink)

Economic change, globalisation and harmonisation of European Law have brought new challenges to contract law. The contributions in this Volume by prominent legal scholars deal with current trends and perspectives in European and International Contract Law and their impact on the various domestic legal systems. The Compendium provides an analysis of new developments in formation of contract, performance and remedies, consumer contract law and the particularly controversial area of anti-discrimination law. Experts in their field examine the (...) underlying legal principles and problems arising in legal practice in Common Law and Civil Law. The essays written in English, German and French are the product of a series of lectures held in 2006 at the Centre for European Private Law at the University of Münster, Germany. The contributing authors are: John Adams, Hugh Beale, Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Barbara Dauner-Lieb, Michele Graziadei, Thomas Gutmann, Geraint Howells, Simon James, Paul Lagarde, Matthias Lehmann, Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, Salvatore Patti, Thomas Pfeiffer, John C. Reitz, Judith Rochfeld, Martin Schmidt-Kessel, Jürgen Schmidt-Räntsch, Alessandro Somma, Stefano Troiano, Christian Twigg-Flesner, Antoni Vaquer Aloy and Fryderyk Zoll. (shrink)

The Principles of European Law on Commercial Agency, Franchise and Distribution Contracts are an academic proposal of the Study Group on a European Civil Code for the European-wide regulation of the contents of these three types of agreements. The academic analysis "Franchising in European Contract Law" focuses on the harmonised Principles on Franchising. At present all member states of the EU have their own regulation on franchising. This situation might change in the light of the political process of Europeanization (...) of contract law that was initiated by the European Commission in 2001. As a result of that process the Principles on Franchising could be declared a set of rules which might be opted for by the parties to franchising contracts Europe-wide to govern their relationship. In this analysis the main obligations in franchising in PEL CAFDC are compared with those under French and Spanish law. The main conclusion of this thesis research has been that the main obligations of parties in franchising under the PEL CAFDC resemble those under French and Spanish law. Eventually, differences will arise depending on how national courts weigh the interests of the parties in each case. A second conclusion has been that a choice for the PEL CAFDC instead of for French and Spanish law could be considered a rational alternative concerning the applicable system of remedies and legal certainty. (shrink)

Against the background of the creation of an EU-wide frame of reference for private law relevant to the Common Market, this study, which was requested by the EU Commission, analyses the dovetailing between contract and tort law on the one hand, and between contract and property law on the other. The study examines the legal orders of almost all the Member States of the EU, illustrates the differences between contractual and non-contractual liability and evaluates the different systems of (...) the transfer of property, of movable and immovable securities as well as trust law. The study comes to the conclusion that the intensive considerations on the creation of a model-law in the area of European private law do not allow these thoughts to be limited to contract law. Such a limitation to the scope of the regarding of this area would probably cause more problems than it would solve, or at any rate not do justice to the needs of the Common Market. (shrink)

This Article draws attention to a conceptual point that has been overlooked in recent discussions about the theoretical foundations of contract law. I argue that, rather than enforcing the obligations of promises, contract law concerns complaints against promissory wrongs. This conceptual distinction is easy to miss. If one assumes that complaints arise whenever an obligation has been violated, then the distinction does not seem meaningful. I show, however, that an obligation can be breached without giving rise to a (...) valid complaint. This Article illustrates the importance of this conceptual distinction by focusing first on the doctrine of substantive unconscionability. I claim that the doctrine can be best explained by the way in which a party who engages in exploitative behavior may lose her moral standing to complain. It is because such a party has lost her moral standing to complain that the law, through unconscionability doctrine, bars her from bringing a legal complaint. This explanation avoids the oft-issued charge of paternalism and it also offers benefits over an alternative state-oriented account developed recently by Seana Shiffrin. Using the conceptual distinction behind this account of unconscionability, this Article further argues that recent theoretical debates about the relationship between contract law and morality have been largely misconceived. Those debates have focused on whether contract law and morality impose parallel obligations. Once one appreciates the difference between imposing obligations and recognizing complaints, the comparison looks quite different. Contract law recognizes valid complaints against broken promises, much as morality recognizes moral complaints. (shrink)

Freedom of contract and corrective justice are considered to be the basic principles governing contract law. However, many contemporary legal orders implement various policy goals into private law. The regulatory private law of the European Union is the most striking example of such a trend. This article aims at reconciling the corrective justice theory of private law and the principle of freedom of contract with the regulatory dimension of the EU law. The main argument is that the (...) meaning of the concept of harm, one that is crucial to the principle of corrective justice, should be understood broadly so that it can transform the corrective justice theory from a monistic one into a pluralistic one. (shrink)

This book explores how the design, construction, and use of robotics technology may affect today's legal systems and, more particularly, matters of responsibility and agency in criminal law, contractual obligations, and torts. By distinguishing between the behaviour of robots as tools of human interaction, and robots as proper agents in the legal arena, jurists will have to address a new generation of "hard cases." General disagreement may concern immunity in criminal law (e.g., the employment of robot soldiers in battle), personal (...) accountability for certain robots in contracts (e.g., robo-traders), much as clauses of strict liability and negligence-based responsibility in extra-contractual obligations (e.g., service robots in tort law). Since robots are here to stay, the aim of the law should be to wisely govern our mutual relationships. (shrink)

This article examines the role culture plays in contract law. It demonstrates that even in contract law, the branch of law most committed to the ideal of individual autonomy, law’s reliance on culture makes compulsion by the law an unavoidable outcome. The concept of culture is applied to contract law in two principal ways. First, it attempts to explain the rise of objectivism in late nineteenth-century contract law as a manifestation of some central experiences prevalent in (...) modern culture. Second, it analyzes the role played by culture within the context of some of the central doctrines of contract law, namely, the doctrines on the formation and interpretation of contracts. (shrink)

This article discusses to what extent the widely accepted hypotheses of Hugo Grotius’s crucial impact on the theory of contract law – also in Scandinavia – may be maintained or even positively confirmed. Although few direct references to the works of Grotius can be found in Scandinavian legal literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it would be premature to draw a negative conclusion. An impact of Grotius’s thoughts may rather be demonstrated by thoroughly analysing patterns of argumentation concerning (...) specific contractual topics both in legal literature and case law. The article provides the reader with necessary information on the institutional and intellectual preconditions for the reception of Grotius in the Scandinavian legal orders before discussing the impact of the ‘will-theory’ on the requirements of a legally binding contractual agreement in the works of selected influential legal scholars and in case law in more detail. The analysis confirms that Grotius’s work contributed substantially to shaping the intellectual framework in which the first contract law doctrines in Scandinavia evolved. (shrink)

There are a growing number of general theories of contract law and of other doctrinal areas. These theories are vastly ambitious in their aims. This article explores the nature of these claims, and the motivations for offering such theories, while considering the challenges to success. It is in the nature of theorizing to seek general categories, including doctrinal categories, and to try to discover insights that hold across those categories. However, differences both within a doctrinal area and across legal (...) systems undermine the case for universal and general theories. Also, unjustifiably general theories may distract us from developing properly contextual legal rules, and might even have the unintended effect of legitimating unjust rules. (shrink)

The notion of the ‘reasonable expectations of the parties’ plays an important justificatory role in contract law, yet the notion has not been subjected to any sustained analysis in the contract law literature. This article examines the various roles that reasonable expectation plays in contract law and explores the different understandings of the notion that are revealed. It identifies three possible bases for reasonable expectations—an institutional basis, an empirical basis and a normative basis—and examines how reasonable expectations (...) arguments in contract reflect each of these differing justificatory bases. This makes appeals to reasonable expectation in contract law problematic since the differently grounded expectations of the contracting parties are usually the precise site of conflict between them. It is therefore doubtful that conflicts between contracting parties can be resolved solely by identifying and protecting their ‘reasonable expectations’. In the conclusion some speculative comments are offered as to why, given its limited explanatory power, the notion has proved attractive in attempts to explain contract law. (shrink)

In an earlier article, it was established that the rules which govern the relations between universities and their students may find their legal source in prescription, royal charter, parliamentary legislation or contract. This article compares judicial review of student rules according to these different sources, whether this review forms part of public law (the review of byelaws, delegated legislation or the expression of other statutory rule‐making powers) or of contract law (as a matter of the fairness of the (...) rules as terms of the student contract or by the inherent qualification of any contractual rule‐making power in a university by reference to reasonableness). Both similarities and differences in these different types of review are identified and their implication in the student context assessed (notably, as to the exclusivity of the visitorial jurisdiction in the case of chartered universities). Finally, it is argued that the compatibility of student rules with students' human rights may be relevant to review in contract law as well as in public law as a result of the very inclusive nature of the grounds of this review. (shrink)

This article argues that the disjunctive obligation in contract law can be justified on moral grounds. It argues that from a perspective that regards human beings as free agents capable of choice and therefore independent of material objects, the contracting parties must be understood as agreeing to mutually guarantee one another's ownership of a certain value. This guarantee can be fulfilled either by handing over what was promised or by making up the difference between the market value and the (...) contract value of what was promised. The plaintiff's contractual right is therefore a right that the defendant perform or pay. This makes expectation damages intelligible as a vindication of the plaintiff's contractual right. Moreover, the disjunctive obligation can be reconciled with all the doctrines that others take to be decisive arguments against it—with the doctrines of specific performance, inducing breach, impossibility, preexisting duty consideration, and nominal damages. (shrink)

The article examines how the rules on formation of contract and on mistake, contained in the various transnational model rules that have been published over the past two decades, have taken shape. The approach adopted here is based on an analysis of the ‘textual stratification’ of European private law. The relevant instruments (Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Principles of European Contract Law, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Draft Common Frame of Reference, Principes contractuels (...) communs) are analysed and compared in their historical sequence. To what extent and why have the texts been transformed in the process? The article demonstrates that there is a very considerable common ground reflecting the state of the art of comparative research in these fields over the past hundred years. It also highlights issues on which consensus must still be reached and it suggests patterns towards reaching such consensus. It is argued that the Principles of European Contract Law, rather than the Draft Common Frame of Reference, should provide the point of departure for future discussions. The scene for the article is set by a critical examination of the concepts of contract and legal act, as used in the Draft Common Frame of Reference. (shrink)