After characterizing the general outlines of Davidson's criticism of the idea of conceptual schemes, the specifics of his argument are examined and evaluated. It is argued that his argument against radically different conceptual schemes does mark out plausible limits to what might be thought of as differences against conceptual schemes, but it is doubtful that those he mentioned as proponents of the idea envisions such differences. It is argued that the stylized character of Davidson's (...) arguments against the less radical variants of the idea fail to foreclose the possibility of differences that many would find interesting. (shrink)

This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s (...) account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement. (shrink)

The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories (...) or languages does not lie in differences in determining truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. This new interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes, which I refer to as presuppositional languages, is not only good in itself—for establishing the intelligibility and tenability of the notion—but quite beneficial in its effect on other related issues. (shrink)

I draw attention to how one of Donald Davidson’s arguments against the claim that others have an alternative conceptual scheme does not look compatible with his rejection of analytic truths – how his rejection of the third dogma of empiricism depends on accepting the first. The appendix contests Davidson’s approach to organizing the Pacific Ocean.

D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp schemecontent distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose (...) the Kantian scheme-content dualism. On the contrary, it is exactly the abandonment of the concept-neutral content and the denial of a fixed, absolute scheme-content distinction that turns the Kantian conceptualabsolutism upside down and thus makes alternative conceptual schemes possible. Proposing common-sense experience as the empirical content of alternative schemes, I construct and defend a non-Kantian scheme-content dualism based on a non-fixed, relative scheme-content distinction. The proposed non-Kantian scheme-content dualism is not only “innocent” enough to be immune from Davidson’s charge of the third dogma of empiricism, but also “solid” enough to be able to sustain alternative conceptual schemes. I conclude that in terms of our conceptual schemes, we are connected to the world as closely as possible; only through conceptual schemes can we be connected to the world. (shrink)

According to Donald Davidson, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is the third dogma of empiricism. In this paper I examine the ways in which this claim may be interpreted. I conclude by arguing that there remains an innocent version of the scheme -content distinction which is not motivated by empiricism and does not commit us to the pernicious type of dualism that Davidson rejects.

This paper pays tribute to the distinguished legal and political philosopher Joseph Raz, who recently passed away. I present a response to Donald Davidson on conceptual schemes which tries to imitate Raz’s writing style, which attracts me despite the difficulties it poses. The response includes a definition.

This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s (...) account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement. (shrink)

The idea of conceptual schemes is one of the most influential and widely used notions in contemporary philosophy. Within the analytic tradition the idea occupies a fundamental position in positivist views as well as in replacing them post-positivist conceptions. Outside the analytic tradition a similar idea is of key importance in structuralist and post-structuralist theories. Despite the broad applicability of the notion of a conceptual scheme, its precise sense is far from being evident in the context of (...) various philosophical trends. Moreover, the well-known American philosopher Donald Davidson's position is that any clear, non-metaphorical meaning cannot be as - cribed to that notion at all – the statement which he tried to substantiate in his famous paper On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme published in 1974.The present paper is aimed, firstly, at outlining the historico-philosophical evolution of the idea of conceptual scheme, concentrating on its development in logical positivism and post-positivist theories of such philosophers as Quine, Sellars, Kuhn, et al., and, secondly, at examining Davidson's criticism of both the idea and the position of conceptual relativism which was raised on its ground, revealing the assumptions which that criticism relies on and which concern relations between language and thought, truth and translation, as well as the role of the scheme-content dualism for empiricism and the place of extensionalism in semantics, etc. Our purpose, on the one hand, is to evaluate the historico-philosophical significance of Davidson's criticism; on the other hand, it is to show that his critical arguments remain to be actual since they shed a new light on the idea of conceptual schemes and allow us to determine their place in tackling the fundamental philosophical question of a relation between reality, thought and language. (shrink)

This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but (...) a way of thinking about meaning and knowledge that assumes a dualism that cannot be maintained. (shrink)

This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but (...) a way of thinking about meaning and knowledge that assumes a dualism that cannot be maintained. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I : Shorter Version (Leaves Key Premises Unsupported) Part II : Detailed Version Complete Failure of Translation Partial Failure of Translation The Unintelligibility of the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.

The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they have been focused too much on the truth-conditional notions of meaning/concepts and translation/interpretation in Tarski's style. It is exactly due to such a Quinean interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes that the very notion of conceptual schemes falls prey to Davidson's attack. We argue that what should concern us in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, following (...) the initiatives of I. Hacking, T. Kuhn, and N. Rescher, is not the truth-values of assertions, but rather the truthvalue-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories/languages does not lie in differences in determining the truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. The core of conceptual relativism does not consist in the claim that different conceptual schemes may yield incommensurable truth claims, but rather that different conceptual schemes may yield incompatible truth-value-status and therefore lead to distinct perceptions of reality. Conceptual schemes are no longer seen as sentential languages consisting of a set of sentences accepted as true, but rather seen as metaphysical presuppositions of presuppositional languages.[ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

En este artículo examino las posiciones de McDowell y Davidson acerca del dualismo de esquema y contenido. Defiendo que este dualismo no puede recuperarse de las críticas de Davidson incluso en la sugestiva forma defendida por McDowell. Defiendo que McDowell falla al evaluar el verdadero alcance y significado de los argumentos davidsonianos y que su empirismo mínimo no puede evitar algunos de los problemas que otras posiciones empiristas muestran.

Davidson’s 1974 argument denying the possibility of incommensurable conceptual schemes is widely interpreted as entailing a denial of metaphysical pluralism. Speakers may group objects differently or have different beliefs about the world, but there is just one world. I argue there is tension arising from three aspects of Davidson’s philosophy: the 1974 argument against conceptual schemes; Davidson’s more recent emphasis on primitive triangulation as a necessary condition for thought and language; and Davidson’s semantic approach to metaphysics, (...) what he calls ‘the method of truth in metaphysics’. After elucidating the tension, I argue the tension can be resolved while preserving at least two major tenets of Davidson’s philosophy: conceptual schemes do not carve an uninterpreted reality into different worlds and truth is objective and non-epistemic. I argue Davidson is implicitly committed to a plurality of worlds. (shrink)

This paper evaluates a form of dualism, which is referred to here as the dualism of conceptual scheme and undifferentiated reality. According to this dualism, although reality appears to be divided into distinct things from the perspective of our system of concepts, it is actually not. I justify the view that this dualism is incoherent.

The aim of my paper is to interpret S. Kierkegaard's concept of a leap as a metaphor for the process of moving from one conceptual scheme to another. The basis for this reading of the concept is provided by the growing recognition of Kierkegaard's philosophy as dealing with conceptual schemes, equipements or paradigms through which reality is interpreted. I use Kierkegaard's metaphor as a point of departure for the analysis of the conditions of possibility and the very (...) process of changing conteptual schemes in general. I use the story of Abraham and Isaac, as described in „Fear and Trembling”, as a source of examples illustrating more general points I make during my analysis. Firstly, I present a general understanding of what a conceptual scheme is and how it is functioning. Afterwards, I show how this functioning is impaired in case of Abraham and Isaac. Finally, I put forward a hypothesis that the problems that Abraham's scheme is encountering due to God's demand to sacrifice Isaac can all be reduced to the fact that a very deep change in meaning of certain terms within the conceptual scheme, such as "God", "good" or "duty", has occured. The adoption of new meanings would be equivalent to moving into another conceptual scheme. (shrink)

Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' argued, is immune (...) from Davidsonian objections to the very idea of a scheme. (shrink)

In Heraclitus and Thales’ Conceptual Scheme: A Historical Study Aryeh Finkelberg rejects the teleological interpretation of early Greek thought as targeted at later results, viz. philosophy, and seeks to determine its intended meaning by restoring it to its historical context.

Is a philosophical theory needed to ‘underwrite’ attitudes of toleration and respect in a multicultural and religiously diverse world? Many philosophers of religion have thought so, including Victoria Harrison. This article interrogates Harrison’s theory of internalist pluralism, which, though offering a welcome alternative to other theories, such as John Hick’s ‘pluralistic hypothesis’, nevertheless faces problems. Questioning the coherence of the theory’s account of how the existence of objects of worship can avoid being fully conceptual-scheme dependent, and raising doubts about (...) its pretensions to promote interreligious harmony, I also critically discuss the common philosophical tendency to work with under-described and insufficiently analysed examples. What philosophy ought to be able to offer in relation to religious diversity, I propose, is attentiveness to nuances and particularities, thereby aiding religious understanding without the need for a general theory. (shrink)

Davidson attacks the intelligibility of conceptual relativism, i.e. of truth relative to a conceptual scheme. He defines the notion of a conceptual scheme as something ordering, organizing, and rendering intelligible empirical content, and calls the position that employs both notions scheme-content dualism. He argues that such dualism is untenable since: not only can we not parcel out empirical content sentence per sentence but also the notion of uninterpreted content to which several schemes are relative, and the (...) related notion of a theory ”fitting the evidence’, can be shown to lack intelligibility too. Davidson argues further that belief in incommensurable schemes or non-intertranslatable languages is possible only on violating a correct understanding of interpretability : if we succeed in interpreting someone else then we have shown there is no need to speak of two conceptual schemes, while if we fail ”there is no ground for speaking of two.’. (shrink)

Maria Baghramian; XIV*—Why Conceptual Schemes?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 287–306, https://doi.org/10.1111.

RESUMEN En este artículo, se defiende un relativismo conceptual sin esquemas conceptuales. En primer lugar, se presenta la crítica de Davidson al relativismo conceptual. Luego, se construye un contraejemplo que cuestiona la eficacia del principio de caridad y se argumenta que, si se trata de sostener el holismo con el fin de evitar el relativismo, habría que aceptar un relativismo moderado que trace la distinción entre un background de creencia y redes internas de creencias. Este relativismo es compatible (...) con el abandono de la idea de un esquema conceptual y, por tanto, no implica ningún tipo de inconmensurabilidad ni de intraducibilidad. ABSTRACT The article defends a conceptual relativism without conceptual schemes. First, it presents Davidson's critique of conceptual relativism. Ten, it goes on to build a counterexample questioning the efficacy of the principle of charity, and argues that upholding holism in order to avoid relativism would entail accepting a moderate relativism that distinguishes between a background of belief and internal networks of beliefs. This relativism is compatible with abandoning the idea of a conceptual scheme, and, therefore, does not imply any type of incommensurability or untranslatability. (shrink)

In one of his influential works ‘One the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Donald Davidson argues against conceptual relativism. According to Davidson, ‘we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own’. Davidson’s thesis seems to have a consequence for comparative philosophy, particularly in a comparative study between Chinese and Western traditions of philosophy which are often considered to differ conceptually. If Davidson is correct, it is not (...) clear whether or not we can have insight into how and why concepts differ between these traditions. -/- In this paper, I philosophically reflect on Davidson’s argument against conceptual relativism. Though this paper retains the backbone of his argument, I reject Davidson’s thesis that different ways of conceptualisation cannot be compared. I do this through a discussion of the comparative studies conducted by David Hall and Roger Ames. In conclusion, I self-reflectively examine the nature of the demarcation between different traditions of philosophy and show how the activities of comparative philosophy can proceed. (shrink)

Lately, an increased interest in formal devices has led to an attempt on the part of some mathematicians to do without those aspects of mathematics which require intuition. One consequence of this movement has been a new conception of pure mathematics as a science of axiomatic systems. According to this conception, there is no reality beyond an axiomatic system which the statements of mathematics are about; the fact that a statement is a theorem in the system is all that is (...) of interest. This is a sort of nominalist position, since the contrary position seems to be committed to a belief in the existence of a domain of mathematical entities, which are just as suspect as the universale commonly discussed in metaphysical treatises. More often it is called formalism. (shrink)

1. Argument. Questions that have arisen about the “existence” of elementary particles and other entities of physics have often been dismissed as unprofitable, with the tacit assumption that the categories suitable for the discussion of everyday knowledge are not suitable for the discussion of physical knowledge, which requires mathematical treatment. But for the layman who stumbles at the discontinuity between his world and that of mathematical physics, and for the physicist who wishes his knowledge of the world to have some (...) kind of unity, a scheme which will embrace both kinds of knowledge is essential. Such a scheme is developed from a consideration of the dependence on mind, and conceptual modes of thought, common to science and all other intellectual approaches to the world, which is seen clearly in the growth of science from more primitive concepts. It begins with the concept as the most elementary category of the organization of experience, and moves to the construct, a distinctly scientific category arising out of the concept, and the isolate, corresponding to elements of reality not directly perceived. An escape from certain paradoxes generated by the incomplete nature of perceptual experience is thus provided. (shrink)

The generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither (...) reducible to one another, nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow. (shrink)

The generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither (...) reducible to one another, nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow. (shrink)

This paper is an examination of Donald Davidson's writings on the idea of a conceptual scheme--and idea which he famously rejects. O relevance in this is the notion of linguistic relativity and the famous Whorf-Sapir thesis.

En este artículo, analizamos el significado de las matrices densidad en el formalismo de la mecánica cuántica. Discutimos el problema de los "sistemas cuánticos compuestos" en la lógica cuántica así como también la interpretación de las mezclas impropias. Tomando en cuenta el desarrollo de la lógica cuántica convexa, presentamos un análisis de la estructura formal de la teoría que, argumentaremos, debe ser considerado a la hora de desarrollar un nuevo esquema conceptual para la interpretación de las mezclas cuánticas. In (...) this article, we analyze the meaning of density matrices within the formalism of quantum mechanics. We discuss the problem of compound systems in the context of quantum logic as well as the interpretation of improper mixtures. Taking into account the development of convex quantum logic, we present an analysis of the formal structure of the theory which we will argue, must be taken into account when developing a new conceptual scheme for the interpretation of quantum mixtures. (shrink)

This systematic development of the internal realist approach, first developed by Hilary Putnam, tries to steer a middle course between metaphysical realism and relativism. It argues against metaphysical realism that it is open to global skepticism and cannot cope with conceptual pluralism. Against relativism it is claimed that there are mind-independent constraints on the validity of our claims to knowledge. The book provides a moderately verificationist account of semantics and novel explanation of the idea of conceptual schemes. (...) It is also argued that internalism realism can accommodate our common sense realist intuitions adn is also compatible with physicalism and naturalism. (shrink)