In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Index to Volume Fifty-SixArticlesBernier, Bernard, National Communion: Watsuji Tetsurō's Conception of Ethics, Power, and the Japanese Imperial State, 1 : 84-105Between Principle and Situation: Contrasting Styles in the Japanese and Korean Traditions of Moral Culture, Chai-sik Chung, 2 : 253-280Buxton, Nicholas, The Crow and the Coconut: Accident, Coincidence, and Causation in the Yogavāiṣṭha, 3 : 392-408Chan, Sin Yee, The Confucian Notion of Jing (Respect), Sin Yee Chan, 2 : (...) 229-252Chong, Kim-chong, Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, 3 : 370-391Chung, Chai-sik, Between Principle and Situation: Contrasting Styles in the Japanese and Korean Traditions of Moral Culture, 2 : 253-280The Confucian Ideal of Harmony, Chenyang Li, 4 : 583-603The Confucian Notion of Jing.(Respect), Sin Yee Chan, 2 : 229-252The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? Jay L. Garfield, 2 : 201-228The Crisis of Knowledge in Islam (I): The Case of al-'āmirī, Paul L. Heck, 1 : 106-135The Crow and the Coconut: Accident, Coincidence, and Causation in the Yogavāiṣṭha, Nicholas Buxton, 3 : 392-408De Reu, Wim, Right Words Seem Wrong: Neglected Paradoxes in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts, 2 : 281-300The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhaga-vadgītā, Christopher Framarin, 4 : 604-617Framarin, Christopher, The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhagavadgītā, 4 : 604-617Garfield, Jay L., The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? 2 : 201-228Heck, Paul L., The Crisis of Knowledge in Islam (I): The Case of al-'ā mirī, 1 : 106-135Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel, 4 : 519-566Ho, Chien-hsing, Saying the Unsayable, 3 : 409-427Kantor, Hans-Rudolf, Ontological Indeterminacy and Its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538-597) Tiantai Buddhism, 1 : 16-68Lai, Karyn, Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility, 1 : 69-83Li, Chenyang, The Confucian Ideal of Harmony, 4 : 583-603Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility, Karyn Lai, 1 : 69-83Ma, Lin, and Jaap van Brakel, Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, 4 : 519-566National Communion: Watsuji Tetsurō's Conception of Ethics, Power, and the Japanese Imperial State, Bernard Bernier, 1 : 84-105Ontological Indeterminacy and Its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538- 597) Tiantai Buddhism, Hans-Rudolf Kantor, 1 : 16-68Right Words Seem Wrong: Neglected Paradoxes in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts, Wim De Reu, 2 : 281-300The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic, Jinmei Yuan, 1 : 136-152Sakya Pandita and the Status of Concepts, Jonathan Stoltz, 4 : 567-582Saying the Unsayable, Chien-hsing Ho, 3 : 409-427Schiltz, Elizabeth, Two Chariots: The Justification of the Best Life in the Katha Upanishad and Plato's Phaedrus, 3 : 451-468Spackman, John, The Tiantai Roots of Dōgen's Philosophy of Language and Thought, 3 : 428-450Stevenson, Frank W., Zhuangzi's Dao as Background Noise, 2 : 301-331Stoltz, Jonathan, Sakya Pandita and the Status of Concepts, 4 : 567-582The Tiantai Roots of Dōgen's Philosophy of Language and Thought, John Spackman, 3 : 428-450 [End Page 709]Two Chariots: The Justification of the Best Life in the Katha Upanishad and Plato's Phaedrus, Elizabeth Schiltz, 3 : 451-468van Brakel, Jaap, and Lin Ma, Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, 4 : 519-566Yuan, Jinmei, The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic, 1 : 136-152Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, Kim-chong Chong, 3 : 370-391Zhuangzi's Dao as Background Noise, Frank W. Stevenson, 2 : 301-331Book NotesFenner, David E. W., Introducing Aesthetics (note by James McRae), 3 : 515-516Introducing Aesthetics, by David E. W. Fenner (note by James McRae), 3 : 515-516McRae, James, a book... (shrink)

I seek to advance enquiry into the philosophical question of in virtue of what human beings have a dignity of the sort that grounds human rights. I first draw on values salient in sub-Saharan African moral thought to construct two theoretically promising conceptions of human dignity, one grounded on vitality, or liveliness, and the other on our communal nature. I then argue that the vitality conception cannot account for several human rights that we intuitively have, while the community (...) conception can do so. I conclude that, of plausible theories of human dignity with an African pedigree, the field ought to favour a community-based view and critically compare it in future work with the Kantian, autonomy-based view that dominates Western thinking about dignity. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The thesis is an examination of the concept of rights. Its aims are analytical and descriptive. No attempt is made to justify any particular possession or denial of rights. It is, however, a theory about rights in general, and not just about either legal or moral rights. This reflects the writer's belief that conceptual problems about the nature of rights can be satisfactorily (...) tackled only if a unified approach is adopted. In each of the first three chapters a leading theory of rights is examined, criticised and rejected. These theories are benefit theories, choice theories, theories of overriding. Particular attention is given to the writings of John Austin, HLA Hart and RM Dworkin. In the fourth chapter Hohfeld's claim for the diversity of rights is examined and rejected as unproven. In the fifth chapter an attempt is made to provide a more satisfactory theory of moral rights. This draws a distinction between rights as assessments of that which the right-holder may do and as assessments of that which others must do for the right-holder. Rights of the first type are explained in terms of a strong sense of permission; those of the second type as an instance of welfare principles. In the succeeding chapter this explanation is extended to legal rights. Finally, an attempt is made to provide a theory of the nature of property rights in general, and of ownership in particular. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed account of the role of property in German Idealism. It puts the concept of property in the center of the philosophical systems of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel and shows how property remains tied to their conceptions of freedom, right, and recognition. The book begins with a critical genealogy of the concept of property in modern legal philosophy, followed by a reconstruction of the theory of property in Kant's Doctrine of Right, Fichte's Foundations of (...) Natural Right, and Hegel's Jena Realphilosophie. By turning to the tradition of German Rechtsphilosophie, as opposed to the more standard libertarian and utilitarian frameworks of property, it explores the metaphysical, normative, political, and material questions that make property intelligible as a social relation. The book formulates a normative theory of property rooted in practical reason, mutual recognition, and social freedom. This relational theory of property, inspired by German Idealism, brings a fresh angle to contemporary property theory. Additionally, it provides crucial philosophical background to 19th century debates on private property, inequality, labor, socialism, capitalism, and the state. The Concept of Property in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in 19th Century German philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of law, political theory, and political economy. (shrink)

In a variety of disciplines, there exists a consensus that human rights are individual claim rights that all human beings possess simply as a consequence of being human. That consensus seems to me to obscure the real character of the concept and hinder the progress of discussion. I contend that rather than thinking of human rights in the first instance as “claim rights” possessed by individuals, we should regard human rights as higher order norms (...) that articulate standards of legitimacy for sociopolitical and legal institutions. (shrink)

This paper defends a legal and political conception of sexual relations grounded in Kant’s Doctrine of Right. First, I argue that only a lack of consent can make a sexual deed wrong in the legal sense. Second, I demonstrate why all other legal constraints on sexual practices in a just society are legal constraints on seemingly unrelated public institutions. I explain the way in which the just state acts as a civil guardian for domestic relations and as a civil guarantor (...) for private property and contract relations—and thereby enables the existence of legally enforceable claims. Throughout the aim is to demonstrate that Kant’s relational conception of justice entails that legally enforceable claims regarding sexual deeds are fully justifiable only insofar as they are determined and enforced by a public authority that we may refer to as a liberal democratic welfare state. (shrink)

Marxism has relinquished the position of the ruling ideology in Russia without having been subjected to a fundamental critique. There was hardly time to boo it as it expired. The shelves in our libraries are still occupied by hundreds of books in which the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is introduced as the total fulfillment of the preceding social and philosophical thought. The tendentious construct of the history of philosophy that upholds this illusion has not been demolished to this day. People who teach, (...) study, or simply love philosophy fall, as before, into this trap. It has had a particularly strong influence on the reception of the German philosophical classics, which, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Lenin had already raised to the ideological rank of one of the immediate sources of Marxism. (shrink)

This article is a critical review of work on the concept of rights, Including the concept of human rights, From 1963 to 1978. Our focus is mainly on issues of the analysis of rights and human rights. We do not deal with the closely related issues bearing on the normative foundations of moral and human rights. Nor have we attempted much in the way of historical treatment of our topic. Section I surveys general (...) characterizations of rights. In section ii, We discuss treatments of the defeasibility of rights with special attention to the notion of a prima facie right. Section iii takes up attempts to give an account of human rights. Section iv provides a brief conclusion. A bibliography listing what we take to be the most important works in this area, Including everything cited, Concludes our essay. (shrink)

Intellectual property Rights (IPRs) is protected by different systems of laws. Journals must choose a definitive form of systems. Some Blackwell journals use copyright system and some Blackwell use license from authors. Now a days online journals are using creative common licenses. Under creative common license journals are open access, allowed to download, copy, distribute, and display derivative works with proper attribution to author or owner for noncommercial purpose at a free cost. Education on IPRs will support to comprehend (...) ones rights, professional code of conduct and the doctrine of "fair use" in publication. One cannot do anything with once writing. Researchers, academic, editors and readers must have the basic knowledge on who owns the rights in a publication and what users can do with the publication by law. (shrink)

Ethics 101 offers an exciting look into the history of moral principles that dictate human behavior. This easy-to-read guide presents the key concepts of ethics in fun, straightforward lessons and exercises featuring only the most important facts, theories, and ideas. Ethics 101 includes unique, accessible elements such as explanations of the major moral philosophies, including utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, and eastern philosophers including Avicenna, Buddha, and Confucius; and unique profiles of the greatest characters in moral philosophy.

John Rawls makes a provocative, original, but largely underdeveloped and neglected suggestion about the most basic subject-matter and aims of normative ethical theory. Rawls proposes that the moral concept of ‘right’, which we use when we call an individual action or social practice morally right or wrong, is defined by the functional role it has of properly adjudicating conflicting claims that persons make on one another and on social practices. Substantive moral theories of right and wrong, including utilitarianism, Kantianism (...) and contractualism, are supposed to provide more specific principles, criteria, values and ideals for interpreting and resolving this fundamental moral problem. It is not immediately apparent, however, what moral problem Rawls thinks substantive theories of right are supposed to interpret and address. The aim of this paper is to offer a fuller account of what Rawls could have meant by defining the concept of right as the proper adjudication of conflicting claims that persons make on one another or on social practices. I also describe and assess three implications of this expanded definition of right and I end with two reasons why one might accept some version of it. (shrink)

The article examines the claim made by earlier interpreters of Fichte's political thought, such as Marianne Weber and Xavier Léon, that it contains a number of striking parallels with some of the main ideas associated with the French revolutionary communist Gracchus Babeuf. It is argued that once we understand what it means for Fichte to 'apply' the concept of right (Recht), and how this application relates in particular to his views on property, there appears to be some substance to (...) Weber's and Léon's claims. This in turn speaks against a more recent tendency to locate Fichte's political thought in the liberal tradition; a tendency which the author shows does not pay sufficient attention to Fichte's ideas concerning the need to apply the concept of right and how this leads him to develop the economic proposals found in The Closed Commercial State, which contain a number of parallels with some of the doctrines attributed to Babeuf. The author does, however, point to some fundamental differences between Fichte's social and political thought and some of the main ideas associated with the revolutionary movement known as Babouvism. Yet these differences again speak against a liberal interpretation of Fichte's social and political thought. (shrink)

Mary Wollstonecraft is celebrated for her Vindication of the Rights of Woman. However, while her title suggests that rights must play an important part in improving women’s situation, it is less clear how she envisages them. What does she think rights are and how are they to transform women’s lives? I argue that Wollstonecraft blends two traditions, a republican conception of rights as powers to act, and a distinct conception of natural rights. She offers a (...) radical development of republican rights theory, but, in order to resolve one of the problems it poses, resorts to divinely-ordained rights of nature. Is she alone in combining these two stances? In the final part of the chapter I show that she is not. Her position belongs to a historical trend in which republicanism gives way to a liberal outlook grounded on individual natural rights. (shrink)

(Abstract: To say that there is a moral right to act in a certain way is to say that there is a presumption that such acts are morally right, which implies that others should not blame, punish or deliberately obstruct. A community’s recognition of such rights is a way of reducing conflict among its members. Natural or human rights are rights that ought to be recognised in every community. Statements of natural rights are not analytic; they (...) may be self evident, at least in the sense that everyone can easily see the usefulness of recognising such rights. The concept of a right has not changed since the middle ages and neither have the kinds of justifications given for recognising rights. Medieval moralists clearly recognised the human freedom presupposed by all ethical and legal systems and valued the liberty that consists in not being excessively constrained by legally and socially enforced duties. In modern times more recognition has been given to the rights of conscience, and this has led to some attempt to formulate duties we have toward conscientious agents whose actions we cannot accept as morally permissible.). (shrink)

Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral-legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating (...) role of the concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those "dignities" that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, "human dignity" still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status—in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody. (shrink)

This article examines the foundations for the legitimacy of law from the perspective of Hegel’s philosophy. In a first step, Kant’s justification of law is discussed, as Hegel takes the Kantian model as a central point of reference. Then, in the Section 2, I discuss Hegel’s reasons for rejecting the main strategies of justification of the legal order: natural law, contractarianism and legal positivism. This is further followed by a discussion of the meaning and scope of Hegel’s contextualism, according to (...) which there can be no practical normativity without a certain historical embedding. Finally, I describe a more traditional met-aphysical reading that I consider to be the correct solution, contrasting it with Honneth’s theory of recognition and Bran-dom’s pragmatism. (shrink)

Recently, there has been some discussion about the relationship between Kant's conception of right (the sphere of juridical rights and duties) and his moral theory (with the Categorical Imperative as its fundamental norm). In section 1, I briefly survey some recent contributions to this debate and distinguish between two different questions. First, does Kant's moral theory (as developed in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason ) imply , or validate, a Kantian conception of right (as developed in (...) the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals , the Doctrine of Right)? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative sufficient to show that the fundamental principles of right are normatively valid? Second, does Kant's conception of right presuppose his moral theory? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative necessary to show that the basic principles of right are normatively valid? In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with defending a negative answer to the first of these questions. In section 2, I will discuss Paul Guyer's attempt to vindicate a positive answer to the same question. In section 3, reasons will be given why any attempt to derive Kant's conception of right from the Categorical Imperative must fail because of the analytic connection between right and coercion. (shrink)

This essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues that the key framers, (...) while aware of the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate. (shrink)

Fichte’s ambitious project in the Foundations of Natural Right is to provide an a priori deduction of the concept of right independently from morality. So far, interpretations of Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right have persistently fallen into one of two rough categories: either they (re)interpret the normative necessity of right in terms of moral or quasi-moral normativity or they interpret right’s normative necessity in terms of hypothetical imperatives. However, each of these interpretations faces significant exegetical difficulties. (...) By contrast, I argue that we can understand the normative necessity of right in terms of conceptual necessity. On this view, right does not tell us what ought to be done, but instead tells us what we are doing and have done. Not only does this provide for a promising philosophical account of the non-moral normativity of right, but also provides a compelling reading of Fichte’s text in both the deduction of the concept of right in the Foundations of Natural Right as well as his discussion of the application of the concept of right and coercion. (shrink)

First published in 1985. In this study, Donnelly distinguishes between "having a right" and "being right" and elaborates the distinction with great subtlety to show that rights have to be understood as action and not as a possession. This is done with such clarity and good sense that he is able to cast light on all aspects of the often confusing discussions of the natures and usages of "right". He illuminates an astonishing range of issues, from the limitations of (...) Thomist and utilitarian conceptions of right to the confusions of many present-day defenders of rights, both in the West and the Third World. As importantly, Donnelly is centrally concerned with the human aspect of "human rights". He is thus able to rest his discussion of rights on a plausible philosophical anthropology as well as an appreciation of an historical dimension to human rights, and, at the end of his book, is able to open the door towards potential new developments in the discussion of human rights. Down the path he points us lies a reconciliation of the notion of individual rights with that of political community. This title will be of great interest to students of politics and philosophy. (shrink)

Modern slavery is a major topic of concern in international law and global governance, in civil society, and in academic debates. Yet, what does modern slavery mean, and can its highly different forms be covered in a single concept? This paper discusses these questions in three steps: First, it develops common definitions of modern slavery. Second, it discusses critical rejections of these definitions. The two camps that adhere to the definitions of modern slavery, and that reject them, respectively, face (...) certain limits. In a third step, the paper takes up with the limits and the strengths of both. It suggests that the limits of definitions of modern slavery can be overcome by critical approaches; and that the limits of critical approaches can be overcome by definitions of modern slavery. The key is their integration into a human rights frame. Ultimately, the paper proposes an approach to modern slavery that neither relies on a binary distinction between slavery and non-slavery, nor does it strive for the abolishment of the concept of modern slavery. Rather, the paper calls for a normatively and contextually embedded approach within the human rights frame. (shrink)

This article argues that Wolterstorff’s concept of rights is ambiguous between the interest and will theories. It provides possible reconstructions and points towards a more suitable third concept theologically grounded in an account of humans as constituted relationally, juridically and eternally.

Does a political conception of human rights dictate a particular view of corporate human rights obligations? The U.N. “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights hold that corporations have only a responsibility to respect human rights. Some critics have argued that corporations should be responsible for a wider range of human rights obligations, beyond merely an obligation to respect such rights. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Framework (...) relied on a political conception of human rights, and this is what led to limiting corporate obligations to mere respect for human rights. In this paper, I explore and critically assess this general claim about political conceptions of human rights. This involves distinguishing different types of political conceptions of human rights, as well as specifying what makes a theory of human rights a “political conception.” In light of this clarificatory discussion, I argue that the general thesis is false; the mere fact that a theory offers a political conception of human rights does not necessarily entail any certain range of corporate human rights obligations. Finally, I identify some of the other aspects of a theory of human rights that do affect the range of corporate obligations it will prescribe. (shrink)

I.WhatVintage ofCivilRights?In this paper I wish to compare and contrast two separate conceptions of civil rights and to argue that the older, more libertarian conception of the subject is preferable to the more widely accepted version used in the modern civil rights movement. The first conception of civil rights focuses on the question of individual capacity. The antithesis of a person with civil rights is the slave. But even if individuals are declared free, they are nonetheless (...) denied their civil rights if they are unable to own property, to enter into contracts, to make wills, to give evidence, and to sue (and be sued) in courts. With all these civil rights claims, the target of the individual grievance is the state; it has denied large classes of individuals the formal capacities that it recognized and protected in others. The Civil War was fought largely over slavery. In its aftermath, civil rights claims protecting individual capacity received explicit, if imperfect, statutory and constitutional protection. The postbellum protections didnotguarantee these rights in absolute fashion – that is, in a way that would not be susceptible to abridgment under any circumstances. Instead, civil rights were protected in what might be called a relative fashion: whatever rights of this sort were enjoyed by white citizens were to be enjoyed by the newly freed black citizens as well. (shrink)

This article, while disclosing the conception of rights, their relation to law and their nature, presents the constructive criticism and motivated support of legal personalism, i. e. the original theory presented by prof. A. Vaišvila. This article presents the criticism of terms “positive law” and “natural law”. It emphasizes that the term “natural rights,” while historically very important and common, is rarely used of late. The primary reason for its fall from favor seems to be that it was (...) used in too many different ways and therefore ceased to be useful. So, the author, while defending the indispensable relation between law and morals, offers the term “good morals” instead of “natural law” and also offers to refuse the usage of terms “positive law” and “natural law”. This article represents the view that morality is the source of law. The author accepts a position asserting that the terms “human rights”, “natural rights” and “fundamental moral rights” are synonymous. However, some institutional rights (for example, social rights) flow from statutes, but not morals. (shrink)

Introduction -- Theses and discussions -- Analytical concepts -- General approach -- Moral philosophy in antiquity -- Christian moral philosophy -- Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas -- William of Ockham -- From William of Ockham to Francisco Suarez -- Protestant natural law -- John Locke -- The American and French declarations of rights -- Early critique of the Declaration of Rights -- Immanuel Kant and modern moral philosophy -- Human rights today.

The paper analyses the concept of equality in theoretical, philosophical, and practical context, as it appears in the programs of the Polish political parties. Inquiries regard the concept of equality for the LGBTQ community (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer) in the context of human rights. The concept of human rights is discussed within the vertical and horizontal approach. The following questions are addressed: How do political parties relate to the concept of equality? Does equality (...) appear in the political programs, and if it does, then in relation to which social groups? Do political parties engage in the problem of equality with regard to the LGBTQ community? The aim of the paper is to indicate significant differences in this respect between political parties. (shrink)

In the jurisprudence of constitutional courts around the world, there is an emerging trend towards an autonomy-based understanding of constitutional rights: increasingly, rights are interpreted as being about enabling people to live autonomous lives, rather than disabling the state in certain ways. This article investigates the conception of autonomy employed by courts by presenting two candidates and examining which of them explains the current practice of constitutional rights law better. The first, labelled the excluded reasons conception of (...) autonomy, claims that a person’s autonomy is violated if he is treated on the basis of certain impermissible—in particular, moralistic or paternalistic—reasons. It is concluded that, while this is a coherent understanding of autonomy, it cannot explain many of the rights that are widely accepted today. The second, the protected interests conception, argues that a person has autonomy interests in controlling certain domains of her life, and offers a scale on which the importance of the various autonomy interests can be assessed. The article demonstrates that this conception is coherent and adequately explains the current practice. The final section briefly explores some implications of this result for a comprehensive reconstructive theory of constitutional rights. (shrink)

On the grounds of the fundamental value of the human rights, which is the human dignity, this article describes a basis of the right to health care in terms of quality, discloses its concept, reviews the spheres of health system in which this right is exercised: health care and public health. The right to health care is stressed as one of the fundamental rights, without which the person will not able to enjoy other rights: economic, political (...) and social rights. It comprises the right to enjoy the best physical and mental health. The right to health care is not absolute in itself: efficiency of its implementation depends upon both ability of administrative and institutional systems, which were created by the state, to properly implement the assigned functions and upon the individual, its state of health and lifestyle. (shrink)

This paper argues: (1) the concept of human rights has not yet well founded. The human rights in terms of natural rights are problematic, theoretically and even practically leading to the risk of anti-justice so that self-defeating in some possible cases; (2) a more reasonable concept of human rights could be defined in terms of credit rights. It means that human rights should be granted unconditionally and equally to everyone in terms of (...) human credit rights, but be conditionally kept, if and only if, one would carry out the human obligations of a human being as a return to his granted rights. Simply put, human rights are granted unconditionally but enjoyed conditionally. (shrink)