Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were (...) at work. In this paper. we show how this argument by analogy is flowed with respect to the case of second-order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore (B&M) provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.

Comparative cognitive science often involves asking questions like ‘Do nonhumans have C?’ where C is a capacity we take humans to have. These questions frequently generate unproductive disagreements, in which one party affirms and the other denies that nonhumans have the relevant capacity on the basis of the same evidence. I argue that these questions can be productively understood as questions about natural kinds: do nonhuman capacities fall into the same natural kinds as our own? Understanding such questions in (...) this way has several advantages: it preserves the intuition that these are substantive empirical questions worth asking; it helps us to understand why they so frequently give rise to disagreements of the kind described; and it provides clues about how to diagnose and resolve them. (shrink)

A widespread assumption in experimental comparative cognition is that, barring compelling evidence to the contrary, the default hypothesis should postulate the simplest cognitive ontology consistent with the animal’s behavior. I call this assumption the principle of cognitive simplicity . In this essay, I show that PoCS is pervasive but unjustified: a blanket preference for the simplest cognitive ontology is not justified by any of the available arguments. Moreover, without a clear sense of how cognitive ontologies are to be (...) carved up at the joints—and which tools are appropriate for the job—PoCS rests on shaky conceptual ground. (shrink)

This research builds on previous investigations seeking to understand how individuals reason about moral problems. Our research includes a preliminary investigation about Millennials and a cross‐generational analysis using secondary research data to understand this emerging generation's moral reasoning and assess trends in moral reasoning over time. This study addresses content‐bias in moral reasoning by using a new instrument with business‐based dilemmas, the Moral Recognition Interview, based on the well‐established moral reasoning framework of Lawrence Kohlberg. Results show that the Millennials in (...) this study exhibit differences in moral reasoning based on gender, intelligence, work experience, and academic major, however not necessarily in an expected manner. Differences in moral reasoning were found when the context or “story pull” of the ethical dilemmas presented is considered. In addition, a comparison to other studies shows that business student Millennials tend to reason at lower levels of cognitive moral reasoning than non‐business college students, as well as college students in the 1960s–1970s (Baby Boomers) and in the 1980s–1990s (Generation Xers). (shrink)

This book offers substantial insight into students’ conceptualization of scientific terminology. The current book explores the commonalities and distinctions between Arabic and French physics terms, and the impact of the language disparities on students’ understanding of physics terms. This book adopts a novel approach to the problem of scientific terminology by exploring physics terms’ polysemy, prototypical meanings, and conceptual metaphor and metonymy, which motivates their extension of meaning. The book also investigates how the linguistic discrepancies and other variables affect the (...) learning of physics by Arab students (Moroccan students, in this book). Concepts in Physics: A Comparative Cognitive Analysis of Arabic and French Terminologies, whether you are a student of science, a science teacher or lecturer, a translator, or a linguist, is what you need. The book will help you comprehend the linguistic and cultural differences between western and non-western physics terminologies (in this book, French and Arabic physics terminologies) and the factors influencing the learning of physics concepts, and thus address the multiple challenges in learning scientific terms and concepts. (shrink)

Replications are often taken to play both epistemic and demarcating roles in science: they provide evidence about the reliability of fields’ methods and, by extension, about which fields “count” as scientific. I argue that, in a field characterized by a high degree of theoretical openness and uncertainty, like comparative cognition, replications do not sit well in these roles. Like other experiments conducted under conditions of uncertainty, replications are often equivocal and open to interpretation. As a result, they are (...) poorly placed to deliver clear judgments about the reliability of comparative cognition’s methods or its scientific bona fides. I suggest that this should encourage us to take a broader view of both the nature of scientific progress and the role of replication in comparative cognition. (shrink)

Evolution would favor organisms that can make recurrent decisions in accordance with classical probability (CP) theory, because such choices would be optimal in the long run. This is illustrated by the base-rate fallacy and probability matching, where nonhumans choose optimally but humans do not. Quantum probability (QP) theory may be able to account for these species differences in terms of orthogonal versus nonorthogonal representations.

Behavioural flexibility is often treated as the gold standard of evidence for more sophisticated or complex forms of animal cognition, such as planning, metacognition and mindreading. However, the evidential link between behavioural flexibility and complex cognition has not been explicitly or systematically defended. Such a defence is particularly pressing because observed flexible behaviours can frequently be explained by putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms. This leaves complex cognition hypotheses open to ‘deflationary’ challenges that are accorded greater evidential weight precisely (...) because they offer putatively simpler explanations of equal explanatory power. This paper challenges the blanket preference for simpler explanations, and shows that once this preference is dispensed with, and the full spectrum of evidence—including evolutionary, ecological and phylogenetic data—is accorded its proper weight, an argument in support of the prevailing assumption that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognitive mechanisms may begin to take shape. An adaptive model of cognitive-behavioural evolution is proposed, according to which the existence of convergent trait–environment clusters in phylogenetically disparate lineages may serve as evidence for the same trait–environment clusters in other lineages. This, in turn, could permit inferences of cognitive complexity in cases of experimental underdetermination, thereby placing the common view that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognition on firmer grounds. (shrink)

Although the advantage of biorobotics over traditional modelling tools is not always evident from the studies on animal search addressed in the target article, this commentary argues that testing different robotic architectures and specific biological organisms in structured search spaces, where environmental constraints matter, might prove one of the most promising research strategies in comparative cognition.

We commend Byrne & Russon for their effort to expand and clarify the concept of imitation by addressing the various levels of behavior organization at which it could occur. We are concerned, however, first about the ambiguity with which these levels are defined and second about whether there is any particular need for comparative cognition to keep focusing on imitation as an important intellectual faculty. We recommend stricter definitions of hierarchical behavioral levels that will lend themselves to operational (...) definitions and continued study of how animal subjects organize their goal-directed behavior as opposed to whether it is or is not imitation. (shrink)

(2013). Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition. Philosophical Psychology. ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.732339.

The title of the target article suggests an agenda for research on cognitive evolution that is doubly flawed. It implies that we can learn directly about animals' mental states, and its focus on human uniqueness impels a search for an existence proof rather than for understanding what components of given cognitive processes are shared among species and why.

Mentalist view began to lose its standing among psychologists mainly during the first half of the twentieth century. As a result, the enthusiasm to build an objective science began to grow among behaviourists and ethologists. The rise of cognitive sciences around the 1960s, however, revived the debates over the importance of cognitive intervening variables in explaining behaviours that could not be explained by clinging solely to a pure behavioural approach. Nevertheless, even though cognitive functions in nonhuman animals have been identified (...) in many studies, attributing human mental properties to animals is still being criticized as anthropomorphism. Such anthropomorphic attributions have been considered as an open door to the return of subjective methodology. Representation of anthropomorphic attributions as scientific activities within the context of discovery as opposed to the context of justification casts a new light on this problem. The present analysis proposes that anthropomorphic attributions are formed based on top-down idiosyncratic intuitions on the cusp of hypothesis building, outside the context of scientific justification. In other words, an anthropomorphic attribution is a potential creative link between pure observations of behaviours and building testable hypotheses about cognition in the process of scientific discovery. Thus, serving a function within the context of discovery, anthropomorphism does not motivate the return of subjective methodology, simply because it is not inconsistent with the rule-governed path in the context of scientific justification. (shrink)

There was a strong consensus in the commentaries that animals' performances in metacognition paradigms indicate high-level decisional processes that cannot be explained associatively. Our response summarizes this consensus and the support for the idea that these performances demonstrate animal metacognition. We amplify the idea that there is an adaptive advantage favoring animals who can – in an immediate moment of difficulty or uncertainty – construct a decisional assemblage that lets them find an appropriate behavioral solution. A working consciousness would serve (...) this function well. This explains why animals may have the functional equivalent of human declarative consciousness. However, like other commentators who were friendly to this equivalence, we approach carefully the stronger claims that animals' metacognitive performances imply full-blown self-awareness or phenomenal consciousness. We discuss the commentators' interesting ideas for future research, as well as their intriguing ideas about the evolution and development of metacognition and its relation to theory of mind. We also discuss residual confusions about existing research and remaining methodological issues. (shrink)

Moving from a behavioral definition of intelligence, which describes it as the ability to adapt to the surrounding environment and deal effectively with new situations (Anastasi, 1986), this paper explains to what extent the performance obtained by ChatGPT in the linguistic domain can be considered as intelligent behavior and to what extent they cannot. It also explains in what sense the hypothesis of decoupling between cognitive and problem-solving abilities, proposed by Floridi (2017) and Floridi and Chiriatti (2020) should be interpreted. (...) The problem of symbolic grounding (Harnad, 1990) is then addressed to show the problematic relationship between ChatGPT and the natural environment, and thus the impossibility for it to understand the symbols it manipulates. To explain the reasons why ChatGPT does not succeed in this task, an investigation is carried out and a possible solution to the problem in the artificial domain is proposed by making a comparison with the natural ability of living beings to ground their own meanings from some basic cognitive-sensory aspects, which, it is explained, are directly related to the emergence of self-awareness in humans. Thus, the question is raised whether a possible and concrete solution to the Symbol Grounding Problem would involve in the artificial domain the development of cognitive abilities fully comparable to those of humans. Finally, I explain the difficulties that would have to be overcome before such a level could be reached, since human cognitive capacities are intimately linked to intersubjectivity and intercorporeality. (shrink)

People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying these preferential choices, two prominent cognitive models, decision field theory (DFT; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) and the proportional difference model (PD; González‐Vallejo, 2002), were rigorously tested against each other. In two consecutive experiments, the participants repeatedly had to choose between monetary gambles. The first experiment provided the reference to estimate the models’ free parameters. From these estimations, new gamble pairs were generated for the second (...) experiment such that the two models made maximally divergent predictions. In the first experiment, both models explained the data equally well. However, in the second generalization experiment, the participants’ choices were much closer to the predictions of DFT. The results indicate that the stochastic process assumed by DFT, in which evidence in favor of or against each option accumulates over time, described people’s choice behavior better than the trade‐offs between proportional differences assumed by PD. (shrink)

From a developmental and comparative perspective, folk biology is a core “meme.” The universality and resistance to change in such core “memes” may be a function of the developmental timing of cognitive domains during childhood. Evidence from cognitive development in humans, monkeys, and apes is discussed. Suggestions for a developmental research program are offered.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.2 (2004) 125-128 [Access article in PDF] Comparing Psychoanalytic and Cognitive-Behavioral Perspectives on Control Bruce N. Waller Keywords freedom, locus of control, psychoanalysis, self-efficacy, volition Cognitive behavioral research on locus of control and self-efficacy has produced an extensive body of empirical results that might prove useful to psychoanalytic researchers endeavoring to strengthen the empirical foundation of psychoanalytic therapy. Cognitive-behaviorists and psychoanalysts share a common interest (...) in the importance of perspectives and belief systems and their impact on individual freedom, and comparative research on therapeutic effectiveness could yield benefits for both therapeutic approaches.Locus of control and self-efficacy are central elements in cognitive-behavioral psychology, and they play an important role in cognitive-behavioral therapy. Although the psychoanalytic approach does not explicitly employ those concepts, psychoanalytic therapists are obviously concerned with problems of effective action and internal obstacles to action. Attention to these two perspectives and their overlapping interests offers potential benefits for both the cognitive-behavioral and the psychodynamic approaches to psychological research and therapy.One potential benefit is the development of useful tools for advancing empirically based research on psychoanalysis. As Lehrer (1999) states, it is advantageous to ground psychoanalysis in "firm empirical evidence whenever possible." Although there have obviously been significant positive steps in that direction (Singer 2003; Weiss 1995, 1988; Weiss and Sampson 1986), psychoanalytic researchers have recognized that one source of difficulty is in finding clearly measurable research objectives and hypotheses (Burgin 2002). Cognitive-behavioral research on locus of control and self-efficacy has produced an extensive body of research using clear measurement standards that could prove useful in the empiricist approach to psychodynamic theories. In particular, those cognitive-behavioral research findings might offer a means of extending empirical investigation of psychodynamic theory in a direction usually regarded as difficult to test empirically: the study of psychoanalytic effectiveness to "change your way of seeing" (Lieberman 1999). Shifting locus of control or efficacy expectations in specific domains (Bandura 1997) [End Page 125] would empirically confirm the effectiveness of psychoanalytic techniques. It might well be that some efficacy expectations are enhanced more effectively by psychodynamic processes than by cognitive-behavioral therapy, or that psychoanalysis is effective in enhancing some specific efficacy expectations but not others. This could potentially extend the empirical examination of psychoanalytic theory as well as provide a base of comparison with cognitive-behavioral therapy techniques.Although self-efficacy enhancement might be a fruitful empirical test for psychodynamic therapy, therapeutic intervention to modify locus of control potentially could be even more productive. Current research indicates that one's orientation toward locus of control is a relatively stable characteristic, although it can be modified (Holyrod et al. 1984; Rotter 1979; Sadow and Hopkins 1993). One reason for locus of control stability may be that the locus of control imposes a perspective on the conceptualization of all one's experiences: from a strong internal locus of control perspective I view failures and successes as largely my own doing, whereas from an external locus perspective even my most effective efforts are seen as events that were outside my control: "I guess it was just my time to do well on a math exam," rather than "My hard work for that exam really paid off." (Lieberman makes this phenomenon quite clear in his excellent discussion of transparency.) Although locus of control is not easily modified, it is important to find effective means of helping subjects to achieve such changes, because research shows that a strong internal locus of control is positively correlated with success in work, sports, studies, marriage, and psychological adjustment (Lefcourt 1981, 1992), as well as with better health care behavior and better health (Bandura 1977; Schorr and Rodin 1982; Schulz 1976; Schulz and Hanusa 1978; Wallston 1993). Those deeply enmeshed in an external locus of control enjoy less real freedom and suffer severe disadvantages.How does one effect a shift in such a basic orientation? Not easily. From a psychoanalytic approach, the key will lie in recognizing and reconceptualizing the beliefs that impede effective action. Cognitive-behaviorists are more likely to... (shrink)

It is shown that the evolution of physics canin several regards be described by elements of``regression'', i.e., that within a certaintradition of ideas one begins with theconstruction of most ``plausible'' statements(axioms) at hand, and then ``works onselfbackwards'' with respect to developmental terms.As a consequence of this strategy, the furtherwork proceeds along such a ``regressive'' path,the more one arrives at concepts andrelationships which are unexpected or evencounter-intuitive in terms of our everydayexperiences. However, a comparable phenomenology is wellknown from studies on states (...) of consciousness.In particular, the evolutionary logic of theconstructions of major ``cognitive invariances''in physics, which is in part due to everincreasing rates of data processing, ismirrored in a logic of states of consciousnesswhich deviate from a ``normal'' state of dailyroutine along increasing levels of centralnervous arousal. Examples are given from the evolution ofphysics, and future perspectives are brieflyoutlined on the basis thereof. (shrink)

Colin Allen prescribes cognitive modeling as “the right kind of theory” to use in comparative animal cognition and predicts that unless researchers shift from using conceptual framework hypotheses (“the wrong kind of theory”) to cognitive models, the field will fail to be sustained or develop further. I argue, on the contrary, that the robust development of the field over the past 35 years actually belies Allen's dire prediction. What is more, there is reason to be concerned that if (...) Allen's prescription were wholeheartedly adopted by researchers, it would undermine one of the principal aims of the field: the discovery of the reasons for which animals act. Although cognitive modeling may be a useful tool to use to verify predictions made by conceptual framework hypotheses, I see no reason to think that comparative animal cognition would be, or needs to be, saved by researchers coming to taking cognitive modeling as the right kind of theory to use in the field. (shrink)

The essays are tied together by the idea that our understanding of cognition is likely to be enhanced by consideration of mechanisms and processes at its ...

A great deal of progress has been made on information ethics. Which portion is not sufficient? That might be the comparison from countries to countries. The purpose of this study was closely examined using the cross-cultural method for comparison. To determine the ethics cognitions and behaviors of the students, a comprehensive survey was distributed. The questionnaire for the study used Mason’s four essential factors in information ethics that included Privacy, Accuracy, Property and Accessibility (PAPA). The samples were comprised of Kaohsiung (...) Taiwan and Nanjing China, junior high school students in 2006. The sample and the survey were obtained from two stages of random sampling that was conducted using an Internet website. Students could read the online questionnaire in the computer laboratory and then send immediate feedback to the website server. The result of the experiment showed the divergence of information ethics in cognition and behavior between Kaohsiung and Nanjing school children. The effects of background and correlation are from cognition and behavior between two regions. (shrink)

This study has two goals. First, we present much‐needed empirical linguistic data and systematic analyses on the spatial semantic systems in English and Korean, two languages that have been extensively compared to date in the debate on spatial language and spatial cognition. We conduct our linguistic investigation comprehensively, encompassing the domains of tight‐ and loose‐fit as well as containment and support relations. The current analysis reveals both cross‐linguistic commonalities and differences: From a common set of spatial features, each language (...) highlights a subset of those features for its principal categorization, and those primary features are importantly different between English and Korean: English speakers categorize events predominantly by containment and support relations (and do so with prepositions), whereas Korean speakers categorize them by tight‐fit and loose‐fit relations (and do so with verbs), with a further distinction of containment and support within the loose‐fit relation. The analysis also shows that the tight‐fit domain is more cross‐linguistically diverse in categorization than is the loose‐fit domain. Second, we test the language data against the nonlinguistic categorization results reported in Choi and Hattrup (2012). The results show a remarkable degree of convergence between the patterns predicted from the current linguistic analysis and those found in C&H's nonlinguistic study and thus provide empirical and strong evidence for an influence of language on nonlinguistic spatial cognition. At the same time, the study reveals areas where the two systems closely interact with each other as well as those where one is independent from the other. Taking both parts of the study together, we identify the specific roles that language and spatial perception/cognition play in spatial categorization. (shrink)