Results for 'companions in guilt'

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  1. Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work.C. Cowie - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):407-422.
    One recently popular strategy for avoiding the moral error theory is via a ‘companions in guilt’ argument. I focus on those recently popular arguments that take epistemic facts as a companion in guilt for moral facts. I claim that there is an internal tension between the two main premises of these arguments. It is a consequence of this that either the soundness or the dialectical force of the companions in guilt argument is undermined. I defend (...)
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  2. Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):161–171.
    Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
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  3. Companions in Guilt: Entailment, Analogy, and Absorbtion.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I say what I mean by a ‘companions in guilt’ argument in meta-ethics. Second, I distinguish between two kinds of argument within this family, which I call ‘arguments by entailment’ and ‘arguments by analogy’. Third, I explore the prospects for companions in guilt arguments by analogy. During the course of this discussion, I identify a distinctive variety of argument, which I call ‘arguments by absorption’. I argue that this (...)
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  4. Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Still Work: Reply to Cowie.Ramon Das - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv078.
  5. Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox.Michael Campbell - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):151-173.
    In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny the existence of irreducible and categorically normative epistemic reasons. My argument for the second of these claims exploits an analogy between the thesis (...)
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  6. (Probably) Not Companions in Guilt.Sharon Berry - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2285-2308.
    In this paper, I will attempt to develop and defend a common form of intuitive resistance to the companions in guilt argument. I will argue that one can reasonably believe there are promising solutions to the access problem for mathematical realism that don’t translate to moral realism. In particular, I will suggest that the structuralist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge in terms of some form of logical knowledge offers significant hope of success while no analogous approach offers (...)
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  7. Companions in Guilt Arguments.Christopher Cowie - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12528.
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  8.  95
    Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity – Hallvard Lillehammer.Andrew Fisher - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):379-382.
    A review of "Companions in guilt: Arguments for ethical objectivity" by Hallvard Lillehammer.
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    Companions in Guilt Arguments in the Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.R. A. Rowland - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 187-205.
    A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified moral belief in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not undermine justified non-moral belief. Call this argument the argument for moral skepticism from peer disagreement. Jason Decker and Daniel Groll have recently made a companions in guilt response to this argument. Decker and Groll argue that if peer disagreement undermines justified moral belief, then peer disagreement undermines much non-moral justified belief; if the (...)
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  10. The Companions in Guilt Strategy.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  11.  20
    Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore’s Paradox.Michael Campbell - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    Michael Campbell ABSTRACT: In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is...
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  12. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.
    Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support (...)
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  13.  16
    Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics.Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.
    Comparisons between morality and other 'companion' disciplines - such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics - are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the 'companions in guilt' strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by (...)
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  14. Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):474-482.
    The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and argue for its (...)
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  15. Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Ramon Das - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):58-69.
    A ‘companions in guilt’ strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is (...)
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  16.  47
    What’s Left for the Companions in Guilt Argument?Patrick Clipsham - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):137-151.
    Companions in guilt arguments respond to moral error theory by pointing out that its philosophical rationale mandates the rejection of all categorical normative reasons, including epistemic reasons. A number of philosophers have recently been engaging in a dialogue about the strength of this argumentative strategy and the significance of the criticisms that has been raised against it. In this paper, I identify a specific argument, which I dub the ‘bullet-biting response’ as a crucial element in some recent attacks (...)
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  17.  27
    Is There a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument ?Patrick Clipsham - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-16.
    Companions in guilt arguments are widespread in defenses of moral realism and criticisms of error theory. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the companions in guilt argument fails because it makes untenable assumptions about the existence of categorical epistemic reasons. In this article, I develop an alternative version of the companions in guilt argument that does not succumb to this criticism, as it begins with the claim that there is a presumptive case (...)
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  18.  14
    Oughts, Thoughts, and Companions in Guilt: A Defense of Moral Realism.Zachary Swindlehurst - unknown
    According to the moral error theory, there are no moral facts: all moral judgements are systematically and uniformly false. A popular strategy in recent years for arguing against the moral error theory is to deploy a companions in guilt argument. According to CG theorists, arguments for the moral error theory are insufficient, because either they rely on premises which do not warrant scepticism about moral facts, or they threaten to support an implausible error theoretic conclusion in other areas (...)
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  19. Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt.Daan Evers - 2019 - In Richard Rowland & Christopher Cowie (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.
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  20.  61
    Practical Reason and 'Companions in Guilt'.James Harold - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):311–331.
    Since Phillipa Foot’s paper ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ was published some twenty-five years ago, questions about categorical imperatives and the alleged rationality of acting morally have been of central concern to ethicists. For critics and friends of Kantian ethical theories, these questions have special importance. One of the distinctive features of Kantian ethical theories is that they claim that there are categorical imperatives: imperatives which dictate which actions one should follow insofar as one is rational.This way of (...)
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  21. Review: Hallvard Lillehammer: Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity. [REVIEW]T. Cuneo - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):492-497.
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  22. Moral Error Theory, Explanatory Dispensability and the Limits of Guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.
    Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. According to Cuneo (The normative web: an argument for moral realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), Das (Philos Q 66:152–160, 2016; Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, 2017), Rowland (J Ethics Soc Philos 7(1):1–24, 2012; Philos Q 66:161–171, 2016) and others, epistemic facts would be (...)
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  23. Uneasy Companions.Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):359-368.
    A critical notice of Terence Cuneo's The Normative Web and Hallvard Lillehammer's Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity.
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  24.  21
    On the Dialectical Disadvantage of the Normative Error Theorist: A Reply to Clipsham.Xinkan Zhao - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):861-871.
    In response to the companions in guilt arguments, some error theorists have tried to defend a nihilist thesis that there truly are no normative epistemic reasons to believe, and further no normative reasons whatsoever, making them global normative error theorists. In his recent paper, Patrick Clipsham tries to adjudicate on this debate. Dubbing this nihilist response a “bullet-biting” one, he argues that sophisticated forms of this response are viable and immune from the frequently leveled charges. However, he further (...)
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  25.  51
    Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.
    Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this (...)
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  26.  6
    A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Miles Groth - 2002 - Review of Metaphysics 56 (2):452-454.
    The coterie of commentators represented in the present volume include some of the clearest voices for Heidegger’s way of thinking among the second and third generations of American Heidegger scholars. Two of the contributors, who are also the volume’s editors, have just published a new translation of Einführung in die Metaphysik, an event that would appear to be one of the reasons for the project published here. Its thirteen essays are organized under three headings: the question of being, Heidegger and (...)
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  27. On Herbert J. Phillips’s “Why Be Rational?”.Max Harris Siegel - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):826-828,.
    In recent metaethics, moral realists have advanced a companions-in-guilt argument against moral nihilism. Proponents of this argument hold that the conclusion that there are no categorical normative reasons implies that there are no epistemic reasons. However, if there are no epistemic reasons, there are no epistemic reasons to believe nihilism. Therefore, nihilism is false or no one has epistemic reasons to believe it. While this argument is normally presented as a reply to Mackie, who introduced the term “ (...)-in-guilt” in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong of 1977, Herbert J. Phillips presented a form of this argument in Ethics in 1940. In this paper, I will discuss Phillips’ version of the companions-in-guilt argument, demonstrate how recent epistemology bears out an important premise of the argument, and compare Phillips’ argument to Derek Parfit’s recent work. (shrink)
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  28.  57
    Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Knowledge.Silvan Wittwer - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This PhD thesis provides an extended evaluation of evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics. Such arguments attempt to show that evolutionary theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, lead to moral scepticism: the implausible view that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified. To establish that, these arguments rely on certain epistemic principles. But most of the epistemic principles appealed to in the literature on evolutionary debunking arguments are imprecise, confused or simply implausible. My (...)
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    Good Dog: Aspects of Humans' Causal Attributions for a Companion Animal's Social Behavior.D. W. Rajecki Holder, Jeffrey Lee Rasmussen, Clinton R. Sanders, Susan J. Modlin & M. Angela - 1999 - Society and Animals 7 (1):17-34.
    Lay theories or assumptions about nonhuman animal mentality undoubtedly influence relations between people and companion animals. In two experiments respondents gave their impressions of the mental and motivational bases of companion animal social behavior through measures of causal attribution. When gauged against the matched actions of a boy, as in the first experiment, respondents attributed a dog's playing to internal, dispositional factors buta dog's biting to external, situational factors. A second experiment that focused on a dog's bite revealed clear attributional (...)
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  30. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. -/- Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. (...)
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  31.  20
    Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon E. Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687 - 701.
    In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo (and has recently been made much of by Justin Clarke-Doane). I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms of (something like) general epistemic norms of (...)
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  32. Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
    In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how (...)
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  33.  81
    Moral and Epistemic Error Theory : The Parity Premise Reconsidered.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-121.
    Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the (...)
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  34. Evolutionary Debunking: The Milvian Bridge Destabilized.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2695-2713.
    Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. I examine the so-called ‘Milvian Bridge principle’ A new science of religion, Routledge, New York, 2012; Sloan, McKenny, Eggelson Darwin in the 21st century: nature, humanity, and God, University Press, Notre Dame, 2015)), which offers exactly such a called for regulative metaepistemic norm. (...)
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  35.  52
    Companions in Innocence: Defending a New Methodological Assumption for Theorizing About Moral Responsibility.Kelly McCormick - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):515-533.
    The contemporary philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility is rife with appeal to a variety of allegedly intuitive cases and principles. As a result, some have argued that many strands of this debate end in “dialectical stalemates,” boiling down to bedrock, seemingly intractable disagreements about intuition . Here I attempt to carve out a middle ground between conventional reliance on appeal to intuition and intuitional skepticism in regards to the philosophical discussion of moral responsibility in particular. The main (...)
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  36. The Ethics–Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
    Ethics and mathematics have long invited comparisons. On the one hand, both ethical and mathematical propositions can appear to be knowable a priori, if knowable at all. On the other hand, mathematical propositions seem to admit of proof, and to enter into empirical scientific theories, in a way that ethical propositions do not. In this article, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between ethical (i.e., moral) and mathematical knowledge, realistically construed -- i.e., construed as independent of human mind and languages. (...)
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  37. Against Overgeneralisation Objections to the Argument From Moral Disagreement.Thomas Pölzler - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):261-273.
    According to the argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus supports, the view that there are no objective moral truths. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it “overgeneralises”: it implausibly forces its proponents to also deny the existence of objective truths about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. (“companions in guilt” objections) or even about the argument’s own conclusion or its own (...)
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  38.  5
    Companions in the Between: Augustine, Desmond, and Their Communities of Love by Renée Köhler-Ryan, Pickwick/Wipf and Stock, Eugene, or, 2019, Pp. XXII + 159, £18.00, Pbk. [REVIEW]Steven E. Knepper - 2021 - New Blackfriars 102 (1100):595-597.
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  39.  73
    Parfit on Moral Disagreement and The Analogy Between Morality and Mathematics.Adam Greif - 2021 - Filozofia 9 (76):688 - 703.
    In his book On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a version of moral non-naturalism, a view according to which there are objective normative truths, some of which are moral truths, and we have a reliable way of discovering them. These moral truths do not exist, however, as parts of the natural universe nor in Plato’s heaven. While explaining in what way these truths exist and how we discover them, Parfit makes analogies between morality on the one hand, and mathematics and (...)
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  40.  33
    Could Robots Become Authentic Companions in Nursing Care?Theodore A. Metzler, Lundy M. Lewis & Linda C. Pope - 2016 - Nursing Philosophy 17 (1):36-48.
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  41.  3
    Companions in the Between: Augustine, Desmond, and Their Communities of Love by Renée Köhler‐Ryan, Pickwick/Wipf and Stock, Eugene, or, 2019, Pp. XXII + 159, £18.00, Pbk. [REVIEW]Steven E. Knepper - 2021 - New Blackfriars 102 (1100):595-597.
    New Blackfriars, Volume 102, Issue 1100, Page 595-597, July 2021.
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  42. Moral Disagreement, Anti-Realism, and the Worry About Overgeneralization.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - In Christian Kanzian, Josef Mitterer & Katharina Neges (eds.), Contributions to the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 245-247.
    According to the classical argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus inductively supports the view that there are no objective moral facts. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it “overgeneralizes”: it implausibly forces its proponents to deny the existence of objective facts about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. as well (companions in guilt), or even about its own conclusion or its (...)
     
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  43. The Place of Individuation in Guilt and Self Renewal.John C. Hoffman - 1969 - Humanitas 5 (2):121.
     
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  44. Naturalism, Normativity, and Explanation: Some Scientistic Biases of Contemporary Naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.
    The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of (...)
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    The Limits of Self-Effacement: A Reply to Wittwer.Patrick Clipsham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3617-3636.
    This article is concerned with the interconnection between three arguments: the Moral Explanatory Dispensability Argument, the Epistemic Explanatory Dispensability Argument, and the Companions in Guilt Argument. Silvan Wittwer has recently argued that the Epistemic EDA is self-effacing, whereas the Moral EDA is not. This difference between them is then leveraged by Wittwer to establish that there is a significant disparity between these arguments and that this disparity undermines attempts to use the CGA as a means of refuting the (...)
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  46.  38
    Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’T Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.
    Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95:58–69, work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use to advance their conceptual claim apply in the epistemic domain also. This prohibits (...)
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  47. Place of Individuation in Guilt and Self Renewal.G. E. Jackson - 1969 - Humanitas 5 (2):143-158.
     
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  48.  32
    Reason and Ethics: The Case Against Objective Value.Joel Marks - 2020 - New York and Abington, Oxon: Routledge.
    Reason and Ethics defends the theoretical claim that all values are subjective and the practical claim that human affairs can be conducted fruitfully in full awareness of this. Joel Marks goes beyond his previous work defending moral skepticism to question the existence of all objective values. This leads him to suggest a novel answer to the Companions in Guilt argument that the denial of morality would mean relinquishing rationality as well. Marks disarms the argument by conceding the irreality (...)
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    A Unique Metaphysical Problem for Moral Realism.Brian Collins - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):257-265.
    The standard moral realist response to the charge of “queerness” has been a type of companions in guilt defense. This response asserts that moral properties are no more queer than other abstract properties and since most people accept these other abstract properties into their ontology then they ought to also accept moral properties. Moral realists contend that moral properties face no special problem. In this paper, I argue that moral properties do face a unique problem – the moral (...)
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  50. Editorial 123 Guilt, Aspiration and the Free Self.In Guilt & Summaries of Selected Works - 1969 - Humanitas 5 (2):121.
     
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