Some philosophers, for example David Lewis, have argued for the need to introduce de se contents or centered contents, i.e. contents of thought and speech the correctness of believing which depends not only on the possible world one inhabits, but also on the location one occupies. Independently, philosophers like Robert Stalnaker (and also David Lewis) have developed the conversational score model of linguistic communication. This conversational model usually relies on a more standard conception of content according to which (...) the correctness of believing a content depends merely on the possible world one occupies. The aim of this paper is to develop a modified conversational score model that operates with centered contents. I begin by explaining how in principle centered contents can figure in the transfer of information from one thinker to another. Here I distinguish the local portability approach from the portable surrogate approach. Then I explain how these modes of information transfer can be exploited in a stalnakerian conversational model involving centered contents, proposing a modified update rule for assertion. (shrink)

I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and (...) not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped (and hence non-circularshaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Relativistic Content The Argument from Primitive Colors The Argument from the Inverted Spectrum The Argument from Dual Looks The Argument from Duplication Conclusion References.

0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will (...) give a talk on the day following the occurrence of my belief state in the actual world. Let us call propositional content which has a truth-value relative only to a possible world ‘non-relativistic content’. Non-relativistic content can be treated as either structured or unstructured. On the unstructured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set of possible worlds and bears the truth-value true just in case the actual world is a member of that set. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is working now’ at time t is the set of worlds in which Jim is working at t, and this content is true just in case the actual world is among those worlds. On the structured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set or conglomeration of properties and/or objects, where properties are features which objects possess regardless of who considers or observes them and regardless of when they are being considered or observed. Such properties are said to be (or represent) functions from possible worlds to extensions. Relative to a possible world they determine a set of objects instantiating the property. For example, relative to the actual world the property of being human determines the set of actual humans. Not all content is non-relativistic. Let us say that propositional content is relativistic just in case it possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world. A centered world is a possible world in which an individual and a time are marked, where the marked individual.. (shrink)

According to an attractive account of belief, our beliefs have centered content. According to an attractive account of communication, we utter sentences to express our beliefs and share them with each other. However, the two accounts are in conflict. In this paper I explore the consequences of holding on to the claim that beliefs have centered content. If we do in fact express the centered content of our beliefs, the content of the belief (...) the hearer acquires cannot in general be identical to the content the speaker expresses. I sketch an alternative account of communication, the Recentering model, that accepts this consequence and explains how expressed and acquired content are related. (shrink)

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with (...) centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities. (shrink)

The Centered Mind offers a new view of the nature and causal determinants of both reflective thinking and, more generally, the stream of consciousness. Peter Carruthers argues that conscious thought is always sensory-based, relying on the resources of the working-memory system. This system enables sensory images to be sustained and manipulated through attentional signals directed at midlevel sensory areas of the brain. When abstract conceptual representations are bound into these images, we consciously experience ourselves as making judgments or arriving (...) at decisions. However, our amodal propositional attitudes are never actually among the contents of this stream of conscious reflection. Our beliefs, goals, and decisions are only ever active in the background of consciousness, working behind the scenes. They are never themselves conscious.Drawing on extensive knowledge of the scientific literature on working memory and related topics, Carruthers challenges the central assumptions of many philosophers. In addition to arguing that non-sensory propositional attitudes are never conscious, he also shows that they are never under direct intentional control. Written with his usual clarity and directness, The Centered Mind will be essential reading for all philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of human thought processes. (shrink)

Advanced AI systems are rapidly making their way into medical research and practice, and, arguably, it is only a matter of time before they will surpass human practitioners in terms of accuracy, reliability, and knowledge. If this is true, practitioners will have a prima facie epistemic and professional obligation to align their medical verdicts with those of advanced AI systems. However, in light of their complexity, these AI systems will often function as black boxes: the details of their contents, calculations, (...) and procedures cannot be meaningfully understood by human practitioners. When AI systems reach this level of complexity, we can also speak of black-box medicine. In this paper, we want to argue that black-box medicine conflicts with core ideals of patient-centered medicine. In particular, we claim, black-box medicine is not conducive for supporting informed decision-making based on shared information, shared deliberation, and shared mind between practitioner and patient. (shrink)

It was pointed out, first by Robert Stalnaker, then also by Andy Egan, that David Lewis’s model of centered-worlds contents has undesired consequences for communication of de se contents. The recent years have seen a number of attempts to save the model by amending it to handle de se communication. Proposals include the appeal to sequences of individuals in the centers, to ersatz classical propositions, and to operations of “re-centering”. The authors are Dilip Ninan and Stephan Torre, Sarah Moss (...) and Max Kölbel, and Alan Gibbard and Clas Weber. The present paper discusses these attempts. The conclusion is that they fail. (shrink)

David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self-locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. In this paper, I raise a problem for centered worlds and discuss the costs and benefits of different solutions. My investigation into the nature of centered worlds brings out potentially problematic implicit commitments of (...) the theories that employ them. In addition, my investigation shows that the conception of centered worlds widely attributed to David Lewis is not only problematic, but in fact not his. (shrink)

Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory stores nonconceptual content , in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC cannot be stored in visual memory and why only conceptual information can: NCC lasts for a very short time and does not reach either visual short-term memory or visual long-term memory; the content of visual states is stored in memory only if (...) and when object-centered attention modulates visual processing and this modulation signifies the onset of the conceptualization of that content; only categorical high-level information that characterizes conceptual content and not metric and precise iconic information that characterizes NCC can be stored in visual memory for long periods; and if NCC were stored in visual memory then this would allow recognitional judgments pertaining to NCC—one could recognize the precise shade of a color that one had seen before. However NCC does not allow such recognitional judgments. (shrink)

Voice-assistants are becoming increasingly popular and can be deployed to offers a low-cost tool that can support and potentially reduce falls, injuries, and accidents faced by older people within the age of 65 and older. But, irrespective of the mobility and walkability challenges faced by the aging population, studies that employed Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based voice-assistants to reduce risks faced by older people when they use public transportation and walk in built environment are scarce. This is because the development of AI-based (...) voice-assistants suitable for the mobility domain presents several techno–social challenges. Accordingly, this study aims to identify _user-centered_ service design and functional requirements, techno–social factors, and further design an architectural model for an AI-based voice-assistants that provide personalized recommendation to reduce falls, injuries, and accidents faced by older people. Accordingly, a scoping review of the literature grounded on secondary data from 59 studies was conducted and descriptive analysis of the literature and content-related analysis of the literature was carried out. Findings from this study presents the perceived techno-socio factors that may influences older people use of AI-based voice-assistants. More importantly, this study presents user-centred service design and functional requirements needed to be considered in developing voice-assistants suitable for older people. Implications from this study provides AI techniques for implementing voice-assistants that provide safe mobility, walkability, and wayfinding for older people in urban areas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian InternalismDaniel E. PalmerGeorge W. Harris. Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Pp. xi + 434. Cloth, $60.00.Contemporary philosophers have found substantial resources in the ethical writings of both Aristotle and Kant. Together Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethics and Kantian constructivism have not only contributed greatly to the resurgence of interest in normative (...) theory in recent decades, but have also provided the most prominent alternatives to the utilitarianism that has dominated Anglo-American ethics for so long. However, the development of these ethical projects has been carried out largely independently of one another. In Agent-Centered Morality, George Harris helps to overcome this lacuna by comparing and contrasting these two competing versions of [End Page 449] morality. As such, this work is a welcome addition to the literature both as a survey of recent work in Aristotelian and Kantian ethics as well as an account of the many ways in which they converge and diverge in their corresponding treatments of practical rationality.Harris begins by noting that the appeal of both the Aristotelian and Kantian models is that they attempt to generate a foundation for ethics within an account of practical reason, and thus to ground morality within a deliberative perspective that connects the demands of morality with an agent's own meaningful commitments. As such, Harris correctly argues that these projects have much more in common than has sometimes been supposed. The central question that Harris raises in this book is which account of practical reason is best suited for this task. His thesis is that the Aristotelian model gives us a more plausible picture of the role of norms within practical rationality.The major distinction between the Aristotelian and the Kantian models according to Harris is that while on the Aristotelian model the norms made use of in practical judgments are symmetric in their regulative function, the Kantian model provides an asymmetrical account of norms. To arbitrate between these two views, Harris proposes an integration test. The point of the integration test is to assure that our account of practical rationality and the function of regulative norms that it provides can support the integrity of rational agents. Minimally then, the test will favor the account of practical rationality that best "integrates the various concerns of rational human agents in a way that preserves integrity" (32).While the above vastly simplifies Harris's rich treatment of this issue, it nonetheless allows us to see how Harris goes about arguing for the superiority of the Aristotelian view. For Harris maintains that the Aristotelian symmetrical model integrates regulative norms better than the Kantian model. To show why, Harris makes use of a number of examples to demonstrate that regulative norms function in a symmetrical fashion in regards to one another for the agent of integrity. For instance, to show that the norm of impartial respect is sometimes regulated by the norm of impartial sympathy, Harris gives an example of someone who breaks a lunch date in order to help a dog that is being mistreated. Likewise, Harris uses examples to argue that sometimes even partial norms, like that of parental concern, regulate the impartial norm of respect. Harris believes that these cases demonstrate that the regulative norms made use of in practical deliberation must function in a symmetrical fashion. Thus, Harris thinks we have good reason to reject the Kantian view "that the integrative function of practical reason is achieved by an impartial norm that is asymmetrical in its regulative function" (127).Though interesting and worthy of attention, I am not convinced that Harris makes use of the most plausible understanding of the Kantian model of practical rationality in his central argument. By focusing almost exclusively upon the idea of respect, Harris assumes that the best reading of the Kantian project will be founded primarily in the idea of impartial respect. However, if we adopt a procedural understanding of the Categorical Imperative, a plausible case could be made that a Kantian account of practical rationality can account for the examples that Harris makes use of just as well as the Aristotelian... (shrink)

Recent descendants of David Lewis, such as Stephen Torre, Dilip Ninan, and Dirk Kindermann have utilized multi-centered propositions, which are roughly sets of possible worlds centered on a sequence of individuals, to characterize the content of attitudes. In an attempt to explain counterfactual attitudes such as wishing and imagining, Ninan (2012, 2013) developed a more fine-grained characterization of multi-centered propositions than others in the multi-centered camp. While Ninan provides a systematic explanation of the nature of (...) de se attitudes (attitudes one expresses with first-person pronouns like ‘I’ or ‘me’), the nature of other types of indexical attitudes (attitudes one expresses with indexical terms like ‘you,’ ‘today,’ ‘now,’) is not explored. This paper does two things. First, it demonstrates how we can account for indexical attitudes within Ninan’s framework. This, however, has the consequence of generating propositions of limited accessibility of sorts, which in turn conflict with a received and simple model of linguistic communication. According to this simple model, successful communication consists of the transmission of mental content from speaker to hearer. Second, in light of this conflict, the paper proposes an adjustment to Ninan’s theory in order to avoid commitment to propositions of limited accessibility, and thus preserve the shareability of attitudinal content from speaker to hearer. (shrink)

David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self‐locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. This paper raises a problem for centered worlds and discusses the costs and benefits of different solutions. The present investigation into the nature of centered worlds helps to explicate potentially problematic implicit commitments of (...) the theories that employ them. In addition, this investigation reveals that the conception of centered worlds widely attributed to David Lewis is not only problematic, but in fact not his. (shrink)

Social robots as companions play an increasingly important role in our everyday life. However, reaching the full potential of social robots and the interaction between humans and robots requires permanent collection and processing of personal data of users, e.g. video and audio data for image and speech recognition. In order to foster user acceptance, trust and to address legal requirements as the General Data Protection Regulation of the EU, privacy needs to be integrated in the design process of social robots. (...) The Privacy by Design approach by Cavoukian indicates the relevance of a privacy-respecting development and outlines seven abstract principle.In this paper two methods as a hands-on guideline to fulfill the principles are presented and discussed in the content of the Privacy by Design approach. Privacy risks of a typical robot scenario are identified, analyzed and solutions are proposed on the basis of theseven types of privacyand theprivacy protection goals. (shrink)

In the pair of articles of which this is the first, I shall present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. All these problems and proposals concern the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue here is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their correctness (...) should be thought of as varying with some (more or less surprising) factor. In this, first, article, I shall discuss the general issue of relativism about representational content. I shall claim that there are legitimate ways of attributing contents that are absolute truth-bearers, and there are also equally legitimate ways of attributing relativistic representational contents. In the companion piece “Relativism 2: Semantic Content”, I look in more detail at the more specific question whether semantic contents (i.e. the contents assigned to linguistic utterances in the semantics of natural language) should be construed in an absolutist or a relativist way. (shrink)

Patient-Centered Care and Cultural Practices: Process and Criteria for Evaluating Adaptations of Norms and Standards in Health Care Institutions Content Type Journal Article Pages 327-339 DOI 10.1007/s10730-009-9115-8 Authors Matthew R. Hunt, McMaster University Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics Montreal Canada Journal HEC Forum Online ISSN 1572-8498 Print ISSN 0956-2737 Journal Volume Volume 21 Journal Issue Volume 21, Number 4.

This chapter contains sections titled: Preamble The case of proper names The difference principle The ‘within a world’ version of the argument using the difference principle Sentences containing “actual” and “actually” Demonstrative adjectives Natural kind terms A passing comment on centering Where to from here?

This phenomenological case study investigates how planning community-centered civics inquiries can prepare elementary pre-service teachers to better address inequities facing rural communities, including those located on Indigenous reservations. Specifically, the study addresses this research question: How does community-centered planning inform pre-service teacher readiness to support place-conscious and anti-colonial civics education within elementary contexts? Findings suggest that guided, community-centered planning leads to enhanced pre-service teacher confidence in preparing to facilitate equity-oriented elementary education, particularly as related to evolving understandings (...) of civics content competence, relational commitments, and responsibilities of rural teachers. (shrink)

Although the concept of corporate social performance (CSP) has become more clearly specified in recent years, an analysis of CSP from the perspective of one particular stakeholder group has been largely ignored in this research: employees. It is proposed that employees merit specific attention with regard to assessments of corporate social performance. In this paper, a model for evaluating and measuring CSP at the employee level is proposed, and implications for evaluating contemporary employment policies and practices are offered. An iterative (...) process for systematically including normative content in the CSP model across stakeholder groups is also offered. (shrink)

It has long been known that the popular account of egocentric thoughts developed by David Lewis is in conflict with a natural account of communication, according to which successful communication requires the transmission of a thought content from speaker to hearer. In this paper, I discuss a number of proposed attempts to reconcile these two accounts of egocentric thought and communication. Each of them postulates two kinds of mental content, where one is egocentric, and the other is transmitted (...) from speaker to hearer in communication. I argue that Ninan’s account, which involves multi-centered contents, and Kölbel’s and Moss’s accounts, which postulate centered and uncentered proxy contents, respectively, are unsatisfactory. Therefore, I propose a two-dimensionalist account, according to which egocentric thoughts are represented by primary intensions, while the thoughts shared by speaker and hearer in cases of successful communication are represented by secondary intensions. Finally, I argue that aside from being able to reconcile Lewis’s account of egocentric thoughts with the natural account of communication, two-dimensionalism also provides the means for modeling agreement and disagreement. (shrink)

Abstract:Although the concept of corporate social performance (CSP) has become more clearly specified in recent years, an analysis of CSP from the perspective of one particular stakeholder group has been largely ignored in this research: employees. It is proposed that employees merit specific attention with regard to assessments of corporate social performance. In this paper, a model for evaluating and measuring CSP at the employee level is proposed, and implications for evaluating contemporary employment policies and practices are offered. An iterative (...) process for systematically including normative content in the CSP model across stakeholder groups is also offered. (shrink)

Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written (...) on the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content. (shrink)

I argue that a recent variation on the Sleeping Beauty case due to Titelbaum [2012a] puts significant pressure on Lewis's theory of doxastic content—the theory of content that Titelbaum and others presuppose. In particular, that theory cannot make sense of the rational constraints on credences imposed by the Principal Principle, as ordinarily understood. I then argue more generally that any theory on which contents of credences are sets of centered worlds cannot adequately represent all of the rational (...) constraints on credences. (shrink)

In this essay, I specify types of representational content that can be attributed to Kant’s account of representation. The more specific aim is to examine which of these types of content can be regarded as possible without the application of concepts. In order to answer the question, I proceed as follows. First, I show how intuition (in Kant’s sense) can be seen as providing indexical content independently of empirical concepts. Second, I show in what sense the generation (...) of spatial content can be regarded as non-categorial. A key distinction is that a perceptual examination of an object can be understood as thoroughly sensible and particular, whereas a conceptual determination always grasps the object via its generalisable features. Third, I propose that the faculties of sensibility and understanding are not only separable in principle, but that their contributions remain in a certain sense separate in actual cognition as well. This is to say that a conceptual determination of an object does not entail that the object ceases to be non-conceptually available to the perceiver, which further suggests the autonomy of sensibility and its perceptual content. Finally, I raise difficulties in attributing non-conceptual representational content to Kant’s judgment-centered stance on representation and experience, only to emphasise how these difficulties easily lead to a misappreciation of Kant’s fundamental distinction between sensibility and understanding and their unique cognitive contributions. (shrink)

David’s epistemic understanding of two-dimensional semantics has these two features. First, although he considers at least two construals of epistemically possible worlds, on one of them they are centered metaphysically possible worlds. Second, David intends epistemic two-dimensional semantics to yield a theory of propositional-attitude content, as well as having application to the semantics of natural language expressions. These two features come together in David’s “The Components of Content,” where he deploys the apparatus of epistemic two-dimensional semantics to (...) provide an account of propositional-attitude content, and where, for reasons of simplicity and familiarity, epistemically possible worlds are taken to be centered metaphysically possible worlds. My talk is about this account of content. (shrink)

The view that dominates the literature on intentional attitudes holds that beliefs and desires both have propositional content. A commitment to what I call “content uniformity” underlies this view. According to content uniformity, beliefs and desires are but different psychological modes having a uniform kind of content. Prima facie, the modes don’t place any constraint on the kinds of content the attitude can have. I challenge this consensus by pointing out an asymmetry between belief contents (...) and desire contents which shows content uniformity to be mistaken. I do this by revisiting the arguments of Richard (Philosophical Studies, 39(1): 1–13, 1981), and show that arguments which purport to show the temporal specificity of belief contents yield the opposite results for desire contents. I defend this preliminary conclusion from various strategies to neutralize the asymmetry claim. My defense provides occasions to respond to objections by Brogaard (2012) and Recanati (2007) to the Richard argument, and to get clearer on the role of temporal adjuncts in desire ascriptions. Finally, I consider whether the construal of attitude content as centered propositions (as in Lewis Philosophical Review, 88(4): 513–543, 1979) can be invoked to vindicate content uniformity. My conclusion is that while the framework itself doesn’t vindicate content uniformity, it could, but only if it availed itself of a further, substantive thesis about desire, which itself is in need of defense. (shrink)

This paper examines Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis about the two visual streams and raises the questions of whether properties in egocentric space (commonly associated with the vision-for-action, or "dorsal," stream) can be part of the phenomenal content of perceptual experience, or only properties in allocentric space (commonly associated with the vision-for-perception, or "ventral," stream) can play this role, and how (if at all) properties in egocentric space differ from properties in allocentric space. These questions are reminiscent of issues raised (...) by Christopher Peacocke's "equal-sized trees" case: if you are looking at equal-sized trees on the side of a road, the trees will phenomenally look to you to be equally tall. But it is also true that a tree will take up more of the space in your visual field the closer it is to you. So, the equal-sized trees will also phenomenally look to you to have different heights. Your (visual) perceptual experience is not illusory. That is, the trees veridically look to you to have the same height, and they also veridically look to you to have different heights. Call the sort of issue raised here the "problem of dual looks." I provide a solution to the problem of dual looks that helps shed light on whether properties in egocentric space can be part of the phenomenal content of perceptual experience, and how (if at all) properties in egocentric space differ from properties in allocentric space. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 44, no. 2. © 2018 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 363 Ashley Glassburn Falzetti What Makes an Interdisciplinary Feminist Scholar? Preparing for the Unknown in a Skill-centered Curriculum I first read the 1998 special issue of Feminist Studies “Disciplining Feminism? The Future of Women’s Studies” in a monthly reading group of scholars from across the globe working on PhDs in women’s, gender, feminist, and/or queer studies (...) (WGFQS).1 We began meeting informally in the halls of the National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) annual conference, discussing how our training compared and what sort of support was out there for scholars dissertating in WGFQS.2 What surprised us most while we re/read these articles was that the concerns about the field had not changed much in the twelve years that had passed since their original publication. Now that twenty years have passed, the concerns remain even though some of the controversies are settled. Despite claims about the impossibility of the women’s studies PhD, doctoral programs have flourished. In their introduction to the 1998 special issue, Nancy Hewitt and 1. I use WGFQS PhDs to refer to people who have earned a PhD from an interdisciplinary WGFQS doctoral program. The majority of WGFQS doctoral programs were founded on the ideals of interdisciplinarity. Some doctoral programs retained a joint-degree model that honors the multi-disciplinary origins of the field by requiring a major in a disciplinary field, such as English, history, psychology, or law. 2. The most active participants of this group included Sonja Thomas (who coordinated the discussions), Jennifer Musto, Stephanie Clare, Evangeline Heiliger, and Laura Foster. 364 Ashley Glassburn Falzetti Susan S. Lanser focus on the relationship between disciplinary formations and the possibility of formal preparation to conduct interdisciplinary research.3 As graduate programs were expanding, the role of methods in curriculum centered concerns over the efficacy of interdisciplinary training. Now that a critical mass of PhDs is trained in interdisciplinary WGFQS, a new understanding of the role of methods is emerging. Interdisciplinary feminist questions require scholars to employ new research skills regularly throughout their careers, thus preparing junior scholars to ask and answer questions well is more efficient than studying a range of methods. The Problem of Methods Throughout the early literature on WGFQS, there is slippage between discussing interdisciplinary methods and feminist methodology.4 Methods refer to the techniques researchers use to gather data, what Sally Kitch and Mary Margaret Fonow define in their study of WGFQS dissertations as “a technique for gathering evidence.”5 Feminist methodologies involve the ethical, political, and epistemological concerns that mark research as a distinctively feminist approach to inquiry. Slipping between discussions of feminist methodologies (on the dynamics of power, representation, and knowledge production) and disciplinary methods (how researchers gather data) has contributed to the sticky association of feminist interdisciplinarity as a “problem of methods.” Vivian May, one of the earliest WGFQS PhDs and former NWSA president, argues that the continued attachment to such disciplinary parameters “defused that potential” of interdisciplinarity as a means of transforming feminist modes of knowledge production.6 Arguments that feminist interdisciplinarity could be a more just or a more contextually objective 3. Nancy Hewitt and Susan S. Lanser, “Preface,” Feminist Studies 24, no. 2, special issue, “Disciplining Feminism? The Future of Women’s Studies” (Summer 1998): 236. 4. In addition to the 1998 special issue of Feminist Studies, see NWSA Journal 12, no. 2 (Summer 2000) and response essays across feminist studies journals between 2000 and 2003. 5. Sally L. Kitch and Mary Margaret Fonow, “Analyzing Women’s Studies Dissertations: Methodologies, Epistemologies, and Field Formation,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 38, no. 1 (Autumn 2012): 99–126. 6. Vivian May, “Disciplinary Desires and Undisciplined Daughters,” NWSA Journal 14, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 144. Ashley Glassburn Falzetti 365 approach to inquiry fueled the desire to build WGFQS PhD programs; however, the concern that interdisciplinarity is always already undisciplined led many departments to rely on disciplinary methods training when designing curriculum. The focus on methods as a means to interdisciplinarity assumes that traditional disciplines are best suited to intellectual inquiry or at least that WGFQS scholars need a disciplinary rationale for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Managing the Transition from Patient-Centered Care to ProtocolDavid SlakterI learned that I would need a kidney transplant in the summer of 2015. This was not a complete surprise to me, as I had been subjected to a number of tests and invasive procedures to investigate nephritis since I was a child. I had heard similar stories of clinicians performing repeated tests on my father for similar reasons (...) without any conclusions. Following my recommendation for transplant and consultation with genomics specialists, the cause of my kidney failure was determined to be Alport syndrome. What made Alport syndrome so difficult to diagnose in my case was that the associated mutation is a rare, autosomal-dominant one that has only recently been associated with the condition.After reviewing the data on survival rates for transitioning to dialysis versus a transplant, my family and I then considered the success rates for living versus cadaver donors, and the success rates at various transplant centers. The current data favor the long-term outcomes of transplant over dialysis and living over cadaver donors. Since we had decided to focus on searching for a live donor, my nephrologist recommended contacting Renewal, an organization that specializes in connecting those in need of a kidney transplant with live donors and providing support for donors to make the donation process less burdensome.On Renewal’s recommendation, my family and friends reached out across their social networks to search for potential donors. Many of those tested for compatibility were eliminated on basic matching criteria, others due to previously undiagnosed medical problems. Finally, the wife of a childhood friend came forward as an eligible donor and was also an incredibly close match on the antigens tested for kidney transplants.Having a living donor who was also a friend made the transplant experience somewhat less intimidating than it might have been. It meant the transformation of an existing relationship with someone already close to me, with fewer open questions about what may have motivated them to be so generous than if the donor had been someone I did not know. It also meant our families could be together in the waiting room, and that we shared in each other’s recoveries.Life post-transplant has been a significant improvement from what it was like immediately beforehand. Before my transplant, I regularly weighed food and consulted nutrition charts to gauge how much potassium I was consuming. To prevent too much potassium from building up in my bloodstream, I had to take sodium polystyrene [End Page 111] regularly. As one might guess from the name, it tastes much like burnt Styrofoam, and I could only ingest it with copious amounts of fruit-flavored syrup (strawberry covered up the awful flavor the best). There are other potassium binders on the market now, so fewer people with kidney failure will likely need to engage in such gustatory experimentation.I was also able to engage in more activities than what was possible even years before my transplant. I had long experienced difficulty with aerobic exercises, but assumed the reason was merely being out of shape. Though I have always walked regularly, even the one-mile walk from my office to my apartment had become a chore by the end. Within a few months after my transplant, I was riding a bicycle all over NYC, from Harlem to Brooklyn and back regularly, and hiking trails in nearby state parks. I began sessions with a personal trainer and attained a level of fitness I had not reached since I played soccer as a child.The transition from personalized care to one more driven by protocol has been a surprising and challenging aspect of the transplant process. While my previous experience with medical treatment has been individual meetings with physicians, my post-transplant care is managed by a team of nephrologists and other specialists in transplant care. My initial transplant nephrologist was automatically assigned to me. Because the standard of care for transplant patients is often driven by protocol, my assigned nephrologist recommended a biopsy on my transplanted kidney due to results in my recent lab tests. When pressed on the necessity of a biopsy in my case versus... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Third Way: Social Disability and Person-Centered AssessmentChristopher Heginbotham (bio)Keywordsimpaired functioning, psychopathic, personality disorder, neurological damage, psychotherapyJohn Sadler’s Fascinating Paper identifies a significant problem with existing diagnostic classifications. But in doing so he raises further unresolved philosophical, nosological, and practical problems. Although he is undoubtedly right in showing that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)-IV (and International Classification of Diseases [ICD]-10) do not provide (...) an adequate categorization, he is I believe wrong to use the term “vice” to describe the cluster of wrongful acts.“Vice” conjures up images of Miami, drugbusting police, prostitution, and other activities that are characterized by one thing—by and large, these are actions undertaken knowingly, usually for financial gain. These are not the actions of people with impaired mental functioning as a result of mental disorder or neurological damage. It is of course true that human trafficking and enforced prostitution may mean women forced into prostitution against their will, but rarely are these women considered mentally disordered solely as a result of their prostitution. Yet it is capacitated, premeditated wrongdoing that is normally considered to be “vice.”By contrast, all the cases cited in the paper describe conditions that are almost certainly the result of some form of impaired functioning, either owing to early childhood experiences (Case A), familial culture and conditioning (Case B), or neurological damage (Case C). The common thread in these cases is impaired capacity—in Case A this could be described as due to psychopathic or personality disorder (I distinguish the two separately rather than describe the phenomenon as “psychopathic personality disorder”) as a result of multiple childhood traumas. Their presentation is not unexpected given the person’s history and, although the condition may have become refractory, it might be amenable to treatment with psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy, given sufficient time and a nurturing environment (Bateman and Fonagy 2006, 2008; Cordess and Cox 1996; Levy 2008).The description of Case B leaves a lot of room for doubt and uncertainties. Did Ms A really try to smother her child? She confessed to one occasion, but was this under duress? Did she feel that if she agreed she would be treated more leniently? And if she was guilty, does it suggest “vice,” a premeditated act, or is there another explanation—attention [End Page 31] seeking because of low self-esteem or a personality disorder as a result of some abuse that had not been identified? Almost certainly from the description given this would not count, for me at any rate, as vice. Her actions may be odd, bizarre, or dangerous, but did they demonstrate a mens rea? Was Ms A making adequate evaluative judgments of her situation and that of her child? We know from clinical work with very damaged women in forensic mental health services that early physical, emotional, or sexual abuse leads in turn to women harming both themselves and their children (Bland et al. 1999; Cordess and Cox 1996; see also for example, Jeffcote and Watson 2004). Or perhaps, speculatively, her condition was Munchausen’s by proxy?Case C is horrendous but does not lend itself readily to the forms of psychiatric classification available. Indeed there is no easy way to describe such actions other than those of someone who is either incapable of understanding the nature and consequence of the actions that he has undertaken, or is simply “mad” in a folk sense. Prima facie this seems to be the result of permanent and little understood neurological damage. However, this case comes closest to the evil that is implied in the term “vice”; and might be diagnosed similarly to a celebrated English murderer, that of Peter Sutcliffe, the so-called Yorkshire Ripper. Sutcliffe was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, although the jury at his trial found that he was fit to plead, and he was initially sent to prison, where he deteriorated. He is now, and has for some time, been in Broadmoor high secure hospital.The result of these comments is that I agree fully with John Sadler’s conclusions, but for rather different reasons. DSM-IV categories try and fail to offer a symptomatology for... (shrink)

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a (...) proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person?that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person?it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm. (shrink)

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a (...) proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm. (shrink)

When you look at a circular plate at an angle, it looks circular. But there also is a certain sense in which its look can be described as oval. When you move, the plate’s look changes with your perspective on it—nevertheless, it continues to look circular. This chapter investigates whether these “constancy in variation” phenomena can be explained in terms of the representational content of visual experience, and whether constancy in variation provides special, phenomenological, reasons to construe experience as (...) having centered contents. Concentrating on shape, it argues that due to warring phenomenological demands, all views construing constancy in variation as representation of both objective and perspectival properties or features have limited explanatory powers, and that centering does not provide any advantage. By contrast, adopting the non-standard intentionalism called phenomenal intentionalism, we get rather natural explanations of the phenomenology of constancy in variation. (shrink)

Aesthetic perception is one of the most interesting topics for philosophers and scientists who investigate how it influences our interactions with objects and states of affairs. Over the last few years, several studies have attempted to determine “how aesthetics is represented in an object,” and how a specific feature of an object could evoke the respective feelings during perception. Despite the vast number of approaches and models, we believe that these explanations do not resolve the problem concerning the conditions under (...) which aesthetic perception occurs, and what constitutes the content of these perceptions. Adopting a naturalistic perspective, we here view aesthetic perception as a normative process that enables agents to enhance their interactions with physical and socio-cultural environments. Considering perception as an anticipatory and preparatory process of detection and evaluation of indications of potential interactions, we argue that the minimal content of aesthetic perception is an emotionally valued indication of interaction potentiality. Aesthetic perception allows an agent to normatively anticipate interaction potentialities, thus increasing sense making and reducing the uncertainty of interaction. This conception of aesthetic perception is compatible with contemporary evidence from neuroscience, experimental aesthetics, and interaction design. The proposed model overcomes several problems of transcendental, art-centered, and objective aesthetics as it offers an alternative to the idea of aesthetic objects that carry inherent values by explaining “the aesthetic” as emergent in perception within a context of uncertain interaction. (shrink)

Following the global financial crisis, banks have become more regulated to advance ethical sales cultures throughout the sector. Based on case studies of three retail banks, we find that they construct the ‘appropriate advisor’ in different ways. Inspired by Bakhtin’s work on ethics, we propose a vocabulary of relational ethics centered on the ‘answerable self.’ We argue that this vocabulary is apt for studying and discussing how organizations advance ethical sales cultures in ways that instead of encouraging value congruence (...) and alignment allow for ethical openness. In such cultures, employees—as moral agents—are morally questioning, critically self-reflexive, and answerable for their own actions toward others in their social relationships. Our paper makes three theoretical contributions, namely, problematizing the idea of cultural alignment and value congruence, demonstrating that identity regulation can both comprise and support the ‘answerable self,’ and advancing our understanding of the interdependence of ethical openness and ethical closure in fostering ethical sales cultures. (shrink)

The essay approaches the relationship between education, didactic content and transamazonic geography. Objective to question the sharing of the sensitive present in the current format of geocartographic contents in the textbooks, as well as to express, in an embryonic state, the possibility of another sharing, centered in the emerging geography of the places on the verge of the Transamazonica Paraense, especially students and teachers in vicinal , Valuing localized expressions as paths of educational geocartography. Methodologically, the text is (...) part of the action-research movement inspired by the existential phenomenological atmosphere. I conclude as a suggestion of deepening that: the transamazonic between-places, materialized in the vicinities, is ignored as a space for the creative existence of other regional narratives; Generalizing geographical fictions must be confronted with other fictions, in view of the differentiation and creation of new positions and interpretability criteria of the Amazônia; The corporal engagement and the experiences in the field require description, interpretation and understanding, already begun, but not yet affirmed in terms of the production of dialogical content with what already circulates via didactic books; It is central to focus the subjectivity and corporeality of individuals / collectives as creative powers of the space culture, not just recipients of that culture. (shrink)

In a recent article in Political Theory, entitled “Human Rights, Freedom, and Political Authority,” Laura Valentini proposes a “freedom-centered” account of human rights. On this account, “human rights are derived from the universal right to freedom, namely each person’s innate right to a sphere of agency within which to pursue her ends and goals without being subject to the will of others”. In spite of its prima facie appeal, I argue that Valentini’s theory does not do a good job (...) at explaining some of our settled convictions about the content of human rights and that she offers an implausibly restrictive view of our reasons for respecting human rights. I conclude by very briefly presenting the main elements of a broader perfectionist and dignitarian account of human rights, which seems more consistent with our settled convictions on these matters. (shrink)

The study aims at exploring the salience and functions of media and television contents in children’s lives by focusing on their uses as a discursive resource in naturally occurring peer talk. We observed and recorded Israeli children talk in everyday, natural settings in two separate studies, in 1999–2002 and in 2012–2013. Detailed discourse analysis of television-based interactions from an ethnographic, child-centered perspective reveals the enduring centrality of television as an enjoyable, available, and shared cultural resource with valuable social, cognitive, (...) and discursive affordances: it is frequently mentioned during everyday adult-free interactions; utilized as the basis for drawing and negotiating boundaries and hierarchies within the peer community; and facilitates experiencing a variety of discursive literacy skills, ranging between practicing adherence to original texts and creativity and distancing from them. These findings provide further evidence for the mediatization of everyday life, and may have educational implications, which are discussed. (shrink)

Each technology—and also biotechnology—relates to and is developed within a certain context. Besides a technical dimension (the techniques) biotechnology also contains asocial dimension, such as the social relations that reflect themselves in the technology-development, and the aims for which the technology is used.The Center for Agriculture and Biotechnology (CAB), the research department of the Western Farming and Horticultural Organization, is attempting to relate the socio-economic contents of biotechnological developments more to the interests of farmers and sustainable farming styles.

The paper argues that the objects of belief should not be conceived as sets of possible worlds or propositions of set of centered possible worlds or egocentric propositions (this is the propositional conception), but rather as sets of pairs consisting of a centered world and a sequence of objects (this is the intentional conception of the objects of belief). The paper explains the deep significance of this thesis for the framework of two-dimensional semantics, indeed for any framework trying (...) to adequately relate semantics and epistemology (which is here construed as what I call the Congruence Principle). I give three arguments for this thesis, two preliminary indecisive ones by way of examples, and third theoretical one alluding to a deep principle of philosophical psychology (which I call the Invariance Principle). This paper is an improved and up-dated version of my paper No. 25. It will appear in Causation, Coherence, and Concepts. A Collection of Essays of mine. (shrink)