Star Trek is a series of philosophical thought experiments that challenges viewers to arrive at consistent positions about some of life's toughest questions. It isn't an exaggeration to say that, with very few exceptions, Star Trek has done more to teach audiences about the nuances of reality, science, morality, and friendship than any other show in the history of television. Casuistry is a method of analysis that makes use of case studies, either real or fictional; in order to examine (...) what should happen in similar real‐life situations. The combination of science and fiction creates three virtues that Star Trek's creative team pushes to their boundaries in order to constantly engage viewers to be active watchers and thinkers. This chapter considers two prime examples of Star Trek's use of casuistry to make tangible contributions to important philosophical discussions. (shrink)

This article elaborates on the relation between ethical casuistry and common law reasoning. Despite the frequent talk of casuistry as common law morality, remarks on this issue largely remain at the purely metaphorical level. The article outlines and scrutinizes Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin’s version of casuistry and its basic elements. Drawing lessons for casuistry from common law reasoning, it is argued that one generally has to be faithful to ethical paradigms. There are, however, limitations for (...) the binding force of paradigms. The most important limitations—the possibilities of overruling and distinguishing paradigm norms—are similar in common law and in casuistry, or so it is argued. These limitations explain why casuistry is not necessarily overly conservative and conventional, which is one line of criticism to which casuists can now better respond. Another line of criticism has it that the very reasoning from case to case is extremely unclear in casuistry. I suggest a certain model of analogical reasoning to address this critique. All my suggestions to understand and to enhance casuistry make use of common law reasoning whilst remaining faithful to Jonsen and Toulmin’s main ideas and commitments. Further developed along these lines, casuistry can appropriately be called “common law morality.”. (shrink)

Did the Gulf War defend moral principle or Western oil interests? Is violent pornography an act of free speech or an act of violence against women? In _Casuistry and Modern Ethics_, Richard B. Miller sheds new light on the potential of casuistry—case-based reasoning—for resolving these and other questions of conscience raised by the practical quandaries of modern life. Rejecting the packaging of moral experience within simple descriptions and inflexible principles, Miller argues instead for identifying and making sense of the (...) ethically salient features of individual cases. Because this practical approach must cope with a diverse array of experiences, Miller draws on a wide variety of diagnostic tools from such fields as philosophy of science, legal reasoning, theology, literary theory, hermeneutics, and moral philosophy. Opening new avenues for practical reasoning, Miller's interdisciplinary work will challenge scholars who are interested in the intersections of ethics and political philosophy, cultural criticism, and debates about method in religion and morality. (shrink)

At the heart of the uniqueness debate is the possibility that the computer revolution may demand more in the way of ethical analysis than our traditional (that is, modern) ethical edification has prepared us for. In short, it may present new and unique problems and therefore demand new and unique solutions. In this article I argue that the solution is in fact an old and not‐so‐unique one: casuistry. Appealing to Jonsen and Toulmin's analysis of casuistry (1988), I argue (...) that a casuistic methodology is a more accurate description of the moral reasoning used by contemporary computer ethicists than are other accounts. In addition, I argue that the strengths that enabled casuistry to deal successfully with radical social, economic, and religious changes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries render casuistry well suited to the task of dealing with radically new situations like those found in twentieth‐ and twenty‐first‐century computer technology. Before concluding, I briefly explore Pascal's fatal critique of casuistry and its relevance for contemporary computer ethics. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Casuistry is a traditional method of interpreting and resolving moral problems. It focuses on the circumstances of particular cases rather than on the application of ethical theories and principles. After a brief history of casuistry, the method is explained and its relation to theory and principles is discussed.

Collection of cases with decisions attributed to Cardinal William Allen and Robert Persons, S.J. -- Collection of cases discussed at the English College, Douai (which was at Rheims from 1578 to 1593).

(2011). Casuistry: Case-based Reasoning for the Ethical Journalist. Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Vol. 26, Media Accountability Part Two, pp. 88-92. doi: 10.1080/08900523.2011.532386.

The English cases -- Cases concerning marriage -- Cases concerning ecclesiastical fasts -- Appendix: List of faculties.

In a Christian context casuistry is a necessity because it provides the means by which we learn to check our particular telling of the story of God with the way our community tells it.

This essay focuses on how casuistry can become a useful technique of practical reasoning for the clinical ethicist or ethics consultant. Casuistry is defined, its relationship to rhetorical reasoning and its interpretation of cases, by employing three terms that, while they are not employed by the classical rhetoricians and casuists, conform, in a general way, to the features of their work. Those terms are (1) morphology, (2) taxonomy, (3) kinetics. The morphology of a case reveals the invariant structure (...) of the particular case whatever its contingent features, and also the invariant forms of argument relevant to any case of the same sort: these invariant features can be called topics. Taxonomy situates the instant case in a series of similar cases, allowing the similarities and differences between an instant case and a paradigm case to dictate the moral judgment about the instant case. This judgment is based, not merely on application of an ethical theory or principle, but upon the way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of the case itself and in comparison with other cases. Kinetics is an understanding of the way in which one case imparts a kind of moral movement to other cases, that is, different and sometimes unprecedented circumstances may move certain marginal or exceptional cases to the level of paradigm cases. In conclusion, casuistry is the exercise of prudential or practical reasoning in recognition of the relationship between maxims, circumstances and topics, as well as the relationship of paradigms to analogous cases. (shrink)

Casuistry and principlism are two of the leading contenders to be considered the methodology of bioethics. These methods may be incommensurable since the former emphasizes the examination of cases while the latter focuses on moral principles. Conversely, since both analyze cases in terms of mid-level principles, there is hope that these methods may be reconcilable or complementary. I analyze the role of principles in each and thereby show that these theories are virtually identical when interpreted in a certain light. (...) That is, if the gaps in each method are filled by a concept of judgment or Aristotelian practical wisdom, these methods converge. (shrink)

Brings together three important processes for business ethics: casuistry, virtue ethics, and the business case method. In doing so, it considers the overlap and synergy of casuistry and virtue ethics, the similarities and differences of casuistry and the business case method, and the relationships between emerging and well-established cases. The goal of the book is twofold: to provide a distinctly practical method for moral decision-making within the context of business and to illustrate how contemporary vexing issues are (...) similar to those of the past and how they might be resolved satisfactorily. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the application questions of a case study method known as casuistry. In its long tradition, it focuses on an influential variant of the early modern period and reconstructs its functionality. In the course of reading recent receptions, it is noted that some studies speak of a “casuistic revival” in moral case deliberation in health care. As a result of this revival, casuistry has been modified in such a way that it guides case discussions (...) in practice with the help of a tripartite methodology. However, as it turns out, casuistry, a case comparison method of ethical judgement based on reasoning logic, is less suitable for moral case deliberations in direct patient care. This stems from the fact that casuistry is a detailed procedure of ethical learning beneficial to institutionalized ethics committees or similar forms of ethics consultation in health care. (shrink)

This article argues for the compatibility of casuistry and the business case method. It describes the salient features of casuistryand the case method, shows how the two methods are similar yet different, and suggests how elements of casuistry might benefit theuse of the case method in management education. Toward these ends, it shows how casuistry and the case method are both inductive and practical methods of reasoning focussed on single settings and real-life situations and how both methods (...) stress that real-life decision making is not the exclusive domain of experts. It also shows how casuistry and the case method are not identical processes but have different purposes and emphasize order and problem-resolution differently. In the end, Casuistry and the Business Case Method suggests that, despite their differences, casuistry and the case method might be brought together to benefit business management and the field of business ethics. (shrink)

For a number of reasons, casuistry has come into vogue in medical ethics. Despite the frequency with which it is avowed, the application of casuistry to issues in medical ethics has been given virtually no systematic defense in the ethics literature. That may be for good reason, since a close examination reveals that casuistry delivers much less than its advocates suppose, and that it shares some of the same weaknesses as the principle-based methods it would hope to (...) supplant. (shrink)

For the last century, moral philosophy has stressed theory for the analysis of moral argument and concepts. In the last decade, interest in the ethical issues of health care has stimulated attention to cases and particular instances. This has revealed the gap between ethical theory and practice. This article reviews the history and method of casuistry which for many centuries provided an approach to practical ethics. Its strengths and weaknesses are noted and its potential for contemporary use explored.

This article begins by showing how recent controversies over the widespread promotion of artificially gene-altered foods are rooted in opposing ethical and ideological worldviews. It then explains how these contrasting worldviews have led to a practical, ethical, and ideological standoff and, finally, suggests the combined use of casuistry and virtue ethics as a way for both sides to move ahead on this pressing issue.

Linking abstract principles and concrete cases is not always easy. Beginning deductively with ethical theory requires an a priori choice of ethical principles which, when applied, may not take account of the complexity of real problems. But beginning with cases can result in a situationalism in which the normative role of ethical principles is slighted. Casuistry, a case-centered methodology, offers one way to bridge this gap. Casuistry's bottom-up strategy develops policy guidelines out of case analysis, building a middle (...) ground between practice and principle. This article identifies the key features of casuistry and its link to ethical theory. The development of a code of ethics and the use of anonymous sources at a daily newspaper test casuistry's relevance for journalism ethics. (shrink)

In this engaging study, the authors put casuistry into its historical context, tracing the origin of moral reasoning in antiquity, its peak during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and its subsequent fall into disrepute from the mid-seventeenth century.

At the heart of the uniqueness debate is the possibility that the computer revolution may demand more in the way of ethical analysis than our traditional (that is, modern) ethical edification has prepared us for. In short, it may present new and unique problems and therefore demand new and unique solutions. In this article I argue that the solution is in fact an old and not‐so‐unique one: casuistry. Appealing to Jonsen and Toulmin's analysis of casuistry (1988), I argue (...) that a casuistic methodology is a more accurate description of the moral reasoning used by contemporary computer ethicists than are other accounts. In addition, I argue that the strengths that enabled casuistry to deal successfully with radical social, economic, and religious changes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries render casuistry well suited to the task of dealing with radically new situations like those found in twentieth‐ and twenty‐first‐century computer technology. Before concluding, I briefly explore Pascal's fatal critique of casuistry and its relevance for contemporary computer ethics. (shrink)

Both the function of one’s conscience, as Thomas Aquinas understands it, and the work of casuistry in general involve deliberating about which universal moral principles are applicable in particular cases. Thus, understanding how conscience can function better also indicates how casuistry might be done better – both on Thomistic terms, at least. I claim that, given Aquinas’ descriptions of certain parts of prudence and the role of moral virtue in practical knowledge, understanding particular cases more as narratives, or (...) parts of narratives, likely will result, all else being equal, in more accurate moral judgments of particular cases. This is especially important in two kinds of cases: first, cases in which Aquinas recognizes universal moral principles do not specify the means by which they are to be followed; second, cases in which the type-identity of an action – and thus the norms applicable to it – can be mistaken. (shrink)

Since the publication of the first edition of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics there has been much debate about what a proper method in medical ethics should look like. The main rival for Beauchamp and Childress’s account, principlism, has consistently been casuistry, an account that recommends argument by analogy from paradigm cases. Admirably, Beauchamp and Childress have modified their own view in successive editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics in order to address the concerns proponents (...) of casuistry and others have had about principlism. Given these adjustments to their view, some have claimed that principlism and casuistry no longer count as distinct methods. Even so, many still consider these two conceptions of bioethical methodologies as rivals. Both accounts of the relationship between casuistry and principlism are wrong. These two conceptions of methodology in biomedical ethics are significantly different, but the differences are not the ones pointed out by those who still claim that they are distinct positions. In this article, I explain where the real similarities and differences lie between these two views. (shrink)

Reproductive counseling includes counseling of prospective parents by obstetricians, clinical geneticists, and genetic counselors regarding, for example, the use of assisted reproductive technologies, prenatal testing, and preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Two different views on wisdom and the goal of reproductive counseling are analyzed. According to the first view, the goal of reproductive counseling is to help prospective parents reach a wise decision. A specific course of action is recommended by the counselor in contrast to other possible alternatives. According to the second (...) view, the goal of reproductive counseling is not to help prospective parents reach a wise decision but to help them reach their own decision wisely. It is the prospective parents who should make the decision, and it is their value commitments that should be decisive. It is argued that the second approach is to be preferred to the first. It combines respect for autonomy with a recognition of the need for assistance in decision-making. Both the first and second views relate the goal of reproductive counseling to wisdom. A problem is, however, what wisdom more precisely means — there are many different views. A casuistic view of wisdom is investigated. This view roughly defines wisdom as practical prudence in dealing with particular cases. What characterizes a casuistic decision-making method is elaborated in more detail. Applied to the second view, a casuistic view of wisdom implies that the counselor should encourage prospective parents to take into consideration the nature of the particular problem at hand, the context of the problem, their own individual identities, their personal value commitments, and various alternative perspectives, values and arguments. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to review the recent popularity of casuistry as a model of moral inquiry. I argue that proponents of casuistry do not endorse the particularist epistemology that seems to be implied by their position, and that this is why casuistry does not seem to present something really new in comparison to 'top-down' generalist approaches. I contend that casuistry should develop itself as a (moderately) particularist position and that the challenge for the (...) defender of casuistry is to come up with ideas that strengthen the ('intuitionist') model of rationality that underlies most forms of particularism. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning. By Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin.

Communitarian critics have derided case-based reasoning for ignoring the need to arrive at a shared hierarchy of goods prior to case.

In this engaging study, the authors put casuistry into its historical context, tracing the origin of moral reasoning in antiquity, its peak during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and its subsequent fall into disrepute from the mid-seventeenth century.

Casuistic methods of reasoning in medical ethics have been criticized by a number of authors. At least five main objections to casuistry have been put forward: (1) it requires a uniformity of views that is not present in contemporary pluralistic society; (2) it cannot achieve consensus on controversial issues; (3) it is unable to examine critically intuitions about cases; (4) it yields different conclusions about cases when alternative paradigms are chosen; and (5) it cannot articulate the grounds of its (...) conclusions. Two main versions of casuistry have been put forward, and the responses to these objections depend in part on which version one is defending. Jonsen has advocated a version modeled on the approach to casuistry used by moral theologians in the 15th and 16th century, involving comparison of the case at hand with a single paradigm and a lineup of cases. The present author has advocated another version, drawn from experience with cases in clinical ethics, which involves comparing the case at hand with two or more paradigms. Four of the five objections are unsuccessful when directed against Jonsen'sapproach, and all of them are unsuccessful when directed against the approach involving comparison with two or more paradigms. (shrink)

The thought and work of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) is widely acknowledged as the culmination point of the contribution of the theologians and jurists of the so-called School of Salamanca to the development of modern Western law. This collection of studies on the legal work of Suárez explores some of his major forays into the law. Both his theoretical system-building as well as his interventions in practical questions are covered. Next to discussions on the nature of law and its (...) different categorisations, they extend to various subbranches of the law including family law, property law, the law of obligations, criminal law and international law. Contributors are: Dominique Bauer, Daniel Schwartz, João Manuel Azevedo Alexandrino Fernandes, Lisa Brunori, Wim Decock, Bart Wauters, Gaëlle Demelemestre, and Jean-Paul Coujou. (shrink)

The body of this paper is devoted to tracing out some aspects of the development of the idea of conscience in the Church of England in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Surely, it may seem, a subject of limited interest to the readers of this journal! Yet I hope they will find otherwise. I chose to describe this phase of the history of conscience in the West because it illustrates a decisive shift in ideas about conscience which has (...) occurred in many Western cultures besides England's: the belief that the individual ought in many cases to seek the aid of others in forming his moral judgments gives way to the belief that he ought to be self‐reliant in such matters. A knowledge of this shift can advance the philosophical understanding of the idea of conscience and the work to be done in the comparative study of conscience ‘East‘and ‘West.'. (shrink)

The Holy Scriptures can be considered a specific kind of normative texts, whose use to assess practical moral cases requires interpretation. In the field of ethics, this interpretative problem results in the necessity of bridging the gap between the normative source – moral precepts – and the specific cases. In the history of the Church, this problem was the core of the so-called casuistry, namely the decision-making practice consisting in applying the Commandments and other principles of the Holy Scriptures (...) to specific cases or moral problems. By taking into account the sin of lying, this paper argues that casuistic texts reveal an extremely sophisticated interpretative method, grounded on “pragmatic” contextual and communicative considerations and argumentative structures that resemble the ones used in legal interpretation. These works show how the underspecified biblical text expressing an abstract norm was enriched pragmatically by completing it and modulating its meaning so that it could be used to draw a conclusion in a specific context on a specific case. The mutual interdependence between biblical interpretation, pragmatics, and argumentation sheds light on a much broader phenomenon, namely the pragmatic nature of argumentation. (shrink)

This paper deals primarily with theDoctrine of Method(DM) of Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of theDM(1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is aDMnecessary at all (2.1)? How does theDMrelate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for (...) latitude. The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to theDM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties. (shrink)

This examination of a fundamental but often neglected aspect of the intellectual history of early modern Europe brings together philosophers, historians and political theorists from Great Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, France and Germany. Despite the diversity of disciplines and national traditions represented, the individual contributions show a remarkable convergence around three themes: changes in the modes of moral education in early modern Europe, the emergence of new relations between conscience and law (particularly the law of the state), and (...) the shared continuities and discontinuities of both Roman Catholic and Protestant moral culture in relation to their medieval past. (shrink)

Contemporary casuistry, informed by a centuries-old intellectual tradition within the Jesuit order of the Catholic Church, characteristically maintains that ethical judgment does not rely on abstract laws, general rules or universal principles. Ethical judgment is formed through a subtle activity of comparing prior, settled cases with the current problem one is experiencing. Judgment on moral matters is therefore thought to be highly context-dependent and requires a sensitivity to the unique facts and social circumstances of each case. This discussion reviews (...) the origins of casuistry within Jesuit thought and then examines the implications of casuistry for organizational ethics. Our central argument is that contemporary casuistry, while correct to emphasize the particularity of ethical judgment, is nonetheless compatible with an important role for general principles in ethical decision-making within organizations. (shrink)

Casuistry, or case-based reasoning, should be used in environmental ethics. Casuistry came to prominence during the transition from medieval to modern, when historical circumstances challenged settled moral perspectives. Similarly, environmental ethics arose in response to real-life dilemmas that also challenged existing moral theories. Casuistry’s focus on cases means that it can resolve individual environmental dilemmas without needing to solve every other problem (theoretical or practical) in the field. It is a “taxonomic” form of moral reasoning that operates (...) by analogy to paradigm cases, appeals to authorities in the field, and application of moral rules of thumb. Analogy to just-war reasoning and medical ethics and appeal to ecological reasoning yields four basic principles for environmental casuistry, justice, prudence, diversity, and a presumption toward preservation, and provides guidance in selecting paradigms and sources of authority within the field of environmental ethics. (shrink)