. Human capabilities theory has emerged as an important framework for measuring whether various social systems promote human flourishing. The premise of this theory is that human beings share some nearly universal capabilities; what makes a human life fulfilling is the opportunity to exercise these capabilities. This essay proposes that the use of human capabilities theory can be expanded to assess whether a company has organized the work environment in such a way that allows workers to develop (...) a variety of human capabilities. This mode of analysis is put forward as a complement to the work of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, who has suggested that the key to promoting human well-being in the workplace is the maximization of flow experiences. (shrink)

In Frontiers of Justice, Martha Nussbaum applies the “Capabilities Approach,” which she calls “one species of a human rights approach,” to justice issues that have in her view been inadequately addressed in liberal political theory. These issues include rights of the disabled, rights that transcend national borders, and animal rights issues. She demonstrates the weakness of Rawlsianism, contractualism in general, and much of the Kantian tradition in moral philosophy and shows the need to move beyond the limitations of narrow (...) rationalism, nationalism, and speciesism. Nevertheless, Nussbaum fails to elaborate adequately the grounds for her own capabilities position or to face fundamental theoretical questions about the nature and implications of that position. (shrink)

The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. Each citizen is entitled to a set of basic capabilities. But which are these? Martha Nussbaum formulated a set of ten central capabilities. Amartya Sen argued they should be selected in a process of public reasoning. Critics object that the Nussbaum‐approach is too perfectionist and the Sen‐approach is too proceduralist. This paper presents a third alternative: a substantive but non‐perfectionist capability theory (...) of justice. It presents a two‐level concept of individual agency as connected to social practices. It then argues basic capabilities are those necessary to for the agency necessary to navigate freely and autonomously between different social practices. (shrink)

Capability theory improves our understanding of well being because it takes account of the “conversion” problem: income/wealth/commodities. need to be made effectively available to really increase well being. However, just as IWCs need to be converted into functionings in order to be effective in bringing additional possibilities to a person, our institutions, abilities and environments need to be converted as well to allow them to be used effectively in the same pursuit. Freedom of the press and speech, education (...) and certainly economic independence as well as the democratic political processes themselves are as inert as IWCs without some additional conversion to enable them to do what we have set them up to do. The moniker “conversion factor” is the name of the problem rather than the source of a solution. This paper will explore the possibility that the needed theoretical addition to capability theory might be found by understanding how the elements of the capabilities equation change over time. Using education as an example of a conversion factor, the paper will explore how an addition to the theory might help create effective policy alternatives. (shrink)

The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. Each citizen is entitled to a set of basic capabilities. But which are these? Martha Nussbaum formulated a set of ten central capabilities. Amartya Sen argued they should be selected in a process of public reasoning. Critics object that the Nussbaum-approach is too perfectionist and the Sen-approach is too proceduralist. This paper presents a third alternative: a substantive but non-perfectionist capability theory (...) of justice. It presents a two-level concept of individual agency as connected to social practices. It then argues basic capabilities are those necessary to for the agency necessary to navigate freely and autonomously between different social practices. (shrink)

The discussion about theories of health has recently had an important new input through the work of Sridhar Venkatapuram. He proposes a combination of Lennart Nordenfelt's holistic theory of health and Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability approach. The aim of the present article is to discuss and evaluate this proposal. The article starts with a discussion of Nordenfelt's theory and evaluates Venkatapuram’ critique of it, that is, of its relativism, both regarding goals and environment, and of (...) the subjectivist theory of happiness used. Then the article explains why Nordenfelt's idea of a reasonable environment is not a problem for the theory, and it critiques Venkatapuram's own incorporation of the environment into the concept of health, suggesting that this makes the concept too wide. It contends, moreover, that Venkatapuram's alternative theory retains a problem inherent in Nordenfelt's theory, namely, that health is conceived of as a second-order ability. It is argued that health should, instead, be defined as first-order abilities. This means that health cannot be seen as a capability, and also that health cannot be seen as a meta-capability of the kind envisioned by Venkatapuram. It is, furthermore, argued that the theory lacks one crucial aspect of health, namely, subjective wellbeing. Finally, the article tries to illustrate how health, in the suggested alternative sense, as first-order abilities, fits into Nussbaum's capability theory, since health as an ‘actuality’ is part of all the ‘combined capabilities’ suggested by Nussbaum. (shrink)

This paper is written from a perspective that is sympathetic to the basic idea of the capability approach. Our aim is to compare Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory of justice with Alan Gewirth’s moral theory, on two points: the selection and the justification of a list of central capabilities. On both counts, we contend that Nussbaum’s theory suffers from flaws that Gewirth’s theory may help to remedy. First, we argue that her notion of a (dignified) (...) human life cannot fulfill the role of a normative criterion that Nussbaum wants it to play in selecting capabilities for her list. Second, we question whether Nussbaum’s method of justification is adequate, discussing both her earlier self-validating argumentative strategy and her more recent adherence to the device of an overlapping consensus. We conclude that both strategies fail to provide the capabilities theory with the firm foundation it requires. Next, we turn to Gewirth’s normative theory and discuss how it can repair these flaws. We show how his theory starts from a fundamental moral principle according to which all agents have rights to the protection of the necessary preconditions of their agency. Gewirth’s justification of this principle is then presented, using a version of a transcendental argument. Finally, we explicitly compare Nussbaum and Gewirth and briefly demonstrate what it would mean for Nussbaum to incorporate Gewirthian elements into her capabilities theory of justice. (shrink)

Much of the most influential free speech scholarship emphasises that ‘political speech’ warrants the very highest standards of protection because of its centrality to self-governance. This central idea mitigates against efforts to justify the regulation of political speech and renders some egregiously offensive or harmful speech worthy of protection from a theoretical perspective. Yet paradoxically, in practice, in many liberal democracies such speech is routinely restricted. In this paper, I develop an argument that is compatible with both the argument from (...) democracy and the notion of political speech, and that can justify the regulation of hate speech, by joining an understanding of the constitutive role of speech in individuals’ lives derived from Nussbaum's capabilities theory with ideas of democratic deliberation and legitimation drawn from a Habermasian framework. This approach attends to the conditions required at an individual level for democratic legitimation to occur at a social level. It permits the development of a robust theoretical justification for the protection of a broad range of speech. It simultaneously provides a guiding framework for regulatory policy designed to ameliorate the effects of, and inhibit the expression of, that speech, which could imperil the conditions required for individuals to develop their own capabilities and which instantiates anti-democratic practice, and thus discourse, preventing the very communications required to perform democracy from being uttered. Thus, my argument also strengthens and transforms the argument from democracy as a justification for free speech protection more generally. (shrink)

This paper will begin with an explication of the central tenets of Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. The next section examines Nussbaum’s two-fold justification of capabilities; namely, the substantive good approach (or intuitionism), which serves as the primary justification, and a version of Kantian proceduralism, which provides ancillary support. The following section focuses on Jaggar’s critique of Nussbaum. Here, I will discuss three criteria of adequacy for a global ethic and their importance, why we should accept them and how both of (...) Nussbaum’s justification strategies fail to satisfy them. In the fifth section, I propose a version of discourse ethics as an alternative justification for capabilities that can satisfy the adequacy discerned from Jaggar’s critique. This account of discourse ethics reveals that intersubjective dialogue under certain conditions is more likely to provide adequate justification of capabilities, and those engaged in dialogue are also likely to develop practical reason and affiliation. So this method of justification does not merely ground the capabilities, but helps people realize them. Finally, the sixth section presents an example from the Self-Employed Women’s Association as a real-life case illustrating how this version of discourse ethics can be manifested. (shrink)

This article critically examines the competitive, adversarial nature of the Western neoliberal style of democracy. Specifically, this article focuses on Amartya Sen’s notion of a “universal democracy” as a means of addressing socio-economic inequalities through Sen’s capability approach. Sen’s capability theory has become an acclaimed and widely used theory to evaluate and understand development and inequalities. However, we employ a distinctive critique by engaging Amartya Sen through Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of one dimensionality and the adversarial nature (...) of Western democracy. We further highlight how contemporary neoliberal society employ a particular, adversarial form of public participation. Through this, we underline the various neoliberal problemata, such as Western idealism, political passivity, and a “flattening of choice,” within contemporary democracies and locate how their competitive, winner-take-all nature has become essential to contemporary, Western democratic models. Consequently, we argue that democracy, as a functional concept and form of public engagement, should be fundamentally re-examined in order to address inequalities. (shrink)

The capability approach, originated by Amartya Sen is among the most comprehensive and influential accounts of justice that applies to issues of health and health care. However, although health is always presumed as an important capability in Sen’s works, he never manages to fully explain why health is distinctively valuable. This paper provides an explanation. It does this by firstly laying out the general capability-based argument for health justice. It then discusses two recent attempts to justify why (...) health is distinctively valuable from within a capability framework – these are Sridhar Venkatapuram’s conception of health as the central human meta-capability and, respectively, Norman Daniels’ embrace of the capability metric in his use of Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity. The paper argues that none of these accounts succeed in providing a plausible justification of the value of health. Finally, the paper suggests an alternative more complex justification, closely tied to different but central element of the capability view, that captures the core intuitions of both Venkatapuram and Daniels’ accounts but without being vulnerable to the objections raised against each of them. This, the paper concludes, provides a promising ground on which the capability view on health justice should be founded. (shrink)

Digital transformation of traditional enterprises can better develop new customer relationships and help mitigate the business risk of their over-reliance on single-customer relationships. However, little research has been conducted on the internal mechanisms of how enterprise digitalization reshapes corporate customer relationships. In this manuscript, from the perspective of dynamic capability theory, we construct conceptual models of enterprise digital transformation, innovation capability, operational cost, and customer satisfaction, and explore the internal mechanisms of enterprise digital transformation to reduce the (...) dependence of enterprises on large customers. The model is empirically studied by obtaining data on the degree of digital transformation of enterprises through “search statistics” of keywords in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies during 2011–2019. This manuscript finds that digital transformation significantly reduces the concentration of large customers and has become a powerful driver of business model innovation in the digital economy, and this finding remains robust to the use of PSM and instrumental variable methods to address endogeneity. Digital transformation reduces firms’ dependence on large customers through three mechanisms: improving firms’ innovation capabilities, reducing firms’ operating costs, and increasing customer satisfaction. The impact of digital transformation on reducing the dependence of non-state enterprises on large customers is greater than that of state-owned enterprises; the implementation of digital transformation strategies is more helpful for enterprises that have active interactions with customers to reduce their customer concentration; and the reduction of customer concentration is greater for enterprises in regions with higher levels of digital development compared to those in regions with lower levels of digital development. The economic consequence test finds that digital transformation diversifies customer structure and reduces business risks. The analysis of the innovation effect and customer satisfaction effect on reducing the concentration of large customers of enterprisesby implementing digital transformation enriches and expands the dynamic capability theory and provides important insights for enterprises to diversify their customer structure. (shrink)

There are striking parallels between current capability theories and the moral philosophy of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. This article reconstructs central arguments of Krause’s ethics and correlates them with passages from the works of Martha Nussbaum, showing that such similarities extend not only to what, substantially, is being professed in either philosophy but also, procedurally, to the question of how the respective moral conclusions are reached. As Krause correlates responsibility with capability, the article begins with an examination of (...) Krause’s idea of human — as compared to animal — freedom and their respective normative implications. Next, the argument is extended to the social responsibilities of personal freedom, before widening the scope to the cosmopolitan plane. The paper then briefly examines historical links between Krause and current capability theorists, before concluding. (shrink)

What sort of entitlements should citizens have in a just society? In this book, Rutger Claassen sets out a theory of what he terms 'navigational agency', whereby citizens should be able to navigate freely between social practices. This shows how individuals can be at the same time free and autonomous in striving for their own goals in life, but also embedded in social practices in which they have to cooperate with others. He argues that for navigational agency, people need (...) three sets of core capabilities: those which allow human empowerment in civil society, a decent level of socio-economic subsistence, and political participation in democratic decision-making procedures. The idea of navigational agency, the book argues, provides an alternative to currently dominant versions of the capability approach to social justice, and strengthens its liberal foundations. (shrink)

This paper explores what insights can be drawn from critical theory to enrich and strengthen Sen’s capability approach in relation to technology and human development. The two theories share some important commonalities: both are concerned with the pursuit of “a good life”; both are normative theories rooted in ethics and meant to make a difference, and both are interested in democracy. The paper provides a brief overview of both schools of thought and their applications to technology and human (...) development. Three areas are identified where critical theory can make a contribution to the capability approach: conceptually, by providing a critical account of individual agency and enriching the concept of technology beyond the simplistic notion of commodities; methodologically, by sensitising towards reification and hegemony of scientific tools, and, finally, by emphasising reflexivity of researchers. (shrink)

In this critique, Martha Nussbaum argues that our dominant theories of development have given us policies that ignore our most basic human needs for dignity and self-respect.

Over the last two decades, the capabilities approach has become an increasingly influential theory of development. It conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of an individual's ability to achieve functionings we have reason to value. In contrast, the African ethic of ubuntu views human flourishing as the propensity to pursue relations of fellowship with others, such that relationships have fundamental value. These two theoretical perspectives seem to be in tension with each other; while the capabilities approach focuses on individuals as (...) the locus of ethical value, an ubuntu ethic concentrates on the relations between individuals. In this article, we ask: to what extent is the capabilities approach compatible with this African ethical theory? We argue that, on reflection, relations play a much stronger role in the capabilities approach than often assumed. There is good reason to believe that relationality is part of the concept of a capability itself, where such relationality has intrinsic ethical value. This understanding of the ethical centrality of relations grounds new normative perspectives on the capabilities approach, and offers a more comprehensive grasp of the relevance of relationships to empirical enquiry. (shrink)

This article asks about the conditions of a sociological operationalization of the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Raising the question of freedom and social opportunities, the capability approach has so far mainly been discussed by economists and philosophers. In order to adopt this approach for a sociological and pragmatist perspective, it engages with methodological and theoretical issues. Whereas capabilities have until now mainly been studied within quantitative frameworks, the author opts for a qualitative method (...) of inquiry that draws on a pragmatist and configurational approach. Such a shift towards qualitative inquiry is a key condition for a better sociological understanding of notions like freedom and opportunities that stand at the core of the capability approach. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess Martha Nussbaum's application of the capabilities approach to non-human animals for both its philosophical merits and its potential to affect public policy. I argue that there are currently three main philosophical problems with the theory that need further attention. After discussing these problems, I show how focusing on factory farming would enable Nussbaum to demonstrate the philosophical merits of the capabilities approach as well as to suggest more powerful and effectives changes in our public (...) policies. (shrink)

The issue of distributive justice receives substantial amount of attention in our society. On the one hand, we are sensitive to whether and the extent to which people are responsible for being worse off. On the other hand, we are mindful of society’s worst-off members. There has been a debate over luck egalitarianism, which relates to the former concern, and relational egalitarianism, which echoes the latter. By investigating the psychological processes of these two concerns, this paper examines the reliability of (...) the argument that Elizabeth Anderson, a renowned relational egalitarian, presents against luck egalitarianism and for relational egalitarianism. It also considers whether it is possible to support luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously, using an online experiment. The results of the experiment show that, first, for ordinary people, the luck consideration is as important as the basic capabilities consideration. Second, while real people consider the degree of compensation through the factors of causality and responsibility, the lack of basic capabilities directs them to determine how much victims of bad luck should be compensated. This suggests that pluralist egalitarianism is on the right track. (shrink)

With our state-guaranteed or internationally recognized human rights, liberalism is rather a common basis of political discussion today. John Rawls’s theory of justice, which set a framework for liberal theory of justice in the last decades of the twentieth century, is notably contractarian. Martha Nussbaum, although claiming to be a neo-Aristotelian, argues that her capabilities approach (hereafter CA) can upgrade the liberal theory of justice, particularly that of political liberalism, to deal with unsolved problems of justice, namely, (...) disability, nationality, and species membership. However, this paper argues that her proposal issuccessful only when her CA-based theory proves its affiliation with political liberalism in more detail. As defined by Rawls, political liberalism produces “free-standing” political conceptions and rejects any metaphysical or religious ideas. It halts conceptions of justice that promote conceptions of good derived from particular comprehensive doctrines. I do not believe a mere convergence between CA and contractarianism is sufficient enough to secure the rational acceptability of her CA-based theory. I suggest that if she wishes to maintain her CA-based theory’s being politically liberal, she either has to prove more of the public, in particular the global public, acceptability of her intuitive ideas of human dignity without relying on her intuitions or alter the meaning of political liberalism itself so that it allows a room for some sort of comprehensive doctrine. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct (...) a normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance. (shrink)

While being generally appreciative of Sen's theory of capabilities, the point of this paper is to raise some conceptual challenges that arise in addressing entrenched conditions of power and domination from the capability paradigm. The enhancement of people's capability prospects with regard to education, employment, decent living standards and political participation can empower them to challenge various dominating conditions in society. It can also bestow a sense of self-confidence in people to stand up against discriminating practices. Yet, (...) the objectives of the capability theory remain less secure as long as citizens’ capability prospects are dependent on and subjected to arbitrary power and domination. I argue that Sen's theory of capabilities can be strengthened and developed as an effective antidote to the liberal hegemony in political theory by drawing on resources from Pettit's republicanism particularly by accommodating the robustness condition of freedom and by envisioning individual freedom as intimately tied to the common good of the polity. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum has sought to establish the significance of disability for liberal theories of justice. She proposes that human dignity can serve as the basis of an entitlement to a set of capabilities that all human beings either possess or have the potential to develop. This article considers whether the concept of human dignity will serve as the justification for basic human capabilities in accounting for the demands of justice for people with profound learning difficulties and disabilities. It examines the (...) relationship between dignity and capabilities, suggesting that Nussbaum fails to distinguish between several conceptions of human dignity, whilst also identifying one of these conceptions as coming close to meeting several of her demands. It is difficult enough, however, to show how dignity is related to just one of our basic entitlements, and even that requires more than the resources available in Nussbaum's approach. (shrink)

The capability approach constitutes a significant contribution to social theory but its potential is diminished by its insufficient treatment of the social construction of meaning. Social meanings enable people to make value judgements about what they will do and be, and also to evaluate how satisfied they are about what they are able to achieve. From this viewpoint, a person’s state of wellbeing must be understood as being socially and psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural contexts. In (...) this light, the telos of ‘living well’ which is at the heart of Sen’s version of the capability approach is inadequate and must be modified to a telos of ‘living well together’ which includes consideration of the social structures and institutions which enable people to pursue individual freedoms in relation to others. The policy significance of the capability approach can be further strengthened by paying greater consideration to the political economy of policy decision-making processes and the ways in which conflicts and distributions of power are institutionalized. (shrink)

This article presents the framework Capability Sensitive Design (CSD), which consists of merging the design methodology Value Sensitive Design (VSD) with Martha Nussbaum's capability theory. CSD aims to normatively assess technology design in general, and technology design for health and wellbeing in particular. Unique to CSD is its ability to account for human diversity and to counter (structural) injustices that manifest in technology design. The basic framework of CSD is demonstrated by applying it to the hypothetical design (...) case of a therapy chatbot for mental health. By applying CSD to a design case, the merits of this new framework over the standard VSD approach become apparent. Also, the application demonstrates what a technology design would look like when attention is paid to capabilities right from the start of the design process. (shrink)

A capability approach prescribes paternalist government actions to the extent that it requires the promotion of specific functionings, instead of the corresponding capabilities. Capability theorists have argued that their theories do not have much of these paternalist implications, since promoting capabilities will be the rule, promoting functionings the exception. This paper critically surveys that claim. From a close investigation of Nussbaum's statements about these exceptions, it derives a framework of five categories of functionings promotion that are more or (...) less unavoidable in a capability theory. It argues that some of these categories may have an expansionary dynamic; they may give rise to widespread functionings promotion, which would defeat the capabilitarian promise that paternalist interventions will be exceptions to the rule of a focus on capabilities. Finally, the paper discusses three further theoretical issues that will be decisive in holding this paternalist tendency in check: how high one sets threshold levels of capability protection, how lengthy one's list of basic capabilities is, and how one deals with individual responsibility for choices resulting in a loss of one's capabilities. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question of whether a capability theory of justice (such as that of Martha Nussbaum) should accept a basic “capability to hold property.” Answering this question is vital for bridging the gap between abstract capability theories of justice and their institutional implications in real economies. Moreover, it is vital for understanding the difference between egalitarian and libertarian versions of the capability approach. In the paper, three main arguments about private property are discussed: (...) those relating property to a private sphere of control, to the market system of allocating goods, and to the ability to keep the fruits of one's labor. On the basis of this discussion it is argued that the capability theory of justice should accept a basic capability to hold private property, albeit one that is restricted in scope and has an egalitarian character. Special attention is paid to libertarian arguments about property acquisition, and it is argued that capability theories of justice must reject them because they presuppose a method of justifying capabilities that the capability approach cannot accept. (shrink)

The article discusses a fundamental problem that has to be faced if the general capability approach is to be developed in the direction of a theory of justice: the selection and justification of a list of capabilities. The democratic solution to this problem (defended by Amartya Sen) is to leave the selection of capabilities to a process of democratic deliberation, while the philosophical solution (defended by Martha Nussbaum) is to establish this list of capabilities as a matter of (...) philosophical theory. The article investigates the debate between these two different positions and argues in favour of the philosophical solution. First, it distinguishes political from epistemological reasons for (not) making capability lists. Second, it shows that the democratic position must incorporate at least some philosophical theorising in general and a theory of democracy in particular. Third, the article argues that the democratic position presupposes that the philosophical position will bypass the democratic process while actually it does not. The philosophical position is actually more respectful of democracy than the democratic position. Fourth, while philosophers may exercise caution and connect their capability lists to actual democratic debates and other empirical sources, this kind of epistemological virtue ironically may heighten the chance of receiving reproaches on the political level. (shrink)

In his action theory, John Dewey makes use of the concept of capability to highlight the way human capacities depend on the environment and the character of an agent. In his capability approach, Amartya Sen likewise refers to the environment by discussing the role of conversion factors. Yet, he abstains from a discussion of character development, presumably in order to allow for a variety of conceptions of the good and ways in which characters can develop. In this (...) paper, I develop the outlines of a pragmatist capability theory by enriching the core concepts of Sen’s capability approach with the Deweyan notions of habit and character. In this way, the role of the environment in the capability approach can be reaffirmed and supplemented by a notion of character development. Subsequently, I explore the implications of this framework for Sen’s notions of impartiality and freedom. The result is a pragmatist capability theory which builds on Sen’s conceptual framework and puts additional emphasis on character development and sensitivity to one’s environment. (shrink)

In ‘traditional’ liberation theological discourse, especially the Latin American strand, the concept of development, desarrollismo, that is developmentalism, has been severely critiqued. In recent times, the interpretation of development shifted to a number of models, one of which has been the view of development as freedom, associated with Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities theory’. While the capabilities theory ostensibly comes closer to the goals of the liberation paradigm in general, this article seeks to critically explore in dialogue with this (...) class='Hi'>theory of capabilities assumptions and implications of the concept of development for our national democratic revolution. A number of service delivery strikes in our land, with many poor people expecting government to ‘deliver’ for them, might suggest among other things that the state does ‘development’ for people, hence the designation of the post-1994 South African state as a ‘developmental state’. This article argues that, at foundational level, development understood as liberation could help alter the assumptions that held the national democratic revolution back. (shrink)

The Capability Approach is in the first place an approach to the evaluation of individual well-being and social welfare. Many disciplines refer to the CA, first and foremost welfare economics, development studies and political philosophy. Educational theory was not among the first disciplines that took notice of the CA, but has a rising interest in it. This paper argues that the CA would also profit from looking into educational theory. The first part of the paper shows why (...) and where educational theory—or more precisely: a theory of learning—is missing in the CA. This is done in three steps: the first section gives a brief overview of the core concepts of Sen’s CA. Section “Capability and Choosing” focuses on the role of choosing in the CA. It states the views of Sen and Nussbaum on choosing and shows the shortcomings in their appreciation of choosing. In consequence, the third section derives some demands on a theory of learning in the CA. The second part of the paper presents Dewey’s educational theory on experience as a possible starting point when looking for a learning theory that lends itself to the integration in the CA. Section “Opportunity of Choosing, Experience and Education” introduces Dewey’s conception of experience, freedom of the learner, conditions of experience and education. Section “Capability and Experience” discusses how Dewey’s concepts fit into the CA. On the first glance, there are three points in which the CA and Dewey’s concepts match: the importance of freedom for human life, the role of participation in education and the need to take internal and external factors as well as their interaction into account in assessing choice situations. This establishes a basis for linking both theories. Yet, more research is needed to explore the issue further. Section “Conclusion and Outlook” concludes and sketches the lines for future research. (shrink)

The concept of dignity plays a foundational role in the more recent versions of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. However, despite its centrality to her theory, Nussbaum’s conception of dignity remains under-theorised. In this paper we critically examine the role that dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory by, first, developing an account of the concept of dignity and introducing a distinction between two types of dignity, status dignity and achievement dignity. Next, drawing on this account, we analyse Nussbaum’s conception (...) of dignity and contrast it with Kant’s conception of dignity. On the basis of this comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, we highlight tensions between Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism, which is central to her conception of dignity, and her commitment to political liberalism. This leads us to conclude that Nussbaum’s claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism. (shrink)

While being generally appreciative of Sen's theory of capabilities, the point of this paper is to raise some conceptual challenges that arise in addressing entrenched conditions of power and domination from the capability paradigm. The enhancement of people's capability prospects with regard to education, employment, decent living standards and political participation can empower them to challenge various dominating conditions in society. It can also bestow a sense of self-confidence in people to stand up against discriminating practices. Yet, (...) the objectives of the capability theory remain less secure as long as citizens’ capability prospects are dependent on and subjected to arbitrary power and domination. I argue that Sen's theory of capabilities can be strengthened and developed as an effective antidote to the liberal hegemony in political theory by drawing on resources from Pettit's republicanism particularly by accommodating the robustness condition of freedom and by envisioning individual freedom as intimately tied to the common good of the polity. (shrink)

Standard agent and action-based approaches in computer ethics tend to have difficulty dealing with complex systems-level issues such as the digital divide and globalisation. This paper argues for a value-based agenda to complement traditional approaches in computer ethics, and that one value-based approach well-suited to technological domains can be found in capability theory. Capability approaches have recently become influential in a number of fields with an ethical or policy dimension, but have not so far been applied in (...) computer ethics. The paper introduces two major versions of the theory – those advanced by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum – and argues that they offer potentially valuable conceptual tools for computer ethics. By developing a theory of value based on core human functionings and the capabilities (powers, freedoms) required to realise them, capability theory is shown to have a number of potential benefits that complement standard ethical theory, opening up new approaches to analysis and providing a framework that incorporates a justice as well as an ethics dimension. The underlying functionalism of capability theory is seen to be particularly appropriate to technology ethics, enabling the integration of normative and descriptive analysis of technology in terms of human needs and values. The paper concludes by considering some criticisms of the theory and directions for further development. (shrink)

Résumé Le but de cet article est de mettre en dialogue Ricœur avec la théorie sociale d’Anthony Giddens, plus spécifiquement l’herméneutique de l’homme capable avec la théorie de la structuration. Nous commencerons par explorer quelques termes clefs permettant de comparer les deux auteurs au sujet du rapport entre acteurs et systèmes. Chez Ricœur, nous commenterons les notions d’institution et de pratique; chez Giddens, des notions importantes pour présenter la “dualité de structure.” Au cours de cette exploration, quatre tâches seront identifiées (...) en vue de préciser la “théorie sociale” de Soi-même comme un autre : dépasser le schéma foncièrement téléologique de l’action; explorer la stabilisation de l’action malgré l’incertitude inscrite dans le schéma téléologique; réinvestir la notion de contrainte; et clarifier l’ambiguïté de la notion d’institution. En conclusion, nous montrerons quels apports la mise en dialogue de Ricœur avec Giddens pourrait offrir pour accomplir ces quatre tâches. Mots-clés : Homme capable, sructuration, acteur, dualité de structure, institution, contrainte.The aim of this article is to reconstruct a dialogue between Ricœur and Anthony Giddens, in particular between the hermeneutics of the capable human and the theory of structuration. The article starts with an exploration of key concepts on the basis of which to compare the two authors on the relation between actors and systems. On Ricœur’s side the concepts of institution and practice will be commented on; on Giddens’ side notions selected to present the “duality of structure” will be considered. In the course of this exploration, four tasks will be identified by which to refine the “social theory” of Oneself as Another : surpass its ultimately teleological schema of action; explore the stabilisation of action despite the uncertainty attributed to the teleological schema; reinvest the notion of constraint; and clarify the ambiguity in the notion of institution. In conclusion the contribution of a Ricœur-Giddens dialogue to the accomplishment of these four tasks will be demonstrated. Keywords: Capable Man, Structuration, Actor, Duality of structure, Institution, Constraint. (shrink)

Both the capability and the recognition approach are influential and substantial theories in social philosophy. In this contribution, we outline their main assumptions in their assessment of poverty. The two approaches are set in relation to each other, focusing mainly on (a) their moral evaluation of poverty, (b) issues of justification of their central normative claims, and (c) the role that is attributed to subjective experiences, feelings and emotions in these theories. This comparison reveals that in spite of significant (...) differences, both lead to the claim that poverty can never be adequately assessed without putting it into the context of a comprehensive ethical theory about the nature and function of societies. Drawing on this result, we conclude that the critical function of social philosophy plays an irreducible role in the study and understanding of poverty. (shrink)

The capability approach aims to ensure all individuals are able to form and pursue their own conception of the good, whilst the state remains neutral between them, and has done much to include oppressed and marginalised groups. Liberal neutrality and social inclusivity are worthy goals, yet I argue that Martha Nussbaum’s influential formulation of the capability approach, at least, cannot meet them. Conceptualising capabilities as opportunities to perform specific, valuable functionings fails to accommodate those who do not value, (...) or cannot perform, these functionings. I therefore propose that the capability approach be modified, such that capabilities are conceptualised, instead, as opportunities to exercise control in certain central domains of our life. (shrink)

The salience of social risks and the incidence of various crises in China have induced widespread concerns among urban residents. Encountering frequent risks places higher demands on the cognition of urban residents. The concept of safety cognition capability is defined within the context of urban residents' daily life, and measurement instruments are developed and tested to lay the foundation for grasping the current safety cognition capability of urban residents and conducting further research. In this study, the five-dimensional structure (...) of urban residents' safety cognition capability was proposed by using the grounded theory method to sort out the interview transcript of interviews with 30 urban residents, and a 38-item URSCC scale was designed and used for surveys conducted in China. The results show that the scale can be used as a valid tool to measure the URSCC, and it can help city managers to better understand the safety needs of residents, as well as monitor the effectiveness of policy implementation. (shrink)

Numerous scholars have observed that the relationship between poverty and violent conflict is endogenous. As a result, the area of Peace Through Commerce argues as one of its central tenets that the institution of business may be able to contribute to sustainable peace by creating economic development where poverty is a critical issue. While this argument may be valid, it leaves the question open — what is the business case for engaging in poverty alleviation business strategies? Strategic Management scholars are (...) addressing this question, arguing the general proposition that poverty is not only experienced by the people, but also impacts businesses operating in environments where the phenomenon is pervasive. By addressing poverty, businesses can help themselves. Yet, organizational theory justifying this proposition is still emerging, consisting of only a few studies that generally suggest that these strategies can help firms develop competitive advantage through the lens of the resource-based view. This article extends the theoretical application of the resource-based view, suggesting that conditions of poverty directly suppress the value of organizational resources and capabilities that are or could be contributed by people affected by it. In addition, it characterizes poverty alleviation strategic capabilities as dynamic capabilities. Finally, it describes a framework of "base of the pyramid dynamic capabilities" that could guide both future discourse in the area and deductive-disconfirmatory research examining the efficacy of these strategies. (shrink)

Since its inception, Stakeholder Management Capability (SMC) has constituted a powerful hermeneutic through which business organizations have understood and leveraged stakeholder relationships. On this model, achieving a high level of capability largely depends on managerial ability to effectively bargain with stakeholders and establish solidarity vis-à-vis the successful negotiation, implementation, and execution of "win–win" transactional exchanges. Against this account, it is rightly pointed out that a transactional explanation of stakeholder relationships, regarded by many as the bottom line for stakeholder (...) management, fails to provide managerial direction regarding how to resolve a variety of normative stakeholder claims that resist commoditization. In response to this issue, this paper has two overlapping goals. It seeks to elaborate a discourse theoretical approach to the problem by first drawing out Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action and delineating the various types of rational discourse. Second, the paper attempts to present concrete implications for SMC relative to reshaping the contours of rational, process, and transactional analysis in light of central discourse theoretical conclusions. (shrink)

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. is a worthy successor to Joseph Schumpeter as analyst of the large corporation and its role in economic growth. His new book, Scale and Scope, a comparative history of corporate capitalism in the U. S., Britain, and Germany, is animated by a vision of the large corporation as the leading force in economic growth, outdistancing older owner?managed forms of organization with a superior ability to invest entrepreneurially in large?scale production, mass distribution, and professional management. Chandler's account (...) implicitly relies on a dynamic?capabilities? theory of competition that reveals the fundamental irrelevance of neoclassical theory and policy, including antitrust policy. In some ways, however, Chandler's vision is too narrow, underplaying the role of markets in economic growth. One needs to know how economic systems build capabilities, not merely how the corporate institution does so. Moreover, there is reason to think that the last few decades have seen an organizational revolution with a dynamic rather different from the one that animates Chandler's account. As a result, Chandler's work is important for understanding the present?day issues of industrial competitiveness, but is only one piece of the puzzle. (shrink)

This article focuses on the philosophical aspects of the Capability Approach and its foundations in the work of Amartya Sen. It discusses the development and structure of Sen’s account, how it relates to other ethical approaches, and its main contributions and criticisms. It also outlines various capability theories developed within the Capability Approach, with particular attention to that of Martha Nussbaum.

This chapter contains sections titled: 1. Frontiers of Justice and the Challenge of Disability 2. The General Approach of Frontiers of Justice 3. Equality and Adequacy 4. Social and Economic Entitlements 5. Equality in Education 6. Equality in Political Entitlements Acknowledgments References.

This research explores the dynamic capabilities required for firms to implement environmental, social, and governance strategies, and investigates sustainable management performance that can be created based on them. By using dynamic capabilities theory, we integrate sustainable management and the ESG literature to suggest a research model and identify the factors that act as the catalysts achieving sustainability. The data used for the analysis were collected from 78 firms listed on the Korea Exchange with assets totaling more than 2 trillion (...) Korean won. In this study, the partial least squares structural equation model is applied. We found that absorptive capability and adaptive capability significantly affect sustainable management performance through implementation of the ESG strategy as a mediating variable. In particular, a firm’s implementation of an ESG strategy is a significant determinant that impacts sustainable management performance. We also believe our model contributes to the current knowledge by filling several research gaps, and our findings offer valuable and practical implications not only for achieving sustainable growth but also for creation of competitive advantage. (shrink)

This book is about power and freedoms in our technological world and has two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate that a theoretical exploration of the algorithmic governmentality hypothesis combined with the capability approach is useful for a better understanding of power and freedoms in Ambient Intelligence, a world where information and communication technologies are invisible, interconnected, context aware, personalized, adaptive to humans and act autonomously. The second is to argue that these theories are useful for a better (...) comprehension of privacy and data protection concepts and the evolution of their regulation. Having these objectives in mind, the book outlines a number of theses based on two threads: first, the elimination of the social effects of uncertainty and the risks to freedoms and, second, the vindication of rights. Inspired by and building on the outcomes of different philosophical and legal approaches, this book embodies an effort to better understand the challenges posed by Ambient Intelligence technologies, opening paths for more effective realization of rights and rooting legal norms in the preservation of the potentiality of human capabilities. (shrink)