This chapter surveys the variety of ways in which people who may appear at first to be bystanders, or mere bystanders, to wrongdoing, harm or danger might instead share responsibility with other actors. My discussion divides cases into three rough, non- exclusive categories: (a) shared responsibility for wrongs and harms; (b) shared responsibility to provide aid; and (c) shared responsibility to enforce moral norms. The third category has received the least discussion to date. My modest goal for this (...) portion of the chapter is to highlight some ways in which the responsibilities of witnesses to wrongdoing need to be more thoroughly theorized. But, furthermore, I want to suggest that these cases show that active bystanders are not always preferable to passive ones. Sometimes, it is better for witnesses to wrongdoing to remain mere bystanders. (shrink)

According to standard philosophical analyses, only victims can forgive. There are good reasons to reject this view. After all, people who are neither direct nor indirect victims of a wrong frequently feel moral anger over injustice. The choice to foreswear or overcome such moral anger is subject to most of the same sorts of considerations as victims’ choices to forgive. Furthermore, bystanders’ reactions to their experiences of moral anger often reflect either virtues or vices that are of a piece (...) with what we normally describe as a forgiving or unforgiving disposition. In this paper, I reject the view that only victims can forgive by comparing the experience and regulation of moral anger by victims and bystanders. The virtues of victims and bystanders with regard to moral anger are so similar that there is no good reason to apply different labels. However, the recognition of forgiveness in bystanders offers us more than simple consistency. It also leads us to think about the role moral bystanders play in the maintenance of the moral community, as well as the ways in which this role can be abused or overstepped. (shrink)

In 2012, a U.S. Institute of Medicine report called for a different approach to health care: “Left unchanged, health care will continue to underperform; cause unnecessary harm; and strain national, state, and family budgets.” The answer, they suggested, would be a “continuously learning” health system. Ethicists and researchers urged the creation of “learning health organizations” that would integrate knowledge from patient‐care data to continuously improve the quality of care. Our experience with an ongoing research study on atrial fibrillation—a trial known (...) as IMPACT‐AFib—gave us some insight into one of the challenges that will have to be dealt with in creating these organizations. Although the proposed educational intervention study placed no restrictions on what providers and health plans could do, the oversight team argued that the ethical principle of beneficence did not allow the researchers to be “bystanders” in relation to a control group receiving suboptimal care. In response, the researchers designed a “workaround” that allowed the project to go forward. We believe the experience suggests that what we call “bystander ethics” will create challenges for the kinds of quality improvement research that LHOs are designed to do. (shrink)

This paper considers the moral status of bystanders affected by medical research trials. Recent proposals advocate a very low threshold of permissible risk imposition upon bystanders that is insensitive to the prospective benefits of the trial, in part because we typically lack bystanders' consent. I argue that the correct threshold of permissible risk will be sensitive to the prospective gains of the trial. I further argue that one does not always need a person's consent to expose her (...) to significant risks of even serious harm for the sake of others. That we typically need the consent of participants is explained by the fact that trials risk harmfully using participants, which is very hard to justify without consent. Bystanders, in contrast, are harmed as a side-effect, which is easier to justify. I then consider whether the degree of risk that a trial may impose on a bystander is sensitive to whether she is a prospective beneficiary of that trial. (shrink)

Literature on testimonial injustice and ways that perpetrators might combat it have flourished since Miranda Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice. Less attention has been given, however, to the role of bystanders. In this paper, I examine the accountability that bystanders may have for their omissions to redress testimonial injustice. I argue that bystander accountability applies in cases where it is opportune for bystanders to intervene, and if they are also sufficiently equipped and able to redress the (...) testimonial injustice. Moreover, I recommend that we move beyond virtue responsibilism for ameliorative thinking about testimonial injustice. (shrink)

Scientists seeking to conduct research with human subjects must first submit their proposals to research ethics committees (Institutional Review Boards [IRBs], in the United States). Some of these studies pose risks to “bystanders,” i.e., people who may be affected by the research but who are not enrolled as study subjects. Should IRBs expand their scope to include oversight over possible harms to bystanders as well as research subjects? This paper presents arguments against this step. Prior review of research (...) with human subjects, despite its evident burden on the research enterprise, is a necessary caution, because the tension between the objectives of humane treatment of research subjects and sound scientific design and procedure has in the past led to serious abuses. This rationale is inapplicable in the case of bystanders. Moreover, in view of the many and varied effects of both research practices and scientific advances on the broader public over time, those who may be considered to be “bystanders” may potentially expand without limit; requiring IRBs to anticipate these distant and long‐term effects as part of prior ethical review could greatly increase its burden and its deterrent effect on research. While conducting research without concern for serious potential harm to bystanders may be irresponsible and unethical, expanding the scope of prior review by IRBs to include risks to bystanders is not required by the principles governing human subjects research, and the costs and burdens of this expansion may outweigh any expected gains. (shrink)

Research participants are afforded protections to ensure their rights and welfare are not unduly jeopardized by research activities. Yet people who do not meet the criteria for research participant status may likewise be impacted by research activities, and ethicists argue that protections should be afforded these “research bystanders.” The standard rationale for extending protections to research bystanders contends that they are sufficiently like research participants that the ethical principles governing health research ought to extend to them. In this (...) article we argue that this analogical reasoning is mistaken. Salient moral differences mean that research ethics frameworks are not fit for purpose. We defend the research bystander category by articulating a novel foundation for this new class of stakeholder. Focusing on bystanders directly impacted by publicly funded health research, we argue that bystanders are sometimes owed protections—but neither because of their similarity to research participants nor because research ethics principles should extend to them. Instead, we reframe the issue as a question of justice. Building on the work of Douglas MacKay, we argue that bystanders to publicly funded health research are owed protections as citizens of liberal states to whom the state owes duties of justice. The state has duties to protect the interests of citizens and to conduct health research. When the means by which the state fulfils the latter duty comes into conflict with the means by which it fulfils the former, the state must ensure that those impacted, including research bystanders, are afforded protections. (shrink)

In 2012, a U.S. Institute of Medicine report called for a different approach to health care: “Left unchanged, health care will continue to underperform; cause unnecessary harm; and strain national, state, and family budgets.” The answer, they suggested, would be a “continuously learning” health system. Ethicists and researchers urged the creation of “learning health organizations” that would integrate knowledge from patient‐care data to continuously improve the quality of care. Our experience with an ongoing research study on atrial fibrillation—a trial known (...) as IMPACT‐AFib—gave us some insight into one of the challenges that will have to be dealt with in creating these organizations. Although the proposed educational intervention study placed no restrictions on what providers and health plans could do, the oversight team argued that the ethical principle of beneficence did not allow the researchers to be “bystanders” in relation to a control group receiving suboptimal care. In response, the researchers designed a “workaround” that allowed the project to go forward. We believe the experience suggests that what we call “bystander ethics” will create challenges for the kinds of quality improvement research that LHOs are designed to do. (shrink)

Liberalist thinking argues that moral agents have a right to pursue an ordinary life. It also insists that moral agent can be bystanders. A bystander is involved with morally bad states of affairs in the sense that they are bound by moral duty, but for a non-blameworthy reason. A common view on the morality of commercial life argues that commercial agents cannot and ought not to assume the status of bystander, when confronted with child labor, pollution, or other overwhelmingly (...) big morally bad states of affairs. According to the common view, the agent will get overdemanded. In this paper, the overdemandingness charge is interpreted as a criticism of the liberalist position. According to this charge, bystander status must be given up in the market because otherwise the right to pursue a personal life is crushed. In this paper, we demonstrate that the overdemandingness charge fails. It does not make sense if bystander status is grounded in the duty of beneficence. It would make sense if the status were grounded in the duty of rescue but that duty does not apply in relation to oMBS. The condition of ‘subjective urgency’ is not fulfilled. Hence, liberalist thinking can withstand the charge of overdemandingness and commercial agents cannot assume a right never to acknowledge bystander status. (shrink)

The ethics of research on human subjects is often construed as a fine balance between the interests of patients in need of novel health interventions, and those of study participants who should remain safe in the process. But there is a third group in the mix. Some people belong to neither category, yet research can affect or jeopardize them. Call such people “bystanders.” This article shows that thinking about bystander protection can question whether there is an upper limit on (...) the risks that studies may legitimately visit upon their participants. Thus, thinking about appropriate bystander protection can shed light on the appropriate protection of study participants. Core research ethics, which focuses on the latter, must consider the former as well. (shrink)

Suppose COVID-19 is the runaway tram in the famous moral thought experiment, known as the “Bystander at the Switch.” Consider the two differentiated responses of governments around the world to this new threat, namely the option of quarantine/lockdown and herd immunity. Can we contrast the hypothetical with the real scenario? What do the institutional decisions and strategies for dealing with the virus, in the beginning of 2020, signify in a normative moral framework? This paper investigates these possibilities in order to (...) highlight the similarities and, more importantly, the differences that exist between utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Analysis shows that the hypothetical scenario can never be fully compared to the complex multifactorial nature of the real world. But if a comparison is attempted, the most obvious difference between the two governmental strategies is the concept of duty within the Kantian perspective. Ultimately, it is a matter of comparing freedom and life. Attributing a moral “priority ticket” to one or the other can be analysed through interpersonal aggregation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the widespread view that obstructors are a special sort of bystander is mistaken. Obstructors make Victim worse off by their presence, and thus are more properly described as innocent threats. Only those characters who do not make Victim worse off by their presence can be classified as bystanders.

Framed within theories of fairness and stress, the current paper examines bystanders’ intervention intention to workplace bullying across two studies based on international employee samples (N = 578). Using a vignette-based design, we examined the role of bullying mode (offline vs. online), bullying type (personal vs. work-related) and target closeness (friend vs. work colleague) on bystanders’ behavioural intentions to respond, to sympathise with the victim (defender role), to reinforce the perpetrator (prosecutor role) or to be ambivalent (commuter role). (...) Results illustrated a pattern of the influence of mode and type on bystander intentions. Bystanders were least likely to support the victim and more likely to agree with perpetrator actions for cyberbullying and work-related acts. Tentatively, support emerged for the effect of target closeness on bystander intentions. Although effect sizes were small, when the target was a friend, bystanders tended to be more likely to act and defend the victim and less likely to reinforce the perpetrator. Implications for research and the potential for bystander education are discussed. (shrink)

The moral right to act in self-defense seems to be unproblematic: you are allowed to kill an aggressor if doing so is necessary for saving your own life. Indeed, it seems that from the moral standpoint, acting in self-defense is doing the right thing. Thanks, however, to works by George Fletcher and Judith Thomson, it is now well known how unstable the moral basis of the right to self-defense is. We are in the dark with regard to one of the (...) most basic problems raised by this right, namely: the problem of the innocent aggressor. The disturbing question is simple enough: Is a potential victim allowed to kill, in self-defense, a morally innocent aggressor? (shrink)

The goal of the present paper is to construct a formal explication of the pluralistic ignorance explanation of the bystander effect. The social dynamics leading to inaction is presented, decomposed, and modeled using dynamic epistemic logic augmented with ‘transition rules’ able to characterize agent behavior. Three agent types are defined: First Responders who intervene given belief of accident; City Dwellers, capturing ‘apathetic urban residents’ and Hesitators, who observe others when in doubt, basing subsequent decision on social proof. It is shown (...) how groups of the latter may end in a state of pluralistic ignorance leading to inaction. Sequential models for each agent type are specified, and their results compared to empirical studies. It is concluded that only the Hesitator model produces reasonable results. (shrink)

This paper integrates theoretical and methodological evaluations of the effect of group size on helping. Bystander theory includes a reward–cost model for understanding the general helping context and a more specific designation of three psychological processes that produce the bystander effect. The three processes include: diffusion of responsibility, audience inhibition, and social influence. The present analysis identifies incompatibilities between the general model and the three processes and incompatibilities between the three processes and the definition of the bystander effect. Implications of (...) these problems in the theory extend to the passive confederate design, one of the two major methods used in bystander research. This method is an attempt to test the bystander effect by manipulating social influence. But, because of a previously unrecognized disjunction between social influence and the bystander effect, we conclude that passive confederate studies do not actually test the bystander effect. (shrink)

Cyberbullying has progressively increased due to the massive use of the internet and social networks. Bystanders constitute the largest group, occupying a key role in the evolution of the cyberbullying situation and its consequences for the victim. Research shows different ways in which bystanders behave, suggesting different types of sub-roles associated with different study variables. The objective of this literature review is to identify and characterize the roles of bystanders in cyberbullying situations that involve adolescent students. To (...) achieve this objective, a systematic search was carried out in the Web of Science, PubMed, and Scopus databases for articles published between 2015 and 2020, resulting in 233 articles. Articles were then selected by relevant title and summary. Subsequently, the inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied, resulting in a total of nine articles. The findings of this review allowed us to identify two to five types of bystanders, the largest type representing outsiders and the smallest type representing assistants of the aggressor. The identified types of bystanders are characterized for variables such as sex, age, previous experience, and empathy. The results are discussed considering the available theoretical and empirical evidence. (shrink)

An increasing body of evidence indicates that the response to genotoxic agents such as radiation or drugs is a group phenomenon, rather than the summed response of individual independent cells to injury. Thus, a complex contagion-like response may spread beyond the initial impact of an agent to enlarge its effect. This indirect effect, termed “Bystander Effect,” is multifaceted and may play a significant role in the therapy of tumors and in carcinogenesis. A better understanding of this phenomenon is needed in (...) order to modulate treatment protocols to therapeutic advantage and to provide more rational guidelines for the evaluation of environmental hazards. BioEssays 22:286–290, 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Many types of human research activities present risks and burdens to third parties (e.g., bystanders). Few human protection policies directly address the protection of research bystanders, though some address it in passing. In what follows, I re‐iterate reasons why bystanders are entitled to protections. I also argue that Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are in the best position to signal to researchers and sponsors that bystanders should be protected in research. In some cases, IRB review would consist (...) of evaluating bystander protection strategies directly; in other cases, this might entail merely certifying that another institutions, like a drug regulator, has taken adequate measures to protect the welfare of research bystanders. (shrink)

We examined developmental changes in British children’s (8- to 10-year-olds) and adolescents’ (13- to 15-year-olds,N = 340; FemaleN = 171, 50.3%) indirect bystander reactions (i.e., judgments about whether to get help and from whom when witnessing social exclusion) and their social-moral reasoning regarding their reactions to social exclusion. We also explored, for the first time, how the group membership of the excluder and victim affect participants’ reactions. Participants read a hypothetical scenario in which they witnessed a peer being excluded from (...) a school club by another peer. We manipulated the group membership of the victim (either British or an immigrant) and the group membership of the excluder (either British or an immigrant). Participants’ likelihood of indirect bystander reactions decreased from childhood into adolescence. Children were more likely to get help from a teacher or an adult than getting help from a friend, whereas adolescents were more likely to get help from a friend than getting help from a teacher or an adult. For both indirect bystander reactions, children justified their likelihood of responding by referring to their trust in their teachers and friends. Adolescents were more likely to refer to group loyalty and dynamics, and psychological reasons. The findings support and extend the Social Reasoning Developmental (SRD) approach by showing the importance of group processes with age in shaping children’s judgments about how to respond indirectly by asking for help from others, when they are bystanders in a situation that involves exclusion. The findings have practical implications for combating social exclusion and promoting prosocial bystander behavior in schools. (shrink)

There is no quick and easy answer to the question whether research activities that endanger bystanders without their consent ever thereby violate those bystanders’ rights. We cannot dismiss the idea that bystanders possess strong rights against researchers simply on the grounds that they are, after all, merely bystanders. Indeed, it is easy to imagine scenarios in which researchers would be morally required to gain the informed consent of bystanders whom they risk harming. Whether bystander consent (...) is required in any particular real‐world case will depend, in part, upon exactly how the research activity endangers them. (shrink)

abstract Michael Otsuka claims that it is impermissible to kill innocent threats because doing so is morally equivalent to killing bystanders. I show that Otsuka's argument conflates killing as a means with treating a person herself as a means. The killing of a person can be a means only if that person is instrumental in the threat to Victim's life. A permission to kill a person as a means will not permit killing bystanders. I also defend a permission (...) to kill innocent threats against Otsuka's Trolley Cases. Otsuka depicts a person tied to an oncoming trolley as a bystander. I argue that such characters are threats whom Victim can permissibly kill. (shrink)

This paper develops the concept of the ‘continuum of destructiveness’ in relation to organizational corruption. This notion captures the slippery slope of wrongdoing as actors engage in increasingly dubious practices. We identify four kinds of individuals along this continuum in corrupt organizations, who range from complete innocence to total guilt. They are innocent bystanders, innocent participants, active rationalizers and guilty perpetrators. Traditional explanations of how individuals move from bystander status to guilty perpetrators usually focus on socialization and institutional factors. (...) In addition to these factors, we propose that the very distance between an act and its ethical consequences (ethical distance) may also play a determining role – if not always in the same way – in the transition process. Having developed this conceptual argument, we conclude with a discussion of managerial and research implications. (shrink)

Thomas Merton wrote extensively on spiritual and social issues, and his theories have profound implications on many areas of life. This book focuses on the significance of his reflections on work, which seek to transcend the complexities of professional life.

It has been a commonplace since the 2012 coup to hear how fragile the Malian democracy had become. Among the many causes is the political role that non-governmental organizations have played as a fourth branch of government. As deliberative democratic processes were replaced by a corrupt elite consensus during the past eight years, NGOs assumed an important place in this system. This included humanitarian NGOs. However, these same NGOs until recently were blind to the political impact they were having. This (...) essay suggests one explanation for this blindness and argues for the importance of a conception of humanitarian aid that balances moral responsibility with political responsibility. (shrink)

Cells contain a myriad of membraneless ribonucleoprotein (RNP) condensates with distinct compositions of proteins and RNAs. RNP condensates participate in different cellular activities, including RNA storage, mRNA translation or decay, stress response, etc. RNP condensates are assembled via liquid‐liquid phase separation (LLPS) driven by multivalent interactions. Transition of RNP condensates into bodies with abnormal material properties, such as solid‐like amyloid structures, is associated with the pathogenesis of various diseases. In this review, we focus on how RNAs regulate multiple aspects of (...) RNP condensates, such as dynamic assembly and/or disassembly and biophysical properties. RNA properties – including concentration, sequence, length and structure – also determine the phase behaviors of RNP condensates. RNA is also involved in specifying autophagic degradation of RNP condensates. Unraveling the role of RNA in RNPs provides novel insights into pathological accumulation of RNPs in various diseases. This new understanding can potentially be harnessed to develop therapeutic strategies. (shrink)

Political responsibilities for systemic mass violence have been subordinated to the moral guilt and legal liability of perpetrators and collaborators, while the role of the bystander has been narrowly construed in terms of charitable rescue or negligence. This dominant victim–perpetrator framework ignores the complex political dimensions of bystander responsibilities for systemic mass violence, especially those responsibilities that stem from the benefits that bystanders receive. The films of Claude Lanzmann, Rithy Panh, and Yael Hersonski contain elements of an alternative framework (...) of bystander responsibility and also can serve as catalysts for the political education of bystander beneficiaries and those from whom they have benefited. (shrink)

When research poses risks to non‐participant bystanders, it is not always practicable to obtain their consent. One approach to assessing how much research risk may be imposed on nonconsenting bystanders is to examine analogous circumstances, including risk thresholds deemed acceptable for nonconsenting research participants and for nonconsensual risks imposed outside the research setting. For nonconsenting participants, US research regulations typically limit risks to those deemed to be “minimal.” Outside the research context, US tort law tolerates a more flexible (...) “reasonable” risk threshold. This article advances a preliminary case that nonconsenting participants and nonconsenting bystanders exposed to similar research risks may be entitled to the same level of protection, but that risks generated by research may not be special in kind. Thus, limiting research risks to those that are “reasonable,” rather than demanding that they be held to the “minimal” standard, may be the best approach for both nonconsenting participants and nonconsenting bystanders. Further work is needed to establish whether the descriptive standards used to support the analogies relied on here are normatively justifiable, as well as the extent to which the minimal risk standard and the reasonable risk standard would lead to meaningfully different outcomes in practice. (shrink)

There is limited guidance on how to assess the ethical acceptability of research risks that extend beyond research participants to third parties (or “research bystanders”). Community or stakeholder engagement has been proposed as one way to address potential harms to community members, including bystanders. Despite widespread agreement on the importance of community engagement in biomedical research, this umbrella term includes many different goals and approaches, agreement on which is ethically required or recommended for a particular context. We analyse (...) the case of a potential Zika virus human challenge trial to assess whether and how community engagement can help promote the ethical acceptability of research posing risks to bystanders. We conclude that, in addition to having intrinsic value, community engagement can improve the identification of bystander risks, effective approaches to minimizing them, and transparency about bystander risks for host communities. (shrink)