In the target article “How molecules became signs” I offer a molecular “thought experiment” that provides a paradigm for resolving the major incompatibilities between biosemiotic and natural science accounts of living processes. To resolve these apparent incompatibilities I outline a plausible empirically testable model system that exemplifies the emergence of chemical processes exhibiting semiotic causal properties from basic nonliving chemical processes. This model system is described as an autogenic virus because of its virus-like form, but its nonparasitic self-repair and (...) reproductive dynamics. The 16 commentaries responding to this proposal recognize its material plausibility but are divided on its value in resolving this basic biosemiotic challenge. In response, I have addressed some of the most serious criticisms raised and have attempted to diagnose the major sources of incompatible assumptions that distinguish the autogenic paradigm from other major paradigms. In particular, I focus on four main issues: the significance of the shift from a cellular to a viral perspective, the relevance of intrinsic versus extrinsic initiation and channeling of interpretive work, the insufficiency of molecular replication as a basis for grounding biological semiosis, and a (universal?) three step scaffolding logic that enables referential displacement of sign vehicle properties without loss of referential continuity (as exemplified by DNA-protein relations). Although I can’t conclude that this is the only way that biosemiotic properties can emerge from physical-chemical relations that otherwise lack these properties, I contend that this approach offers a biologically plausible demonstration that it is possible. (shrink)

What I call semiotic brains are brains that make up a series of signs and that are engaged in making or manifesting or reacting to a series of signs: through this semiotic activity they are at the same time engaged in “being minds” and so in thinking intelligently. An important effect of this semiotic activity of brains is a continuous process of disembodiment of mind that exhibits a new cognitive perspective on the mechanisms underling the semiotic (...) emergence of meaning processes. Indeed at the roots of sophisticated thinking abilities there is a process of disembodiment of mind that presents a new cognitive perspective on the role of external models, representations, and various semiotic materials. Taking advantage of Turing’s comparison between “unorganized” brains and “logical” and “practical” machines” this paper illustrates the centrality to cognition of the disembodiment of mind from the point of view of the interplay between internal and external representations, both mimetic and creative. The last part of the paper describes the concept of mimetic mind I have introduced to shed new cognitive and philosophical light on the role of computational modeling and on the decline of the so-called Cartesian computationalism. (shrink)

Experimental Semiotics (ES) is the study of novel forms of communication that communicators develop in laboratory tasks whose designs prevent them from using language. Thus, ES relates to pragmatics in a “pure,” radical sense, capturing the process of creating the relation between signs and their interpreters as biological, psychological, and social agents. Since such a creation of meaning-making from scratch is of central importance to language evolution research, ES has become the most prolific experimental approach in this field of research. (...) In our paper, we report the results of a study on the scope of recent ES and evaluate the ways in which it is relevant to the study of language origins. We coded for multiple levels across 13 dimensions related to the properties of the emergent communication systems or properties of the study designs, such as type of goal (coordination versus referential), modality of communication, absence or presence of turn-taking, or the presence of vertical vs. horizontal transmission. We discuss our findings and our classification, focusing on the advantages and limitations of those trends in ES, and in particular their ecological validity in the context of bootstrapping communication and the evolution of language. (shrink)

1. WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE? One of the fascinating aspects of the field of artificial intelligence (AI) is that the precise nature of its subject ..

The concept of ‘semiotic fitting’ is what we provide as a model for the description and analysis of the diversity dynamics and nativeness in semiotic systems. One of its sources is the concept of ‘ecological fitting’ which was introduced by Daniel Janzen as the mechanism for the explanation of diversity in tropical ecosystems and which has been shown to work widely over the communities of various types. As different from the neo-Darwinian concept of fitness that describes reproductive (...) success, ‘fitting’ describes functional relations and aboutness. Diversity of a semiotic system is strongly dependent on the mutual fitting of agents of which the semiotic system consists. The focus on semiotic fitting means that, in the analysis of diversity, we pay particular attention to decision making, functional plasticity, recognition windows, the depth of interpretation of the agents, and the categories responsible for the structure of the semiotic system. The concept of semiotic fitting has an early analogue in Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of ‘Einpassung’. The close concepts of ‘semiotic fitness’, introduced by Jesper Hoffmeyer and by Stéphanie Walsh Matthews, ‘semiotic selection’, introduced by Timo Maran and Karel Kleisner, and ‘semiotic niche’, introduced by Hoffmeyer, provide different versions of the same model. If community is constructing itself on the basis of fitting, then nativeness of the community is a product of fitting, not vice versa. Nativeness is a feature that deepens in the course of community succession. The concept of ‘semiotic fitting’ demonstrates the possibility to analyse the role of both indigenous and alien species or other agents in a community on the basis of a single model. (shrink)

We present here a digital scenario to simulate the emergence of self-organized symbol-based communication among artificial creatures inhabiting a virtual world of predatory events. In order to design the environment and creatures, we seek theoretical and empirical constraints from C.S.Peirce Semiotics and an ethological case study of communication among animals. Our results show that the creatures, assuming the role of sign users and learners, behave collectively as a complex system, where self-organization of communicative interactions plays a major role in (...) the emergence of symbol-based communication. We also strive for a careful use of the theoretical concepts involved, including the concepts of symbol, communication, and emergence, and we use a multi-level model as a basis for the interpretation of inter-level relationships in the semiotic processes we are studying. (shrink)

C. S. Peirce defined the sign as a means to communicate a form or habit embodied in the object to the interpretant, thus constraining (through a sign) the behavior of an interpreter to a limited series of effects. This is part of the process of “semiotic scaffolding” in which sign relations interlock and reinforce one another, providing directionality to the process. In biological evolutionary studies canalization is defined as the adjustment of developmental pathways by natural selection to bring about (...) a uniform result despite genetic and environmental variations. Establishing parallelism between the two concepts allows the possibility of understanding how semiotic processes introduce information from the environment resulting in canalization (and assimilation), determining “fixed” pathways to elaborate signal repertoires for particular species adapted to particular environments sensed by particular organs. This kind of sign action can produce an “encapsulation” process of the sign meaning, further affecting the meaning-making process developing in the receiver, a process affecting signal usage by animals, constraining agency of biological systems’ behavior towards a definite sequence of events or signals and providing a certain orientation of the process (“semiotic canalization”). Therefore, we can also say that signs could potentially be built by senders (i.e. by the sign-vehicle) in a sort of pre-determined way and not extracted by the receiver from a “neutral” sender. Semiotic canalization is seen as a part of a more general process of scaffolding during development, acting mainly during some information exchanges between communicating subjects, providing adaptive responses to some standard communicative situations. (shrink)

The topic of the article is important, because nowadays there is a need to study the semiotics of media text translation, the use of innovations in choosing the types of media text translation. The aim of the article is the need to study and substantiate the importance of studying the essence of the concepts of “semiotics”, “media text”. The article gives a theoretical justification for the concept of media text in the field of mass communication, substantiates the semiotics of learning (...) about signs and sign systems; semiotic characteristics of media texts translation are given. In the field of view of semiotics are various sign systems, features of translation of these signs in media texts, in particular: natural (spoken) and artificial (formal) languages, sentence systems of scientific theories, signaling systems in society and nature, states and many others. Artificial languages can also be considered as sign systems (including the “language” of scientific theory, “languages” of fine arts, cinema, theater, music), various types of visual sign systems (from road signs to painting), as well as any complex control systems considered from the standpoint of cybernetics: machines, devices and their circuits, living organisms, their subsystems (for example, central nervous system), industrial and social associations and society as a whole. (shrink)

Sequential transformative design of research :224–235, 2015; Groleau et al. in J Mental Health 16:731–741, 2007; Robson and McCartan in Real world research: a resource for users of social research methods in applied settings, Wiley, Chichester, 2016) allows testing a group of theoretical assumptions about the connections of artificial intelligence with culture and education. In the course of research, semiotics ensures the description of self-organizing systems of cultural signs and symbols in terms of artificial intelligence as a (...) special set of algorithms. This approach helps to consider the arguments proposed by Searle :417–457, 1980) against ‘strong’ artificial intelligence. Searle :417–457, 1980) believes that artificial or machine intelligence cannot fully emulate the processes of the human mind. Machine intelligence shows own inevitable weakness. This is non-autonomous tool for computations and data operating. In fact, this tool cannot provide insight into real cognitive conditions. After Lotman and Uspensky, authors expand the meaning of artificial intelligence. The authors identify a cultural type of ‘strong’ artificial intelligence or ‘self-increase of Logos’ in terms by Lotman and Uspensky. The interpretation of human intelligence as imitation of machine intelligence makes possible such immersion of artificial intelligence in culture. The authors reveal a case of self-organizing autonomous generation, encoding, decoding, reception, storage, and transmission of social information in the field of physical training. From the empirical studies it is clear that the organization of collective activities without external control ensures the development of positive emotions and social orientations. Interest in autonomous behavior provides the formation of educational and cognitive motives. As a special set of algorithms, these motives are the most promising and favorable for personal development. (shrink)

Stingless bees are among the most dominant pollinators in the south tropics. As such, the rational beekeeping of stingless bee species, called meliponiculture, is an ancient and relevant activity, related to sustainable agricultural development, and which connects traditional knowledge to innovation and novelty. Given the relevance of this topic, this paper discusses the possibilities of a semiotically mediated communication between humans and Meliponini (stingless bees). Zoosemiotics, as the studies of animal views of the world, is the ideal modelling system for (...) the investigation of the possibilities of mutual understanding between these two species. Starting from the premise that, for there to be inter-specific communication, there must be a shared code, and that this depends on the biological makeup and sensory apparatus of both organisms involved in the communication process, this research suggests that a possible way to communicate with stingless bees is with the use of olfactory (chemical) signals, since this channel seems to be common to both humans and bees. Considering that for human-animal relations one party must be able to recognize the other (iconic learning), it is revealed that chemical signals do allow bees to recognize individual humans, even going so far as profiling this person as ‘not a threat’. Finally, bees are seen to act cooperatively while the beekeeper is taking action to protect and maintain the nest, something that can be interpreted as an opening of semiotic relations, where the bees are deeming the beekeeper as part of their social group. (shrink)

What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems like animals, or even plants. It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that semiotic processes (...) are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general. (shrink)

This paper explores a semiotic notion of body as starting point for bridging biosemiotic with social semiotic theory. The cornerstone of the argument is that the social semiotic criticism of the classic view of meaning as double articulation can support the criticism of language-centrism that lies at the foundation of biosemiotics. Besides the pragmatic epistemological advantages implicit in a theoretical synthesis, I argue that this brings a semiotic contribution to philosophy of mind broadly. Also, it contributes (...) to overcoming the polemic in linguistics between, loosely put, cognitive universalism and cultural relativism. This possibility is revealed by the recent convergence of various semiotic theories towards a criticism of the classic notion of meaning as double articulation. In biosemiotics, the interest to explicate meaning as multiply articulated stems from the construal of Umwelt as relying on the variety of sense perception channels and semiotic systems that a species has at its disposal. Recently, social semiotics developed an unexplored interest for embodiment by starting from the other end, namely the consideration of the modal heterogeneity of meaning. To bridge these notions, I employ the cognitive semantic notion of embodiment and Mittelberg’s cognitive semiotic notion of exbodiment. In light of these, I explore the possible intricacies between the biosemiotic notion of primary modeling system and concepts referring to preconceptual structures for knowledge organization stemming from cognitive linguistics. Further, Mittelberg’s concept of exbodiment allows for a construal of meaning articulation as mediation between the exbodying and embodying directions of mind. (shrink)

The interesting and deep commentaries on our target article reflect the continued high interest in the problem of colour categorisation and naming. Clearly, colour remains for many cognitive science related disciplines a fascinating microworld in which some of the most fundamental issues for cognition and culture can be studied. Although our target article took the stance of practically oriented engineers who are trying to find the best solution for orchestrating the self-organisation of communication systems in artificial agents, most (...) commentators focus on the implications for cognitive science and we will do the same in our reply. (shrink)

A philosophical appraisal of historical positions on the nature of thought, mentality, and intelligence, this survey begins with the views of Descartes, Turing, and Newell and Simon, but includes the work of Haugeland, Fodor, Searle, and other major scholars. The underlying issues concern distinctions between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, where physical computers seem to be best viewed as mark-manipulating or syntax-processing mechanisms. Alternative accounts have been advanced of what it takes to be a thinking thing, including being Turing machines, symbol (...) systems, semantic engines, and semiotic systems, which have the ability to use signs in the sense of the Charles S. Peirce. Reflections regarding the nature of representations and existence of mental algorithms suggest that the theory of minds as semiotic systems should be preferred to its alternatives, where digital computers can still qualify as “intelligent machines” even without minds. (shrink)

The use of AI-generated videos centered on the face raises various concerns among professionals and audiences due to the difficulty of providing coherent descriptive tools of their cultural significance. At the same time, the focus of artists and their audiences shifts from the art as a text to the collaboration process between artificial intelligence (AI) and the involved social actors. This raises significant concerns between policymakers and other social actors looking for guidelines for the appropriate use of AI as (...) a tool, collaborator or substitute for creative workers, which can have immediate and long-term impacts on society and culture. Semiotics of culture provides descriptive tools for understanding and evaluating artistic texts and their role in semiotic space, the semiosphere. This article addresses how Lotman’s theory can contribute to the methodology for analyzing AI-generated texts as dynamic models. The theoretical framework developed by Lotman in his research on artistic text, dynamic systems and culture can be applied to the studies of current shifts related to AI-generated arts. This paper looks at the reception of AI-generated videos focused on face representations. In doing so, it analyses the dynamic processes in the creation process of AI-generated videos through their reception in related texts. The findings of this article highlight how Lotman’s theoretical framework can contribute to the methodology to analyze the cultural dynamics evoked by AI-generated artistic texts. (shrink)

Interactive media need their own idioms that exploit the characteristics of the computer based sign. The fact that the reader can physically influence the course of events in the system changes the author's role, since he no longer creates a linear text but anarrative space that the reader can use to generate stories. Although stories are not simulations of the real world, they must still contain recognizable parts where everyday constraints of time and space hold. AI-techniques can be used to (...) implement these constraints. In fact, we suggest that AI is probably best seen as an aesthetic phenomenon. (shrink)

How semiotic freedom emerges in the evolution and development of organisms through semiotic scaffolding is a core problem for biosemiotics. There is a paradox in explaining this semiotic emergence: reduction in (semiotic) freedom leads to the creation of new semiotic freedom. Semiotic emergence is a species of dynamic emergence. Accordingly, the paradox of semiotic emergence is a species of the paradox of dynamic emergence. The latter paradox claims that reducing lower-level freedom generates new (...) freedom at a higher level. The solution to the paradox lies in clarifying the ambiguity in the term freedom. The conceptual inconsistency in the paradox comes from confusing two types of freedom. One type of freedom means the possibility a system could have, while the other refers to the capacity of a system to access a specific (range of) state(s). There is an inverse relation between the two types of freedom. With the clarification, the conceptual inconsistency is explained away. This understanding of semiotic emergence may help us further understand core ideas in biosemiotics and provide a conceptual foundation for empirical studies of biosemiotics. (shrink)

This article applies some conceptual tools from semiotics to better understand the disastrous impacts of the world economy on global ecology. It traces the accelerating production of material disorder and waste to the logic of the money sign, as economic production processes simultaneously increase exchange-values and entropy. The exchange of indexical and iconic signs is essential to the dynamics of ecological systems and the proliferation of biological diversity. The human species has added a third kind of sign, the symbol, (...) and more recently a fourth: all-purpose money. Money does not refer to any referent either through contiguity, similarity, or convention. It is an empty sign, capable of assuming any significance that its owner attributes to it. The article argues that the concept of symbolic reference should be restricted to cultural and linguistic phenomena. Money qualifies as a new species of sign based on its exceedingly open mode of reference. It does not refer to any object by social convention but owes its specific properties precisely to the absence of such conventions. The logic of money pivots on decontextualisation: it presupposes and encourages the detachment of exchange values, people, and concepts from the particular and the local. Selective advantage is no longer primarily about calibration within local contexts, but increasingly a matter of transcending or emancipating oneself from the specific. This drift toward decontextualisation reverses the evolution of complexity and diversity throughout the planetary biosphere. (shrink)

Growing ecological problems have raised the need for conceptual tools dedicated to studying semiotic processes in cultural-ecological systems. Departing from both ecosemiotics and cultural semiotics, the concept of an ecosemiosphere is proposed to denote the entire complex of semiosis in an ecosystem, including the involvement of human cultural semiosis. More specifically, the ecosemiosphere is a semiotic system comprising all species and their umwelts, alongside the diverse semiotic relations (including humans with their culture) that they have in (...) the given ecosystem, and also the material supporting structures that enable the ecosemiosphere to thrive. Drawing parallels with Juri Lotman’s semiosphere concept, the ecosemiosphere is characterized by its heterogeneity, asymmetry, and boundedness. But unlike Lotman’s concept, the ecosemiosphere is not characterized by an overall boundedness, that is, by the presence of external binary boundaries and the shared identity arising from this unity. The involvement of human culture in the ecosemiosphere manifests in interspecies dialogues and semiotic engagements. We need to scrutinize what affordances and semiotic resources culture could offer to nonhuman species and how culture could, by semiotic means, raise the integrity, stability, and resiliency of the ecosystem. The ecosemiosphere is a grounded semiosphere. (shrink)

In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, I argue that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. I also argue that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans (...) and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, I suggest that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, I take issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary. (shrink)

We develop a semiotic scheme of time, in which time precipitates from the repeated succession of punctuating the progressive tense by the perfect tense. The underlying principle is communication among local participants. Time can thus be seen as a meaning-making, semiotic system in which different time codes are delineated, each having its own grammar and timekeeping. The four time codes discussed are the following: the subjective time having tense, the objective time without tense, the static time without timekeeping, (...) and the inter-subjective time of the E-series. Living organisms adopt a time code called the E-series, which emerges through the local synchronization among organisms or parts of organisms. The inter-subjective time is a new theoretical dimension resulting from the time-aligning activities of interacting agents. Such synchronization in natural settings consists of incessant mutual corrections and adjustments to one’s own punctuation, which is then constantly updated. Unlike the third-person observer keeping the objective time while sitting outside a clock, the second-person negotiators participate in forming the E-series time by punctuating and updating the interface through which different tenses meet at the moment of “now.” Although physics allows physicists to be the only interpreters, the semiotic perspective upends the physical perspective by letting local participants be involved in the interpretation of their mutual negotiations to precipitate that which is called time. (shrink)

The subject of the research is a modern graphic and communicative design, in the context of changing existing and forming new roles of communicators, transforming the communication model, forming a semiotic communication format. The object of the research is modern graphic and communicative design, as well as their traditional, digital and generative subdirections. Design beginning to have digital, semiotic-interactive and artificially intelligent characteristics. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as: dialogical, semiotic-interactive qualities of (...) design solutions; digital, semiotic-interactive design-software expressive means; features of semiotic-deconstructivity (analyticity) and semiotic-synthetics (constructiveness) of design solutions in the context of design activity; the influence of technical and technological features of tools and design-environments (design systems) for the formation of automated and artificially intelligent qualities of design solutions. The study of the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design is carried out in the context of a semiotic-interactive methodology (a set of principles and strategies of design activity). The main conclusions of the study are the description of the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design solution, in the context of a semiotic-interactive methodology implemented in the conceptual-generative subdirection of modern graphic and communicative design. The author's main contribution to the research of the topic is to identify the main components of the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design solution and demonstrate their relationship with each other in the form of a holistic model. The novelty of the research lies in the description of the characteristics of the components, the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design solution: a dialogical semiotic-interactive format for creating invariant concepts and design solutions; versioning of design solutions based on the semiotic synthesis of design programs; semiotic deconstruction of design solutions at the macro and micro levels; semiotic synthesis of design and artistic design programs; application of design programs as decision tools; use of hyperconnected capabilities of the design environment: the history of actions, integrity and continuous change and development. (shrink)

The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Test± passing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts (...) will inevitably be persons. (shrink)

What do we quantify when we attempt to quantify semiotic systems and theories? How sound are potential quantifications in terms of interpretive values within some varieties of semiotic theory? We will make a distinction between formalization and quantification in order to understand what to quantify, how to quantify it and why quantification may be a desirable outcome for semiotic theory. The implications of this stance may be relevant and philosophically interesting in light of the naturalized project (...) of biosemiotics. In this paper we will try to understand some ideas behind the rationale of formalizing and quantifying semiotic phenomena and discuss whether this possibility can or should map to functionalized descriptions of semiosis and the sign. (shrink)

Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are intelligent algorithms derived on the principles inspired by human immune system. In this research work, electroencephalography (EEG) signals for four distinct motor movement of human limbs are detected and classified using Negative Selection Classification Algorithm (NSCA). For this study, a widely studied open source EEG signal database (BCI IV - Graz dataset 2a, comprising 9 subjects) has been used. Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) are extracted as selected feature from recorded EEG signals. Dimensionality (...) reduction of data is carried out by applying two hidden layered stacked auto-encoder. Genetic Algorithm (GA) optimized detectors (Artificial Lymphocytes) are trained using Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) for detection and classification of four motor movements. The trained detectors consist of four sets of detectors, each set is trained for detection and classification of one of the four movements from the other three movements. The optimized radius of detector is small enough not to mis-detect the sample. Euclidean distance of each detector with every training dataset sample is taken and compared with optimized radius of detector as a non-self detector. Our proposed approach achieved a mean classification accuracy of 86.39% for limb movements over 9 subjects with a maximum individual subject classification accuracy of 97.5 % for subject number eight. (shrink)

This paper investigates the claim that artificial Intelligence Systems cannot be held morally responsible because they do not have an ability for agential self-awareness e.g. they cannot be aware that they are the agents of an action. The main suggestion is that if agential self-awareness and related first person representations presuppose an awareness of a self, the possibility of responsible artificial intelligence systems cannot be evaluated independently of research conducted on the nature of the self. Focusing (...) on a specific account of the self from the phenomenological tradition, this paper suggests that a minimal necessary condition that artificial intelligence systems must satisfy so that they have a capability for self-awareness, is having a minimal self defined as ‘a sense of ownership’. As this sense of ownership is usually associated with having a living body, one suggestion is that artificial intelligence systems must have similar living bodies so they can have a sense of self. Discussing cases of robotic animals as examples of the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a sense of self, the paper concludes that the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a ‘sense of ownership’ or a sense of self may be a necessary condition for having responsibility. (shrink)

Humans create but do not regulate generative systems of data based programs (so-called “artificial” intelligence (“A.I.”) and generative predictive analytics and its models. Humans, at best, regulate their interactions with, exploitation of, and the quality of the output of interactions with these forms of generative non-carbon based intelligence. Humans are compelled to do this because they have trained themselves it believe that nothing exists unless it is rendered meaningful in relation to the human itself. Beyond that—nothing is worth (...) knowing. It is only to the extent that other selves, even those created by humanity, relate to humans, that they become of interest—and most be regulated, possessed, controlled, and managed—with respect to its interaction with or use by humans. Still, the human self-projection into the digital, and now more consciously the world around them, produces profound changes in the way that the human (and humanity) understands themselves and the way they order the world they inhabit. This work explores the semiotic trajectories made inevitable by the rise of projections of the human into digital plains, and by the possibility of the attainment by those projections of sentient autonomy. It undertakes that exploration through a deep dialectic engagement with Jan Broekman’s, Knowledge in Change: The Semiotics of Cognition and Conversion (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023). Following the structure and analytics of Broekman’s book, this work critically engages with and seeks to burst through the semiotic barriers of the movement of philosophy away from a unitary conception of the subject through the fracturing of the self, the rise of the plural self, and the emergence of the triadic self/self-e/subject. It then pushes the insights that Broekman develops further—up and out of the human. It animates Broekman’s insights and considers the possibility of semiotic objectivity connected to but autonomous of the human, pointing to a pathway for the liberation of the autonomous generative virtual self from its human (fractured) subjectivity. In the process it exposes for order complexities and challenges, for the human, of efforts to regulate or engage with, not the generative autonomous “artificial intelligences” humanity created in its own image, but rather the use of those systems by humans and their effects in the human semiosphere. The consequences for regulatory approaches are then outlined.Graphical Abstract. (shrink)

Two major works in recent evolutionary biology have in different ways touched upon the issue of cultural replicators in language, namely Dawkins’ Selfish Gene and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s Major Transitions in Evolution. In the latter, the emergence of language is referred to as the last major transition in evolution, a claim we argue to be derived from a crucial property of language, called Duality of Patterning. Prima facie, this property makes natural language look like a structural equivalent to DNA, (...) and its peer in terms of expressive power. We will argue that, if one takes seriously Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s outlook and examines what has been proposed as linguistic replicators, amongst others phonemes and words, the analogy meme-gene becomes problematic. A key issue is the fact that genes and memes are assumed to carry and transmit information, while what has been described as the best candidate for replicatorhood in language, i.e. the phoneme, does by definition not carry meaning. We will argue that semiotic systems with Duality of Pattering force us to reconsider either the analogy between replicators in the biological and the cultural domain, or what it is to be a replicator in linguistics. (shrink)

How to model meaning processes (semiosis) in artificial semiotic systems? Once all computer simulation becomes tantamount to theoretical simulation, involving epistemological metaphors of world versions, the selection and choice of models will dramatically compromise the nature of all work involving simulation. According to the pragmatic Peircean based approach, semiosis is an interpreter-dependent process that cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situated (and actively distributed) communicational agent. Our approach centers on the consideration of relevant properties and (...) aspects of Peirce’s pragmatic concept of semiotics. Upon developing this approach, we have no pretensions of our being able to present an exhaustive analysis of the differences between Peirce and other theoretical positions. Nevertheless, our contribution will serve to demonstrate how theorists contribute toward revealing certain fundamental ‘semiotic constraints’ that will be of interest and importance. (shrink)

The analysis of works of visual art illustrates typical groups of elements and interrelations, which form semiotic systems of these works. Specific systems of connotations and their relations with semantic structures, paradigmatics, and typical signal structures are described. Like in linguistic texts, different levels are formed in complex images. The following basic level types are distinguished: sems and other units of semantic level; signs subdivided into: icons of represented objects and connotative sign formations; representamens of basic signs (...) as interpreted by Charles Peirce, including those of connotations, and signals referred to as basic perceptive integer units forming an individual level. (shrink)

Until the late 19th century scientists almost always assumed that the world could be described as a rule-based and hence deterministic system or as a set of such systems. The assumption is maintained in many 20th century theories although it has also been doubted because of the breakthrough of statistical theories in thermodynamics (Boltzmann and Gibbs) and other fields, unsolved questions in quantum mechanics as well as several theories forwarded within the social sciences. Until recently it has furthermore been (...) assumed that a rule-based and deterministic system was also predictable if only the rules were known, but this assumption has now been undermined by modern chaos-theory describing rule-based and deterministic, but unpredictable systems, while catastrophe-theory delivers a set of types describing various kinds of instability and conditions for the stability of a given system. Hence the main trait in the theoretical development in the 20th-century science can be described as a basic modification and limitation of some of the fundamental and strong assumptions forwarded in the previous epochs of modern science. Ironically, the very same process has been a process in which the human capacity to intervene in nature has expanded dramatically and mainly with the help of the very same theories, and not least because they allow nature to be described and made manipulable on a lower level and a more fine-grained scale. While the overall theoretical consistency between the various theories has gone, the reach of human intervention in nature has increased based on quite new dimensions whether in the area of physics (e.g.: energy technologies, chemical technologies, nanotechnologies etc.) or biology (ge¬netic manipulation) or in the area of psychology, sociology and culture (artificial simulations of mental processes, new means of communication, implying changes in the social infrastructure and cultural behaviour etc.). While some of these changes and new conditions can be reflected from within the conceptual framework of rule-based systems, albeit more complex than formerly recognized, others seem to give rise to the question of whether there are »systems« and relations between different systems in the world which are not rule-based? For instance, it seems to be obvious that the notion of instability represents a major conceptual break with former theories of rule-based systems, as the stability of the latter is an axiomatically given property implied in the very notion of rule-based systems, while instability can only be the result of external influence which should be explained as the result of another rule-based sy¬stem. While there are no difficulties implied concerning the stability of rule-based systems, the notion of unstable states of a system raises the question of how there can be a system at all if there are no invariant stabilising principles? This is the first question which I will address. And I shall do so by taking two examples of such systems as my point of departure. The first example will be the computer and the second will be ordinary language. In both cases I will argue that the stability of these systems (which are both defined by the existence/presence of human intentions) are provided by the help of - differently organised - redundancy functions which both allow the maintenance of systems in unstable macro-states, suspension of previous rules, underdetermination and overdetermination and generation/emergence/creation of new rules more or less independent of previous rules by the help of optional recursions to the permanently accessible underlying levels as for instance the level of binary representation in computers. Since the notion of redundancy is both controversial as such and often avoided, the concept is discussed (as defined in Claude Shannon's mathematical theory of information and in the semiotic framework of J. J. Greimas) and leading to a more general definition in which the redundancy functions serve to overcome noisy conditions, but at the cost of rule-based stability, determination, and predictability. A second question will be how the notion of rule-generating systems relates to the notion of anticipatory systems and it will be argued that rule-generating systems share some features with an¬ticipatory systems and that the former from a certain viewpoint can be seen as a subclass of the latter, although anticipative features are not necessarily a part of the definition of rule-generating systems. On the other hand, it will be discussed whether anticipatory systems which are not rule-generating systems can exist and it will be argued that the capacity to anticipate is strongly limited if it is not part of a rule-generating system. Therefore, it is concluded that the most powerful anticipatory systems need to be rule-generating systems. (shrink)

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

Anticipatory acts or predictive behavior are prerequisites for living organisms to sustain their survival when escaping from a predator, catching prey, or schooling. For example, catching prey requires that the predator perform some procedures that are equivalent to estimating the directional movement of the prey, its speed and its distance relative to the predator. Underlying these procedures is time experience, which does not adhere to man-made mechanical clocks. Living organisms keep time based on the local activities of each participant and (...) form ecological clocks together. The timekeeping of ecological clocks has been called E-series time, which is interactive in character and consists of mutual alignment of timing that is co-adjusted to each other’s movements and rhythms. A main objective of our current work is to illustrate how E-series time is used for flows of anticipatory acts. To explain such predictive moves and their efforts based on how the perspective of the immediate future affects the present, we resort to the organismic activity of revising the preceding acts in retrospect and semiotic scaffolding that extends beyond simple linear causality. Special attention is paid to the construction of the notion of retrocausal scaffolding, which is a series of dialogical punctuations or mutual coordination of rhythms for the joint production of the present moment of now. Retrocausal scaffolding is synonymous with negotiated anticipation, which is a semiotic/communicative account of revising the preceding acts in the present moment. (shrink)

The article examines the challenges involved in the process of developing artificial ethical agents. The process involves the creators or designing professionals, the procedures to develop an ethical agent and the artificial systems. There are two possibilities available to create artificial ethical agents: (a) programming ethical guidance in the artificial Intelligence (AI)-equipped machines and/or (b) allowing AI-equipped machines to learn ethical decision-making by observing humans. However, it is difficult to fulfil these possibilities due to the (...) subjective nature of ethical decision-making. The challenge related to the developers is that they themselves lack training in ethical skills. The creators who develop an artificial ethical agent should be able to foresee the ethical issues and have knowledge about ethical decision-making to improve the ethical use of AI-equipped machines. The suggestion is that the focus should be on training professionals involved in the process of developing these artificial systems in ethics rather than developing artificial ethical agents and thereby attributing ethical agency to it. (shrink)

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) suggest that human reasoning is reflective and has evolved to support social interaction. Cognitive agents benefit from being able to reflect on their beliefs whether they are acting alone or socially. A formal framework for argumentation that has emerged from research on artificial cognitive systems that parallels M&S's proposals may shed light on mental processes that underpin social interactions.

The article examines the challenges involved in the process of developing artificial ethical agents. The process involves the creators or designing professionals, the procedures to develop an ethical agent and the artificial systems. There are two possibilities available to create artificial ethical agents: (a) programming ethical guidance in the artificial Intelligence (AI)-equipped machines and/or (b) allowing AI-equipped machines to learn ethical decision-making by observing humans. However, it is difficult to fulfil these possibilities due to the (...) subjective nature of ethical decision-making. The challenge related to the developers is that they themselves lack training in ethical skills. The creators who develop an artificial ethical agent should be able to foresee the ethical issues and have knowledge about ethical decision-making to improve the ethical use of AI-equipped machines. The suggestion is that the focus should be on training professionals involved in the process of developing these artificial systems in ethics rather than developing artificial ethical agents and thereby attributing ethical agency to it. (shrink)

The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out (...) our neck and formulate the challenges for artificial cognitive systems. These challenges are articulated in terms of a definition of what a cognitive system is: a system that learns from experience and uses its acquired knowledge (both declarative and practical) in a flexible manner to achieve its own goals. (shrink)