Results for 'anti-realism'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  11
    John Skorupski.I. On'anti-Realism - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 151.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Frank Hindriks.Anti-Hegelian Skepticism - 2003 - In Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller (eds.), Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 321--213.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Anti-realism and logic: truth as eternal.Neil Tennant - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Anti-realism is a doctrine about logic, language, and meaning that is based on the work of Wittgenstein and Frege. In this book, Professor Tennant clarifies and develops Dummett's arguments for anti-realism and ultimately advocates a radical reform of our logical practices.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  4. Ontological anti-realism.David J. Chalmers - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    The basic question of ontology is “What exists?”. The basic question of metaontology is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and ontological anti-realists say no. (Compare: The basic question of ethics is “What is right?”. The basic question of metaethics is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ethics? Here moral realists say yes, and moral anti-realists say no.) For example, the ontologist may ask: Do numbers exist? (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   185 citations  
  5. Moral anti-realism.Richardn D. Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  6.  72
    Medicine, anti-realism and ideology: Variation in medical genetics does not show that race is biologically real.Phila Mfundo Msimang - 2020 - SATS 20 (2):117-140.
    Lee McIntyre’s Respecting Truth chronicles the contemporary challenges regarding the relationship amongst evidence, belief formation and ideology. The discussion in his book focusses on the ‘politicisation of knowledge’ and the purportedly growing public (and sometimes academic) tendency to choose to believe what is determined by prior ideological commitments rather than what is determined by evidence-based reasoning. In considering these issues, McIntyre posits that the claim “race is a myth” is founded on a political ideology rather than on support from scientific (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. What anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics must offer.Feng Ye - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8. A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity.Heinrich Wansing - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):93-100.
    Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9.  85
    Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):53-82.
    Many metaethicists agree that as ordinary people experience morality as a realm of objective truths, we have a prima facie reason to believe that it actually is such a realm. Recently, worries have been raised about the validity of the extant psychological research on this argument’s empirical hypothesis. Our aim is to advance this research, taking these worries into account. First, we propose a new experimental design for measuring folk intuitions about moral objectivity that may serve as an inspiration for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  10. Anti-realist truth and concepts of superassertibility.Jim Edwards - 1996 - Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  11.  53
    Radical anti-realism and substructural logics.Jacques Dubucs & Mathieu Marion - 2003 - In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 235--249.
    According to the realist, the meaning of a declarative, non-indexical sentence is the condition under which it is true and the truth-condition of an undecidable sentence can obtain or fail to obtain independently of our capacity, even in principle, to recognize that it obtains or that fails to do so.1 In a series of papers, beginning with “Truth” in 1959, Michael Dummett challenged the position that the classical notion of truth-condition occupied as the central notion of a theory of meaning, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  12.  25
    Global anti-realism.James-O. Young - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47:641-647.
    DUMMETT HAS BEEN CONCERNED WITH SHOWING HOW ONE MIGHT GIVE\nAN ANTI-REALIST ACCOUNT OF RESTRICTED CLASSES OF SENTENCES.\nTHIS PAPER ARGUES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO GIVE AN\nANTI-REALIST ACCOUNT OF ALL CLASSES OF SENTENCES. THAT IS,\nIN THE CASE OF NO CLASSES OF SENTENCES DOES TRUTH TRANSCEND\nWHAT CAN BE WARRANTED. THE KEY TO GLOBAL ANTI-REALISM IS\nREPLACING DUMMETT'S EMPIRICISM WITH A COHERENTIST ACCOUNT\nOF WARRANT. THE AUTHOR POINTS OUT THAT COLIN McGINN'S\nARGUMENT AGAINST GLOBAL ANTI-REALISM FAILS.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  13. Negation, anti-realism, and the denial defence.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  14.  5
    Continental Anti-Realism: A Critique.Richard Sebold - 2014 - New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.
    Sebold provides a critique of the arguments for anti-realism in Continental philosophy, engaging specifically with Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl. Utilizing resources from both the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, it provides realist ways of reading those aspects of Continental anti-realism that are found to be problematic.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Should Anti-Realists be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism?Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):233-258.
    On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. Radical anti-realism, Wittgenstein and the length of proofs.Mathieu Marion - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):419 - 432.
    After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. Mathematical anti-realism and explanatory structure.Bruno Whittle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6203-6217.
    Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  48
    The anti-realist argument for underdetermination.Igor Douven - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):371-375.
    Typically, anti-realists argue for the underdetermination of theory by the data on the basis of the claim that each theory has empirically equivalent rivals. Leplin has recently sought to show that, whatever the truth-value of this latter claim, it cannot play any positive role in an argument for underdetermination. I argue that Leplin’s attempt fails.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  19. An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics.Otávio Bueno - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2591-2604.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  20. Anti-Realism and Modal-Epistemic Collapse: Reply to Marton.Jan Heylen - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):397-408.
    Marton ( 2019 ) argues that that it follows from the standard antirealist theory of truth, which states that truth and possible knowledge are equivalent, that knowing possibilities is equivalent to the possibility of knowing, whereas these notions should be distinct. Moreover, he argues that the usual strategies of dealing with the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability are either not able to deal with his modal-epistemic collapse result or they only do so at a high price. Against this, I argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. Phenomenology, antirealism, and the knowability paradox.James Kinkaid - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1010-1027.
    Husserl endorses ideal verificationism, the claim that there is a necessary correlation between truth and the ideal possibility of experience. This puts him in the company of semantic anti-realists like Dummett, Tennant, and Wright who endorse the knowability thesis that all truths are knowable. Unfortunately, there is a simple, seductive, and troubling argument due to Alonzo Church and Frederic Fitch that the knowability thesis collapses into the omniscience thesis that all truths are known. Phenomenologists should be worried. I assess (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Anti-realism and the epistemology of understanding.John McDowell - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 225--248.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  23.  88
    Anti-realist aporias.N. Tennant - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):825--854.
    Using a quantified propositional logic involving the operators it is known that and it is possible to know that, we formalize various interesting philosophical claims involved in the realism debate. We set out inferential rules for the epistemic modalities, ranging from ones that are obviously analytic, to ones that are epistemologically more substantive or even controversial. Then we investigate various aporias for the realism debate. These are constructively inconsistent triads of claims from our list: a claim expressing some (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  24. Anti-Realism in Metaphysics.Vera Flocke - 2019 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 358—366.
    Metaphysical anti-realism is a large and heterogeneous group of views that do not share a common thesis but only share a certain family resemblance. Views as different as mathematical nominalism—the view that numbers do not exist—, ontological relativism—the view that what exists depends on a perspective—, and modal conventionalism—-the view that modal facts are conventional—all are versions of metaphysical anti-realism. As the latter two examples suggest, relativist ideas play a starring role in many versions of metaphysical (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25.  88
    Anti-realist Semantics: the Role of Criteria.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 13:225-248.
    §I. Anti-realism of the sort which Michael Dummett has expounded takes issue with the traditional idea that an understanding of any statement is philosophically correctly analysed as involving grasp of conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Many kinds of statement to which, as we ordinarily think, we attach a clear sense would have to be represented, according to this tradition, as possessing verification-transcendent truth-conditions; if true that is to say, they would be so in virtue of circumstances (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  26. Theological Anti-Realism.John A. Keller - 2014 - Journal of Analytic Theology 2:13-42.
    An "overview article" that (a) clarifies the nature of theological anti-realism and how that thesis should be formulated, and (b) negatively assesses some of the most common arguments for being a theological anti-realist.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27.  68
    Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition.Gabriele Usberti - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):37-45.
    I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28.  42
    Moral Anti-Realism.Richard Joyce - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  29.  55
    Modern anti-realism and manufactured truth.Gerald Vision - 1988 - New York: Routledge.
    I INTRODUCTION - THE TOPIC EXPLAINED 1 GENERAL DIFFERENCES From its inception to the present, philosophy may be viewed as a series of struggles between ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  30.  62
    Disagreement, Anti-Realism about Reasons, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Brian Leiter - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    I defend an inference to the best explanation (IBE) argument for anti-realism about reasons for acting based on the history of intractable disagreement in moral philosophy. The four key premises of the argument are: 1. If there were objective reasons for action, epistemically-well-situated observers would eventually converge upon them after two thousand years; 2. Contemporary philosophers, as the beneficiaries of two thousand years of philosophy, are epistemically well-situated observers; 3. Contemporary philosophers have not converged upon reasons for action; (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31.  2
    Anti-realistic and Non-classical Theories of Analysis and Synthesis.Георгий Левин - 2021 - Philosophical Anthropology 7 (2):188-210.
    The article shows that three antirealistic theories of classical analysis and synthesis are logically possible: presentationistic, solipsistic and Kantian, but only the latter is actually being developed. Revealed its specific features and features shared with other, logically possible antirealistic theories. The correlation of the Kantian theory of analysis and synthesis of knowledge with his theory of analysis and synthesis of subjects of knowledge is analyzed. Gnoseological problems that forced Kant to assert that new knowledge is provided only by the synthesis (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?Michael Zhao - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Call "radical moral theorizing" the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral intuitions, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency, simplicity, explanatory depth, and so on. Many moral philosophers assume that radical moral theorizing does not require any particular metaethical commitments. In this paper, I argue against this assumption. The most natural justification for radical moral theorizing presupposes moral realism, broadly construed; in contrast, there may be no justification for radical (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  13
    Semantic Anti-Realism in Kant’s Antinomy Chapter.Kristoffer Willert - 2022 - Open Philosophy 5 (1):737-757.
    By considering the semantic footings of the so-called antinomies of pure reason, this article contributes to the debate about whether Kant was committed to semantic realism or anti-realism. That is, whether verification-transcendent judgements are truth-apt (realism) or not (anti-realism). Against the (empiricist) semantic principle that Strawson, and others, have ascribed to Kant as the “principle of significance,” the bedrock of my article is what I call Kant’s Real Principle of Significance: an extension-based and normative (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  76
    Anti-realist semantics.Wolfram Hinzen - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (3):281-311.
    I argue that the implementation of theDummettian program of an ``anti-realist'' semanticsrequires quite different conceptions of the technicalmeaning-theoretic terms used than those presupposed byDummett. Starting from obvious incoherences in anattempt to conceive truth conditions as assertibilityconditions, I argue that for anti-realist purposesnon-epistemic semantic notions are more usefully kept apart from epistemic ones rather than beingreduced to them. Embedding an anti-realist theory ofmeaning in Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory(ITT) takes care, however, of many notorious problemsthat have arisen in trying (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  35.  7
    Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding.John Mcdowell - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 225-248.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  36. Realism/anti-realism.Michael Devitt - 2008 - In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 224--235.
  37.  5
    Global Anti-realism: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry.Andrew Cortens - 2000 - Westview Press.
    An analysis of the realist/anti-realist debate, arguing that both positions display a similar underlying structure.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  32
    Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community.William Seager - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:181-187.
    Bas van Fraassen has presented a most vigorous argument in support of an anti-realist interpretation of science. In defence of his view he revives the seemingly moribund 'observable-unobservable' distinction, and employs it in the attempt to show that science provides no grounds for accepting, as real, entities which it itself classifies as unobservable. Traditional arguments against the observable-unobservable distinction can be reinterpreted as arguments for the reality of what is unobservable to humans. The argument is quite straightforward. We could (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. Anti-realism and speaker knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166.
    Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of verification-transcendent truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called realist semantics, which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  40.  29
    Anti-Realism and Logic.Michael Luntley - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):361.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  41. Anti-realism untouched.Joseph Melia - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):341-342.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  42.  46
    Anti-realism and Logic. Truth as Eternal.W. D. Hart & Neil Tennant - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1485.
  43.  72
    Anti-Realist Classical Logic and Realist Mathematics.Greg Restall - unknown
    I sketch an application of a semantically anti-realist understanding of the classical sequent calculus to the topic of mathematics. The result is a semantically anti-realist defence of a kind of mathematical realism. In the paper, I begin the development of the view and compare it to orthodox positions in the philosophy of mathematics.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. Anti-realism and aesthetic cognition.Ruben Berrios - unknown
    Ruben Berrios Queen’s University Belfast Anti-realism and Aesthetic Cognition Abstract At the core of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the relation between scientific theory and the world. The realist possesses a mimetic conception of the relation between theory and reality. For the realist, scientific theories represent reality. The anti-realist, in contrast, seeks to understand the relations between theory and world in non-mimetic terms. We will examine Cartwright’s simulacrum account (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Should a historically motivated anti-realist be a Stanfordite?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2019 - Synthese 196:535-551.
    Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific version of this view, based on the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, Stanford’s challenge cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism, namely: superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and superseded theories that were not the result of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46.  81
    Global anti-realism.James O. Young - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):641-647.
  47.  9
    AntiRealism about the Past.Fabrice Pataut - 2008 - In Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 190–198.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Realism vs. Antirealism in the Semantics of Mathematical Language Antirealism about the Empirical Realm and, in Particular, about the Past Historical Significance and Historical Insignificance Generality and Holistic Explanations The Objectivity of Historiography Conclusion Bibliography Further Reading.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  55
    Deconstruction, AntiRealism and Philosophy of Science—an interview with Christopher Norris.Christopher Norris & Marianna Papastephanou - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 36 (2):265-289.
    In this interview, Christopher Norris discusses a wide range of issues having to do with postmodernism, deconstruction and other controversial topics of debate within present–day philosophy and critical theory. More specifically he challenges the view of deconstruction as just another offshoot of the broader postmodernist trend in cultural studies and the social sciences. Norris puts the case for deconstruction as continuing the ‘unfinished project of modernity’ and—in particular—for Derrida’s work as sustaining the values of enlightened critical reason in various spheres (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. Anti-Realism and Anti-Revisionism in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics.Anderson Nakano - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):451-474.
    Since the publication of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein’s interpreters have endeavored to reconcile his general constructivist/anti-realist attitude towards mathematics with his confessed anti-revisionary philosophy. In this article, the author revisits the issue and presents a solution. The basic idea consists in exploring the fact that the so-called “non-constructive results” could be interpreted so that they do not appear non-constructive at all. The author substantiates this solution by showing how the translation of mathematical results, given (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  77
    Coherence, anti-realism and the vienna circle.James O. Young - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):467 - 482.
    Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted in believing. If so, truth cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000