Anti-exceptionalists about formal logic think that logic is continuous with the sciences. Many philosophers of science think that there is feminist science. Putting these together: can anti-exceptionalism make space for feminist logic? The answer depends on the details of the ways logic is like science and the ways science can be feminist. This paper wades into these details, examines five different approaches, and ultimately argues that anti-exceptionalism makes space for feminist logic in several different ways.

Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues (...) about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson uses an anti-exceptionalist argument to defend classical logic, while Priest claims that his anti-exceptionalism supports nonclassical logic. This paper argues that the disagreement is due to a difference in how the parties understand logical theories. Once we reject Williamson’s deflationary account of logical theories, the argument for classical logic is undercut. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the thesis that logic is not special. In this paper, I consider, and reject, a challenge to this thesis. According to this challenge, there are basic logical principles, and part of what makes such principles basic is that they are epistemically exceptional. Thus, according to this challenge, the existence of basic logical principles provides reason to reject anti-exceptionalism about logic. I argue that this challenge fails, and that the exceptionalist positions motivated by (...) it are thus unfounded. I make this case by disambiguating two senses of ‘basic’ and showing that, once this disambiguation is taken into account, the best reason we have for thinking that there are basic principles actually implies that those principles do not require a special epistemology. Consequently, the existence of basic logical principles provides reason to accept, rather than reject, anti-exceptionalism concerning the epistemology of logic. I conclude by explaining how an abductivist, anti-exceptionalist approach to the epistemology of logic can accommodate the notion of basic logical principles. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the doctrine that logic does not require its own epistemology, for its methods are continuous with those of science. Although most recently urged by Williamson, the idea goes back at least to Lakatos, who wanted to adapt Popper's falsicationism and extend it not only to mathematics but to logic as well. But one needs to be careful here to distinguish the empirical from the a posteriori. Lakatos coined the term 'quasi-empirical' `for the counterinstances to (...) putative mathematical and logical theses. Mathematics and logic may both be a posteriori, but it does not follow that they are empirical. Indeed, as Williamson has demonstrated, what counts as empirical knowledge, and the role of experience in acquiring knowledge, are both unclear. Moreover, knowledge, even of necessary truths, is fallible. Nonetheless, logical consequence holds in virtue of the meaning of the logical terms, just as consequence in general holds in virtue of the meanings of the concepts involved; and so logic is both analytic and necessary. In this respect, it is exceptional. But its methodologyand its epistemology are the same as those of mathematics and science in being fallibilist, and counterexamples to seemingly analytic truths are as likely as those in any scientic endeavour. What is needed is a new account of the evidential basis of knowledge, one which is, perhaps surprisingly, found in Aristotle. (shrink)

While anti-exceptionalism about logic is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences. Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the rejection of (...) certain traditional properties of logic. The picture that results is not of one singular position, but rather a cluster of often connected positions with distinct motivations, understood in terms of their rejection of clusters of the various traditional properties. In order to show the fruitfulness of this new conception of AEL, we distinguish between two prominent versions of the position, metaphysical and epistemological AEL, and show how the two positions need not stand or fall together. (shrink)

Logical anti‐exceptionalism is the view that logic is not special, it is continuous with science. This continuity is typically understood in terms of the use of the abductive method in logical theory choice, with logical knowledge resulting from our choice of the theory best accounting for the data. In this paper, we argue for two related claims: (i) that this understanding of the continuity between logic and science faces considerable challenges; and (ii) that such challenges may be avoided (...) by elaborating the continuity of logic with science in terms of the “logic‐as‐models” approach. More specifically, we defend that logical theories should be seen in the lights of the “models‐as‐epistemic‐tools” approach, an approach to the nature of models in empirical science more closely connected with current scientific practice. The result is a version of logical anti‐exceptionalism opening new perspectives for the philosophical understanding of logic. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} (...) \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

The debate between exceptionalists and anti-exceptionalists about logic is often framed as concerning whether the justification of logical theories is a priori or a posteriori (for short: whether logic is a priori or a posteriori). As we substantiate (S1), this framing more deeply encodes the usual anti-exceptionalist thesis that logical theories, like scientific theories, are abductively justified, coupled with the common supposition that abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference, in the sense that the epistemic value of (...) abduction is (and, indeed, must be) a posteriori. In past work, however, we have argued that this common supposition is incorrect: abduction is an a priori mode of inference, in the sense that the epistemic value of abduction is (and indeed, must be) a priori (Biggs and Wilson 2017a, 2017b, 2019). After sketching our two main argumentative strategies for this conclusion (S2), we go on (S3) to consider its import on the proper understanding of anti-exceptionalism about logic. (shrink)

Introduction to this special issue of The Australasian Journal of Logic.

According to methodological anti-exceptionalism, logic follows a scientific methodology. There has been some discussion about which methodology logic has. Authors such as Priest, Hjortland and Williamson have argued that logic can be characterized by an abductive methodology. We choose the logical theory that behaves better under a set of epistemic criteria. In this paper, I analyze some important discussions in the philosophy of logic, and I show that they presuppose different methodologies, involving different notions of evidence and different (...) epistemic values. I argue that, rather than having a specific methodology such as abductivism, logic can be characterized by methodological pluralism. This position can also be seen as the application of scientific pluralism to the realm of logic. (shrink)

Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic, the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL’s prominent claims is that logic’s methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amounts to, and the challenges that arise in providing an account of explanations (...) in logic. This paper clarifies these challenges, and shows how the practice-based approach is best placed to meet them. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logical theories to be continuous with scientific theories. Scientific theories are subject to criteria of theoretical equivalence. This article compares two types of theoretical equivalence – one syntactic and one semantic – in the context of logical anti-exceptionalism, and argues that the syntactic approach leads to undesirable consequences. The anti-exceptionalist should therefore take a semantic approach when evaluating whether logical theories, understood as scientific theories, are equivalent. This article argues for a (...) particular semantic approach, in terms of categorical equivalence, to determine whether logical theories are equivalent. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the (...) damage the Adoption Problem causes for anti-exceptionalism, and show that it is also problematic for exceptionalist positions too. My diagnosis of why the Adoption Problem affects both positions is that the self-governance of basic logical rules of inference prevents them from being adoptable, regardless of whether logic is exceptional or not. (shrink)

In this paper we put forward and defend a view of the nature of logic that we call moderate anti-exceptionalism. In the first part of the paper we focus on the problem of genuine logical validity and consequence. We make use of examples from current debates to show that attempts to pinpoint the one and only authentic logic inevitably either yield irrefutable theories or lead to dead ends. We then outline a thoroughly naturalist account of logical consequence as (...) grounded in rules implicit in human linguistic practices. We insist that there are only two existing kinds of language: natural languages, and artificial languages that have been forged by us. There is thus no room for a "genuine" language and hence for "genuine" logic. We conclude that though logical theories are established—and are liable to criticism—in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over our argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special. Logical theory is not meant to provide just an explanation, the standards it establishes serve also as a tool, providing for a reinforcement of our rational communication. (shrink)

I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I argue that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent on the agent’s situation and change depending on what that situation is like. (Bradley 2019). Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those (...) concerning what epistemic rationality requires, have the special property of being ‘fixed points’—it is impossible to have total evidence that supports false belief about them. (Smithies 2012; Titelbaum 2015). Each of these kinds of exceptionality permits a solution to downstream theoretical problems that arise from the possibility of evidence supporting false belief about requirements of rationality. However, as I argue here, they incur heavy explanatory burdens that we should avoid. (shrink)

Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is (...) our intuitions about the validity of inferences. In order to make sense of this claim, I will appeal to the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti. I will then pose a problem for Priest’s anti-exceptionalism. Finally, I will suggest a way out of the problem for Priest. Whether or not he accepts my solution, I will let him decide. (shrink)

_ doi:10.1093/analys/anx072 _, published: 27 June 2017.

I briefly rehearse the positive conception of philosophy in my book The Philosophy of Philosophy, as an introduction to the symposium on it that follows.

This paper aims at disentangling two distinct problems in present philosophy of logic: the a priori/a posteriori divide and the theory choice problem. A confusion of these problems is present in the heart of current anti-exceptionalism about logic, as the use of a posteriori methods is identified with theory choice. We illustrate how the division may be preserved in a version of anti-exceptionalism by discussing Carnap’s approach, which had both an a priori epistemology and a pragmatic (...) account of logical theory choice. This contributes to illuminate the claim that the current understanding is mistaken in considering Carnap as an exceptionalist, and it also helps us to address one of the difficulties of current anti-exceptionalism, to know, that, by equating a posteriori with theory choice, it requires appeal to framework-independent facts. We suggest that the pragmatic account of both Quine and Carnap to theory choice was advanced precisely to avoid that kind of difficulty. (shrink)

Problems of logical theory choice are current being widely dis- cussed in the context of anti-exceptionalist views on logic. According to those views, logic is not a special science among others, so, in particular, the methodology for theory choice should be the same in logic as for other scientific disciplines. Richard Routley advanced one such methodology which meshes well with anti-exceptionalism, and argued that it leads one to choosing one single logic, which is a kind of ultralogic. (...) We argue that the choice for only one correct system of logic may be rejected on the basis of the methodology proposed by Routley and, furthermore, that taking anti-exceptionalism about logic seriously recommends that a pluralist view of logic should be accepted. We call this view “full-blooded anti-exceptionalism”, and the resulting view on logic, lacking a proper name, “local pluralism”. (shrink)

This paper critically examines logical instrumentalism as it has been put forth recently in the anti-exceptionalism about logic debate. I will argue that if one wishes to uphold the claim that logic is significantly similar to science, as the anti-exceptionalists have it, then logical instrumentalism cannot be what previous authors have taken it to be. The reason for this, I will argue, is that as the position currently stands, first, it reduces to a trivial claim about the (...) instrumental value of logical systems, and second, by its denial that logic aims to account for extra-systemic phenomena it significantly differs from science, in contrast with the AEL agenda. I will conclude by proposing a different kind of logical instrumentalism that I take to have a broad appeal, but especially for anti-exceptionalists, for it is developed as analogous to—and thus much closer aligned with—scientific instrumentalism. (shrink)

Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world), make trouble for both this commitment and the closely related commitment to theories being closed under (...) logical consequence. I provide three arguments. The first two show that anti-exceptionalism about logic provides an epistemic challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims; the third shows that logical realism provides a metaphysical challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims. Along the way, I show that there are important methodological upshots for metaphysicians and philosophers of logic. In particular, there are lessons to be drawn about certain conceptions of naturalism as constraining the possibilities for metaphysics and the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked (...) in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science. (shrink)

In the first part of the dissertation, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. (...) I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways. (shrink)

The end of the constitutional right to abortion with Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health stands to generate massive conflict between abortion regulation and the First Amendment. Abortion exceptionalism within constitutional doctrine -- which both treats abortion differently than other areas and favors anti-abortion over pro-choice viewpoints -- will not retreat but advance, unless confronted by the courts.

Animals are at work everywhere in education, yet existing nowhere: Education doesn’t know them beyond their instrumental use value; as animals-for-us (Pedersen, 2019a, p. 7; Wallin, 2014, p. 149; c...

Although former Yugoslavia constituted what was widely held to be the most "promising" communist country in terms of potentials for economic reform and political democratization, Serbia remained the only East European country in which the former communist elite managed to defeat its opponents in a series of elections and preserve important elements of institutional and ideological continuity with the old system. Moreover, its regime played a conspicuous role in Yugoslavia's violent collapse. In the specialist literature, the "Serbian exceptionalism" thesis (...) has been elaborated in a number of forms. These are critically reviewed in the first part of the paper, classifying the paradigms according to whether they emphasize: 1) Serbian traditionalist, authoritarian, and collectivist political culture, 2) the affinity between traditional Serbian national populism, Russophile anti-Westernism, and communism, 3) the exclusivist and assimilating character of Serbian nationalism, or 4) the appeals of the contemporary Serbian political elite led by S. Milosevic. In the second part of the paper an alternative explanation is presented that seeks to be both interpretively adequate and causally plausible. It rests on five basic factors: 1) historical legacy ; 2) institutional analysis ; 3) ideology ; 4) leadership and social base ; and 5) the role of the Diaspora.. Iako se pre 1990. smatralo da bivsa Jugoslavija medju svim komunistickim zemljama ima najbolje potencijale za ekonomsku reformu i politicku demokratizaciju, Srbija je ostala jedina istocnoevropska zemlja u kojoj je nekadasnjoj komunistickoj eliti poslo za rukom da porazi svoje protivnike u nekoliko uzastopnih izbornih nadmetanja i da ocuva znacajne elemente institucionalnog i ideoloskog kontinuiteta sa starim sistemom. Stavise, taj je rezim igrao krupnu ulogu u nasilnom raspadu SFRJ. U specijalistickoj literaturi, teza o "srpskoj izuzetnosti" razvijana je u razlicitim formama, cijem kritickom razmatranju je posvecen prvi deo rada. Identifikovano je nekoliko paradigmi, u zavisnosti od toga da li osnovni naglasak stavljaju na: 1) tradicionalisticku, autoritarnu i kolektivisticku politicku kulturu Srba, 2) afinitet izmedju tradicionalnog srpskog nacionalnog populizma, rusofilskog antizapadnjastva i komunizma, 3) ekskluzivisticku i asimilacionisticku prirodu srpskog nacionalizma, ili pak 4) odlike savremene srpske politicke elite na celu sa S. Milosevicem. U drugom delu rada izlozio je alternativno objasnjenje, ciji su glavni oslonci: 1) istorijsko nasledje, 2) institucionalna analiza, 3) ideologija, 4) osobine vodja i drustvena baza i 5) uloga dijaspore.. (shrink)

ResumoApresentam-se alguns conceitos fundamentais e posições representativas referentes a três debates correntesna filosofia da lógica, a saber aquele acerca da natureza da relação de consequência, o que versasobre o problema do pluralismo lógico (e sua alternativa fundamental, o monismo) e o que gira em tornoda chamada proposta anti-excepcionalista, que nega o caráter excepcional da lógica e a põe numa relaçãode continuidade essencial com as demais ciências, de modo a evidenciar pontos de conexão entre as trêsdiscussões mencionadas. Levanta-se, por fim, (...) a questão da plausibilidade da posição, presentementeminoritária, de um anti-excepcionalismo pluralista, vinculando-a, por sua vez, à aceitação de algumavariedade de pluralismo científico.Palavras-chave: consequência lógica; pluralismo lógico; anti-excepcionalismo lógico.AbstractSome fundamental concepts are presented, along with the theses relative to three current debates in thephilosophy of logic, namely the one concerning the nature of the relation of logical consequence, the oneover the problem of logical pluralism (and its fundemental alternative, monism), and the one around theso-called anti-exceptionalist proposal, which denies logic’s exceptional character and puts it in a relationof essential continuity with the remaining sciences, so as to highlight the points of connection betweenthe three aforementioned discussions. The question is raised, finally, of the plausibility of the position,presently of small currency, of a pluralist anti-exceptionalism, which is associated, in its turn, to the acceptanceof some variety of scientific pluralism. (shrink)

The war against Iraq unleashed in March 2003 spawned an attempt to silence the protest movement by accusing it of anti‐Americanism. This essay argues that the theory according to which right‐wing anti‐Americanism and left‐wing anti‐Americanism coincide is a myth. A new issue appears now, a paradox that characterizes the United States, where democracy developed within the white community concomitantly with the enslavement of blacks and the deportation of American Indians. In the American “Herrenvolk democracy,” a line of (...) demarcation between whites and people of color fosters the development of relations based on equality within the white community. Furthermore, U.S. history is marked by the fundamentalist tendency to transform the Judeo‐Christian tradition into a sort of national religion that consecrates the exceptionalism of the American people and the sacred mission with which they are entrusted (“Manifest Destiny”). Europe is unable thoroughly to comprehend the American mixture of religious and moral fervor, on the one hand, and overt pursuit of political, economic, and military world domination, on the other. But it is this mixture, or rather this explosive combination, this peculiar fundamentalism, that constitutes the greatest threat to world peace today. (shrink)

20 years since the negotiation of the Palermo Protocol on Trafficking in 2000, the anti-trafficking field has gone from an early, almost exclusive preoccupation with sex work to addressing extreme exploitation in a range of labour sectors. While this might suggest a reduced focus on the nature of the work performed and a greater focus on the conditions under which it is performed, in reality, anti-trafficking discourse remains in the grip of polarised positions on sex work even as (...) the carceral effects of anti-trafficking law become evident and the Swedish model of criminalising the purchase of sexual services spreads. In this article, I demonstrate how despite the recent discursive shifts to ‘modern slavery’ and ‘forced labour’, the anti-trafficking transnational legal order itself reinforces, rather than diffuses cultures of sex work exceptionalism. The growing international sex workers’ movement has offered resistance, yet a closer look at the movement and the widespread support that it has garnered for decriminalisation from international organisations, while valuable, helps reveal the greatest cost yet of anti-trafficking discourse, namely, the inability of the sex workers’ movement to produce a sophisticated theory of regulation to reduce levels of exploitation within sex work, one which is commensurate with the informality and heterogeneity of sex markets the world over. Finally, to the extent that neoabolitionist projects derive legitimacy from interventions abroad, especially in the global South, I chronicle the edifice on which it rests in one such context, namely India, to demonstrate how countries in the global South are not merely conduits for the global North’s preoccupation with moral gentrification through neo-abolitionism, but rather, that the circuits of global governmentality while influential, are highly contingent, thus producing opportunities for creative forms of mobilisation by sex workers. (shrink)

‘Feminist logic’ may sound like an impossible, incoherent, or irrelevant project, but it is none of these. We begin by delineating three categories into which projects in feminist logic might fall: philosophical logic, philosophy of logic, and pedagogy. We then defuse two distinct objections to the very idea of feminist logic: the irrelevance argument and the independence argument. Having done so, we turn to a particular kind of project in feminist philosophy of logic: Valerie Plumwood's feminist argument for a relevance (...) logic. Plumwood's work serves as our primary case study as we turn to the project of considering three different ways we might understand her argument and revisionist arguments like it: as a priori theorizing, as ameliorative conceptual engineering, or as instances of anti-exceptionalist approaches to logic. After arguing that the anti-exceptionalist approach seems to provide the most promising means of understanding the kind of project undertaken in a feminist challenge to classical logic, we briefly address the consequences that this might have for logic instruction. Here, we argue for the perhaps unexpected conclusion that feminist programs ought to offer more, not less, instruction in logic for those who take interest. (shrink)

I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of logical theories. Essentially, (...) the problem is that a pair of logics may each evaluate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between logical options. The piecemeal approach offers a way out of this problem andthereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I go on to show that reflective equilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep problems of its own when applied to logic. (shrink)

This book explores various connections of John Stuart Mill's thought to ancient Greek philosophy primarily in relation to his conception of happiness. It argues that a better understanding of Mill's background in ancient Greek thought and his reading(s) of Plato's dialogues leads to innovative interpretations of his moral and political thought.

The rise and fall of the historian of British India -- A classical education -- History, philosophy, and history -- Induction and deduction -- Rational persuasion -- Good government.

I investigate syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence between logical theories and a recent objection thereto. I show that this recent criticism of syntactic accounts, as extensionally inadequate, is unwarranted by developing an account which is plausibly extensionally adequate and more philosophically motivated. This is important for recent anti-exceptionalist treatments of logic since syntactic accounts require less theoretical baggage than semantic accounts.

Summary John Stuart Mill's classic tale of disillusionment from a ‘narrow creed’, an overt as much as a covert theme of his Autobiography (London, 1873), has for many years served as a guide to the search for the causes and sources of his ‘enlargement-of-the-utilitarian-creed’ project. As a result, in analyses of Mill's mature views, Samuel Taylor Coleridge—and friends—commonly take centre stage in terms of influence, whereas John's father—James Mill—is reduced either to a supernumerary or a villain in the last act (...) of John's intellectual development. However, students of Mill's works should not take at face value the story presented in Autobiography. Mill's own emphasis on the role of his ‘new influences’ has led scholars to disregard the role of his ‘old influences’ in his attempt to create a broader theory of living—one which takes into account both the intellectual and the emotional capacities of individuals. A close look at key aspects of John Stuart Mill's ‘enlargement project’ suggests that James Mill may have played a more positive role than is usually acknowledged. A way into the intellectual affinity of the two Mills is the person they both kept returning to for guidance and inspiration throughout their lives: Plato. (shrink)

The article views the development of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school from the analysis of texts to the study of spatial entities (semiosphere being most well known of them). It comes to light that ‘culture’ and ‘space’ have been such notions in Tartu–Moscow School to which, for instance, the ‘semiosphere’ does not add much. There are studied possibilities to join Uexküll’s and Lotman’s basic concepts (as certain grounds of Estonian semiotics) with Tartu–Moscow School’s treatment of culture and space through the notion (...) of ‘semiotic subject’. Such an approach allows to see transdisciplinarity, which has come to issue only during the last decade, already in the first conceptions of Tartu–Moscow School where transdisciplinarity revealed itself in the symbiotic use of ‘culture’ and ‘space’. (shrink)

It seems that eudaimonistic reconstructions of John Stuart Mill's conception of happiness have fallen prey to what they thought Mill should have done with regard to the role of pleasure in his notion of happiness. Insisting that utility and eudaimonia make conflicting claims, something which mirrors Mill's ‘conflicting loyalties’, they downgrade pleasure to just one of the ingredients of happiness. However, a closer look at Mill's intellectual development suggests otherwise. By focusing on Mill's radical background, this paper argues that pleasure (...) retains a central role in his conception of happiness – even from a eudaimonistic point of view. (shrink)