We obtain an almost everywhere quantifier elimination for (the noncritical fragment of) the logic with probability quantifiers, introduced by the first author in [10]. This logic has quantifiers like $\exists ^{ \ge 3/4} y$ which says that "for at least 3/4 of all y". These results improve upon the 0-1 law for a fragment of this logic obtained by Knyazev [11]. Our improvements are: 1. We deal with the quantifier $\exists ^{ \ge r} y$ , where y is (...) a tuple of variables. 2. We remove the closedness restriction, which requires that the variables in y occur in all atomic subformulas of the quantifier scope. 3. Instead of the unbiased measure where each model with universe n has the same probability, we work with any measure generated by independent atomic probabilities pR for each predicate symbol R. 4. We extend the results to parametric classes of finite models (for example, the classes of bipartite graphs, undirected graphs, and oriented graphs). 5. We extend the results to a natural (noncritical) fragment of the infinitary logic with probability quantifiers. 6. We allow each pR , as well as each r in the probability quantifier $(\exists ^{ \ge r} y)$ , to depend on the size of the universe. (shrink)

We introduce a new framework for classifying logics on finite structures and studying their expressive power. This framework is based on the concept of almost everywhere equivalence of logics, that is to say, two logics having the same expressive power on a class of asymptotic measure 1. More precisely, if L, L ′ are two logics and μ is an asymptotic measure on finite structures, then $\scr{L}\equiv _{\text{a.e.}}\scr{L}^{\prime}(\mu)$ means that there is a class C of finite structures with μ (C)=1 (...) and such that L and L ′ define the same queries on C. We carry out a systematic investigation of $\equiv _{\text{a.e.}}$ with respect to the uniform measure and analyze the $\equiv _{\text{a.e.}}$ -equivalence classes of several logics that have been studied extensively in finite model theory. Moreover, we explore connections with descriptive complexity theory and examine the status of certain classical results of model theory in the context of this new framework. (shrink)

We give an axiomatization of first‐order logic enriched with the almost‐everywhere quantifier over finitely additive measures. Using an adapted version of the consistency property adequate for dealing with this generalized quantifier, we show that such a logic is both strongly complete and enjoys Craig interpolation, relying on a (countable) model existence theorem. We also discuss possible extensions of these results to the almost‐everywhere quantifier over countably additive measures.

Let ω be the set of natural numbers. For functions f, g: ω → ω, we say f is dominated by g if f < g for all but finitely many n ∈ ω. We consider the standard “fair coin” probability measure on the space 2ω of in-finite sequences of 0's and 1's. A Turing oracle B is said to be almost everywhere dominating if, for measure 1 many X ∈ 2ω, each function which is Turing computable from X is (...) dominated by some function which is Turing computable from B. Dobrinen and Simpson have shown that the almost everywhere domination property and some of its variant properties are closely related to the reverse mathematics of measure theory. In this paper we exposit some recent results of Kjos-Hanssen, Kjos-Hanssen/Miller/Solomon, and others concerning LR-reducibility and almost everywhere domination. We also prove the following new result: If B is almost everywhere dominating, then B is superhigh, i. e., 0″ is truth-table computable from B ′, the Turing jump of B. (shrink)

A Turing degree a is said to be almost everywhere dominating if, for almost all $X \in 2^{\omega}$ with respect to the "fair coin" probability measure on $2^{\omega}$ , and for all g: $\omega \rightarrow \omega$ Turing reducible to X, there exists f: $\omega \rightarrow \omega$ of Turing degree a which dominates g. We study the problem of characterizing the almost everywhere dominating Turing degrees and other, similarly defined classes of Turing degrees. We relate this problem to some questions in (...) the reverse mathematics of measure theory. (shrink)

We explore the interaction between Lebesgue measure and dominating functions. We show, via both a priority construction and a forcing construction, that there is a function of incomplete degree that dominates almost all degrees. This answers a question of Dobrinen and Simpson, who showed that such functions are related to the proof-theoretic strength of the regularity of Lebesgue measure for Gδ sets. Our constructions essentially settle the reverse mathematical classification of this principle.

We examine the concept of almost everywhere domination from the viewpoint of mass problems. Let AED and MLR be the sets of reals which are almost everywhere dominating and Martin-Löf random, respectively. Let b1, b2, and b3 be the degrees of unsolvability of the mass problems associated with AED, MLR × AED, and MLR ∩ AED, respectively. Let [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w be the lattice of degrees of unsolvability of mass problems associated with nonempty Π01 subsets of 2ω. Let 1 (...) and 0 be the top and bottom elements of [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w. We show that inf, inf, and inf belong to [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w and 0 < inf < inf < inf < 1. Under the natural embedding of the recursively enumerable Turing degrees into [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w, we show that inf and inf but not inf are comparable with some recursively enumerable Turing degrees other than 0 and 0′. In order to make this paper more self-contained, we exposit the proofs of some recent theorems due to Hirschfeldt, Miller, Nies, and Stephan. (shrink)

We prove that PTIME generalized quantifiers are closed under Boolean operations, iteration, cumulation and resumption. -/- .

Although first-order Kripke semantics has become a well established branch of modal logic, very little - almost nothing - is written about logics with a weaker modal fragment. We try to help the situation by isolating principles determining the interaction between quantifiers and modalities in minimal semantics. First, we let the standard-model properties of monotonic and anti-monotonic domains clue us in on how to do this – i. e. we try to articulate, in terms of the inclusiveness of the domains (...) of a certain set of worlds, a set of semantical restrictions that will validate the Barcan and converse Barcan formulae respectively. As it turns out, this can indeed by done, but only by adding assumptions strong enough to make the models virtually normal. Since the whole point of switching to a minimal framework would be to generalise the logic, we therefore abandon the worlds-objects thinking altogether, and switch to a much simpler and more direct validation strategy in which the propositions we are after are simply picked out as such. (shrink)

Animals, like humans, experience different levels of well-being depending on decisions made by others. As a result, the well-being of animals must be included in any full accounting of the well-being consequences of decisions. However, this is almost never done in large-scale policy and investment analyses, even though it is common to quantify the consequences for human welfare in these decision analyses. This is partly due to prejudice, but increasingly also because we do not currently have good methods for quantifying (...) animal well-being consequences and putting them on the same scale as quantified human well-being consequences. We might call this ‘the problem of interspecies comparisons.’ This important barrier to including animal well-being in decision-making is the result of an insufficiently developed theory and practice of animal well-being and its relation to human well-being. This chapter explains the problem of interspecies comparisons, explains recent research that develops methods to overcome this problem. (shrink)

Incredible discoveries from the fringes of the universe to the inner workings of our mindsÑall from nothing! It turns out that almost nothing is as curiousÑor as enlighteningÑas, well, nothing. What is nothingness? Where can it be found? The writers of the world's top-selling science magazine investigateÑfrom the big bang, dark energy, and the void to superconductors, vestigial organs, hypnosis, and the placebo effectÑand discover that understanding nothing may be the key to understanding everything: What came before the big bang, (...) and will our universe end? How might cooling matter down almost to absolute zero help solve our energy crisis? How can someone suffer from a false diagnosis as though it were true? Does nothingness even exist? Recent experiments suggest that squeezing a perfect vacuum somehow creates light. Why is it unfair to accuse slothsÑanimals who do nothingÑof being lazy? And more! Contributors Paul Davies, Jo Marchant, and Ian Stewart, along with two former editors of Nature and 16 other leading writers and scientists, marshal up-to-the-minute research to make one of the most perplexing realms in science dazzlingly clear. Prepare to be amazed at how much more there is to nothing than you ever realized. (shrink)

I am attracted to ontological pluralism, the doctrine that some things exist in a different way than other things.1 For the ontological pluralist, there is more to learn about an object’s existential status than merely whether it is or is not: there is still the question of how that entity exists. By contrast, according to the ontological monist, either something is or it isn’t, and that’s all there is say about a thing’s existential status. We appear to be to be (...) ontological committed to what I will call almost nothings. Examples of almost nothings include holes, cracks, and shadows; almost nothings thrive in the absence of ‘positive’ entities such as donuts, walls, and sunlight. Let’s focus on holes, since the literature on them is voluminous.2 We quantify over holes, and even count them: we say, for example, that there are some holes in the cheese, seven to be precise. We ascribe features to them and talk as though they stand in relations: that hole is three feet wide, much wider than that tire over there. Holes apparently persist through time, as evidenced by the fact that my sweater has the same hole in it as the last time you saw me wear it. We even talk as though holes are causally efficacious: my ankle was badly sprained because I stepped in that hole in the sidewalk.3 It seems then that we believe in holes. If our beliefs are true, holes must enjoy some kind of reality. This puts the ontological monist in an uncomfortable position. According to her, everything that there is enjoys the same kind of reality, which is the kind of reality enjoyed by full-fledged concrete entities such as ourselves. She is committed to the unpleasant claim that holes are just as real as concretia, a claim that is apt to be met with incredulous stares by those not acquainted with contemporary metaphysics. Roy Sorensen (2008, p. 19) notes the tension almost nothings generate for ontological monists: ‘… it feels paradoxical to say that absences exist—but no better to say that absences do not exist’.. (shrink)

Consider syllogisms in which fraction (percentage) quantifiers are permitted in addition to universal and particular quantificrs, and then include further quantifiers which are modifications of such fractions (such as "almost ½ the S are P" and "Much more than ½ the S are P"). Could a syllogistic system containing such additional categorical forms be coherent? Thompson's attempt (1986) to give rules for determining validity of such syllogisms has failed; cf. Carnes & Peterson (forthcoming) for proofs of the unsoundness and incompleteness (...) of Thompson's rules. Building on Peterson (1985), the coherence of such a syllogistic can, however, be demonstrated with an algebra which provides its semantics; e.g., "almost ¾ the S arc P'" is represented as " -(3(SP) » SP)". (shrink)

The following result is an approximation to the answer of the question of Kokorin about decidability of a quantifier-free theory of field of rational numbers. Let Q0 be a subset of the set of all rational numbers which contains integers 1 and −1. Let be a set containing Q0 and closed by the functions of addition, subtraction and multiplication. For example coincides with Q0 if Q0 is the set of all binary rational numbers or the set of all decimal (...) rational numbers. It is clear that , where Z is the set of all integers and Q is the set of all rational numbers. A negationless theory uses only conjunction and disjunction as logical connectives. Let T be a quantifier-free negationless elementary theory of signature , where Pol is the list of all polynomials with rational coefficients from Q0 in which exponent of the polynomials and rational coefficients are written in binary number system. Theorem 1. Theory T is NP-hard and if is everywhere dense then the theory T is decidable by an algorithm which belongs to EXPTIME. The set of all rational numbers or the set of all binary rational numbers may be taken instead of . The quantifier-free negationless theory of the field of rational numbers may be regarded as a base of constructive mathematics. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide an overview of some of the results obtained in the mathematical theory of intermediate quantifiers that is part of fuzzy natural logic. We briefly introduce the mathematical formal system used, the general definition of intermediate quantifiers and define three specific ones, namely, “Almost all”, “Most” and “Many”. Using tools developed in FNL, we present a list of valid intermediate syllogisms and analyze a generalized 5-square of opposition.

Some arguments use ‘generic’, or ‘typical’, objects. An explanation for this idea in terms of ‘almost all’ is suggested. The intuition of ‘almost all’ as ‘but for a few exceptions’ is rendered precise by means of ultrafilters. A logical system, with generalized quantifiers for ‘almost all’, is proposed as a basis for generic reasoning. This logic is monotonic, has a simple sound and complete deductive calculus, and is a conservative extension of classical first-order logic, with which it shares several properties. (...) For generic reasoning, generic individuals are introduced and internalized as generic constants, thereby producing conservative extensions where one can reason about generic objects as intended. A many-sorted version of this logic is introduced to handle distinct notions of ‘large’ subsets. Other possible applications for this logic are indicated. (shrink)

We discuss the question of Ralf-Dieter Schindler whether for infinite time Turing machines Pf = NPf can be true for any function f from the reals into ω1. We show that “almost everywhere” the answer is negative.

This study aimed to develop a valid and reliable performance analysis template for quantifying team action variables in elite men’s wheelchair basketball. First action variables and operational definitions were identified by the authors and verified by an expert panel of wheelchair basketball coaching staff in order to establish expert validity. A total of 109 action variable were then placed into 17 agreed Categorical Predictor Variable categories. The action variables were then used to develop a computerized performance analysis template for post-event (...) analysis. Each possession (n = 200) from an international men’s wheelchair basketball game was analyzed by the first author on two occasions for assessment of intra-observer reliability and by a coach and a performance analyst for inter-observer reliability. Percentage error and Weighted Kappa coefficients were calculated to compare the levels of error and agreement for each action variable. Intra-observer reliability demonstrated perfect or almost perfect agreement (. (shrink)

John Broome argues that fairness requires that claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength. Broome holds that, when distributing indivisible goods, fairness requires the use of weighted lotteries as a surrogate to satisfy proportionally each candidate's claims. In this article, we present two arguments against Broome's account of fairness. First, we argue that it is almost impossible to calculate the weights of the lotteries in accordance with the requirements of fairness. Second, we argue that Broome rules out those methods (...) whose use might provide some resolution to this problem. From these arguments, we conclude that, contra Broome, fairness does not require the proportional satisfaction of claims. (shrink)

Almost everywhere throughout the Majority World, that is Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Middle East and North Africa, Christianity used to be called the ‘white-man's religion’. But that is the case no more—the church has exploded all over the MW. In this paper I would like to look at this shift in Christianity worldwide, and what implications it has for the global church, and especially for us in Asia. My purpose here is not to highlight the weaknesses of the Western (...) church and to glorify the growth of the churches in the MW. Rather my hope is that this will help us have a clearer understanding of the challenges before us so that we can labor more fruitfully for the advance of the gospel in the Asian context. In the process I will also raise questions which hopefully will help point the way forward. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

We study some aspects of the emergence of _lógos_ from _xáos_ on a basal model of the universe using methods and techniques from algorithmic information and Ramsey theories. Thereby an intrinsic and unusual mixture of meaningful and spurious, emerging laws surfaces. The spurious, emergent laws abound, they can be found almost everywhere. In accord with the ancient Greek theogony one could say that _lógos_, the Gods and the laws of the universe, originate from “the void,„ or from _xáos_, a picture (...) which supports the unresolvable/irreducible lawless hypothesis. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the “laws„ discovered in science correspond merely to syntactical correlations, are local and not universal. (shrink)

There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost (...) everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice. (shrink)

Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of humanuniversals to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. Ifthe same social norms are found in culture after culture, we have goodreason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this paper Ipropose an alternative explanation for the existence of humanuniversals, which does not depend on them being the product of inbuiltpsychological adaptations. Following the work of Brian Skyrms, I suggestthat if a particular convention possesses even a very small advantageover (...) competitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we shouldexpect it to become the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages aretranslated into very large basins of attraction, in the language of gametheory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence for innatepsychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence ofuniversals is consistent with the so-called Standard Social ScienceModel, I turn to a consideration of the evidence, to show that thisstyle of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation, atleast with regard to patterns of gender inequality. (shrink)

Whereas Eichenberger advocates better policies by deregulation of politics, politicians and political scientists in Western Europe are quite satisfied with Western democracies and their performance. This satisfaction is based on neglecting the insights from ‘Public Choice’ theorizing as well as on negating the coming pension crisis in ageing societies. Including Eichenberger’s ideas there are now five schools of thought about how to improve Western democracies: more direct democracy, strengthening market-preserving federalism, less law and fewer lawyers, exploiting international rivalries for limiting (...) government and, now, dismantling the protection from foreign competition which elected representatives enjoy almost everywhere in the West. (shrink)

How do we reconcile Husserl’s repeated criticism of Mach’s phenomenalism almost everywhere in his work with the leading role that Husserl seems to attribute to Mach in the genesis of his own phenomenology? To answer this question, we shall examine, first, the narrow relation that Husserl establishes between his phenomenological method and Mach’s descriptivism. Second, we shall examine two aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Mach: the first concerns phenomenalism and Mach’s doctrine of elements, while the second concerns the principle of (...) economy of thought, which Husserl closely associates with a form of psychologism in his Logical Investigations . Our working hypothesis is that the apparent contradictory comments of Husserl regarding Mach’s positivism can be partially explained by the double status he confers to his own phenomenology—as a philosophical program radically opposed to positivism, and as a method akin to Mach’s descriptivism. (shrink)

In this article, we develop tame topology over dp-minimal structures equipped with definable uniformities satisfying certain assumptions. Our assumptions are enough to ensure that definable sets are tame: there is a good notion of dimension on definable sets, definable functions are almost everywhere continuous, and definable sets are finite unions of graphs of definable continuous “multivalued functions.” This generalizes known statements about weakly o-minimal, C-minimal, and P-minimal theories.

Evidence-based medicine, with its evidence hierarchies and emphasis on RCTs, meta-analyses and systematic reviews, sets the model for evidence-based policy almost everywhere, policing no exception. But how closely should policing follow this model? We argue that RCTs can tell you little about what you need to know for real-world practice: will this policy work where and when you implement it? Defending that it will do so takes good theory. For RCTs to play a role in theory development, they must be (...) set into a larger body of knowledge, including local knowledge about the sites of implementation. Unfortunately the standard EBM model generally ignores the other kinds of knowledge needed. An alternative model for evidence-based policing, similar to that of the new movement for ‘EBM+’ and immanent in the practice of realist synthesis, focuses on the arguments that proposed policing policies will work where and when they are implemented and looks for the evidence needed to support those arguments. (shrink)

If X is set and L a lattice, then an L-subset or fuzzy subset of X is any map from X to L, [11]. In this paper we extend some notions of recursivity theory to fuzzy set theory, in particular we define and examine the concept of almost decidability for L-subsets. Moreover, we examine the relationship between imprecision and decidability. Namely, we prove that there exist infinitely indeterminate L-subsets with no more precise decidable versions and classical subsets whose unique shaded (...) decidable versions are the L-subsets almost-everywhere indeterminate. (shrink)

We explore the relationship between analytic behavior of a computable real valued function and the computability-theoretic complexity of the individual values of its derivative almost-everywhere. Given a computable function f, the values of its derivative \\), where they are defined, are uniformly computable from \, the Turing jump of the input. It is known that when f is \, the values of \\) are actually computable from x. We construct a \ function f so that, almost everywhere, \\ge _T x'\). (...) Although the values \\) at each point x cannot uniformly compute the corresponding jumps \ of the inputs x almost everywhere for any \ function f, we produce an example of a \ function f such that \\ge _T \emptyset '\) uniformly on subsets of arbitrarily large measure, effectively. We also explore analogous questions for weaker smoothness conditions, such as for f differentiable everywhere, and f differentiable almost everywhere. (shrink)

We present the unification of Riemann–Cartan–Weyl (RCW) space-time geometries and random generalized Brownian motions. These are metric compatible connections (albeit the metric can be trivially euclidean) which have a propagating trace-torsion 1-form, whose metric conjugate describes the average motion interaction term. Thus, the universality of torsion fields is proved through the universality of Brownian motions. We extend this approach to give a random symplectic theory on phase-space. We present as a case study of this approach, the invariant Navier–Stokes equations for (...) viscous fluids, and the kinematic dynamo equation of magnetohydrodynamics. We give analytical random representations for these equations. We discuss briefly the relation between them and the Reynolds approach to turbulence. We discuss the role of the Cartan classical development method and the random extension of it as the method to generate these generalized Brownian motions, as well as the key to construct finite-dimensional almost everywhere smooth approximations of the random representations of these equations, the random symplectic theory, and the random Poincaré–Cartan invariants associated to it. We discuss the role of autoparallels of the RCW connections as providing polygonal smooth almost everywhere realizations of the random representations. (shrink)

I argue for an account of semantic paradox that requires minimal logical revision. I first consider a phenomenon that is common to the paradoxes of definability, Russell’s paradox and the Liar. The phenomenon—which I call Repetition—is this: given a paradoxical expression, we can go on to produce a semantically unproblematic expression composed of the very same words. I argue that Kripke’s and Field’s theories of truth make heavy weather of Repetition, and suggest a simpler contextual account. I go on to (...) outline a ‘singularity’ theory of semantical predicates in the spirit of remarks of Gödel. According to this theory, ‘denotes’, ‘extension’ and ‘true’ are context-sensitive expression that apply almost everywhere on a given occasion of use, except for certain singular points. I then turn to revenge paradoxes, and argue that even the dialetheist is subject to revenge. I then examine how the singularity theory responds to revenge. (shrink)

Plato's Individuals is rich and rewarding. McCabe's reading will compel us to examine anew the presuppositions we bring to the enterprise of understanding Plato. Her devotion to showing that her thesis is found almost everywhere in the corpus is noteworthy. At times she also seems to strain to assimilate modern and Platonic concerns. If one can accept that Plato's tripartite soul goes over into something we might recognize as the problem of personal identity, it can only be because we are (...) writing off his devotion to reincarnation and transmigration. It is, however, McCabe's novel and energetic defense of individuation that deserves closest scrutiny. Here charges of anachronism and projection will be heard. (shrink)

Understanding how citizens create contexts for open-ended political conversation in everyday life is an important task for social research. The lack of theoretical attention to political conversation in the current renaissance of studies of "civil society" and "the public sphere "precludes a thoroughly social understanding of civic life. Participant-ob- servation in U.S. recreational, volunteer, and activist groups shows how the very act of speaking itself comes to mean different things in different civic contexts. It shows dramatic contextual shifts-the more public (...) the context, the less public-spirited the discourse. Institutions encouraged groups to avoid public, political conversation. One group challenged the dominant etiquette for citizenship; the others considered talking politics "out of place" almost everywhere. The ways groups relate to public speech itself are themselves meaningful; the concept of "civic practices" highlights how groups develop not just the power to make a particular political program public, but the power to make the public itse. (shrink)

The Jordan decomposition theorem states that every function $f \colon \, [0,1] \to \mathbb {R}$ of bounded variation can be written as the difference of two non-decreasing functions. Combining this fact with a result of Lebesgue, every function of bounded variation is differentiable almost everywhere in the sense of Lebesgue measure. We analyze the strength of these theorems in the setting of reverse mathematics. Over $\mathsf {RCA}_{0}$, a stronger version of Jordan’s result where all functions are continuous is equivalent to (...) $\mathsf {ACA}_0$, while the version stated is equivalent to ${\textsf {WKL}}_{0}$. The result that every function on $[0,1]$ of bounded variation is almost everywhere differentiable is equivalent to ${\textsf {WWKL}}_{0}$. To state this equivalence in a meaningful way, we develop a theory of Martin–Löf randomness over $\mathsf {RCA}_0$. (shrink)

Anyone who does not simply refuse to perceive decline will hasten to claim a special justification for his own personal existence, his activity and involvement in this chaos. There are as many exceptions for one's own sphere of action, place of residence, and moment of time as there are insights into the general failure. A blind determination to save the prestige of personal existence—rather than, through impartial disdain for its impotence and entanglement, at least to detach it from the background (...) of universal delusion—is triumphing almost everywhere. That is why the air is so thick with life theories and world views, and why in this country they cut so presumptuous a figure, for almost always they finally serve... (shrink)

In Joeri Schrijvers’ (2016) book, Between Faith and Belief, Schrijvers discusses various answers to a deceptively simple and yet complex question: what can be said for religious faith “at the end of metaphysics”? Although Schrijvers engages a variety of thinkers in the elaboration of his thesis, he takes particular interest in Ludwig Binswanger, a Swiss existential psychologist, whose contemporaries include Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Buber. Although Schrijvers does not discuss it in his manuscript, it is important to note (...) that Binswanger was heavily influenced by the existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. This influence is particularly apparent in Binswanger’s understanding of the transcendental nature of human love. Demonstrating the degree to which Binswanger draws on Kierkegaard, Elisabetta Basso writes, “What is undeniable, in any event, is the fact that Kierkegaard is almost everywhere present in Binswanger’s work” (Basso 2011 p. 35). Anyone familiar with Kierkegaard’s authorship should also be able to see his ideas shining through Binswanger’s work; but what are as interesting as their similarities are their divergences. (shrink)

Understanding how citizens create contexts for open-ended political conversation in everyday life is an important task for social research. The lack of theoretical attention to political conversation in the current renaissance of studies of "civil society" and "the public sphere "precludes a thoroughly social understanding of civic life. Participant-observation in U. S. recreational, volunteer, and activist groups shows how the very act of speaking itself comes to mean different things in different civic contexts. It shows dramatic contextual shifts-the more public (...) the context, the less public-spirited the discourse. Institutions encouraged groups to avoid public, political conversation. One group challenged the dominant etiquette for citizenship; the others considered talking politics "out of place " almost everywhere. The ways groups relate to public speech itself are themselves meaningful; the concept of "civic practices" highlights how groups develop not just the power to make a particular political program public, but the power to make the public itself. (shrink)

Elekes proved that any infinite-fold cover of a σ-finite measure space by a sequence of measurable sets has a subsequence with the same property such that the set of indices of this subsequence has density zero. Applying this theorem he gave a new proof for the random-indestructibility of the density zero ideal. He asked about other variants of this theorem concerning I-almost everywhere infinite-fold covers of Polish spaces where I is a σ-ideal on the space and the set of indices (...) of the required subsequence should be in a fixed ideal ${{\mathcal{J}}}$ on ω. We introduce the notion of the ${{\mathcal{J}}}$ -covering property of a pair ${({\mathcal{A}}, I)}$ where ${{\mathcal{A}}}$ is a σ-algebra on a set X and ${{I \subseteq \mathcal{P}(X)}}$ is an ideal. We present some counterexamples, discuss the category case and the Fubini product of the null ideal ${\mathcal{N}}$ and the meager ideal ${\mathcal{M}}$ . We investigate connections between this property and forcing-indestructibility of ideals. We show that the family of all Borel ideals ${{\mathcal{J}}}$ on ω such that ${\mathcal{M}}$ has the ${{\mathcal{J}}}$ -covering property consists exactly of non weak Q-ideals. We also study the existence of smallest elements, with respect to Katětov–Blass order, in the family of those ideals ${\mathcal{J}}$ on ω such that ${\mathcal{N}}$ or ${\mathcal{M}}$ has the ${\mathcal{J}}$ -covering property. Furthermore, we prove a general result about the cases when the covering property “strongly” fails. (shrink)

The two authors of this paper have diametrically opposed views of the prevalence and strength of adaptation in nature. Hendry believes that adaptation can be seen almost everywhere and that evidence for it is overwhelming and ubiquitous. Gonzalez believes that adaptation is uncommon and that evidence for it is ambiguous at best. Neither author is certifiable to the knowledge of the other, leaving each to wonder where the other has his head buried. Extensive argument has revealed that each author thinks (...) his own view is amply supported by both theory and empirical evidence. Further reflection has revealed that the differences in opinion may start with the different disciplines in which we work: evolutionary ecology for Hendry and community ecology for Gonzalez. In the present paper, we each present devastating evidence supporting our own position and thus refuting that of the other. We then identify the critical differences that led to such opposing views. We close by combining our two perspectives into a common framework based on the adaptive landscape, and thereby suggest means by which to assess the prevalence and strength of adaptation. (shrink)

We present a faithful axiomatization of von Mises' notion of a random sequence, using an abstract independence relation. A byproduct is a quantifier elimination theorem for Friedman's "almost all" quantifier in terms of this independence relation.